http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/services/Feed ${session.getAttribute("locale")} 5 http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:19394 5 page(s) 2012-05-28T03:34:11.494Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:9036 16 page(s) 2012-01-13T01:51:37.618Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:16532 Why is recognition of such an importance for humans? Why should lack of recognition motivate people to fight or work for recognition? In this article, I first discuss shortly Axel Honneth's somewhat psychologizing strategy for answering these questions, and suggest that the psychological harms of lack of recognition pointed out by Honneth are neither sufficient nor necessary for motivation to fight or work for recognition to arise. According to the alternative that I then spell out, recognition and lack of it are so intimately intertwined with some of the most fundamental and intuitively appealing facts about what it is to be a person in a full-fledged sense — arguably in any culture — that there are reasons to be optimistic about a more or less universal existence of latent motivation to fight or work for more or more equal recognition. 2011-12-21T05:00:17.680Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:16019 24 page(s) 2011-11-18T19:20:44.798Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:8106 2011-10-28T07:00:08.572Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:14422 65 pages(s) 2011-08-09T12:01:47.628Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:14423 21 pages(s) 2011-08-09T12:01:38.448Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:14424 398 page(s) 2011-08-09T12:01:28.871Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:13682 The concept of recognition (Anerkennung in German) has been in the center of intensive interest and debate for some time in social and political philosophy, as well as in Hegel-scholarship. The first part of the article clarifies conceptually what recognition in the relevant sense arguably is. The second part explores one possible route for arguing that the 'recognitive attitudes' of respect and love have a necessary role in the coming about of the psychological capacities distinctive of persons. More exactly, it explores the possibility that they are necessary in the kind of intersubjective relationship in which normal human infants engage in the pre-linguistic communicative practice of pointing things to others, as described by Michael Tomasello. If an incapacity to participate in the already Gricean communicative practices of pointing makes it also impossible for the infant to learn symbolic communication, and if without the immediately intrinsically motivating other-regarding attitudes of recognition communicative pointing does not get off the ground (at least among the most intelligent animals currently known to exist), then the capacity for recognition may be a decisive difference between humans and their closest non-human relatives. That is, it may be why only human infants, but no other animals, are capable of embarking on a developmental journey that normally leads to full-fledged psychological personhood. If this is so, then the concept of recognition, today mostly discussed in social and political philosophy and Hegel-studies, could turn out to be a very useful tool in cognitive scientific work interested in specifically human forms of social intentionality, cognition, volition and so forth. 2011-06-20T03:50:15.101Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:13514 24 page(s) 2011-06-07T08:31:01.046Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:10015 24 page(s) 2010-10-21T03:41:26.253Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:9340 25 page(s) 2010-09-02T06:00:27.794Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:8743 21 page(s) 2010-06-23T15:30:08.698Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:8321 2010-05-26T08:11:12.256Z ]]> http://www.researchonline.mq.edu.au/vital/access/manager/Repository/mq:8041 In this article a wide range of candidates for features that are defining of personhood are conceived of as interrelated, yet irreducible, layers and dimensions of what it is to be a person in the full-fledged sense of the word. Three layers of personhood -- consisting of person-making psychological capacities, person-making interpersonal significances, and person-making institutional or deontic powers -- are distinguished. Running through the layers there are then two dimensions -- the deontic and the axiological -- corresponding to the recognitive attitudes of respect and love. These recognitive attitudes of 'taking something/-one as a person' are responses to the psychological layer and directly constitutive of the interpersonal layer of the respective dimensions of personhood. The multiplicity of ways to understand what 'personhood' means is only apparently chaotic and reveals, on a closer look, a well-ordered and dynamic internal structure. 2010-05-06T01:50:38.239Z ]]>