From North Africa to Byzantium and to New England:
Augustine, Maximus and Jonathan Edwards on the meaning and shape of Christian Salvation

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Thesis Summary

Three theologians from different localities, traditions and centuries are surprisingly similar in their theological and spiritual emphases. Augustine and Maximus have much in common with the eighteenth-century Reformed Protestant theologian, Jonathan Edwards. The common thread that draws these theologians together is found in their theology of the will and the affections, and in the manner in which their soteriological anthropology engaged with the patristic doctrine of deification. Each developed a theology of the will and the affections, which communicated intentionality (in that Christians through grace were capable of reforming and transforming their life), and which was framed by and climaxed in their notions of deification. The doctrine can be seen to function in the soteriological anthropology of each theologian to allow eschatology to inform the issue of Christian ethics and morality in the Christian’s present life. One result is that Christian issues of ethics and morality become a theocentric concern, not an anthropocentric one, demarcating Christian moral theory from secular and philosophical moral theory. With regard to Edwards, this can be seen to be the reason why the doctrine appealed to him in his eighteenth-century Enlightenment context. He perceived as false the ever growing rationalism in Reformed Protestant thinking, which, by imposing a dichotomy between knowledge and reason on the one hand and experience and practice on the other, creates a tension which continues to impact theological thinking today.
Acknowledgements

In the undertaking of this thesis I hold much gratitude to my supervisors Associate Professor Stuart Piggin (founding Director of the Centre for the History of Christian Thought and Experience, Department of Ancient History, Macquarie University) and Dr Ken Parry (Department of Ancient History, Macquarie University). I thank them for not only their support and guidance throughout the duration of this project but for their faith in me to undertake such a thesis of great magnitude, scope and breadth to completion. Although I researched in a few libraries I would like to especially thank the librarians of the St Andrew’s Greek Orthodox Theological College, (corner Cleveland Street & Regent Street, Redfern) Mr Chris Harvey and Ms Zorka Simich for their welcome and personal assistance every time I ventured into their workplace. Finally, I particularly thank my friends from Australia and the United Kingdom who carried the thesis and me in prayer, especially at the very end.

Irene Petrou

Sydney, Australia.

Declaration Statement

The thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly authored works that I have included in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of research I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree candidature and does not include work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright holder(s) of that material.
Author’s Note on the English Translation

Unless otherwise stated and referenced in the footnotes, I have freely adopted and adapted existing translations noted in the Primary Source Bibliography. I have on the whole based my quotations from Augustine on the Latin text and Maximus from the Greek text. So as to add clarity to meaning that can be lost in English translation, I have on occasion felt it necessary to insert square bracketed phrases in the body of the translation, which do not necessarily appear in the original language text.
Abstract

From North Africa to Byzantium and to New England:

Augustine, Maximus and Jonathan Edwards on the meaning and shape of Christian Salvation.

Irene Petrou, Macquarie University

The fourth-century Latin theologian, Augustine of Hippo, and the seventh-century Byzantine theologian, Maximus the Confessor, two of the early church’s greatest theologians, are claimed respectively by the western and eastern church traditions. Both, however, are surprisingly similar in their theological thought despite their disparate theological provenances and the two centuries that separated them. Maximus spent twenty years exiled in Carthage, North Africa, yet there is no evidence in his works that he knew of Augustine’s theological thought. Even more surprising is that these two early theologians have much in common with the eighteenth-century reformed Protestant theologian, Jonathan Edwards, who is claimed by today’s Protestant evangelical tradition.

The basis of this commonality can be traced to how their orthodoxy caused each to deal with issues of human self-determinism arising within their respective historical contexts. The controversies faced by each theologian struck at the heart of what he had understood to be an indisputable teaching in his inherited Christian dogmatic tradition. This was essentially the view that because sin had compromised human nature, humans were incapable of achieving perfection and determining their own salvation without Christ’s mediation and the work of grace. The common thread drawing these theologians together is that each developed a theology of the will and the affections, which communicated intentionality (in that Christians through grace were capable of reforming and transforming their life), and which was framed by and climaxed in their notions of deification.

Each theologian’s adaptation insists on the inseparability of Christ’s work on the cross and Christ’s divine spiritual origins, which also belong to the Christian because of their spiritual adoption. Although the Greek word θεωσις (theosis) has from its inception been a difficult word to define technically, the doctrine takes its meaning from the full implications of the incarnation’s salvific work for both the Christian and the world. The ways in which all three theologians engaged with the
doctrine show that the doctrine is informed by a broad spectrum of soteriological themes shaped by the doctrines of the incarnation and the Trinity. The end result is the communication of a robust view of the Christian’s salvation, because the doctrine takes on its meaning not only from Christ’s redemption, but also from his resurrection. In the soteriological anthropology of each theologian the incarnation’s salvific work has spiritually refashioned human nature, so that the Christian’s identity cannot only be said to lie in Christ as the model of ‘true humanity’, but in a far more realistic sense. This realistic sense is presented by each theologian in their portraits of the Spirit-filled Christian as God’s image and instrument in the world. A key feature of the doctrine also lies in its ability to give meaning to a robust view of the Christian life, which points to, and is informed and given meaning by, the Christian’s eschatological future. This eschatological future has been established and sealed for the Christian by Christ’s salvific work, and it simultaneously bears on the Christian’s current life.

The doctrine can be seen to function in the soteriological anthropology of each theologian to allow eschatology to inform the issue of Christian ethics and morality in the Christian’s present life. One result is that Christian issues of ethics and morality become a theocentric concern, not an anthropocentric one, which demarcates Christian moral theory from secular and philosophical moral theory. Hence, the value of the doctrine can be seen to lie in its application for all matters spiritual that pertain to the Christian life. In the soteriological anthropology of each theologian the doctrine works to account for both the spiritual and earthly concerns of the Christian life without negation of the other, and importantly without enforcing a dichotomy between the spiritual and earthly realms of the Christian life. With regard to Edwards, this can be seen to be the reason why the doctrine appealed to him in his eighteenth-century Enlightenment context. He perceived the ever growing rationalism in Reformed Protestant thinking, which had imposed a dichotomy between knowledge and reason, and experience and practice, to be a false one.
**List of Abbreviations**

**Works of Augustine**

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<tr>
<td>c. Acad.</td>
<td>Against the Academics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Fort.</td>
<td>Against Fortunatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Jul.</td>
<td>Against Julian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civ. Dei</td>
<td>City of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conf.</td>
<td>Confessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>div. qu.</td>
<td>On Eighty-Three Different Questions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dolbeau</td>
<td>The Dolbeau Sermons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>duab. an.</td>
<td>On the Two Souls, Against the Manichees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>en. Ps.</td>
<td>Explanations of the Psalms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ench.</td>
<td>Enchiridion (Faith, Hope and Love)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ep.</td>
<td>Letters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. et symb.</td>
<td>On Faith and the Creed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gest. Pel.</td>
<td>On the Deeds of Pelagius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gn. adv. Man.</td>
<td>On Genesis Against the Manichees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gn. litt.</td>
<td>Literal Commentary on Genesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gn. litt. imp.</td>
<td>Unfinished Literal Commentary on Genesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lib. arb.</td>
<td>On Free Will</td>
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<tr>
<td>mor.</td>
<td>On the Catholic and the Manichean Ways of Life</td>
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<tr>
<td>mus.</td>
<td>On Music</td>
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<tr>
<td>nat. et gr.</td>
<td>On Nature and Grace</td>
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<tr>
<td>nupt. et conc.</td>
<td>On Marriage and Concupiscence</td>
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<td>ord.</td>
<td>On Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>pecc. mer.</td>
<td>On the Merits and Forgiveness of Sins and on Infant Baptism</td>
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<tr>
<td>quant.</td>
<td>On the Greatness of the Soul</td>
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<td>retr.</td>
<td>Retractions</td>
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<td>s.</td>
<td>Sermons</td>
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<td>s. Dom. mon.</td>
<td>On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount</td>
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<td>Simpl.</td>
<td>To Simplicianus</td>
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<td>sol.</td>
<td>The Soliloquies</td>
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trin.  On the Trinity
vera. rel.  On True Religion

Works of Maximus

Ad. Thal.  Questions to Thalassius
Amb.  Ambigua
CC.  The Four Hundred Centuries on Love
CK.  The Centuries on Knowledge
Ep.  Letters
LA.  The Ascetic Life
Myst.  Mystagogia
Opusc.  Opusculum
Or. Dom.  Commentary on the Lord’s Prayer
Pyrrh.  The Disputation with Pyrrhus
QD.  Questions and Doubts

Series

CCL  Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina (Turnhout: Brepols, 1953-)
CCSG  Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca (Turnhout: Brepols, 1953-)
FC  L. Schopp, R. J. Defarrari et al. (eds), The Fathers of the Church (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1947-)

Introduction

But their minds were made dull, for to this day the same veil remains when the old covenant is read. It has not been removed, because only in Christ is it taken away. Even to this day when Moses is read, a veil covers their hearts. But whenever anyone turns to the Lord, the veil is taken away. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. And we, who with unveiled faces all reflect the Lord’s glory, are being transformed into his likeness with ever-increasing glory, which comes from the Lord, who is the Spirit. (2 Cor. 3:14-18)

1. An Elusive Doctrine and Three Theologians

Three theologians from different localities, traditions and centuries are remarkably similar in their theologies in a most surprising way. The fourth-century Latin theologian Augustine of Hippo and the seventh-century Byzantine theologian Maximus the Confessor are two of the early church’s greatest theologians. Augustine, claimed by western church tradition, and Maximus, claimed by the eastern tradition, are surprisingly similar in their theological thought despite their disparate theological provenances and the two centuries that separated them. Although Maximus spent twenty years exiled in Carthage, North Africa, there is no evidence in his works that he knew of Augustine’s theological thought. Yet, despite the different traditions that lay claim to them, Augustine and Maximus also have much in common with the eighteenth-century Reformed Protestant theologian, Jonathan Edwards.

The common thread that draws these theologians together not only lies in their theology of the will and the affections, but in how their soteriological anthropology engaged with the patristic

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1 Quotation is from The Holy Bible- New International Version (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001).
2 The patristic period generally refers to the post-New Testament development of Christianity from the second century onwards. Traditionally historians have divided the Church Fathers into two traditions, the Greek and the Latin, a division based on language of writing, as well as on geography. For example, the cities of Antioch and Alexandria as Greek speaking cities are classified as eastern and Carthage and Rome, as Latin speaking cities, are classified as western. The patristic period was initially thought to have run from the end of the first century to 451, the date of the Council of Chalcedon, but in recent years this dating has been challenged. There is now a consensus in patristic scholarship that at the very least, the period closed in the seventh century in the west with Isidore of Seville (c. 560-636) and in the east in the eighth century with John of Damascus (c.675/676-749). Today, this distinction has also come under challenge because it does not account for the Arab, oriental and later Greek-speaking theologians who are also claimed to be Fathers of the church in their respective traditions. See K. Parry (ed.), The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Patristics (Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming 2015).
doctrine of deification. Their theology on the will and the affections cannot only be seen to be framed by the doctrine of deification, but can also be seen to climax in it. Moreover, although there is a consensus that the eastern Fathers engaged with this soteriological doctrine, this has not been the case with reference to the Latin Fathers. It is only in recent times that a discussion has begun with reference to Augustine’s engagement with the doctrine, which was fuelled in 1990 by the discovery of his ‘Newly Discovered Sermons’. With regard to Jonathan Edwards, however, little has been written on his engagement with the doctrine.

These three seminal thinkers, while responding to the thought forms of their age, have this in common. Each arrive at remarkably congruent soteriologies (understandings of the way humans are saved) because each used the patristic doctrine of deification (theosis) to frame their respective theologies of sin and grace and of the will and affections. Although scholars may have written on the understanding of sin and grace, the will and the affections, and deification in all three theologians, no study has stressed the congruence of their views on all three matters (sin and grace, the will and affections, and deification). Neither has any study advanced an argument that how each theologian understands deification determines their understanding of their theologies of sin and grace and the will and the affections.

The core argument here advanced that all three theologians stress their understanding of deification to give a theocentric, rather than anthropocentric, interpretation of the human predicament (sin and guilt) and human nature (will and affections). Moreover, the explication of the strikingly similar understanding of the role of deification in these three theologians can be seen to be the mechanism which allows each to draw attention to the necessity of Christian practice in light of the Christian’s salvation.

Beyond possible ecumenical engagement, the thesis therefore aims to investigate the reasons for the theological similarities among Augustine, Maximus and Edwards to establish why the early church doctrine of deification, despite its biblical foundations, has remained elusive and often misunderstood by the western theological mindset. The doctrine should not be understood as a

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3 See Chapter 7 sec. 7.3
doctrine from the church’s past that held some importance for early theologians, but as one that continues to hold relevance to western theological discourse today because of its scriptural foundations. Despite the growing interest in the doctrine from the western sphere of the church, understanding the soteriological themes that inform the doctrine will go towards explaining why the doctrine has not been susceptible to technical definition.

A major issue over the relevance of the doctrine of deification lies in how modern theology seeks to provide a definition of it, which usually focuses on one or other of the emphases spawned by the historic theosis tradition. Some writers emphasise the communication of the divine attributes (the characteristics that apply to God’s being), whilst others focus on the participation in the relationship among the divine persons. These two emphases are apparent in the two technical definitions of deification developed by eastern Orthodox scholars. The first is the distinction made between God’s

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8 Ibid., 106. See also Strobel, 279.
uncreated energies (ἐνέργεια) and God’s essence (οὐσία) through God’s uncreated energies. The second defines the doctrine in terms of the Christian’s participation in Christ’s hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) rather than specifically in the divine energies. There has come to be an insistence in contemporary theology that the validity of the doctrine rests on either one of these definitions. Some even argue that if the doctrine is not defined by the energies/essence distinction then it cannot be said to be the doctrine of deification.⁹

Beginning its life as a metaphor, the doctrine of deification was not treated as an independent matter or as a systematic concept in the modern sense, because it was applied to a variety of matters to do with Christian spirituality that spoke to a broad audience.¹⁰ The problem, therefore, with these two technical definitions is that they focus on the metaphysics of the Greek terminology alone, devoid of a keen understanding of the historical and epistemological context, which gave the Greek terms their contextual theological meaning in patristic usage from the earliest of times. Regardless of merit, each definition has sought application to the modern context, somewhat as a ‘blanket rule’, which has inadvertently compromised the fluidity of the full spectrum of doctrines that can be seen to inform the doctrine of deification and function together to give it its robust meaning. The theology that informs deification did not separate cataphatic (positive) theology, what scripture made known about God’s salvific work, from apophatic (negative) theology, what was communicated about Christian salvation by doctrines such as the Trinity, incarnation, Christian anthropology, pneumatology, soteriology and eschatology. Informed by a broad spectrum of soteriological themes, the doctrine first took impetus as a soteriological metaphor so that it possessed rhetorical application; it was used to communicate on spiritual matters that concerned the Christian life.

The doctrine of deification was shaped by the New Testament idea of the Christian’s adoption, alongside the idea of the Christian’s imitation of Christ. Each theologian’s adaptation of deification therefore worked to locate the Christian’s sanctification at the spiritual level of the divine.¹¹ This phrase means that holiness, by which a person is made progressively to be like Christ and participates in the nature, though not in the essence, of God (deification), is not the result of human effort or

¹⁰ See Kharlamov, 115-16.
¹¹ The phrase ‘the spiritual level of the divine’ has been taken from A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 32.
ascetic practices acting on the human psyche, but is the work of divine action (grace) within the human spirit. It is an understanding of sanctification which insists on the inseparability of Christ’s work on the cross and his divine spiritual origins or home, which belong to Christians because of their spiritual adoption. The spiritually renewed nature of the mind of believers differentiated them from the mind of non-believers so that in some ‘realistic’ sense Christians can be said to share Christ’s spiritual home because they take on Christ’s mind. Christians united in Christ could therefore be said to share in Christ’s spiritual home, not only in name but also in a more ‘realistic’ sense because of the believer’s spiritually renewed human nature.

The spiritually renewed human nature, the result of the incarnation and the Holy Spirit’s work, is what the doctrine of deification concerns itself with. The structure of the doctrine is determined by a teleology that implies that creation and human beings were endowed with an affinity and likeness, and intellectual capacity to be drawn towards God. This capacity for knowledge of God had been lost by sin, but was restored in Christians by grace because of the incarnation’s salvific work. The doctrine took meaning from a Trinitarian framework, which makes its concomitants the Trinity and the incarnation. Christ, the perfect image of the Father, reflected the Father to the world, and the Spirit transfigured and transformed Christians into the image of Christ, so that Christians, united with Christ reflected Christ and hence the Father to the world.

Moreover, the doctrine takes its life from the many theological themes that centre on the fulfilment of the incarnation’s work within the scope of God’s salvation plans. That the doctrine frames the moral theory of all three theologians further shows that it should not so much be understood in the modern context as a systematised doctrine but as a synthesis of theological and soteriological themes that take meaning from the incarnation’s salvific work. A robust view of Christian salvation is presented that takes into account both the earthly and spiritual realms of the Christian life which does not dichotomise or negate either realm or overemphasise one realm at the expense of the other. The doctrine functions to allow eschatology to inform the issue of Christian ethics and morality in the Christian’s present life. One result is that for Christians issues to do with

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12 Cf. Rom. 7:25; 15:5-6; 1 Cor. 2:16; 2 Cor. 4:4
13 Ibid., 285.
ethics and morality become for them a theocentric concern, not an anthropocentric one, which demarcates Christian moral theory from secular and philosophical moral theory.

Salvation and sin became correlative issues in the early church in that one could not be formulated without the other. Although scripture did not explicate a doctrine of original sin, the doctrine emerged in Christian thinking from reflection on the stories about creation and the fall in Genesis 1-3. Christian soteriology presupposed an understanding of the human predicament that established humanity as being somehow responsible for its sin-effected predicament. Duffy explains that sin and evil are anomalies for Christian thought, and there was no fully developed orthodox doctrine of sin comparable to the soteriological doctrines of Christology and the Trinity. The fall solidified in Christian thought that, outside of grace, humans were incapable of achieving perfection and determining their own salvation. Each theologian inherited their conceptions of will from out of their respective philosophical contexts. Each developed his conception of the will in light of how the passions or affections could be directed by Christians, because of the spiritual renewal of their moral nature, to produce virtuous behaviour that led to the transformation and reformation of their lives in Christ. For each theologian, their notions of will and its operation in the affections became an integral part of their soteriological anthropology, in that it was directed by their Christological as well as eschatological understanding.

The spiritually renewed nature of the believers’ mind differentiated them from the mind of non-believers. Although believers experienced life in the created material world, as Spirit-filled beings they also shared Christ’s spiritual home. As a way to give validity to both earthly and spiritual realms where neither realm would compromise the other, early theologians drew on Neoplatonism due to the self-sustaining nature of its philosophical system. Less severe a dualistic system in its worldview, its system did not deny the existence of the spiritual/immaterial and material/earthly aspects of the human being or the universe. Its metaphysics allowed early theologians to resolve, communicate and bridge the gap between the spiritual and earthly realm of Christian existence. As Neoplatonism was a circular system, theologians who engaged with its metaphysics, always insisted that the Christian life was on a

16 Ibid., 598.
17 Ibid., 597-98.
18 Ibid., 597.
historical linear trajectory of progression towards an eternal destination. Although Augustine, Maximus and Edwards all interacted with Neoplatonic metaphysics, they each presented a conception of historical time, that spoke about human life in the context of God’s economic salvation plans for the world (οἰκονομία). The similarities in the ideas of all three theologians on deification, shows the influence of Neoplatonism on each of their educational, epistemological and cultural contexts, but it is the traditional scriptural context of the οἰκονομία in which their representations of the doctrine takes meaning for Christian salvation.

2. The Early Church Theologians’ Relationship with Neoplatonism

By the fourth century the specific type of philosophy that influenced the cultural and literary milieu of the early church was Neoplatonism. It encompassed the study of a metaphysical system concerned with the natural world and the place of humanity as seen from the viewpoint of the philosopher’s metaphysics. What characterised Neoplatonism was Plotinus’ hierarchically-ordered system, the pinnacle of which contained ‘the One’ or monad or λόγος; what was beyond being and intellection. The λόγος was the inexhaustible source of life on which all finite things depended for their existence. The intellective principle, the mind (νοῦς) emerged from the first without changing or affecting in any way the λόγος, the mind being produced only because perfection is necessarily productive. The soul (ψυχή) is inferior but remains a rational principle and within the metaphysical hierarchy it continually seeks to return to the source like the νοῦς does upon its source. The system is therefore circular and operates on the idea of emanation and return.

The anthropological value of the Neoplatonic system was that it saw the person composed as a dual unity of body and soul/mind. The soul and the mind are not separate hierarchically ordered.

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19 ‘Neoplatonism’ is a term coined in modern times in order to identify the form of the Platonism that had been inaugurated by Plotinus (A.D. 204-270), which lasted in its non-Christian form to the sixth century. It encompasses the teaching of Plato’s immediate disciples (the ‘Old Academy’) and the Platonism of the earlier Roman Empire (‘Middle Platonism’). ‘Neoplatonism’ was not solely informed by the Platonic dialogues but was greatly influenced by the doctrines and ideas of Aristotle, the Stoics and Epicureanism. The term ‘Neoplatonism’ is also frequently applied to later attempts in the west to revive the school’s leading ideas at the time of the Renaissance and in the seventeenth-century teaching of the Cambridge Platonists. On Neoplatonism, see R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2002). On Neoplatonism in the late Roman Empire and Byzantine period, see A. Sheppard, ‘Philosophy and Philosophical Schools’, The Cambridge Ancient History: Late Antiquity: Empire and Successors, A.D. 425-600. Volume 14. (ed. A. Cameron et al.; Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2001), 835-54.


21 See Wallis, 47-61.
divinities but modes or topoi of the One’s disclosure at different levels of reality. In order to reach the source, individuals need to draw inwards of themselves and contemplate the divine λόγοι (the principles or ideas) of ‘the One’, because in the Platonic view the material/earthly world is an image of its ideal archetype (λόγος). Its metaphysics did not portray a severe dualistic system in that materiality was not understood to be an enemy of the body, rather, the training and discipline of the body was understood to aid the soul and mind to reach its divine source.\footnote{Ibid., 9.}

As a worldview the ancients therefore applied Neoplatonism to the mundane matters of everyday life. This application of philosophy, as a way of life, differentiates the way in which the Greco-Roman world conceived philosophy from that of today. In the modern context, philosophical study is conceived as a ‘theoretical’ academic discipline or subject, which is left separate from other disciplines of study.\footnote{P. Hadot, \textit{Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault}, (tr. M. Chase; Oxford, Blackwell: 1995), 264-65; P. Hadot, \textit{What is Ancient Philosophy?} (tr. M. Chase; Cambridge, The Belknap Press: 2002), 153.} Traditionally to learn philosophy meant both to learn a way of life and to put what was learnt into practice, so as to transform human lives for the better.\footnote{Hadot, \textit{Ancient Philosophy}, 153.} That the ancients understood philosophy as ‘a way of life’ did not mean that its adherents practised it merely for the purpose of moral exercise. The nature of philosophy was thought of as a mode of existing-in-the-world.\footnote{Hadot, \textit{Way of Life}, 265.} Philosophy needed to be practised and applied to the active human life, the goal of which was to transform the whole of the individual’s life.\footnote{Ibid., 264-65.} Since philosophy was so closely linked to the transformation of human life and society, it was especially influential on Epicurean and Stoic thinking about ethics and morality.

The theologians’ engagement with Neoplatonism\footnote{See footnote 19 above. ‘Neoplatonism’ was not solely informed by the Platonic dialogues but was greatly influenced by the doctrines and ideas of Aristotle, the Stoics and Epicureanism. See Wallis, 17-25.} was part of the nature of theological discourse in the early church, and needs to be understood within the context of what was meant by the scriptural ‘tradition’ (παράδοσις). Early Christian thinkers viewed both written and unwritten tradition to be an essential source for the development of doctrine, of which they made creative use in dealing with...
on-going issues. Their theological concern was foremost an ascetic and pastoral one, in that the purpose of doctrine was to help Christians live the Christian life. It was theological controversy that forced them to explicate central Christian doctrines because of theological error that threatened the authenticity of the Christian life. Early theologians therefore theologised *ad mentem partum*, which meant that they were steeped in the writings of the Fathers and the definitions of the church councils. Quoting freely from scripture and the Fathers, showed that they were not only at one with the church’s central teachings but also ‘witnesses to the consensus partum they believed existed.’ Similarly, secular philosophers were also concerned with the consensus philosophorum they believed existed, which they sought to harmonise with the platonic tradition. Yet, what appears to be the common link between the non-Christian philosopher and the theologian also shows the gulf between their motivations. Christian thinkers were foremost concerned to harmonise their thinking with the dogmatic tradition not with Greco-Roman philosophy and this is the context in which both the theological thought of Augustine and Maximus as early theologians is to be understood.

**A. Christian Exemplarism**

The problem that Neoplatonism presented for Christian cosmology was that its system did not allow for the ontological gap between the Creator and his creation. Going against the Christian doctrine of creation from nothing the Neoplatonist idea spoke of the continual emanation of the One. Christian thinkers therefore developed an exemplarist framework, which became an element integral to the Christian understanding of reality. The Christian framework allowed early theologians to

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30 See Parry, ‘Reading Proclus’, 224.


32 Parry, ‘Reading Proclus’, 224-25.

33 Ibid., 224-25.


35 Historians have called the doctrine that the world is created from divine Ideas ‘exemplarism’. God possesses in his intellect all the Ideas, which together make up the pattern of the world, and which owes its existence, origin and preservation to the activity of God’s word (Δόγμα). See T. T. Tollefsen,
emphasise the spiritual over the earthly, so as to provide an ontological means of explaining the philosophical doctrine of God as *causa exemplaris* (‘the exemplary cause’). From scripture, Christian thinkers conceived God as not only ‘beyond being’ but ‘being’ and ‘the source of all being’. God was transcendent, incorporeal, eternal, immutable and incorruptible. Early theologists therefore grounded their exemplarist framework on the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* (‘creation from nothing’), which they used as a corrective for cosmological and soteriological systems, which may have been corrupted by Neoplatonism or where heterodoxy had imposed a severe dichotomy between the material/earthly and spiritual facets of the created realm.

Christian exemplarism was therefore developed as an element integral to the Christian understanding of reality. From the opening words of the Genesis account, creation was described as an ordered system, where God had created all living beings according to its kind. For Christian thinkers, implicit in the Genesis story was the presupposition that the world had resulted from a divine plan and design. It was therefore natural for theologians in a Greco-Roman context to seek to formulate these insights into suitable philosophical terminology, which worked to give expression to a Christian worldview. Greco-Roman cosmology rested on a basic presupposition that the mind was capable of perceiving and understanding the rational order of the universe and consequently the nature of the divine. Its premise was that everything that occurs in the universe has been arranged and initiated by the same reason, which humans upon their creation had also been given. Humans were therefore created to understand their own position in the universe and act accordingly. The notion that divine rule over both cosmic and human affairs is perfect and rational was therefore a concept of philosophical speculation. For example, from the philosophical point of view, to pray meant to disregard the perfect order, which the gods had established but which the supreme creator always

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The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 21-22.
36 See Harrison, 78.
37 Tollefsen, 22.
38 Ibid., 22.
39 Ibid., 22-23.
40 Ibid., 23.
42 Ibid., 2.
43 Ibid., 2-3.
restricted in his activity, by laws or rules, which the mind could grasp as reasonable, good and salutary.\textsuperscript{44}

In the Neoplatonist worldview the creator may desire to create and govern the universe, but he did not create \textit{ex nihilo}.\textsuperscript{45} The creator moulds what was without shape, animates what was without life, brings to reality what was merely potential, but does not ever transcend the created order.\textsuperscript{46} This diverged from Christian thought. Christians believed that no standard rational rule could apply to God and his creation because creation was understood to have resulted from God’s creative activity and power. Creation is maintained and sustained by his will.\textsuperscript{47} God exists outside his creation but maintains a relationship with his creation, making creation entirely dependent on him. What essentially drew early theologians to engage with Neoplatonic metaphysics was the Platonic doctrine which taught that existence is good, and evil is not a substance but a privation of the good. From the vantage of the Christian doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’, this provided theologians with a structured means not only to argue for the goodness of created things but with a way to answer the question of evil as a privation. The concept of evil could then be expressed as a movement of humans away from God and as an intentional rejection of their dependence on him.\textsuperscript{48}

Drawing on the doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’, early Christian thinkers were able to reconcile the idea of God, who creates freely and unconditionally, with the concepts of Hellenistic metaphysics that developed and formed alongside the Gnostic problem.\textsuperscript{49} Hellenistic-Jewish philosophy had declared God’s omnipotence in his creating role, but it did not develop a doctrine of \textit{creatio ex nihilo}. It did not need to engage with the Platonic and Stoic doctrine of principles and the ontological issue of ‘being’, which Gnostic thought and its severe dualism presented Christianity from the second century of the church.\textsuperscript{50} Christian exemplarism was therefore developed in order to answer a cosmological challenge confronting Christian thought from the second century onwards.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 2, 4.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 2, 26-27.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 21.
\textsuperscript{51} Tollefsen, 22.
Christians were aware that similar theories existed in Greco-Roman philosophy and they also learnt from non-Christian thought but their theory of exemplarism was distinctly Christian.\(^\text{52}\) The exemplarist system was not just a matter of apologetics in order to legitimise Christianity as a rational phenomenon, but was bound up with understanding and preserving what scripture taught about God.\(^\text{53}\) God was the transcendent, omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent Creator of the cosmos, and Christian thinkers wanted to explain how everything in creation comes from him (ἐξ αὐτοῦ), was established through him (δι’ αὐτοῦ) and has its end or goal in him (εἰς αὐτοῦ).\(^\text{54}\) Christian exemplarism worked to show how the total cosmic order was kept within God’s providence in such a way that God had in his possession and preservation the plans for everything.\(^\text{55}\) Christian thinkers like Augustine, Maximus and Edwards, whose theology engaged with exemplarist frameworks show that the Christian motive behind exemplarism did not originate from out of Platonic thought. It originated from the Christian understanding of God and his relationship to his creation, which early Christians had reflected upon from their reading of the Genesis story about creation.\(^\text{56}\)

3. Brief Biographies

A. Augustine of Hippo (354-430)

Much of Augustine’s biography can be discerned from his *Confessions*.\(^\text{57}\) Aurelius Augustine was born in November 354, in Thagaste\(^\text{58}\) (modern day, Souk Ahras in Algeria), a prosperous agrarian town in Numidia, North Africa, a province of the Roman Empire. The second half of the fourth century is historically marked as the period which saw the rapid decline of the Roman Empire. Towards the end of Augustine’s life, Alaric and his Christian Arian Goths are recorded to have sacked Rome in August 410.\(^\text{59}\) Augustine was born to a Christian mother, Monica, and a non-Christian father,
Patricius. Although not born into an aristocratic class, his family held Roman citizenship and owned a modest working estate with a few slaves. Comparatively, they were well off.  Although Patricius paid for his son’s early education, Augustine required patronage so that he could continue his education to the highest level. As Augustine proved to be a promising student, Patricius secured patronage for him from the much wealthier Romanianus, ensuring that Augustine could further his studies in Carthage. Prior to his move to Carthage in 371 at the age of seventeen, Augustine was attracted to the Manichaeans' sect and followed its teachings for the next nine years.

Augustine received a classical education characteristic of the later Roman Empire. The purpose of the education system was social in that it sought to prepare future leaders and civil servants for strategic positions in Roman society and government so as to protect and maintain the Empire’s governing elite. In Thagaste, Augustine’s education would have either begun with private tutoring in his home, or with his being sent to the town school for instruction under a grammaticus. His education would have largely consisted of training in understanding the intricacies of reading a text, of accent, poetry, metre, as well as other liberal arts disciplines. In Carthage promising students like Augustine continued into the more advanced school of rhetoric. Rhetoric did not only involve the study of rhetorical theory to an advanced level, but required reading of the standard Latin authors: Cicero (the historian, philosopher and rhetor), Virgil (the poet), Sallust (the historian) and Terence (the playwright/dramatist). Besides rhetoric, a classical education in the fourth century, also involved the study of grammar, music, mathematics (geometry and arithmetic), physics, astronomy, Greek, and

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61 On Manichaean and Augustine see Chapter 1, section 1.3 of this thesis.


65 ‘Physics’ encompassed the study of biology, geometry, astronomy and mathematics; study that was concerned with understanding the observable world.
dialektics. Augustine’s education, however, appears to have consisted of an immersion in literature and oration. He testifies to having gained insufficient knowledge of Greek in his studies.

At the age of eighteen Augustine took on a concubine, who bore him his only recorded child and son, Adeodatus, possibly in the year 373. Completing his studies and in the year 383, aged about twenty-nine, he qualified as a Rhetor who can be likened to someone who has qualified in law to practise at the bar. To begin his career and make the most of his opportunities for public life, he left Carthage for Rome, a strategic move that would allow him to progress into a career in politics and law and enter the elite and aristocratic world of Roman society and government. Within a year of his arrival in Rome, through his Manichee connections, he had secured a central governmental position in Milan (c. 384).

His move to Milan in 385 led to a significant turning point in Augustine’s life, eventuating in his conversion to Christianity. Augustine reports that it was his meeting of Bishop Ambrose and listening to his preaching that motivated his own reading of the Pauline scriptures along with Neoplatonic works. Augustine, however, does not testify to his conversion until the year 387. Within a year of his arrival in Milan, Augustine’s mother had arranged a suitable marriage for him, so that after fourteen years he released his concubine, although his son remained with him. Under Roman law, the betrothed girl was too young for marriage, so Augustine took on another concubine for the interim period. In the year 387, aged thirty-three, Augustine was baptised by Bishop Ambrose and on account of his conversion to Christianity and in accordance with his desire to embrace celibacy and live in monastic community, he released this concubine as well.

Shortly after, following his mother’s death, he left Milan for Rome, and after a year’s stay, returned to Carthage in 388. Along with his son and some likeminded friends, it was not long before he returned to his hometown of Thagaste. On selling his family’s property and giving the proceeds to the poor, he established with his friends a small monastic community. Some of his companion monks

67 It was a socially common practice at this time for men of Augustine’s social class to take on a concubine, a woman more than likely from the poor peasant class. Marriage under Roman law had a prohibitively complex social function, as it demanded that the man and woman be of equal status, and involved dynastic and financial arrangements. See Brown, Augustine, 51.
had also converted out of the Manichean sect into Christianity, and it was during this three-year period in Thagaste, that Augustine began his theological writing. In 390 he records the deaths of his son, Adeodatus and of his close friend, the monk Nebridius. In the following year, aged thirty-seven, he was appointed Bishop of Hippo (modern day Annaba, Algeria). Hippo was a city that was second in North Africa to Carthage for its ecclesiastical importance, which made his appointment a significant one. On his move to Hippo, Augustine chose to continue to live in the episcopal residence in monastic community with his fellow clerical monks.

The 390s onwards can be seen to be the period of Augustine’s life that proved to be the most productive. Besides his theological writing, his pastoral responsibilities as Bishop not only required that he preach regularly, but also that he undertake long and frequent intervals of travel so that he could maintain pastoral oversight of his region. During this period he was frequently called on to preside at synods and councils. He engaged in all of the theological controversies that affected the church at this time, whilst continuing to maintain his pastoral and preaching obligations to his congregants. His correspondence shows that he visited many of his ecclesial and lay friends as part of his travels and his letters reveal that he maintained voluminous correspondences with both men and women throughout his episcopate. It is estimated that he made forty to fifty journeys during this time and visited Carthage (a nine day journey) at least twenty to thirty times a year. Augustine produced copious writings (almost 100 treatises, some 200 letters, an enormous number of sermons, more than 500 of which are still intact as well as commentaries on John and the Psalms). His death at the age of seventy-five occurred on the same day of the Vandals final siege of Rome on 28th August, 430.

B. Maximus the Confessor (580-662)

Maximus was born in 580 probably in Constantinople to an aristocratic family. Although historians classify this period as the Byzantine Empire, Maximus would have considered himself to be

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68 Scholars have discerned the historical account of Maximus’ life from three sources: from the biographical Greek Life of St Maximus composed in the tenth century by the Studite monk, Michael Exaboulites; from the evidence of Maximus’ own writings; and from the record of his first trial. Although the tenth-century account of Maximus’ life cannot be deemed to be entirely accurate, it has proved to be an invaluable source. It should be noted however, that in the last two decades, a biographical Syriac version of the Life of St Maximus, was discovered in the British museum, which contradicts the Greek Life and tells a different story. According to this account Maximus was born in the village of Hesfin, east of Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) in Palestine, the offspring of an adulterous liaison between a Samaritan man and a Persian slave-girl. The importance of the discovery
part of the continuation of the culture of the Roman Empire. Unlike Augustine who left a biographical account, little is known of Maximus’ early and personal life. As an aristocrat, it is likely that Maximus received an entirely private education, probably humanistic and arts-based, a large component of which entailed the study of rhetoric. Browning explains that throughout the fifth and sixth centuries education generally followed the patterns that had been established a thousand years earlier and continued to remain a function of the urban society that served to mark the elite within each city. Moreover, with a few exceptions, the instruction in ‘grammar’- the art of reading, understanding, and on occasion, imitating the works of Latin and Greek classical writers (for example in philosophy and poetry) - continued to form part of the curriculum of rhetoric (the art of structured and persuasive oral and written communication) in the late sixth century.

In late antiquity, the general pattern of rhetorical teaching remained the same in the east as it had been in the west. This period saw a revival of classical philosophical teaching as part of the

of the Syriac Life is that unlike the Greek Life it is contemporary with Maximus, written by one George of Reshaina. The problem with it however, is that it does not explain Maximus’ high governmental position in the Constantinople court, and how he came to make some of his most significant friendships, such as his friendship with Sophronius, or the lay correspondents that he would have known from the Constantinople court. Moreover, the hostile portrayal given by the Syriac Life shows its Monothelite provenance. Contemporary with Maximus, it is an account written for the purpose of vilification. Instead, it provides a snapshot into how violent the forces in the seventh-century political and ecclesial context were against those who spoke up for orthodoxy. For a discussion of the Greek and Syriac versions of the Life see Louth, 4-7; B. Neil & P. Allen, ‘Introduction’, The Life of Maximus the Confessor: Recension 3 (ed. & tr. B. Neil & P. Allen; Strathfield, St Pauls: 2003), 4-12.

69 See K. Parry, ‘What to Jettison Before You Go Sailing (To Byzantium)’, Phronema 24 (2009), 20-23. The Romanisation of the Greek east and the imperialisation of Christianity were two sides of the same coin and the Byzantine Empire continued to reflect this situation long after the ‘collapse’ of the Roman Empire in the west. Byzantium was not a nation-state in the modern sense, in that the people of Byzantium did not define themselves via ethnicity or language but in continuum of an imperialist Christian culture in line with the sense of Christendom. See also A. Cameron, The Byzantines (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 1-38; A. Kaldellis, Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 42-190, 394-97.

70 Louth, 4, n.4.


72 Ibid., 855.

73 Ibid., 855-56. The traditional classical three-stage education system (elementary literacy, grammar and rhetoric) was not only maintained throughout the fifth and sixth century but was maintained later than this. The distinction, however, between the various stages became more blurred in later times.

74 Ibid., 861. Whereas in the Latin west, the curriculum remained relatively unchanged by the fifth century, a standard group of textbooks had been adopted in the east. Students usually began their education by studying the Progymnasmata of Libanius’ student Aphthonius of Antioch, which had
growth and spread of Neoplatonism as a common worldview. Athens and Alexandria were the principal centres of philosophical teaching, and Maximus’ writing shows that he held an extensive knowledge of Neoplatonism alongside Aristotelian logic, which adds to the likelihood that he undertook advanced study in philosophy in Constantinople on top of his studies of grammar and rhetoric. Maximus was educated in Greek, and Constantinople was Greek-speaking, but he probably learnt Latin as part of his studies. Although a gulf between eastern and western culture had been growing since the fifth century, the transfer of the imperial capital from Rome to Constantinople and the increasing bureaucratisation of the Roman government meant that promising students in the eastern realm learnt Latin. Students who learnt Latin could not only further their political careers, but could also communicate with Rome and the imperial visitors to Constantinople, who by this time may have had little knowledge of the Greek language themselves.

By his late twenties or very early thirties, Maximus was appointed to the central position of first secretary and head of the imperial chancery in the court of Emperor Heraclius in Constantinople. The timing of his appointment would have seen him oversee and implement the comprehensive overhaul of the upper echelons of the civil service that followed and coincided with Emperor Heraclius’ disposition of the usurper, Phocas, in 610. For reasons unknown, aged thirty-three or thirty-four, Maximus resigned his important governmental position to become a monk. He is recorded as having initially joined a monastery in Chrysopolis (modern Scutari) across the Bosphorus from Constantinople. In 618 he acquired a disciple and assistant, Anastasius the Monk, who remained one of his most faithful companions throughout his life. That Maximus is recorded as having a disciple as early as this shows that he had already gained a theological and pastoral reputation as a younger monk.

Maximus remained at the monastery in Chrysopolis until 624/5 when he left for another monastery called St George at Cyzicus (modern day Erdek, on the south coast of the Sea of replaced earlier collections, but was later replaced in general use by the less differentiated Progymnasmata of Nikolaos of Myra, the professor of Rhetoric in Constantinople in the fifth century and friend of the philosopher, Proclus.

Ibid., 862-63.
Ibid., 863.
Ibid., 872. See also Parry, ‘What to Jettison’, 22-23.
Louth, 4-5.
See Neil & Allen, 19.
Marmara).

Some of Maximus’ earliest ascetic writings can be dated from this period. By 626, Maximus and the monks of this monastery were forced to leave due to the siege of Constantinople by the Persians, who had already conquered Syria and Palestine, and had established a force with the Avars and Slavs. Due to the invaders, Maximus, along with his companion monks, fled to Carthage in North Africa, where he remained in exile for about 20 years. At the time of his arrival in Carthage, possibly in 630, Maximus was by now about 50 years old, and it is this later period of his life which proved to be his most productive. His arrival in Carthage at this time also explains his meeting of the monk Sophronius (the future Patriarch of Jerusalem), who remained a life-long friend and supporter. Although a theological leader and pastoral teacher, Maximus remained a monk and was not appointed to any higher ecclesial office. The majority of Maximus’ polemical works were written during his long period of exile in North Africa. During this period he not only maintained both ecclesial and lay correspondences, but his active engagement in the Monothelite controversy, saw him participate as the leader for orthodoxy in the church councils of this period.

At the height of the controversy in 655, on a visit to Rome, he was arrested and sent to Constantinople for trial. Accused of treason he was exiled to Bizya in Thrace (modern Vize on the Turkish-Bulgarian border). In exile, he continued his opposition to Monothelite heterodoxy and oversaw a dispute in Bizya in August 656 with Theodosius, Bishop of Caesarea Bithynia, on the topic of the number of wills and energies in Christ. Maximus remained exiled in Bizya until 662, when he was sent back to Constantinople for a second trial along with two of his companion monks, Anastasius the Monk and Anastasius Apocrisiarius. According to two accounts, Maximus had his tongue and right hand cut off so that he could no longer speak and write. He was also paraded through

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80 Louth, 5
81 Ibid., 5.
82 Ibid., 5 On his journey to Carthage, Maximus probably spent a length of time in both Cyprus and Crete.
83 See L. Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos: The Vision of St Maximus the Confessor (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), 22.
84 On Monothelitism, see Chapter 5 section 5.2 n.1 of this thesis.
85 On the first trial, see Neil & Allen, 15-17.
86 For a record of Maximus’ first trial, see B. Neil, Maximus the Confessor and his Companions: Documents from Exile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); G. C. Berthold, Maximus the Confessor: Selected Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 16-31.
87 Neil & Allen, 17.
88 See Neil & Allen, 19.
Constantinople so that the crowds could humiliate him. Maximus and the two Anastasius’s were exiled to Lazica (modern day Georgia) on June 8th 662, but each man was moved to a separate location shortly after arrival. The town of Lazica was located on the southeast shore of the Black Sea, an isolated town on the outskirts of the Empire. Maximus was moved to the military camp at Schemaris (modern day, Tsikhe-Muris) or the fortress of Muri in Lechkhumi near Tsageri. Aged 82, his death is recorded to have occurred on 13th August 662, within two months of his arrival. Twenty years after his death, his orthodox teaching that Christ has two wills, a divine will and a human will, was ratified at the Sixth Ecumenical Council in Constantinople in 680. Yet, his name remained unrecorded at the council as the teacher and defender of the orthodox doctrine.

B. Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758)

Jonathan Edwards was born on October 5th 1703, to a prominent New England clergy family. He was the only son and fifth child of eleven born to the Rev. Timothy Edwards and Esther Stoddard, daughter of the Rev. Solomon Stoddard of Northampton, Massachusetts. The Edwards and Stoddard families were related to many of the influential clerical Puritan families of New England. These families had been part of the first Puritan migration from England to the American colonies in the preceding century. Edwards’ birth therefore automatically placed him into the ‘aristocratic’ class of eighteenth-century colonial New England society.

Edwards’ education began with private tutoring in his home, primarily in Latin and Greek, the two languages that were deemed necessary for his formal collegiate studies. Aged thirteen in 1716, he commenced his formal education at the newly-established Wethersfield College, (later renamed Yale after the college was relocated to New Haven). Like Harvard, it had been established to educate the

89 Ibid., 19.
90 See Neil & Allen, 19-20.
92 The reason Maximus’ name went unrecorded was probably because Emperor Constantine IV felt embarrassment over Maximus’ condemnation and death in captivity, which had occurred under the authority of his predecessor Emperor Constans II. See Neil & Allen, 20-21.
Edwards academically excelled amongst his peers in his studies and on completion of his undergraduate studies remained in New Haven for a year to work on his M.A. The following year, from August 1722 to May 1723, he moved to New York to serve as an interim pastor at a small Presbyterian church after which he returned to New Haven to prepare for and finalise his M.A. The M.A. consisted of an oration entirely in Latin, which he delivered in October that year. By this time in 1724, he secured a position as a tutor at Yale, and it was during this year that he began his courtship of the thirteen-year old Sarah Pierpont, the daughter of another prominent New England clergy family. They married in 1727 when Sarah was seventeen and Edwards was almost twenty-five, and had eleven children. In 1726 Edwards accepted his grandfather Solomon Stoddard’s call to assist him in the parish of Northampton, where he remained as the pastor after his grandfather’s death, in 1729.

During his residence in Northampton, Edwards oversaw and experienced two revivals in the town. The first revival occurred during the years 1734-35, and the second occurred in the early 1740s, sparked by the English itinerant preacher George Whitefield’s tour of New England. In 1750 aged 47, Edwards was dismissed from the Northampton parish and took the post as pastor and missionary to the Housatonic Indians in Stockbridge, Massachusetts. His eight years in Stockbridge proved to be one of the most productive periods of his life. It was at this time that he produced his significant treatises, *Original Sin, On Free Will,* and *On True Virtue,* all of which were published posthumously.

In 1758, he was persuaded to take the position left by his recently deceased son-in-law, Aaron Burr, as President of the recently-established College of New Jersey (now known as Princeton University). He arrived in January 1758 and was installed as President of the college on 16 February. At the end of that month he was inoculated for smallpox, which resulted in an infection that led to his death on 22 March 1758 at the age of 54. Although Edwards never travelled outside of the New England colony, he was known in England and Scotland due to his published pamphlets and sermons.

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His letters show that he regularly corresponded with men and women, not only within the colony but throughout England and Scotland as well.

4. A Literature Survey

The literature that deals with the entire spectrum of philosophical, theological and doctrinal thought of Augustine, Maximus and Edwards is voluminous. Although this thesis engaged with literature that touched on all aspects of their philosophical, cultural and theological thought, the intention of this survey is to outline the literature on the patristic doctrine of deification, which inspired this study.

A. A Twentieth-Century Survey of the Literature Against the Doctrine

In the beginning of the twentieth century the patristic doctrine of deification, considered to be unorthodox was rejected by the west, but today there is a move to reclaim the doctrine for western theology. 95 The influential German Lutheran theologian Adolf von Harnack 96 (1851-1930) dismissed the doctrine as a misguided and mystical notion and an example of what was misconstrued and foreign about the Eastern Orthodox Church. He wrote that the doctrine was a speculation that had originally never reached beyond the fringe of religious knowledge and which had been made a central point of a system that had Hellenised and distorted Christian soteriology by Greek metaphysics. This view continued in the Protestant west through the influential Swiss Reformed theologian Karl Barth 97 (1886-1968). Barth claimed that to accept and maintain the doctrine was to encourage abstract talk about Christ’s human nature. He wrote that the doctrine should be discarded and had no place in reformed theology because it shifted the ‘Christological centre’ of the gospel, ignoring Christ’s centrality in Christian salvation.

Von Harnack’s influence is also discernable in the thinking of later scholars, such as the English academic Benjamin Drewery 98 in his essay on ‘Deification’, as well as work by the English

eastern scholar Philip Sherrard\(^9\) (1922-1995). Both scholars deny that the doctrine appeared in the theology of the Latin Fathers, such as in Augustine, despite earlier studies undertaken by the Catholic scholars Victorino Capanaga\(^10\) and Gerhart Ladner\(^11\), who found strong evidence of Augustine’s engagement with the doctrine in his theology.

**B. Contemporary Eastern Orthodox Scholarship on the Doctrine**

By contrast with western scholars, contemporary eastern scholars have maintained an insistence that the doctrine is authentically Christian, and one, which has long characterised the soteriology of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The influential eastern scholar Vladimir Lossky\(^12\) (1903-1958) was the first to argue that the significance of the doctrine was located in how it worked to encompass the entire scope of God’s redemptive and salvation plans for the world, which he perceived had become neglected in western redemptive theories. Although contemporary eastern scholars have focused and attributed their retrieval of the doctrine to the Church Fathers, its re-introduction into the twentieth-century eastern context can be traced to the nineteenth-century Russian philosopher, theologian and poet, Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900), and his theory of sophiology. Russian sophiology promoted the assumption that deified humanity was an eternal aspect of God’s being. So regardless of the implausibility or the demerits of the idea itself, the first impulse for the recovery of the doctrine in the contemporary eastern church, can be traced to Soloviev, as noted by Paul Gavrilyuk.\(^13\)

On the whole, contemporary eastern scholars have tended to treat the doctrine as the apex of all other doctrines and articles of faith. This treatment can be attributed to the scholarly work of Lossky.\(^14\) Of significance was Lossky’s development of a technical definition for the doctrine based on the Palamite distinction between God’s uncreated energies (ἐνέργεια) and of God’s essence (οὐσία)

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\(^10\) V. Capanaga, ‘La Deificacion en La Soteriologia Agostiana’, *Augustinus Magister* 2 (1954), 745-54.


\(^12\) V. Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness of God* (London: Mowbrays, 1974).

\(^13\) Gavrilyuk, 648.

through God’s uncreated energies. This definition later came to be promoted by another eastern scholar, Georgios Mantzarides.\textsuperscript{105} Lossky’s definition, however, drew criticism from another eastern scholar, John Zizioulas\textsuperscript{106}, who developed an alternate technical definition for the doctrine. Zizioulas has argued that Lossky’s definition has neglected the Christological foundations of the doctrine. He defines the doctrine in terms of the Christian’s participation in Christ’s hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) rather than specifically in the divine energies. The former, Zizioulas explains, places the ontological distinction between created-uncreated upon its Christological foundation. Other contemporary eastern scholars, like Panayiotis Nellas\textsuperscript{107} and John Behr\textsuperscript{108} have promoted Zizioulas’ work which has appealed to western scholars because of its Christocentric focus.\textsuperscript{109}

**C. The Resurgence of Study on the Doctrine in the West**

In the twentieth century the Catholic scholar Jean Danielou\textsuperscript{110} (1905-1974) wrote a preface to the second reprinting of the original 1930s study by French academic Myrrha Lot-Borodine\textsuperscript{111} (1882-1957) on the patristic doctrine of deification. In the preface, Danielou noted the anachronism he saw in western scholarship typified by Lot-Borodine’s study. All the same, Lot-Borodine’s series of articles proved valuable in that they represented the first positive written account on the doctrine in the west, which challenged and counteracted von Harnack’s negative assessment of the doctrine.

In 1938 the German academic Jules Gross\textsuperscript{112} produced the first historical contextual study of the doctrine in the Greek Fathers, providing the first comprehensive and chronological analysis of the doctrine. Examining the concept of deification as it appeared in Hellenised philosophy, biblical and Jewish literature (from Old Testament and New Testament through to Jewish and Christian themes),

\textsuperscript{105} G. Mantzarides, *The Deification of Man: St Gregory Palamas and the Orthodox Tradition* (tr. L. Sherrard; Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984).


\textsuperscript{107} P. Nellas, *Deification in Christ: The Nature of the Human Person* (tr. N. Russell; Crestwood, St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1987).

\textsuperscript{108} J. Behr, *The Mystery of Christ: Life in Death* (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2006).

\textsuperscript{109} See Gavrilyuk, 647-59.


non-Christian mystery religions and postbiblical sources, he found that von Harnack’s original claims against the doctrine had no merit. Gross described the doctrine as a biblical idea in Greek dress, the equivalent of the western doctrine of sanctifying grace. The doctrine was a re-expression of the two New Testament themes: the Pauline theme of both the Christian and the church’s mystical incorporation into Christ, and the Johannine idea of the incarnate Word (\(\Lambda\omega\gamma\omicron\zeta\)) as the source of divine life. Moreover, prior to the sixth century, Gross ascertained that there was no precise definition of the doctrine and that it was after this time that the doctrine became liable to some definition. Gross postulated that from the fourth century the doctrine had already established itself as a fundamental doctrine for the majority of the Greek Fathers, forming a kind of centre to their soteriology.

Gross’ study inspired further investigation into the patristics through the 1940s. The Swiss Catholic theologian, Hans Urs von Balthasar, as well as Danielou, both undertook detailed studies of the theology of the Cappadocian theologian Gregory of Nyssa. After which Von Balthasar produced the first comprehensive study of the theology of Maximus the Confessor in which he examined Maximus’ cosmology, soteriology, Christian anthropology, Christology and eschatology. This comprehensive study was followed by the work of another Catholic theologian, Polycarp Sherwood whose examination of Maximus’ works catapulted Maximus onto the centre stage of patristic study whereby interest has remained into the twenty-first century. The renewed interest in patristic study in the west, particularly with reference to Maximus, also reinvigorated

\[\text{113} \text{Gross, Divinisation of the Christian, 8.}\]
\[\text{114} \text{Ibid., 272. ‘We can conclude without exaggeration that the Greek father’s doctrine concerning divinization of the Christian- so varied and so rich- contains, at least virtually and under the covering of a not very technical terminology, the basic points of our treatises on sanctifying grace.’}\]
\[\text{115} \text{Ibid., 105.}\]
\[\text{116} \text{Ibid., 271-72.}\]
\[\text{118} \text{J. Danielou, Platonisme et theologie mystique: Essai sur la doctrine spirituelle de Saint Gregoire de Nysse (Paris: Aubier, 1944).}\]
\[\text{120} \text{P. Sherwood, An Annotated Date-List of the Works of Maximus the Confessor (Rome: Orbis Catholicus, 1952).}\]
interest into the patristic doctrine of deification. In 1994 the French academic Jean-Claude Larchet\textsuperscript{121} produced a study that specifically focused on the doctrine in Maximus’ theological thought. More recent publications have appeared that have noted the importance of the doctrine to various aspects of Maximus’ theology.\textsuperscript{122}

In 2004 Norman Russell’s\textsuperscript{123} important study on the doctrine of deification in the Greek patristic tradition included a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine in Maximus’ theology. It builds on and answers the questions which Gross’ 1938 study had left unaddressed. Russell’s study offers a careful textual analysis of deification terminology as it appears in the context of each of the Fathers his book examines. In so doing, he considers the wider theological problems that each theologian had to confront, which implied the value of the doctrine to the early church. Russell’s examination introduced the nominal, metaphorical and analogical qualities that the doctrine had, which had been previously overlooked. Moreover, he found that it was not until the sixth and seventh centuries that the doctrine became susceptible to technical definition. Although Russell’s study does not engage in a critique of the current eastern Orthodox debate over the technical definition of the doctrine, it presents an objective scholarly study of the doctrine. Russell’s study also includes an appendix that includes a comprehensive list of some of the Fathers of the Latin west, inclusive of Augustine, and provides a brief but comprehensive overview of their engagement with the doctrine.

On the doctrine of deification in Augustine little had been written outside the comprehensive 1986 article by the English Anglican academic Gerald Bonner\textsuperscript{124} (1926-2013). Although the article appeared a decade prior to the discovery of the Dolbeau sermons, Bonner’s work has remained the most definitive account of Augustine’s engagement with the doctrine.\textsuperscript{125} In 2002, the discovery of the Dolbeau sermons inspired an article, which appeared in French, written by another English Anglican

\textsuperscript{121} J. Larchet, \textit{La Divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confesseur} (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1996).


\textsuperscript{125} It was brought to my attention that a book on the doctrine of deification in Augustine has recently been published: David V. Meconi, \textit{The One Christ: St Augustine’s Theology of Deification} (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013). I have not had the opportunity to examine this book since its release.
academic, Henry Chadwick\textsuperscript{126} (1920-2008). He concludes that the doctrine lay for Augustine at the heart of Christ’s redemption. The discovery of the Dolbeau sermons also inspired an essay by Robert Puchniak\textsuperscript{127}, which revisited Bonner’s original insights in light of the sermons.

In 2005 an article by Carl Mosser\textsuperscript{128} analysed the historical-contextual Jewish-Christian foundation of the patristic doctrine of deification. Contrary to von Harnack’s claim that the doctrine was a Hellenised importation into Christianity, Mosser argued that the earliest patristic interpretations of Psalm 82 represent a remarkable instance of fidelity to the Second Temple Jewish roots of Christian belief.\textsuperscript{129} In 2006-2007 two monographs appeared that examined the doctrine from a historical-contextual perspective.\textsuperscript{130} The 2007 monograph edited by Michael Christensen and Jeffrey Wittung was based on a series of papers that had originally been delivered at Drew University in May 2004. Two articles from the monograph bear specific mention. The first by Vladimir Kharlamov\textsuperscript{131} focused attention on the rhetorical value that the doctrine had for pastoral application in the early church, which could be discerned from the fourth century onwards. Kharlamov found that, whilst the concept was not really treated as an independent theological matter, the language of deification was often used as a rhetorical tool with a great range of applications to Christian spirituality. Rhetoric enhanced the notion of deification so that it made the concept applicable to a wide variety of spiritual matters, and also applicable to a broad audience. The second essay by Gosta Hallonsten\textsuperscript{132} drew attention to the difficulty in discerning a technical definition for the doctrine. Hallonsten instead proposes a distinction between the ‘theme’ and ‘label’ of the doctrine of theosis. Thematically, the doctrine is connected with similar soteriological themes like Christian adoption, the exchange, and participation in the divine

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\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 30. \\
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nature. These themes all inform the doctrine, but are not identical to the ‘label’ doctrine *theosis* as presented by the eastern tradition.

**D. The Doctrine of Deification and the Doctrine of Justification**

From the 1990s onwards, Protestant scholars who made a study of the patristic doctrine of deification shifted their focus to how to reconcile deification with the doctrine of justification that is the focal point of western soteriology. Lutheran evangelical scholars, who have long shown an interest in patristic study, have led the discussion. A 1997 article by Paul Hinlicky\textsuperscript{133} uncovered certain salvation-historical presuppositions of the Lutheran doctrine of justification. Looking at the relationship between theological anthropology and the doctrine of deification (as it is identified with the eastern tradition), he concluded that the doctrine had a Christological centre. The following year, a collection edited by Carl Braaten and Robert Jenson\textsuperscript{134} appeared. The monograph was based on a series of papers on Lutheran Tuomo Mannermaa’s new Finnish understanding of Luther’s teaching on justification and its convergence with the doctrine of deification. Mannermaa’s thesis is that Luther understood faith as a real participation in Christ, so that when Christians are forensically declared righteous, the declaration should not be understood in ‘name’ alone. The declaration also encompassed a realistic sense, whereby Christians are ‘really’ in Christ. It is with this ‘realistic’ sense that the doctrine of deification is concerned. In 2011 an article by the Singaporean evangelical academic Roland Chia\textsuperscript{135} noted how the patristic doctrine of deification has remained alien to Christians in the west for the reason that it is held to be antithetical to the doctrine of justification. Using a historical-contextual approach to understanding the doctrine, Chia presents the metaphorical aspects that both doctrines had in the early church. He shows how an understanding of the doctrine of deification highlights the transformative aspect of justification, so that the doctrine of justification is brought closer to the doctrine of deification.


\textsuperscript{135} R. Chia, ‘Salvation as Justification and Deification’, *Scottish Journal of Theology* 64 (2011), 125-39.
E. Research on Jonathan Edwards and the Doctrine

Discerning the nature of the relationship between the doctrines of justification and deification has stood as a marginal issue in Edwardsean scholarship. In 1951 Thomas Schafer\textsuperscript{136} alluded to aspects of Edwards’ theological thought that appeared to be at odds with the central Reformed soteriological doctrine of justification. He believed that Edwards’ conception of ‘faith alone’ had been considerably enlarged, so that it alluded to a kind of notion of deification because of Edwards’ conception of ‘union with Christ’. In 1974 Jaroslav Pelikan\textsuperscript{137}, church historian and convert to eastern orthodoxy, was the first scholar to recognise publically that the patristic doctrine of deification characterised Edwards’ soteriology.

Other scholars have found an affinity between Edwards’ theological thought and some of the Greek Fathers. For example, in 1978, an article by Patricia Wilson-Kastner\textsuperscript{138} found similarities between Edwards’ cosmic theology and aesthetics and that of the fourth-century eastern theologian Gregory of Nyssa. More recently, a 2003 essay by Michael McClymond\textsuperscript{139} showed the similarities between Edwards’ adaptation of deification and the fourteenth-century eastern theologian Gregory Palamas. Although similarities in theological thought can be traced to their engagement with Neoplatonism, a factor common to both is how each conceives religious experience as a starting point or basis for their theological reflection. Furthermore, in 2008, an article by Michael Gibson\textsuperscript{140} compared Edwards’ cosmic vision and aesthetics with Maximus the Confessor and found that each theologian constructs a foundation of the structure of creation as nothing less than the infinitely beautiful being of the triune God. The eschatological end goal of the deified Christian is pictured by Maximus and Edwards in terms of the Christian’s eternal participation in God’s being, which both distinguish from God’s essence.

More recently, a book by Brandon Withrow\textsuperscript{141} examined Edwards’ incarnational spirituality. The aim of the study was to ascertain how Edwards’ incarnationalism informed his thinking on Christian transformation. Withrow’s study does not focus on Edwards’ engagement with deification, but acknowledges that both the doctrines of deification and justification in Edwards’ soteriological thought are informed by his incarnational theology. In 2012 an article by Kyle Strobel\textsuperscript{142} examined the doctrine of deification in Edwards’ theology, noting how little remained written on the topic. His article examines Edwards’ theology and grammar, asking whether Edwards’ soteriology at all conforms to the doctrine and found that there was a strong relationship between the doctrine and Trinitarian theology. Strobel concludes that Edwards’ adaptation of the doctrine stands to be more cohesive than modern eastern Orthodox accounts, because his Trinitarian framework draws together the communication of the divine attributes and the participation in the relationship among the divine persons.

**Methodology**

This thesis will take a historical and contextual theological approach to establish how the early church’s traditional central doctrines of the fall, sin, and grace, directed each theologian’s teaching on how the Christian life was transformed in Christ. This examination will establish the reasons why the doctrine of deification can be seen to frame each theology of the will and the affections, and will establish clarity and understanding of the doctrine. Therefore it will show the reasons why this early church soteriological doctrine continues to remain relevant for western theological engagement with reference to Christian practice.

**The Argument**

The structure of this thesis is as follows. The first three chapters examine the problem of human self-determination and the issue of sin and grace. These chapters present an in-depth view of how each theologian preserved the church’s traditional teaching about sin as a total deprivation of human nature within their different historical contexts. The three chapters that follow then give an analysis of each theologian’s theology of the will and the affections, which each similarly developed


to show that, outside of grace, humans are incapable of self-reformation and transformation. The next three chapters show how each theologian’s adaptation of deification not only framed his theology of the will and the affections, but also worked to give robust meaning to Christian salvation itself. The concluding chapter provides an overall assessment of the doctrine, how it should be understood and why it continues to remain relevant today.

**Part I. The Problem of Human Self-Determination and the Christian Issue of Sin and Grace**

**Chapter 1. Augustine and the Problem of Sin**

Contemporary Augustinian scholarship has generally struggled to see continuity in Augustine’s early Christian thought believing that it is characterised by Neoplatonism. Contrary to this view, the traditional doctrines of the fall, sin and grace informed Augustine’s theological thought from his conversion onwards. Moreover, it was the context of the Pelagian controversy, which caused Augustine to technically articulate his teaching on ‘original sin’ and grace in his later theological writings. His interaction with the early church doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’ allowed him to frame his thinking on creation, the origin of evil, sin, grace and redemption. As a convert to Christianity he held a pessimistic view of the human moral nature and believed that, outside of grace, Christians were incapable of self-determining their transformation or reformation. His soteriological anthropology expressed sin’s effect on the moral nature as the will’s deliberate movement away from God. He expressed the psychological effects of sin upon the moral nature as ‘the passions’.

**Chapter 2. Maximus and the Problem of Sin**

The classical doctrine of original sin, which is associated with Augustine, has historically not been associated with the soteriology of the eastern Fathers. Scholarship has generally created a division between the eastern and western Fathers over how the issue of sin upon the moral nature was spoken about. A strict demarcation between east and west, with reference to how Maximus spoke about sin, in

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143 See Chapter 1, section 1.11 in this thesis.
comparison with how Augustine spoke about sin, is unwarranted, because the technical differences, language, and emphases are contextually derived. The impetus behind Augustine’s development of his analogy of guilt was the Pelagian controversy, which allowed him to explicate on the nature of grace and human freedom. For Maximus, sin, as a forensic declaration of guilt, was not raised by Origenist\textsuperscript{144} soteriology. He wanted to provide a corrective to Origenist dualism, which located sin’s effects entirely in the material/earthly world and not on the soul or intellect. Believing that the fall had corrupted the moral nature of all humans, he described sin’s effects on human nature in terms of the will’s deliberate move away from God. He believed that outside of the work of grace the moral weaknesses evident in the moral nature, which he expressed as ‘the passions’, were incapable of self-reformation or transformation.

\textit{Chapter 3. Jonathan Edwards and the Problem of Sin}

The Enlightenment conception of human nature projected an optimism that rejected the pessimistic view communicated by the classical doctrine of original sin. The increasingly dominant view amongst libertarian influenced Protestants was that sin did not arise in an individual because of an inherent naturally depraved state, but because of individual choice. For Edwards, however, sin was the result of the misuse of the person’s God-given natural propensity of reason, which was compromised when people chose to follow their base passions or desires. His arguments sought to counteract and correct these assertions so that he could draw its proponents and his readers in line with the traditional doctrine of original sin. His arguments aimed to correct the belief that the Christian’s ability to self-determine their transformation or reformation could be attributed to human reason alone. He developed a distinction between the ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ image, which allowed him to overturn this anthropocentric principle of reason that had replaced the theocentric principle of grace in Arminian and libertarian soteriology. In addition, his conception of ‘personal identity’ and ‘continuous creation’ enabled him to metaphysically explain that the moral nature and the will was incapable of self-reformation and transformation outside of grace.

\textsuperscript{144} See Chapter 2, sections 2.3 and 2.4 in this thesis.
Part 2. The Theology of the Will and the Affections

Chapter 4. Augustine on the Will and the Affections

In all the controversies that Augustine engaged with in his life, the issue of self-determination and the nature of Christian freedom always emerged. Augustine inherited his conception of will from his philosophical and Roman law context, but his idea of will differed from Greco-Roman volitional thought because it communicated intentionality. The passions become synonymous and interchangeable with the direction and focus of the Christian’s mind and heart so that these passions become acts of the will. Augustine presents a portrait of the spiritually-renewed human by way of his Trinitarian conception of the mens, a conception that is inclusive of both the intellectual, emotional and volitional aspects of the interior person. In the mens, memory/knowledge/will operate as three simultaneous functions in the believer, so that their heart and mind psychologically operate in unity. The unity of the heart and mind in the action of the will shows the psyche’s conscious natural capacity for self-determination and autonomous direction. When the Spirit’s work illuminates the believer’s mind of its knowledge of God, the will naturally aligns itself in obedience to God’s will. The believer’s love for God moves the passions to good action, which results in the continual reformation and transformation of the active Christian life.

Chapter 5. Maximus on the Will and the Affections

Origenist soteriology had denied the church’s traditional teaching about the fall and sin, believing that sin impacted the material/earthly world but not the intellect. Contrary to Origenist thought, Maximus believed that sin had compromised the moral nature itself. Although, he inherited his volitional terminology out of his philosophical context, like Augustine, he also developed a psychology of will that communicated intentionality. Using a Trinitarian and Christological framework, he developed a distinction between the ‘natural’ and the ‘gnomic’ will, allowing him to develop a theory of two wills for humanity. The natural will that operated at the spiritual level/mode of the λόγος, but which after the fall had been replaced by the sin-affected gnomic will. The gnomic will operated in the moral
nature of all humans in the sin-affected environment of the fall, which he called the level/mode of the τρόπος. Although the gnomic will operated in natural opposition to God, once the mind was made aware of its knowledge of God, it could be directed to function in accordance with the natural will. When the Spirit’s work illuminates the believer’s mind of its knowledge of God, uniting the mind to the heart, the will aligns itself in obedience to God’s will. The believer’s love for God moves the passions to good action, which results in the continual reformation and transformation of the active Christian life.

Chapter 6. Jonathan Edwards on the Will and the Affections

The increasing influence of libertarian thought upon Reformed Protestantism, associated with the emergent new moral philosophies had begun to erode the classical doctrine of original sin which taught that outside of grace humans were incapable of self-reformation and transformation. In addition, the context of the revivals had impressed upon Edwards the necessity of providing an account for the validity of the affections in the Christian life. He conceived a theology of the will and the affections that not only accounted for the Spirit’s work as a continuing work of grace, but which validated the necessity for the ongoing development of the affections for the Christian active life. He presents a portrait of the spiritually-renewed mind by way of his idea of ‘sense of the heart’, which operated in conjunction to his conception of ‘consent to being’; a conception he correlates with his ideas of ‘true beauty, excellency and virtue’. When the Spirit illuminated the mind of its knowledge of God, the mind and heart are united in action, which inclined the will to consent naturally to God’s being. The Christian’s desirous choice is brought harmoniously in line with God’s own design and purposes, which moves the affections to right action resulting in the continual reformation and transformation of the active Christian life.
Part 3. The Patristic Doctrine of Deification

Chapter 7. Augustine and the Patristic Doctrine of Deification

Contemporary scholarship has not associated the patristic doctrine of deification with the theology of the western Fathers. Augustine, however, engaged with the doctrine frequently in his theology and it provided him with the means to locate the Christian’s sanctification at the spiritual level of the divine. Augustine’s soteriology equates deification with Christian adoption because of the full consequence of Christ’s mediatory work. The Christian’s identity not only lay in Christ as the model of ‘true humanity’, but in a far more realistic sense. He presented this realistic sense in his portrait of the Spirit-filled Christian as God’s image and instrument in the world, which was what enabled him to correlate the Christian’s deification with Christ’s justification of the Christian. Finally, his engagement with deification allowed eschatology to inform the issue of Christian ethics and morality in the Christian’s present life, so that his theology of the will and the affections came to be not only framed by the Christian’s deification but climaxed in it. This understanding placed Christian moral theory upon a theocentric centre, not an anthropocentric one, which demarcated Augustine’s moral theory not only from the moral theory of the Manicheans and Pelagians but also from Greco-Roman philosophical theories.

Chapter 8. Maximus and the Patristic Doctrine of Deification

Maximus’ theology frequently engaged with the patristic doctrine of deification. His conception of deification was the result of Christ’s work of grace in the Christian life. The Spirit’s work was a deifying work in the Christian life because it continued the reformation and transformation of the Christian life. His soteriological anthropology equated deification with Christian adoption because of the incarnation’s fully human and divine nature and Christ’s mediatory work. Deification was a product of Christ’s justification of Christians, the proof of which was the believer’s new disposition of will. Christ was not only the agent of the exchange, but the means by which the will’s new disposition operates at the natural spiritual level/mode of the λόγος. The incarnation’s salvific work had spiritually
refashioned human nature, so that the believer’s identity not only lay in Christ as the model of ‘true humanity’, but in a far more realistic sense. This realistic sense is presented by Maximus in a similar fashion as had occurred with Augustine, in his portrait of the Spirit-filled Christian as God’s image and instrument in the world. This understanding allowed deification to inform his eschatology, and made Christian moral theory a theocentric concern not an anthropocentric one, so that it worked to demarcate his moral theory from both Origenist and Greco-Roman theories.

Chapter 9. Jonathan Edwards and the Patristic Doctrine of Deification

Although Edwards does not use the term ‘deification’ or ‘theosis’ in his writing, his soteriology and eschatology were characterised by the doctrine. His adaptation of deification brings together the transcendent and immanent qualities of the work of grace in the Christian life in a way that is not antithetical to or incompatible with the Reformed doctrine of justification by faith. Edwards’ engagement with the doctrine drew out the full soteriological and cosmic implications of both Christ’s work of redemption and his resurrection. Deification informed his eschatology, which made Christian moral theory a theocentric concern, and demarcated his Christian moral theory from libertarian moral theory. Edwards’ adaptation of deification, therefore worked to account for both the spiritual and earthly concerns of the Christian life without negation of the other and, importantly, without enforcing a dichotomy between the two realms.

Chapter 10. Conclusion. The Importance of the Patristic Doctrine of Deification for Western Theology

The concluding chapter brings together the various strands of the foregoing chapters in an overall assessment of the significance of the patristic doctrine of deification. Although the doctrine remains a difficult one to define technically, this does not negate its authenticity or soteriological importance. The ways in which all three theologians engaged with the doctrine show that the doctrine is informed by a broad spectrum of soteriological themes, given meaning by the incarnation and the Trinity because the doctrine takes its meaning from the context of apophatic or negative theology. Each theologian’s adaptation of deification worked to locate the Christian’s sanctification at the spiritual
level of the divine, because it insists on the inseparability of Christ’s work on the cross and his divine
spiritual origins, which belong to the Christian because of their spiritual adoption. The incarnation’s
salvific work has spiritually refashioned human nature so that the Christian’s identity not only lies in
Christ as the model of ‘true humanity’, but in a far more realistic sense. This realistic sense is
presented by each theologian in their portraits of the Spirit-filled Christian as God’s image and
instrument in the world. A key feature of the doctrine lies in its ability to give meaning to a robust
view of the Christian life seen in terms of the believer’s eschatological future. An important way in
which the doctrine functions is in how it allows eschatology to inform the issue of Christian ethics and
morality in the Christian’s present life, making Christian moral theory a theocentric concern, not an
anthropocentric one. This demarcates Christian moral theory from all types of secular and
philosophical theories.
Part 1: The Problem of Human Self-Determination and the Christian Issue of Sin and Grace

Preface

Issues to do with Christian perfection and the nature of human freedom have concerned Christian theologians from the earliest times.¹ For Christianity, the topic of perfection and sin were correlative issues, as neither could be spoken of without reference to the other. In traditional teaching sin totally corrupted the moral nature, making it incapable of reforming itself outside of the work of grace. By the fourth and fifth centuries the doctrine of universal sin was already well established as a central tenant of Church teaching.² Reflecting on the human condition, the doctrine’s biblical presuppositions established the presence of sin as an historical reality rather than an issue for psychological analysis, because all physical life was afflicted by suffering and death.³

Early Christians explained the world’s present reality in light of the hope of redemption and the future restoration of a new creation as it was promised to Christians in the scriptures.⁴ In reflecting on the human condition, early Christian thinkers took for granted the Greco-Roman philosophical depiction of the human as a composite duality of body and soul or mind. Reflecting on the Genesis 1-3 creation story, Christians also conceived that God, in creating humans in his image, had created them with a ‘rational nature’ or intellect.⁵ Although the body died and wasted away, the soul remained spiritual and immortal.

The Christian view departed from the Neoplatonic one which spoke of the soul as having fallen out of its pre-existing pristine state into the material corruptible world. Although the soul was depicted as spiritual and immortal, its fall had imprisoned it in a corruptible material/corporeal body. The mind (νοῦς) was the door to the soul, the way in which the soul could free itself from its bodily prison, back to its pre-existent primeval state. The Genesis story, however, taught that God the Word (Λόγος) had not only created the world ‘out of nothing’, but in creating humans had set them apart from the animals. Humans, unlike the animals, possessed a reasoning capacity or intellect, which indicated that in the garden prior to the fall, God intended the first humans to participate in his Word

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³ See Ibid., 344.
⁴ See Ibid., 344.
⁵ See Ibid., 344-46.
(Δόγος) and know him. Upon reflection of the Genesis story, it became clear to early Christians that what was meant by ‘God having created humans in his image’ was that humanity was in possession of a reasoning capacity by which they could know God and that distinguished them from all other creatures.  

The Genesis story shows the first humans in the garden in direct communion with God the Word. This depiction implied that Adam and Eve, perfect and immortal, were created with both a spiritual and rational capacity for direct knowledge of God. They therefore participate in the Δόγος in as much as they are not ἀλογος, devoid of the knowledge of God. Their spiritual and rational capacity, also defines their autonomy, so that in order to preserve their created resemblance or likeness to God it was necessary for them to obey God’s word.

Although the Genesis story did not explain the origins of sin, early Christians attributed its origin to the result of Adam’s and Eve’s wilful disobedience of God’s word. The Christian language of sin challenged the private character of human choice because it located human deeds within the context of a relationship with God, ‘prior to and independent of any human choosing’. Early Christians therefore thought of the will as corrupted and deformed by sin, unable to naturally align itself with God’s commands. Yet, that God had created humans in his image signified that humanity retained its rational moral nature and autonomous freedom. The intellect, although clouded by sin’s effects, retained its potential for knowledge of God, so Christians spoke of the work of grace as the reason why the believer’s mind was restored to its knowledge of God.

A. The Classical Greco-Roman Ideal of Perfection

Understanding the Genesis story as the historical explanation for current human experience, early Christians sought to differentiate their doctrinal beliefs about human nature and the meaning of human existence from non-Christian philosophical ideals. For instance, Greco-Roman ideals

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6 See Kelly, 346-47

7 The Greek word λόγος theologically contrasts with its opposite ἀλογος. Translated as ‘without reason’, ‘devoid of reason’, or as ‘irrational’, ἀλογος in the philosophical context takes its meaning from irrational ‘animal nature’ or the ‘irrational’ animal parts of human nature. Non-Christians can therefore not participate in the Λόγος because they are ἀλογος, literally ‘devoid of God’. See G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 78. ἀλογισταινω: to reason foolishly; ἀλογίστευτος: not guided by reason, foolish; ἀλογάμως: become like an irrational creature or animal.

encompassed a worldview that held humans as self-sufficient beings. Capable of achieving happiness and excellence in life, an idea that characterised the philosophical life of wisdom (φιλοσοφία). Like Christianity, Greco-Roman philosophy distinguished humans from animals, portraying them as rational beings that possessed free will. Its departure from Christianity lay in its assumption that because humans possessed reason and free will they were capable of attaining truth intellectually and achieve self-perfection. Christians however, insisted that the will was responsible for sin, although its freedom to act remained intact. The impact of sin upon human nature made humans incapable of shaping their lives in accordance with their ability to reason the truth, based on self-determination alone.⁹

Although Neoplatonism held a pessimistic view of the body, it viewed the soul as the spiritual centre of the human being, where the ‘door’ to the soul could be reached via the intellect or reason. Presenting a less severe dualistic system, the Neoplatonic ascetic ideal promoted a life devoted to daily exercises and spiritual disciplines that helped people achieve victory over their body, so that perfection and wisdom could be attained.¹⁰ Spiritual disciplines therefore became aids to the soul or a means to an end, whereby disciplining the body and mind aided humans in their reasoning in the search for truth.

The Greco-Roman philosophical ideal of perfection was incompatible with Christianity because Christians did not promote a similar pessimism about the body. The doctrine of creation ensured the continuing goodness of creation. Sin had not originated from God, but had manifested in the moral nature, so the soul and mind and the will were implicated in sin. Christians did not think of spiritual disciplines as aids to the Christian life, a means by which true knowledge of God could be attained.¹¹ It was the present reality of sin that made spiritual disciplines necessary.

B. The Fall

Although the idea of the fall was not part of the Genesis story, the idea stemmed from the account.¹² Within the story’s narrative, there is an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ and a ‘before’ and ‘after’.¹³

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¹⁰ Ibid., 167.
¹¹ Evans, 28-29.
Prior to sin, Adam and Eve are inside the garden. After they sin, they are outside the garden. Inside the garden, they are in close relationship and communion with God. They are immortal, and in their work all their needs are met. When they sin, they are cast out of the garden and their relationship with God is broken. Their disobedience results in suffering, toil, and death. Alienated from God, the Word (Λόγος), their broken relationship makes them devoid of God (άλογος). This alienation from God is communicated by the Genesis story as the historical lot and burden of every human.14

For the Jews, many stories in the Hebrew Pentateuch highlighted the problem of sin on human nature, drawing attention to Israel’s disobedience of God’s commands. The origin of evil was located in human ambiguity and the human inclination for sin.15 The problem that undermined humanity’s wellbeing or happiness was traced to humanity’s alienation from God, and the evil humans inflicted upon each other at the historical level was understood to be the result of this.16 The Genesis story therefore held importance to the Jewish tradition, the first of many more stories about sin to do with Israel’s history, but for Christianity it became the central story because it explained the reasons behind the incarnation’s salvific work.17

The idea of the fall was found in early Judeo-Christian theological speculation about human nature, but the interpretation of the first sin as a fall was a much later development.18 The idea entered early Christianity first and foremost as a metaphor because Paul and other New Testament writers influenced by the Jewish tradition had thought about Adam and Eve’s sin as a fall in metaphorical and analogical terms.19 Having established itself in Christian teaching from the first century, the idea of the fall did not present any problems for Christianity until the advent of second-century Gnosticism. Influenced by the Platonic conception of the fall, the Christian Gnostics20 thought of the material/corporeal world as the product of the soul’s fall from its pristine pre-fall state. Believing that

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13 Ibid., 34-35.
15 Wiley, 29.
16 Ibid., 29, 34-35.
17 See Rondet, 15, 18; Wiley, 31, 33.
18 Wiley, 35.
19 Cf. 2 Pet 2:4.
the body and the material/earthly world were evil, Gnostic teaching about sin concerned second-century Christian theologians because its cosmology went against the Christian doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’, which established the created goodness of the corporeal world despite sin’s effects upon it.21 Gnostic teaching about sin effectively wedged apart the place of knowledge and practice in the Christian life, posing major concern to Christian thinking about all types of issues to do with sin and salvation.

C. Sin: A Universal Human Problem?

Christian thinking about sin as a universal problem can be traced to the Old Testament view of Israel’s collective responsibility for sin.22 The objective idea of sin as a collective responsibility contrasts with the modern idea of sin as an individual subjective problem that humans experience.23 In Jewish tradition sin was expressed in terms of the desires and passions of human nature. The sinful desire was reflected as an inner struggle between two impulses: the inclination to do good, yester24 ha-
tov (lasting inclination) and the inclination to do evil, yester ha-ra (lasting inclination).25 The Genesis story had depicted the yester ha-ra as a permanent human problem, which only God could rectify.26 The Jewish tradition exemplified this in the way Israel’s prophets attributed human wickedness to the heart.27 The connection made between sin and the heart was inherited by early Christians and is evident in the author of the ‘The Shepherd of Hermas’ who referred to the yester ha-ra as the origin of evil.28

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22 Rondet, 15.
23 See Ibid., 15.
24 The Hebrew yester (‘inclination’) has no Greek equivalent and no uniform Greek rendering. On the Septuagint’s (LXX) translation of the Hebrew yester into Greek, see G. H. Cohen Stuart, The Struggle in Man Between Good and Evil: An Inquiry into the Origin of the Rabbinic Concept of Yesser Hara’ (Kampen: Uitgeversmaatschappij J. H. Kok, 1984), 82-84.
26 See Cohen Stuart, 72-79; Wiley, 29.
author also assumes a connection between sin and death, an assumption that followed another common Judaic teaching that sin leads to death. 

The early translators of scripture used the Greek word ἐπιθυμία (desire, wish, longing; lust, passion, covet) in their translation of the Judaic conception of the yester ha-ra. The word ἐπιθυμία carried a slightly more negative meaning of ‘evil desire’ than ‘a tendency or inclination towards evil’ conveyed by the Hebrew yester ha-ra. When ἐπιθυμία was translated into Latin it became concupiscence (desire, sensual longing, lust), which further intensified its meaning into something akin to ‘disordered desire’. For the Hebrew writer, yester ha-ra was the explanation for why Adam could have sinned. For the Greek and Latin Fathers concupiscence had come from Adam’s sin as its penalty. The words ἐπιθυμία and concupiscence therefore theologically and psychologically implied something about sin’s manifestation that is qualitatively and dynamically different from what had initially been conveyed by the Hebrew expression of the yester ha-ra.

Although each of the Hebrew, Greek and Latin terms is expressive of psychological experience, in the Hebrew context the human ability to deliberate and choose is experienced either as the desire to be responsible (yester ha-tov, the inclination towards good) or the desire to do what is irresponsible (yester ha-ra, inclination toward evil). The human inclination to choose is intrinsic to created human nature so that it remains a neutral concept. The Latin concupiscence, however, conveys an experience of disordered desire that is taken to be a natural part of the intrinsic dimension of created nature, reflecting a change in human nature because of sin’s original or first and lasting effects. A change had occurred within human nature, which was unnatural because it negatively effected the will’s inclination or disposition toward God. It was something that resulted in the alienation of the person from God, the natural communion with God being broken.

Sin was a powerful force which clouded the mind of the ‘naturally created state’ of its knowledge of God. The idea of sin as a movement or force carried into early Christian thinking about sin’s effects on human nature. Christians began to speak about ‘the pre-fall state of original

31 J. Gaffney, Sin Reconsidered (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 34. See also Wiley, 30.
32 Wiley, 30.
33 See Cohen Stuart, 14-21; Gaffney, 34; Wiley, 30.
34 See Gaffney, 34; Wiley, 30.
35 See Gaffney, 34-35; Wiley, 30.
righteousness’ (the state of human nature in the garden before sin) and ‘the state of human nature after the fall’ (the state of human nature effected by sin). Acting as a force upon human nature, sin was described in terms of Adam and Eve’s deliberate choice to disobey God, a wilful act of disobedience that had lasting effects on their progeny.

D. The Doctrine of Original Sin and the Incarnation’s Cosmic Work

The doctrine of original sin, associated with Augustine, is an important element of both Catholic and Reformed Protestant soteriology. Augustine’s theory of ‘original sin’, seen to be disharmonious with the wider patristic tradition, is generally held to stand apart from the theology of both the Greek and Latin Fathers before and during his time. Although the doctrine depicts sin as a transmission into human nature in terms of inherited guilt, its absence especially from Greek patristic thought does not mean that the elements of the doctrine are missing. Moreover, what came to be communicated by the doctrine developed intrinsically over time through the soteriological ideas of the Fathers. Although Adam’s individual sins were remote from humanity’s own personal transgressions, in the New Testament Paul had written about sin in conjunction with Christ’s work of redemption. Attention was drawn to Christ as the ‘new Adam’ who expiated or atoned for Adam’s original fault, thus redeeming humanity from its bind to sin.

That human nature was afflicted by sin was therefore held to be the reason for the incarnation. The Fathers were not so much concerned with outlining the character of evil as they were to focus on the issue of humanity’s need for Christ. The different ways in which the Fathers spoke about sin was informed by their belief that the incarnation was salvifically necessary because sin was a universal human problem they connected to Adam’s first sin. The Fathers developed three central themes about

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36 See Gaffney, 35.
40 Cf. 1 Cor. 15: 45-50. See Rondet, 24.
41 Rondet, 24.
42 Wiley, 4, 6.
sin, constituting a theory of original sin.\textsuperscript{43} The first is the assumption that all humans are in some way involved in Adam’s initial disobedience because sin continues to occur in humans as a product of wilful disobedience. The second theme attributes the inclination in humans to disobey God to have arisen because of the fall which intrinsically affected human nature. The third theme, building on the first two themes, suggests that sin is a transmitted universal condition, conveyed by a strong sense of the mystical union of humanity incorporated with Adam in his act of disobedience. Adam’s disobedience is therefore understood to affect the moral nature or mind (νοῦς) so that the moral weaknesses evident in human nature, which the Fathers often expressed as ‘the passions’, are understood to be the result of sin’s impact on the mind itself.

The purpose of early Christian teaching about the fall and sin, and the ways in which the Fathers expressed their teaching, were aimed to illuminate this. For example, Irenaeus\textsuperscript{44} (identified by Quasten\textsuperscript{45} as one of the most important of second-century theologians) in his rejection of the Gnostic interpretation of the Genesis story as a cosmic fall, interpreted the story as Adam and Eve’s disobedience of God’s commands. So as to correct the severe materialism of the Gnostics, Irenaeus not only emphasised God’s sovereign transcendence over his creation, but God’s goodness in his creative work.\textsuperscript{46} He saw human nature as responsible for its sins because the first humans had disobeyed God’s commands. Irenaeus therefore described sin as something that was an inevitable condition not of creation, but of the moral nature itself.\textsuperscript{47}

Although Irenaeus understood that Adam’s sin warranted his punishment, his main concern was to address the issue of human responsibility for sin, an issue that had become pertinent because of Gnostic teaching.\textsuperscript{48} Human solidarity in sin was not being questioned. What was being questioned was the issue of human nature, what the restoration of human nature signified about the meaning of Christian salvation, and what ‘true humanity’ entailed.\textsuperscript{49} Following Irenaeus, the patristic tradition continued to speak of sin in order to emphasise its solution, so that teaching on sin was not separated

\textsuperscript{43} See Kelly, 350-52.
\textsuperscript{44} For an overview of Irenaeus’ theology, see Quasten, \textit{The Beginnings of Patristic Literature}, 287-313.
\textsuperscript{45} Quasten, \textit{The Beginnings of Patristic Literature}, 287.
\textsuperscript{46} Rondet, 39.
\textsuperscript{47} See Quasten, \textit{The Beginnings of Patristic Literature}, 311; Rondet, 39, 43; Wiley, 40.
\textsuperscript{48} See Pelikan, 282-83.
\textsuperscript{49} Wiley, 41.
from the doctrine of recapitulation. Reflecting on the Genesis story as a historical explanation for humanity’s present situation, Irenaeus drew an analogy between the process of maturation from childhood to adulthood alongside a progressive image for salvation and history. Early Christians thought of human history as progressing along a linear trajectory towards an eschatological future which would climax and find its fulfilment in the incarnation’s salvific and restorative cosmic work. Irenaeus developed his progressive linear view of history from Pauline theology, informed by his Christological and soteriological idea of ‘recapitulation’, where Adam was typologically portrayed as a ‘type’ of Christ. Adam’s disobedience had led to death, so by type and analogy, Christ’s obedience and righteousness as the ‘new Adam’ reversed this. Christ’s triumph over sin and death therefore ‘recapitulated’ the entire cosmos. The incarnation’s salvific work annihilated sin’s effects on a cosmic scale because Christ fulfilled the economic salvific plans (oikonomia) God had purposed at the beginning of creation.

Christ’s salvific work not only liberated Christians from their captivity to sin, but also restored God’s likeness to them, because Christ had been fully human and divine in nature. Christ in his personhood conveyed the nature of ‘true humanity’ because his will had always obeyed God. The consequences of Christ’s redeeming work therefore spiritually refashioned the believer’s moral nature. In conjunction with the Spirit’s illumination of the mind the believer’s will possessed the capacity to incline itself naturally in obedience to God. One-way in which the Fathers expressed the meaning of the believer’s spiritual refashioning was in the terminology of ‘deification’. The incarnation’s work re-established the process of deification, begun with Adam being created in God’s image and likeness, but lost when sin caused God’s likeness in human nature to be lost. The created moral nature retained its autonomy and free will because God’s image in humanity was interpreted as the rational moral nature, so that it was Adam’s spiritual and holy similarity to the divine attributes (Adam’s likeness to God), which he manifested in his pre-fall state, that are lost in humans because of sin. The patristic metaphor of deification therefore developed as a way to address the idea of the lost ‘likeness’ and how it was regained as a result of the incarnation’s salvific work.

50 See Romanides, 113; Wiley, 6.
52 Rondet, 44-45. See also Quasten, The Beginnings of Patristic Literature, 311.
54 See Pelikan, 284; Wiley, 41.
For the Fathers, the idea of the ‘lost likeness’ was also addressed in terms of God having created humanity as a composite being of body and soul/mind. Although Greco-Roman philosophy portrayed human composition as a duality of body and soul/mind, Christianity developed a triadic conception of the Spirit-filled and perfect human being composed of body, soul/mind and Spirit. The triadic composition of the believer depicted the Spirit’s illumination of the psychology of their whole person (the mind and heart). When the Spirit illuminated the Christian’s mind of its knowledge of God, the heart also became engaged in unity with the mind, the result of which saw the believer’s will naturally align in obedience to God’s will. One way the Fathers expressed this was in the terminology of ‘participation’. Christians ‘participated’ in the fullness of God’s Trinitarian life because the incarnation and Spirit’s work united the Christian’s mind with Christ’s own mind, thereby attaching the Christian to God not only as his son or daughter but as God’s person in the world. Early theologians understood the consequences of sin’s impact upon human nature as a fracturing of the purpose God had intended for humanity prior to the fall. In the garden, Adam and Eve had ‘participated’ fully in communion with God’s Trinitarian life, the life of the Word (Δόγος). When they sinned, this ‘participation’ is breached, as they and their posterity become empty of God’s Word (ἀλογος).

E. Sin and Baptism

Although the Greek Fathers thought about sin as a universal concept, the presupposition of the purpose of the incarnation’s restorative and redemptive work from sin was also thought of as a deifying work. Moreover, scripture did not explain the origins of sin. Rather it highlighted sin as a reality of the human condition universally connected to death. The crucial question being asked by the Fathers was not how to account for the origin of sin, but how to account for the origin of death, because scripture portrayed death as the penalty or judgment for sin. The Fathers also reflected on the relationship between sin and death that undergirded the sacrament of baptism. From its inception baptism was understood as a central initiation rite in its confirmation of an individual’s conversion and

55 See Quasten, The Beginnings of Patristic Literature, 311
56 On the concept of ‘participation’, see Chapter 1, section 1.6 in this thesis.
57 Rondet, 24.
58 See Wiley, 53.
response to Christ in obedience. The sacrament symbolised and denoted the Christian’s redemption of sin, granted to them because of Christ’s redemptive and restorative work. Baptism therefore signified the ‘rebirth’ of the Christian, not only in name, but also in a more realistic sense because the rite testified to the hope of the Christian’s immortal and resurrected life in the eschaton. This is a hope claimed by the active Christian life in the present.

By the third century infant baptism was an established practice in the church. The issue that arose over infant baptism was that infants could not be held responsible for their moral behaviour on an individual level. Infant baptism therefore raised further questions to do with the origin of sin, of how sin was transmitted generationally as well as the question of human responsibility in sin. These questions went hand in hand with Greco-Roman philosophical questions about human rationality, which in turn evoked an initial speculation about how sin was inherited, and how infants could be held responsible for sin. As theologians appealed to the existence of Adam’s sin in his descendants, it generated questions about how sin could be transmitted and by what principle the solidarity in sin with Adam might be understood.

As the Fathers sought to answer these questions, three themes emerged that gradually contributed to the doctrinal assumption of original sin, all of which can be traced back to the practice of infant baptism. The first was the theological consensus that the church baptised infants because they were born into sin. The first implied the second, which was that infant’s required Christ’s redemption because of Adam’s sin. Both these themes informed the third which stemmed from a nuanced reading of Paul’s reference to Adam in Romans 5:12 which interpreted sin as inherited or as ancestral. The idea that sin was an inherited human condition came to inform one of the earliest analogies given for sin: the medical analogy implied that sin was an inherited reality of the human condition. Sin was a disease afflicting all humans, which only Christ the Physician could cure.

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59 Ibid., 6
60 On Infant Baptism in the early church see W. Harmless, ‘Baptism’ Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (ed. A. D. Fitzgerald; Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 84-87; Rondet, 78-84, 122-25, n.78; Wiley, 6, 60.
61 See Rondet, 123; Wiley, 49.
62 See Wiley, 52, 55.
63 Ibid., 52-53.
64 Ibid., 49
65 Although early theologians appealed to the inheritance of sin or ancestral sin, the meaning of this did not become fixed at least from the western perspective until Augustine. See Wiley, 54.
Chapter 1: Augustine and the Problem of Sin

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to show how Augustine from the time that he first converted to Christianity held to the traditional Christian notion of universal sin, an understanding which was important to the theology about the Christian life. A theory known as ‘The Two Augustines’¹ has become influential in contemporary Augustinian scholarship. This theory has divided Augustine’s theological works into two distinct periods, an early period (386-90), and a later period from the 390s onwards. It is thought that until the 390s Augustine’s theology was characterised by Neoplatonism², and not by the traditional church doctrines of creation, the fall, sin and grace. Instead, Augustine’s early soteriological anthropology is supposed to have aspired to the Greco-Roman philosophical ideal of perfection, which promoted a positive view of the human condition. The ‘younger’ Christian Augustine believed that Christians possessed the capacity to self-determine their perfection and salvation in the Christian life. This view contrasts with his later thought, which promoted a negative or pessimistic view of the human condition, developing into the doctrines of ‘original sin’ and grace. In his later life Augustine’s soteriological anthropology is said to be characterised by the traditional church notion of universal sin, that outside of God’s work of grace Christians were unable to self-determine their own salvation or perfection.


² Neoplatonism was the type of philosophy that characterised the cultural and literary environment of Augustine’s fourth-century context. On Neoplatonism and its worldview see Introduction section 2 and n.19.
Contrary to the ‘Two Augustine’s Theory’ an argument can be made that Augustine’s Christian thought from his conversion was not characterised by Neoplatonism. Rather, the traditional early church doctrines of creation, the fall, universal sin, and grace characterised Augustine’s soteriological anthropology from the time of his conversion. Although Augustine engaged with Neoplatonism, this did not mean that he was ignorant of the traditional church doctrine of universal sin. Instead, as an interpreter of tradition, he sought to uphold this doctrine in his teaching. In fact, the development of his theory of original sin primarily arose out of the two central controversies which he engaged with throughout his life, first Manichaeism and later Pelagianism. Christian exemplarism, which early Christian thinkers had derived from Neoplatonism, provided Augustine with the ontological and metaphysical framework to combat Manichaean teaching. Following patristic tradition, Augustine’s interaction with the doctrine ‘creation from nothing’ allowed him to frame his thinking on creation, the origin of evil, sin, grace and redemption. Moreover, his interaction with this doctrine enabled him to make creative use of the Neoplatonic idea of ‘form’ and ‘participation’, allowing him to speak about how sin had distorted the created human capacity to know God, which he believed only the incarnation’s work of grace could restore in the Christian. Evidence that Augustine held a pessimistic view of the human condition from his conversion can be seen by his deployment of three different analogies for sin appearing throughout his writing: the medical analogy, the analogy of sin as a ‘power’ or ‘force’, and the analogy of ‘guilt’. In particular, both the medical analogy and the analogy of sin as a ‘power’ or ‘force’ are evident in Augustine’s soteriological thought from his conversion, whereas his analogy of ‘guilt’ can be said to have become more evident because of his polemical engagement with the Pelagians.

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3 On Manichaeism see section 1.3. Only Augustine’s corrective of Manichaeism and Pelagianism will be examined in this chapter.
4 Christians who followed the teaching of a fourth-century Christian monk named Pelagius. On the Pelagian controversy and the teaching connected with Pelagius’ followers see section 1.11 in this chapter.
5 A method developed by early Christians to explain the Christian understanding of reality. On Christian Exemplarism, see Introduction section 2, part ‘A’. See also section 1.4 of this thesis.
6 The patristic period generally refers to the post- New Testament development of Christianity from the second century onwards. See Introduction section 1, n.2.
1.2 Two Augustine’s or One?

The issue of whether Christians could self-determine their perfection and salvation was foundational to all three controversies with which he engaged during his lifetime: the Manichaeans, the Donatists and the Pelagians. Brown, in his influential biography, argued that in the first decade after his conversion the younger Augustine’s anthropology held to the Greco-Roman philosophical idea of perfection, and not to the traditional Christian view of sin. Brown argues that it was only in his later years, when Augustine developed his soteriological doctrines of original sin and grace, that he came to realise that the philosophical or platonic ideal of perfection was unachievable. Brown’s perceived dichotomy between Augustine’s early and later thought proved to be influential and has come to be taken for granted by the majority of Augustinian scholarship to date. The ‘younger’ Christian Augustine is understood to have aspired to the classic philosophical ideal of perfection, which promoted a positive view of human nature, and taught that humans had the capacity to self-determine their own perfection. The later ‘mature’ Christian Augustine, by contrast held a pessimistic view of human nature.


10 Ibid., 145. These scholars have drawn a line between the theological thought of the ‘early convert Augustine (386-390) whose theology is characterised by Neoplatonism, and the later ‘mature Augustine’, whose theology has been influenced by his reading of Pauline theology. See L. C. Ferrari, *The Conversions of Saint Augustine* (Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1984). Ferrari argues that Augustine’s conversion account in *Conf* 8 is a literary fictional technique modelled on Paul’s conversion account in Acts. P. Fredriksen, ‘Paul and Augustine: Conversion Narratives, Orthodox Traditions, and the Retrospective Self’, *Journal of Theological Studies* 37 (1986), 3-34. Fredriksen describes Augustine’s early theology as a progress in philosophy rather than as one which was based on his theological conceptions of the fall and grace. For a similar view see TeSelle, 54-55; See also: K. Flasch, *Logik des Schreckens: Augustinus von Hippo De dueris quaestionibus as Simplicianum 1.2* (Mainz: Dieterich, 1990). Flasch argues that the divergence between Augustine’s early thought and later thought is only evident at the time of his writing *Ad Simplicianum*. For a similar view see G. Lettieri, *L’altro Agostino. Ermeneutica e retorica della grazia dalla crisi alla metamorfosi del De Doctrina Christiania* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2001).
Harrison\textsuperscript{11}, against Brown’s view, argues for continuity in Augustine’s Christian thought from his conversion, explaining that the fundamental early Christian doctrines of creation, the fall, sin and grace were evident in Augustine’s Christian thought from the beginning. Harrison’s argument is inspired by the much earlier work of the French Augustinian scholar Goulven Madec\textsuperscript{12} who long argued, against Brown’s view, for continuity in Augustine’s theological thought, but whose thinking did not become as influential as Brown’s.\textsuperscript{13} That an argument for continuity in Augustine’s theological thought can now be maintained indicates that the scholars who perceive delineation in doctrinal emphases have failed to see that much of his doctrinal methodology was contextually driven. Augustine’s formulation of his doctrine of original sin should therefore be examined as it arose out of two important controversies that he engaged with during his life: Manichaeism and Pelagianism.

1.3 The Context of Manichaeism

Augustine’s conversion from Manichaeism is significant. It shows that it was his personal experience\textsuperscript{14} of this religion and his familiarity with its cosmological and soteriological views that

\textsuperscript{11} See Harrison, 16-18.

\textsuperscript{12} In two of Madec’s books from 1996, one of which is a revision of his lectures given a quarter of a century earlier, he writes that the intervening years of Augustinian scholarship since Brown’s thesis had not prompted or convinced him at any point to change his argument for continuity. See G. Madec, \textit{S. Augustin et la philosophie} (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1996), 69-70; G. Madec, \textit{Introduction aux ‘Revisions et a la lecture des Oeuvres de saint Augustin} (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1996), 137-46.

\textsuperscript{13} Augustine wrote in his \textit{Retractions} (Retr. 2.27.1 [CCL 57:89-90]) ‘I, indeed, labored in defense of the free choice of the human will; but the grace of God conquered (laboratum est quidem pro libero arbitrio voluntatis humanae, sed vicit dei gratia).’ This has generally been read by scholarship since Brown, as proof that he did not dispense with the philosophical ideal of perfection in his early Christian life. Madec however, has argued that this entry should not be read as proof of Augustine admitting to a shift in his thinking. Instead the passage is an example of Augustine’s rhetoric, which highlights the importance of Romans 1: 18-25 in his theological awareness of the Christian doctrines of sin and grace. Thus any differences between Augustine’s early works and later works are differences to do with context and should not be understood as evidence for a change in doctrinal understanding. Madec cites the much earlier work of the French philosopher Etienne Gilson, who made a study of Augustine’s philosophical thought at the beginning of the twentieth century. Gilson concluded that Augustine’s central ideas (such as his doctrines of sin and grace) were fixed in his Christian thought as a young convert to Christianity. See E. Gilson, \textit{Introduction a l’etude de Saint Augustin} (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1982), 306-11. ‘Ce qu’il y a de philosophiquement neuf dans la doctrine de saint Augustin est ne de son effort pour transformer en une doctrine creationiste la doctrine emanatiste de Plotin. C’est pourquoi, meme lorsqu’il utilise des materiaux empruntes a Plotin, la doctrine qu’il elabore est differente du Neoplatonisme.’ (p. 311) In the English translation see E. Gilson, \textit{The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine} (tr. L.E.M. Lynch; London, Victor Gollancz Ltd: 1961), 232-36. ‘Whatever is philosophically new in Augustine’s doctrine was born of his effort to transform Plotinus’ doctrine of emanation into a doctrine of creation, and this is the reason why the doctrine he elaborates is different from Neoplatonism even when he uses materials borrowed from Plotinus.’ (p. 235).

\textsuperscript{14} Prior to his conversion Augustine had been a member of the sect for nine years.
provided him with the impetus to elucidate and reflect on Christian cosmology and soteriology. As a Christian convert Augustine’s concern was to correct Manichaean views, first because he had been converted out of it, and secondly because he had friends and contemporaries who had also converted to Christianity or remained connected to the sect. His correction of Manichaeism therefore stemmed from pastoral as well as dogmatic concern.

The Manichaean\textsuperscript{15} sect encompassed a Gnostic dualistic system that was rigidly ascetic in practice.\textsuperscript{16} Their explanation\textsuperscript{17} of the origin of evil held that the world was the result of two uncreated principles, good and evil, or light and darkness.\textsuperscript{18} Evil was attributed to the work of the Kingdom of Darkness because it was believed to be a product of the primordial conflict between the two kingdoms. The result of this was that humans were thought to experience a division within themselves. This dualistic explanation of evil implied that the good principle could not be blamed for evil and that it was not omnipotent. Manichaean cosmology therefore did not encompass the Christian cosmological view of a transcendent and omnipotent Creator. Manichaean thought therefore promoted an overt materialism that led to an account of the divine as a substance defined corporeally.\textsuperscript{19} The Manichaean God was therefore anthropomorphised, made subject to time, space, and change, or understood as existing everywhere.\textsuperscript{20}

The Manichees believed that the trapped particles of divine soul or light could be liberated by an ascetic life that avoided contact with evil matter as much as possible.\textsuperscript{21} Sin from the Manichaean point of view, was not an act of one’s own volition, but a temporary loss of consciousness by the soul. Atonement for the soul’s contrition, its confession and renewal, only occurred with an awareness of

\textsuperscript{15} The term ‘Manichaean’ is used in its primary sense, with reference to the religion that was founded by Mani (or Manichaos, that is Mani ‘the living’ as the original Syriac was transmitted into Greek) in the early Sassanian empire during the third century AD. See I. Gardner & S. N. C. Lieu (eds), \textit{Manichaean Texts From the Roman Empire} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1.
\textsuperscript{16} Harrison, 85.
\textsuperscript{18} See Harrison, 75.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 75.
the soul’s divine origins.\textsuperscript{22} Humans were therefore held not to be responsible for sin. In other words, humans remained sinless, while the evil in which they were imprisoned bore the guilt for any wrong that eventuated.\textsuperscript{23} Manichaean soteriology therefore emphasised independent self-achieved salvation which went contrary to traditional Christian teaching about the universality of sin.\textsuperscript{24} Manichaeism was a form of fatalism, which upheld God’s sovereignty in his creation, but denied human freedom and responsibility for sin.\textsuperscript{25}

1.4 Christian Exemplarism

Christian exemplarism, provided Augustine with the ontological and metaphysical framework to combat Manichaean teaching. As a method used to explain the Christian view of reality, it provided the means for him to structure the spiritual and corporeal realities of the Christian life without compromise to the Christian doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’.\textsuperscript{26} Following patristic tradition, Augustine adopted this early church doctrine as the central tenet of his cosmology.\textsuperscript{27} It became a doctrine that framed his thinking on the central articles of faith: the nature of God, creation, humanity, evil and sin, grace and redemption. The doctrine ‘creation from nothing’ enabled Augustine to articulate the Christian belief in God’s absolute transcendence, humanity’s falleness and need for divine grace. For this reason, he identified sin as the privation\textsuperscript{28} of God’s goodness as is evident in this passage:

\begin{quote}
It becomes clear, then, how the term evil is to be employed, for it is properly applied, not to essence, but to privation (\textit{Ita et malum ostenditur quomodo dicatur; non enim secundum}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item S. N. C. Lieu, \textit{Manichaeism in the Later Roman Empire and Medieval China: A Historical Survey}, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 19. For the Manichees, the ultimate sin, for which there was no repentance, was the refusal to accept the special knowledge imparted by the \textit{no\i} (mind) about the primordial existence of the two principles.
\item There were two tiers of peoples within the Manichee sect. The ‘Elect’ were on the higher tier and the ‘Hearers’ on the lower. The Elect lived extremely ascetic lives, whereas the ‘Hearers’, who were permitted to marry were meant to serve the Elect’s needs.
\item See Harrison, 82.
\item Cf. \textit{conf.} 7.20.26, 7.21.27 [CCL 27: 109-10] Augustine wrote that Neoplatonism played a significant role in his conversion. See Harrison, 76.
\item See Harrison, 74.
\item Although it is true that Augustine is credited with the development of a doctrine of sin that depicts sin as a deprivation of the good (privatio boni) or as a lack or absence, he clearly also spoke about sin as a ‘force’ or as a ‘something’. See section 1.13 in this chapter.
\end{footnotes}
essentiam, sed secundum privationem verissime dicitur)... Thus God is the supreme good, and the things which He has made are all good, although they are not as good as He who made them. (Ita et Deus summum bonum est, et ea quae fecit, bona sunt omnia, quamvis non sint tam bona, quam est ille ipse qui fecit). 29

The doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’ also clarified Neoplatonism for him: ‘I did not yet see the turning point of such a great matter in your creative mind, O omnipotent being who alone performs miracles (Ps. 71:8; 135:4). 30 That God had created from nothing meant for Augustine that God had brought his creation into existence by giving it form, order and unity. 31

1.5 The Forms or Ideas

Although ‘form’ (forma) was a word derived from Neoplatonism, Augustine used it to designate and describe what exactly it was that drew things from nothing and gave things existence: what enabled things to exist and to stand out from nothingness, or to ‘be’. 32 Hence, ‘form’ was not part of a separate realm, but was received from the Creator who ‘is eternal and immutable Form’ so that ‘form’ belongs to the divine mind, (mens or λόγος). According to Augustine, ‘form’ was lost and deformed when humans fall away or sin. 33 Form for Augustine is synonymous with the Platonic ‘Ideas’ (ἰδέα). Form belongs to God who is divine form, order, (ordo) and unity (concordia). The ‘forms’ or ‘ideas’

29 mor. 2.4.6 [PL 32:1347]
30 Conf. 4.15.24 [CCL 27:52] Sed tantae rei cardinem in arte tua nondum videbam, omnipotens, qui facies mirabilia solus.
31 See Harrison, 86.
32 Harrison, 100. See also M. Pontifex, The Problem of Free Choice: St Augustine (tr. M. Pontifex; Westminster, The Newman Press: 1955), ACW 22: 263-65 n. 37. In Hellenic philosophy ἰδέα (Idea) came to be used to answer the question: ‘What kind of thing is it?’ It came to mean the nature or essence of a thing. Everything in the material world was considered to have a ‘form’ because ‘everything’ is some definite kind of thing. Hence, the words idea, forma, species, and ratio should be understood to all have the same meaning for Augustine. The Neoplatonists saw difficulty in accepting a sphere of impersonal immaterial essences (i.e. the condition assigned to the essences in Plato’s works, interpreted the ‘ideas’ as thoughts of God, and placed them in the divine mind [νοῦς] which emanates from the One as the first proceeding hypostasis). Augustine’s thinking starts from this position, as he understood the exemplar ideas to be the eternal truths of God, but he differs from Neoplatonic thought in that he rejects their emanation theory. He understands God’s creation act to be twofold: creation and the giving of ‘forms’ or information/knowledge.
33 See Harrison, 102.
are therefore unformed, eternal and transcendent or the first principles to which all created, temporal, mutable beings are formed.34

Every changeable [mutable] thing must necessarily be able to realise form (Omnis enim res mutabilis etiam formabilis sit necesse est)…Nothing can give its form to itself (Nulla autem res formare se ipsam potest)…So we conclude, that body and soul [mind] are given their forms by a form which is unchangeable and everlasting (Conficitur itaque, ut corpus et animus forma quadam incommutabili et semper manente formentur).35

It is in receiving form that formless matter comes from nothing into existing or being. ‘Form’ was therefore an ontological category that referred to existence and being, which Augustine used to emphasise that the entire material created world was good, because God had created it from nothing.36

From what did he make them? Out of nothing (Unde fecit? Ex nihilo). Whatever is must have some form, and though it be but a minimal good it will be good and will be of God (Quoniam quidquid est quantulacumque specie sit necesse est. Ita etsi minimum bonum tamen bonum erit et ex deo erit). The highest form is the highest good, and the lowest form is the lowest good (Nam quoniam summa species sumnum bonum est, minima species minimum bonum est). Every good thing is either God or derived from God. Therefore even the lowest form is of God. And the same may be said of species (Omne autem bonum aut deus aut ex deo, ergo ex deo est etiam minima species. Sane quod de specie, hoc etiam de forma dici potest). We rightly praise alike that which has form and that which has species. That out of which God created all things had neither form nor species, and was simply nothing (Neque enim frusta

34 Cf. lib. arb. 2.16.44 [CCL 29:267] ‘You cannot grasp with bodily sense or attention of the soul any changeable thing you see which is not possessed by some form of number (Si ergo, quicquid mutabile aspexeris, vel sensu corporis vel animi consideratione capere non potes, nisi aliqua numerorum forma teneatur): take this away, and it falls back to nothing (qua detracta in nihil recidat). Therefore have no doubt that there is some eternal and unchangeable form, in order that changeable things may not cease, but, with measured movement and distinct and varied forms, may pass through their temporal course (noli dubitare, ut ista mutabilia non intercipiantur, sed dimensis motibus et distincta varietate formarum quasi quosdam versus temporum peragant).’ See Harrison, 104.
35 lib. arb. 2. 17. 45 [CCL 29:267]
36 See Harrison, 100-03.
Augustine also described form, alongside measure, number and weight. ‘You have arranged all things in measure, number and weight (de quo verissime dictum est, quod omnia in mensura, et numero, et pondere disposuisti).’ Measure (mensura or modus) limits and gives a beginning and end to mutable time and existence, so that it is capable of number, form, or beauty (numera, forma, species) and weight or order (pondus, ordo) are also teleological because they draw things towards their appointed end. When Augustine used these terms, he had in mind God’s essential goodness as the One who created and continued to sustain all of creation. Furthermore, Augustine aligned the terms ‘measure, ‘number’ and ‘weight’ alongside ‘form’ showing that ‘form’ was not just an ontological category for him. It also had teleological value because it originates from God.

All humans possessed ‘form’ because God had created it and this in turn meant that God had created humans with a natural capacity to be drawn towards him. Augustine used the Neoplatonic ‘idea of the good’ to express this:

There is one good in itself and in the highest sense, that is, by its own nature and essence and not by participation in some other good (quae aliud dicit bonum quod summe ac per se bonum est, et non participatione aliquus boni). And there is another good that is good by participation, deriving its good from the supreme good which, however, continues to be itself and loses nothing (sed propria natura et essentia; aliud quod participando bonum et habendo;

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37 [CCL 32:209] Cf. c. Fort. 1.13 [PL 42:117] ‘From which it follows, that according to our faith, all things that God made through His Word and Wisdom, He made out of nothing (Ex quo est consequens, ut secundum fidem nostrum Omnia quae Deus fecit per Verbum et Sapientiam suam, de nihilò fecerit).’

38 Gn. adv. Man. 1.16.26 [PL 34:186] Augustine often related these three terms to the Trinity. He used the terms to sum up the ontological, ethical, and aesthetic nature of both the immutable forms, eternally present in the divine mind as well as the mutable created forms, which drew humans from nothing and enabled them to participate in the divine. See Harrison, 101.

39 The Latin for form, forma, species is derived from the term for beauty, formosus or speciosus.

40 See Harrison, 101-02.
In other words, because God bestows ‘form’ on his creation humans always have the potential to participate in God. That humans can ‘participate’ in God shows that the goodness God bestowed on humanity was a divine gift, or a work of God’s grace. This ‘goodness’ or ‘holiness’ becomes apparent or is received when a person turns towards God, because it is received by grace. When humans turn away from God, they cease to ‘participate’ in God, which for Augustine is the nature of sin. God remains transcendent in his ‘otherness’ and his holiness is preserved, but sin manifests itself when humans turn away or become alienated from God.

1.6 Augustine’s Notion of Participation

The idea that Christians turned away from sin towards knowledge of God was encapsulated within Augustine’s conception of ‘participation’. As long as the human person’s will was directed towards God, they would not fall away and they would find ‘rest’. His idea of the Christian’s participation in God not only maintained God’s sovereignty, but also human responsibility and freedom. ‘Participation’ (participation), was a Neoplatonic philosophical term that was used by the Fathers in a unique way that held stronger meaning than the fact or condition of sharing with others or an object. The Greek form, μεταχημα, μεταχείς, μεταχεία, held both a weak and a strong sense. In the weak sense it

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41 mor. 2.4.6 [PL 32:1347]
42 cf. mus. 6.5.14 [PL 32:1170] ‘And it is so until the push of carnal business, excited by daily habit and inserting itself into the heart of the conversion by disorderly memories, comes to rest (donec carnalium negotiorum requiescat impetus, effrenatus consuetudine diuturna, et tumultuosus recordationibus conversion ejus sese sese inserens).’ See Pontifex, 263-65 n. 37. The giving of form implied creation and participation in the mind of God and hence God’s Trinitarian life. Forma could be translated as ‘perfection’, because by receiving its form a thing receives its perfection through participation in the divine idea, and this is the same as creation. What makes Augustine’s theory original and distinguish it from Neoplatonic ramanation and emanation theories is that it consists in his combining the notion of participation with that of causality by which the form is given (exemplar causality), and that causality by which the thing is created (efficient causality).
43 See N. Russell, Fellow Workers With God: Orthodox Thinking on Theosis (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 127.
44 See N. Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2-3. In philosophical thought μεταχείας or ‘participation’ occurred when an entity is defined in relation to something else. For example, a holy person is an entity distinct from, but is defined as holy because he or she has a share in holiness. Russell writes: ‘Analogy, imitation, and participation thus form a continuum rather than express radically different kinds of relationship.
meant ‘sharing in the attributes of another’, and in the strong sense it is used to account for whatever has no being in its own right, whatever is not self-caused.\textsuperscript{45} Hence, things exist in ‘participation’ when they are dependent on something else; they have no identity that is conceivable entirely in itself.\textsuperscript{46} The strong form of participation is what Augustine has in mind, and is used by him, theologically.\textsuperscript{47}

This idea of participation is not ontologically driven, but theological, in that it operates not simply at the vertical level, but horizontally in that God’s creation of humans means that they always remain dependent on him. Augustine’s idea of ‘participation’ therefore also has teleological value in that the Christian’s relationship to God is defined by their created dependence on God. Humans had a created dependence on God because they were created from nothing as creatures capable of receiving divine form. This capability was not just at the ontological level, but also at the ethical and personal level. Humans were created as rational beings capable of responding to God in subservience and obedience, but when they disobeyed God they lost their participation in God.\textsuperscript{48} That humans are rational beings meant for Augustine that they were created in God’s image, having created them with the capacity of knowing God, a natural capacity which sin had distorted.\textsuperscript{49} When Christians consent to God they reflect God’s goodness or his holiness to the world, but when they fail to consent their created good is diminished and this results in sin.\textsuperscript{50}

Furthermore, the realistic approach, which is based on the participation model, has two aspects, one ontological, the other dynamic.\textsuperscript{46} Russell, \textit{Fellow Workers}, 127.\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 127.\textsuperscript{47} This sense of participation also features in Maximus the Confessor’s theology. Russell notes that the strong sense is evident in Cyril of Alexandria (human nature transformed in Christ). This may be thought of as a transition from a philosophical idea of participation to a theological understanding of participation. What marked Christian thought was the attainment of true personhood through the Christian’s incorporation into Christ. This strong form primarily drew its meaning from Pauline teaching on the believer’s participatory union with Christ (cf. Rom. 6:3-5; 1 Cor 10:16-17). See Russell, \textit{Fellow Workers}, 127-26.\textsuperscript{48} See Harrison, 105.\textsuperscript{49} trin. 14. 8.11 [CCL 50a: 436] ‘But we must first consider the mind in itself before it is a partaker of God, and before his image is to be found in it (\textit{Sed prius mens in se ipsa consideranda est antequam sit particeps dei et in ea reperienda est imago eius}). For we have said that, even though it has become impaired and disfigured by the loss of its participation in God, it remains nonetheless an image of God (\textit{Diximus enim eam eti amissa dei participation obsoletam atque deformem dei tamen imaginem permanere}). For it is his image by the very fact that it is capable of him, and can be a partaker of him; and it cannot be so great a good except that it is his image (\textit{Eo quipped ipso imago eius est quo eius capax est eiusque esse particeps potest, quod tam magnum bonum nisi per hoc quo imago eius est non potest}).’\textsuperscript{50} cf. mor. 2.4.6 [PL 32:1347]
The Christian’s participation in God was not evidenced at the ontological level, but horizontally, by way of the Christian’s relationship to others. Augustine wrote: ‘By these words he shows wherein man has been created in the image of God, since it is not by any features of the body but by a perfection of the intelligible order, that is, of the mind when illuminated (satis ostendens ubi sit homo creates ad imaginem Dei, quia non corporeis lineamentis, sed quadem forma intelligibili mentis illuminatae).’ God had created humans in his image, which meant that at an ethical, moral and personal level, as rational beings (created in God’s image and likeness) they possessed a natural capacity to respond to God in obedience.

1.7 Augustine’s Notion of Image and Likeness

The ‘image of God’ is understood as the human rational faculty which mirrors God’s wisdom or his being of holiness. Unlike Greek patristic writers, Augustine used the Latin terms ‘image’ (imago) and likeness (similitudo) interchangeably and did not convey the same nuanced distinction that the Greek words conveyed in translation. He expressed the notion of ‘image’ as a particular kind of

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51 What accomplishes this transformation is the mind’s turning towards God, also expressed as the mind’s gain of wisdom. See McGrath, Third Edition, 441. Cf. Gn. litt. 3.20.30. [PL 34:292]
52 God gives form to his creation, which means that he gives the capacity to humans to receive form. Cf. vera rel. 36 [CCL 32: 209] ‘If it was yet unformed, still it was at least capable of receiving form (Nam et quod nondum formatum est, tamen aliquot modo, ut formari possit).’
53 Cf. Gn. litt. 3.20.31 [PL 34:292] ‘But first the light was created in which there was produced a knowledge of the Divine Word by whom it was created, and the knowledge consisted precisely in this creature’s turning from its unformed state to God who formed it and in its being created and formed (sed ipsa prima creabantur lux, in qua fieret cognitio Verbi Dei, per quod creabantur, atque ipsa cognitio illi esset ab informitate sua converti ad formantem Deum, et creari, atque formari).’
54 See B. McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism: Vol. 1 of The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1999), 243; See also L. Thunberg, ‘The Human Person as Image of God: Eastern Christianity’ Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century (ed. B. McGinn & J. Meyendorff, New York, Crossroad: 1992), 297-298. The notion of humanity in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gen 1:26) was a central theme in the theological anthropology of the patristic period. Following earlier Fathers, Augustine also interpreted ‘the image of God’ in terms of human moral reason. Yet, his understanding of the image differed from that of the Greek Fathers, whose understanding was influenced by the Greek translation of the Hebrew words, selem (image) and demut (likeness). The Greek translation of εἰκών, image and ὀμοιότης, like/likeness in the Genesis account allowed a distinction between the two meanings, whereas the Latin translation did not. Generally speaking, the Greek Fathers continued to maintain the nuanced distinction between the Greek terms ‘image’ (εἰκών) and ‘likeness’ (ὁμοιότης). When God created humans, he created them in his image and likeness, but the fall had distorted the ὀμοιότης in humans. The Latin words imago (image) and similitudo (likeness) translated from the Greek words did not maintain the same nuanced distinction, which the Greek words had conveyed. The first reason for this, was that the Latin translation of Genesis 1:26 as Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostrum from the Greek Septuagint, did not convey or open up a distinction in the same way that the Greek words did.
‘likeness’ which relates to something as a source. The problem was that the human mind is darkened by sin, so that the person could not see God clearly and ceased to ‘participate’ in God. Bonner writes that Augustine sees fallen humanity as being alienated from God and dwelling in the region of unlikeness (regio dissimilitudinis), and Christ’s humanity as the means by which the Christian’s likeness to God’s image is restored:

For we are not God by nature; by nature we are men, and by sin we are not just (Deus enim natura non sumus; homines natura sumus; iusti peccato non sumus). God, therefore, having been made a just man, intercedes for sinful man (Deus itaque factus homo iustus intercessit deo pro homine peccatore). For there is no harmony between the sinner and the just man, but between man and man (Non enim congruit peccator iusto, sed congruit homini homo). Accordingly, by uniting the likeness of His humanity with us, He has taken away the unlikeness of our iniquity (Adiungens ergo nobis similitudinem humanitatis suae abstulit dissimilitudinem iniquitatis nostrae); and having been made a sharer [partaker] of our mortality, he has made us a sharer [partaker] of His divinity (et factus particeps mortalitatis nostrae fecit participes divinitatis suae).

The second reason was that the original Hebrew words selem and demut, from which the Greek words had been translated, were in effect synonym terms, and as synonyms they conveyed no nuanced distinction. The nuanced distinction only appeared when the Hebrew words were translated into Greek.

Cf. Gn. litt. 3.20.30 ; trin. 7.6.12 [CCL 50: 266] ‘It is for this reason that the plural number is also permitted, as it is written in the Gospel: ‘I and the Father are one. (1 Jn 10.30) Propter quod etiam pluralem numerum admittunt sicut in euangelio scriptum est: Ego et pater unum sumus.’; trin. 11.5.8 [CCL 50:344] ‘Certainly, not everything in creatures, which is in some way or other similar to God, is also to be called his image, but that alone to which he himself alone is superior (Non sane omne quod in creaturis aliquo modo simile est deo etiam eius imago dicenda est, sed illa sola qua superior ipse solus est).’ For a discussion of the Latin and Greek terms for ‘Image’ and ‘Likeness’ see M. T. Clark, ‘The Trinity: The Trinity in Latin Christianity’ Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century (ed. B. McGinn & J. Meyendorff; New York, Crossroad, 1992), 279-282; A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 124; McGinn, Foundations of Mysticism, 243, 414 n. 83; B. McGinn, ‘The Human Person as Image of God: Western Christianity’ Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century (ed. B. McGinn & J. Meyendorff; New York, Crossroad, 1992), 316-18.

Cf. trin. 14.8.11 [CCL 50a: 436]


trin. 4.2.4 [CCL 50:164]; Augustine also described sin as a ‘falling’. Cf. Conf. 10.42.67 [CCL 27:191] ‘And they have fallen into the craving for curious visions and have deserved to be given over to illusions (et inciderunt in desiderium curiosarum visionum et digni habiti sunt illusionibus).’
Humanity is therefore understood by Augustine to be incapable and unworthy of ‘participation’ in Christ because of sin, outside of Christ’s work of grace.\textsuperscript{59}

### 1.8 Augustine’s Development of his Notion of Original Sin

Augustine believed that it was the fall that caused form to be deformed. It had destroyed the created natural capacity for humans to ‘participate’ in God. When God created the first human beings, Adam and Eve, he created them with the ability to understand the first principles (\(\lambda\omega\gamma\omicron\omicron\)\(\tau\)), ideas or forms by which they have knowledge of God and comprehend God’s governance over creation. Sin was what made it impossible for the person to see clearly and understand the higher spiritual truths and ideas.\textsuperscript{60}

Augustine identified sin with Adam’s failure to live in the garden according to his knowledge of God and his commandments:

> Our carnal concupiscence is seduced by words of this serpent, and through it Adam is deceived, not Christ, but the Christian (\textit{Seducitur autem verbis hujus serpentis carnalis nostra concupiscentia, et per illam decipitur Adam, non Christus, sed Christianus}). If he will to observe the commandment of God and live from faith with perseverance, until he became suited to understand the truth (\textit{qui si praeceptum Dei servare vellet, et ex fide perseveranter viveret, donec idoneus fieret intelligentiae veritatis}), that is, if he were working in paradise and guarding what he received, he would not come to such deformity (\textit{id est, si operaretur in paradiso, et custodiret quod accepit; non venire in illam deformitatem}).\textsuperscript{61}

Augustine also drew on the early church soteriological notion of Christ’s descent or ‘emptying’ of himself so that humanity could ascend. See \textit{Ep.} 140.4.10 [PL 33:542] ‘He [Christ] therefore descended that we might ascend (\textit{Descendit ergo ille ut nos ascenderemus}).’; \textit{Ep.} 140.4.12 [PL 33:543] ‘Nevertheless, “he emptied himself,” not losing the form of God, but “taking the form of a servant (\textit{semetipsum tamen exinanvit, non formam Dei amittens, sed formam servi suscipiens}).’

\textsuperscript{59} Cf. \textit{trin.} 4. 2. 4 [CCL 50:163] ‘For this enlightenment is indeed our participation in the Word, namely, of that life, which is the light of men (\textit{Inluminato quippe nostra participatio verbi est, illius scilicet vitae quae lux est hominum}). But we were utterly incapable and by no means fitted for this [participation] on account of the defilement of our sins (\textit{Huic autem participationi prorsus inhabiles et minus idonei eramus propter immunditiam peccatorum}).’

\textsuperscript{60} McGrath, \textit{Third Edition}, 445. See also Harrison, 102, 104.

Even though the human mind can become impaired and disfigured by a loss of its participation in God, God’s created image in the human person remains; it cannot be deformed or lost.\(^62\) It can be regained once the person realises or has clear sight and vision of their created dependence on God: ‘Hence, it is clear that the full likeness to God will then be realised in this image of God when it shall receive the full vision of Him (\textit{Hinc apparet tunc in ista imagine dei fieri eius plenam similitudinem quando eius plenam perceperit visionem}).\(^63\)

One of the earliest ways that Augustine described sin was the soul’s falling away from God: ‘With regard to the soul. We have proof that it is subject to change in time from the great variety of its loves (\textit{quod de anima nobis manifestatur, quae tanta varietate affectionum suarem}) and from the fall by which it became wretched and from the restoration by which it returns again to happiness (\textit{et ipso lapsu quo misera facta est, et reparazione qua rursus in beatitatem redit}).\(^64\) He also expressed this as ‘restlessness’, and the Christian’s return to God as ‘rest’: ‘Because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you (\textit{quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te}).\(^65\) This is reminiscent of the Neoplatonic image of the soul falling away from ‘the One’, but Augustine’s use of the image articulates the effects of sin on the human condition as a result of the fall:

Thus, after he sinned by withdrawing from God’s commandment and was dismissed from paradise, he remained in such a state that he was animal (\textit{Itaque postquam peccavit, recedens a praecepto Dei, et dimissus est de paradiso, in hoc remansit ut animalis esset}). And so all of us who were born from him after sin first bear the animal man until we attain the spiritual Adam, that is, our Lord Jesus Christ, who committed no sin [cf. 1 Pet. 2:22] (\textit{Et ideo animalem hominem prius agimus omnes, qui de illo post peccatum nati sumus, donec

\(^{62}\text{ Cf. trin. 14.8.11 [CCL 50a: 436]}\)
\(^{63}\text{ trin. 14.18.24 [CCL 50a: 455]}\)
\(^{64}\text{ Gn. adv. Man. 2.6.7 [PL 34:200] Contrary to the Manichees, Augustine taught that the soul is mutable and therefore not divine. The Manichees believed that the soul was literally a particle of God. See R. J. Teske, \textit{Augustine on Genesis: Two Books on Genesis Against the Manichees} (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 102 n. 36. On Augustine’s use of the idea of ‘falling’ see Harrison, 169.}\)
\(^{65}\text{ Conf. 1.1.1 [CCL 27:1]}\)
assequamur spiritualem Adam, id est Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, qui peccatum non fecit). 66

Augustine has in mind Adam’s first sin, which he developed into the doctrine of ‘original sin’. His earliest use of the term originate peccatum occurs in the Confessions, where he distinguished between the personal sins he had committed and a universal conception of sin signified by universal death, because of Adam’s sin, from which only Christ could deliver him. Augustine wrote: ‘Carrying all the evils I had committed against you, against myself, and against others, many and serious besides the bond of original sin by which “in Adam we die” [cf. 1 Cor. 15:22] (quae commiseram et in te et in me et in alios, multa et gravia super originalis peccati vinculum, quo omnes in Adam morimur). 67

Augustine did not clarify what he meant by originate peccatum, but three features about the nature of sin are communicated by the phrase. 68 The first is that sin affected the human will and created a hostile disposition to God. The second resounds with early patristic tradition, which saw a link between sin and death, and Christ’s reversal of this. The third is the nuanced reading of the Pauline text, which also resounds with patristic tradition in that it alludes to the unity of humanity with Adam. This implied unity establishes a causal relationship and the reason why humans are affected by a sinful disposition. 69

Historically, the theology of original sin developed gradually in early Christian reflection, but Augustine can be credited with its classical expression as a theological doctrine. 70 By the fifth century, Augustine’s theory of original sin proved to be historically influential, yet this does not mean

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66 Gn. adv. Man. 2.8.10 [PL 34:201] By ‘animal man’ Augustine has in mind 1 Cor. 2:3. God had created Adam as both body and soul/mind. In using the Pauline terms ‘animal/fleshy man’ and ‘spiritual man’ Augustine’s intent is to say that Adam was created as ‘animal/fleshy’ and became ‘spiritual’ when he was placed in the garden where he knew God and whereby he obeyed God before the fall. Cf. retr. 1.9.3 [CCL 57:31-33] In the Retractions Augustine explains that the Apostle Paul had used 1 Cor. 15:45 to prove that the body was animate. To say that humans were created, as ‘animal’ would imply that they were created in a fleshy state, which they maintained after the fall. For further commentary on this idea of ‘animal/fleshy man’ in Augustine see Teske, 105 47, n. 46.

67 Conf. 5.9.16 [CCL 27:65-66]

68 Wiley, 58. For further commentary on the phrase originalis peccati see TeSelle, 192-93.

69 See Wiley, 58-59.

70 Ibid., 5, 13, 37. Augustine differentiated between two meanings of original sin. He used the expression peccatum originale originans, ‘original sin as originating’ to refer to the historical event of Adam and Eve’s first sin. The second expression, peccatum originale originatum, ‘original sin’ or ‘a sin of nature’ referred to humanity’s sinful condition caused by the transmission of Adam’s sin to his progeny. The event of the first sin had caused a defect in human nature, which was inherited generationally.
that he should be thought to have purely ‘invented’ it.\(^{71}\) As both Rondet\(^ {72}\) and Wiley\(^ {73}\) correctly note, in the development of his theory, Augustine drew on the patristic tradition that had come before him. So it was out of the earlier patristic tradition that he should correctly be seen to have developed his theory of ‘original sin’, which went on to shape the classical western doctrine of ‘original sin’.

Key to understanding Augustine’s development of his theory was the distinction he made between the event (Adam’s first sin) and the human condition of sin (Adam’s transmission of sin to his progeny), a distinction, which informs modern soteriologies.\(^ {74}\) Early Christian theologians in their depiction of sin, refused to ground evil in a divine principle or to see the material/corporeal world which had been created good, as the origin of evil.\(^ {75}\) Augustine’s conception of sin followed patristic thought in that he too located the origin of evil in human beings rather than in divine agency, which helped early theologians to resolve the dilemma of how to balance God’s goodness in creation and the origins of evil.\(^ {76}\) The idea of universal sin therefore provided Augustine with a means to not only correct Manichaean soteriology, which taught that sin had its origins in the corporeal world, but also correct the Pelagian’s less pessimistic anthropology. The Pelagians had argued that Augustine’s view of Adam’s sin as a transmission to humanity was simply speculative because the idea of original sin was not spoken about in scripture. It followed then, that human miseries could not be attributed directly to Adam’s sin, but that humans, because of grace, were born with the capacity to reform themselves despite the effects of sin on the human person.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 38, 56. The fifth and sixth-century western church councils of Carthage (411-18) and Orange (529) adopted Augustine’s basic formulation of ‘original sin’, which brought theological speculation about original sin into the official lexicon of the church. Although it was not until the sixteenth-century Council of Trent that the doctrine of original sin came to be ratified as an official doctrine.


\(^{73}\) Wiley, 38, 56.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., 5.

\(^{75}\) See J. S. Romanides, *The Ancestral Sin* (tr. G. S. Gabriel; Ridgewood, Zephyr: 1998), 41-44. Romanides explains that a central question that classical philosophical systems sought to explain was the phenomenon of the presence of evil, something which through observation could be taken for granted. What humans observed was the world after the fall, which led to the conclusion that matter was something negative, evil and non-existent. To the ancient philosophical observer, that birth and decay was a reality inferred ‘a principle of change’, e.g., the cycle of life, the cycle of seasons, the cycle of weather.

\(^{76}\) Wiley, 5-6.
Augustine expressed his conception of humanity as sharing in Adam’s sin in his phrase ‘lump of sin’ (massa peccati). Augustine’s inspiration can be connected to his reading of Ambrosiaster’s commentary on the Pauline epistles and the expression peccare in massa (lump of sin), which appears in the commentary. Augustine coined his own phrase from Romans 9:21 which signified for him human solidarity in sin, derived from Adam’s first sin:

Therefore, given that our nature sinned in paradise (Ex quo ergo in paradise natura nostra peccavit), we are [now] formed through a mortal begetting by the same Divine Providence, not according to heaven, but according to earth (ab eadem divina providentia non secundum caelum sed secundum terram), i.e., not according to the spirit, but according to the flesh, and we have all become a mass of clay (id est non spiritum sed secundum carnem, mortali generatione formamur, et omnes una massa luti facti sumus ), i.e., a mass of sin (quod est massa peccati).

Augustine believed that sin was a universal problem that humanity had inherited from the sin of the first human Adam. He developed the phrase specifically in defence of his notion of free will, in his polemical engagement with Manichaeism and later with Pelagianism. Adam’s sin had resulted in the loss of God’s image and likeness in all humans. In Augustine’s thinking this meant that Adam

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78 Ambrosiaster (Latin: ‘would be Ambrose’) is a name given to a writer of a fourth-century Latin commentary on Paul’s epistles. The commentary was erroneously attributed to Ambrose, but its author remains unknown. Augustine may have known of the author who he cited as ‘Hilary’, but since Hilary was a popular name in the fourth century, attempts to identify the author’s true identity based on Augustine’s citation have to date been unsuccessful.

79 See Rondet, 131.

80 div. qu. 68. 3 [CCL 44a: 177] Cf. div. qu. 68. 4 [CCL 44a: 180] ‘For it springs from deeply hidden merits, because even though sinners themselves have constituted a single mass on account of the sin of all, still it is not the case that there is no difference among them (Venit enim de occultissimis meritis, quia et ipsi peccatores cum propter generale peccatum unam massam fecerint, non tamen nulla est inter illos diversitas).’ Cf. Simpl. 1.2.18 [CCL 44:46] ‘So God, in making vessels of perdition from the lump of the impious (ita deus, quod ex consparsione impiorum facit vasa perditionis).’

81 Fredriksen, 546.

82 div. qu. 51. 1 [CCL 44a: 78] ‘However, since Adam did not remain good, as God had made him, and since he became carnal by loving carnal things, it does not seem an absurd possibility that Adam’s fall consisted in his losing the image and likeness of God (Sæd cum Adam, sicut a deo factus est, bonus non manserit, et diligendo carnalia carnalis effectus sit, non absurde videri potest, hoc ipsum eiuisse cadere imaginem dei et similitudinem amittere).’
had lost the natural capacity of his created dependence on God, because he had turned away from his knowledge of God:

Since the will moves when it turns from the unchangeable to the changeable good (\textit{quoniam mouetur voluntas cum se auertit ab incommutabili bono ad mutabile bonum})…The movement is certainly evil, though free will must be counted as good, since without it we cannot live rightly (\textit{Qui profecto malus est, tametsi voluntas libera, quia sine illa nec recte vivi potest, in bonis numeranda sit}). The movement, the turning away of the will from the Lord God, is undoubtedly a sin (\textit{Si enim motus iste, id est auersio voluntatis a domino deo, sine dubitatione peccatum est}).

Augustine expressed the essence of Adam’s sin as his refusal as a being created from nothing to recognise his absolute dependence upon his creator.\textsuperscript{84}

Notice, however, that such worsening by reason of a defect is possible only in a nature that has been created out of nothing (\textit{Sed vitio depravari, nisi ex nihilo facta natura non posset}). In a word a nature is a nature because it is something made by God (\textit{Ac per hoc ut natura sit, ex eo habet quod a Deo facta est}), but a nature falls away from that [God] which is because the nature was made out of nothing (\textit{ut autem ab eo quod est deficiat, ex hoc quod de nihilo facta est}). Yet, man did not so fall away from Being as to be absolutely nothing (\textit{Nec sic defecit homo, ut omnino nihil esset}), but, in so far as he turned (inclined) himself toward himself (\textit{sed ut inclinatus ad se ipsum}), he became less than he was when he was adhering to him [God] who is supreme Being (\textit{minus esset, quam erat, cum ei qui summe est inhaerebat}). Thus, no

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{lib. arb.} 2.20.54 [CCL 29: 272-73] Augustine makes clear in this passage that sin comes from the choice of the will. Sin does not originate from God. See \textit{c. Fort.} 2. 21[PL 42: 122-23] ‘I say it is not sin, if it be not committed by one’s own will (\textit{Ego dico peccatum non esse, si non propria voluntate peccetur})…the origin and head of evil is sin (\textit{origo et caput mali est peccatum}).’ Augustine goes on to explain that although God is the cause of every movement, he is not the cause of sin. His solution is to apply the principle that evil is not a positive but a defect. The issue is not the direction of the will but whether the will lives up to its full power, which a defective will cannot do. Cf. \textit{civ. Dei} 12.6 [CCL 48:360] ‘If one seeks for the efficient cause of their evil will, none is to be found (\textit{Huius porro malae voluntatis causa efficiens si quaeratur, nihil inventur}). For, what can make the will bad when it is the will itself which makes an action bad (\textit{Quid est enim quod facit voluntatem malam, cum ipsa faciat opus malum})? Thus, an evil will is the efficient cause of a bad action, but there is no efficient cause of an evil will (\textit{Ac per hoc mala voluntas efficiens est operis mali, malae autem voluntatis efficiens nihil est}).’ For further commentary see Pontifex, 265-66 n. 48.

\textsuperscript{84} Bonner, 79-80.
longer to be in God but to be in oneself in the sense of to please oneself is not to be wholly nothing but to be approaching nothingness (Relicto itaque Deo esse in semet ipso, hoc est sibi placere, non iam nihil esse est, sed nihilo propinquare).\textsuperscript{85}

Augustine was able to align evil and sin with the free choice of the will.\textsuperscript{86} The movement, the turning away from God is sin. Sin originated because of Adam’s deliberate turning away from God.\textsuperscript{87} Adam’s sin was therefore inherited by humanity as his offspring.\textsuperscript{88}

1.9 The Pelagian Controversy

It was the Pelagian controversy\textsuperscript{89} that caused Augustine to articulate his teaching on ‘original sin’ and grace. Pelagius had been concerned with Christian practice and its basis in free choice and human nature. He argued for the need of human moral responsibility due to the growing laxity and

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{civ. Dei} 14. 13 [CCL 48:434-35]
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{lib. arb.} 3. 11. 32 [CCL 29: 294] God therefore made all natures, not only those which abide in virtue and justice, but also those that were to sin. He created them not that they might sin, but that they might add beauty to the whole, whether they willed to sin or not (Naturas igitur omnes deus fecit, non solum in virtute atque iustitia permansuras sed etiam peccaturas, non ut peccarent sed ut essent ornaturae uniiversum, siue peccare siue non peccare voluissent). Cf. \textit{retr.} 1.15.1 [CCL 57:51] In it, the question of the origin of evil is treated. I affirmed that the evil of mankind has sprung from free choice of the will (Versatur ibi quaestio unde sit malum, me asserente exortum fuisse hominis malum ex libero voluntatis arbitrio).

\textsuperscript{87} \textit{nupt. et. conc.} 2.43 [PL 44:461] ‘Because marriage is not the cause of the sin which is transmitted in the natural birth, and atoned for in the new birth (quia non sunt nuptiae causa peccati, quod trahitur a nascente, et expiatur in renascente); but the voluntary transgression of the first man is the cause of original sin. (sed voluntarium peccatum hominis primi, originalis est causa peccati).’

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{pecc. mer.} 1.11.13 [PL 44:116] ‘Even in those who had not sinned after the similitude (likeness) of Adam’s transgression [Rom. 5: 14] (etiam in eis qui non peccaverunt in similitudinem praevaricationis Adae); that is, who had not yet sinned of their own individual will, as Adam did, but had drawn from him original sin (id est, qui nondum sua et propria voluntate sicut ille peccaverunt, se ab illo peccatum originale traxerunt).’ Cf. \textit{pecc. mer.} 1.9.9 [PL 44:114] ‘Hence, likewise, they [Pelagians] refuse to believe that in infants original sin is remitted through baptism, for they contend that no such original sin exists at all in people by their birth (Hinc enim etiam in parvulis nolunt credere per Baptismum solvi originale peccatum, quod in nascentibus nullum esse omnino contendunt).’ Augustine connected the evidence for universal sin to the practice of Christian baptism. Unlike the Pelagians, he argued that sin was transmitted universally to humans by natural descent, not by imitation.

\textsuperscript{89} Pelagius was a British monk, born at the same time as Augustine, possibly in Wales, who went to Rome in 384. It is likely that his thinking had been influenced by Stoic thought, which may account for his insistence on the freedom of the Christian to choose what was good, notwithstanding the sin of Adam. On Pelagius and the Pelagians see R. F. Evans, \textit{Pelagius: Inquiries and Reappraisals} (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1968); H. Marrou, ‘Pelagianism’, \textit{The Christian Centuries: The First Six Hundred Years. Volume One} (tr. V. Cronin; London, Darton Longman & Todd, 1964), 401-09; Wiley, 60-62.
corruption he observed in the church. He insisted that Christians possessed the autonomous capacity to reform themselves, because God had given them the commandments of the Old Testament and the example of Christ’s sinless life. Pelagius upheld the total freedom of the human will, whilst denying God’s sovereignty. Both Pelagius and Augustine affirmed human freedom and divine grace. The issue between them lay in the meaning of these terms. The term free will (liberum arbitrium) was a Stoic term, not a scriptural one. It had come into Christian usage by the second century, through Tertullian. Augustine, following early church tradition, retained the term in his soteriology which he developed to address what he perceived as Pelagian error: the belief that Adam’s sin had not affected the natural abilities of his progeny. Any similarities to Adam were therefore considered by Pelagius and his followers to be voluntary, not congenital. This meant that humanity possessed total freedom, and was totally responsible for their individual sins.

According to the Pelgians, any imperfection in humans would reflect negatively on God’s goodness, so for God to influence human decisions was equivalent to compromising human integrity. God had provided humans with all the knowledge they needed, such as his commandments, so that they could obey him. Adam’s influence on humanity was therefore understood by way of a bad example. Grace, as the Pelagians understood it, meant the conditions of right action. In contrast, Augustine believed that Adam’s sin had been transmitted to all human beings because of their descent from the first human, not by way of imitation or by example. Thus, the reformation and transformation of Christians was a result of God’s work of grace and not the result of the right conditions for grace, as the Pelagians believed.

Augustine believed that without grace, humans did not have the freedom to determine good and moral actions. Prior to the fall, humans had been created with the natural ability not to sin, which meant that God had created humans without sin. Outside of the work of grace, sin shaped and

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91 Ibid., 18-19
93 Ibid., 444.
94 See Ibid., 444.
95 See Ibid., 444.
96 In Pelagian thought, grace was understood to occur when the conditions of right action were met. For a discussion on the Pelagian conception of grace see P. F. Fransen, ‘Augustine, Pelagius and the Controversy on the Doctrine of Grace’, *Louvain Studies* 12 (1987), 172-81.
dominated human life. Augustine communicated this idea by way of three analogies in his writings, which all contributed to his conception of original sin; sin as a ‘disease’ in need of a cure, sin as a ‘power’ or ‘force’, and the analogy of sin as ‘guilt’.  

1.10 The Medical Analogy

Early Christian thinkers borrowed the medical or physician analogy from the Stoics. The analogy between medicine and philosophy permeated Greco-Roman philosophical expression because it illustrated the function of philosophy in relation to human problems. The medical analogy also provided a means for the philosopher to discover and justify a concrete account of the philosophical schools’ methods and procedures. Early Christian theologians adapted the analogy as a way to highlight the chronic problem of sin that terminally affected the human condition because of the fall, which could only be remedied by God’s work of grace, the work of the incarnation.

Augustine used the analogy to speak of the disorders and maladies of the human soul which was in need of God as the physician: ‘In the beginning man’s nature was created without any fault and without any sin (Natura quippe hominis primitus inculpata et sine ullo vitio create est); however, human nature in which we are all born from Adam now requires a physician, because it is not healthy (natura vero ista hominis, qua unusquisque ex Adam nascitur, jam medico indigent, qui asana non est).’ God’s grace heals the human mind, heart and will, so that they can recognise God and respond to Christ’s work of grace. Augustine made use of the medical analogy throughout his works and he identified Christ as the physician who cured humanity’s sinful condition by grace.  

1.11 The Analogy of Sin as a Force: Pride, Habit and Concupiscence

The words, pride (superbia), habit (consuetudo), concupiscence, lust, and cupidity/greed/avarice (concupiscentia, libido, cupiditas) were used by Augustine to reflect the force

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99 nat. et gr. 3. 3 [PL 44:249]
100 McGrath, 446.
101 Cf. ord. 1.8.24 [CCL 29:100]; sol. 1.14.25 [PL 32:882-83]; en. Ps. 21.2.4 [CCL 38:124]; div. qu. 82.3 [CCL 44a: 246]; conf.10. 28. 39 [CCL 27: 175] ‘Behold, I do not hide my wounds: You are the Physician, I am a sick man (Ecce vulnera mea non abscondo: medicus es, aeger sum).’
102 See Harrison, 193. Closely related to habit, is ‘involuntary’ sin. In Contra Academicos (c. Acad. 1.1.1 [CCL 29:3]), an early work, Augustine wrote that without the help of fortune the soul as it was
of sin. Pride was indicative of humanity’s non-acknowledgement of their created dependence on God. Sin had caused humanity to turn away and move away from God. ‘We see from these words [Gen. 3. 4-5] that they [Adam and Eve] were persuaded to sin through pride (Videmus his verbis per superbiam peccatum esse persuasum), for this is the meaning of the statement “You will be like gods (ad hoc enim valet quod dictum est, Eritis sicut dii)”’. Augustine traced the origins of humanity’s pride to the sin of the first humans. Pride therefore functions as a force that turns humanity away from God.

united with the body was unable to attain wisdom (sapientia). In his Retractiones Augustine stipulated that he intended this as a reference to the work of grace. In his debate with the Pelagian, Fortunatus, he attributed Adam’s voluntary sin as the reason that humanity had been plunged into the ‘necessity of habit’, which caused humans not to be able to do the good they willed to do. See c. Fort. 2.22 [PL 42: 124] ‘I say that there was free exercise of will in that man who was first formed (Liberum voluntatis arbitrium in illo homine fuisse dico, qui primus formatus est). He was so made that absolutely nothing could resist his will, if he had willed to keep the precepts of God (Ille sic factus est, ut nihil omnino voluntati ejus resisteret, si vellet Dei praecipita servare). But after he voluntarily sinned, we who have descended from his stock were plunged into necessity (Postquam autem ipse libera voluntate peccavit, nos in necessitate praecipitati sumus, qui ab ejus stirpe descendimus)...For today in our actions before we are implicated by any habit, we have free choice of doing anything or not doing it (Hodie namque in nostris actionibus antequam consuetudine aliqua implicemur, liberum habemus arbitrium faciendi aliquid, vel non faciendi).’ See footnote 28. Augustine clearly spoke about sin as a ‘force’ or ‘something’ throughout his writing showing that he was following patristic tradition. That he also spoke about sin as a ‘deprivation’ or ‘absence’ is not a contradiction or negation of the other. Instead, it highlights that Augustine’s theological thought developed within the context and situation he was addressing and that it was the patristic tradition that allowed him to do so. That Augustine is historically credited with the doctrine of sin or evil as a privation of the good does not warrant a clear demarcation between western and eastern soteriology during this period of the early church.

Cf. mus. 6.16.53 [PL 32:1190] ‘The soul lapses by pride into certain actions of its own power, and neglecting universal law has fallen into doing certain things private to itself, and this is called turning away from God (superbia labi animam ad actiones quasdam potestatis suae, et universali lege neglecta in agenda quaedam privata cecidisse, quod dictur apostatare a Deo).’; civ. Dei. 22 [CCL 48:842] ‘Then, take our very love for all those things that prove so vain and poisonous and breed so many heartaches, troubles, griefs and fears; such insane joys in discord, strife, and war; such wrath and plots of enemies, deceivers, sycophants; such fraud and theft and robbery; such perfidy and pride, envy and ambition, homicide and murder, cruelty and savagery, lawlessness and lust; all the shameless passions of the impure-fornication and adultery, incest and unnatural sins, rape and countless other uncleannesses too nasty to be mentioned (Quid amor ipse tot rerum vanarum atque noxiarum et ex hoc mordaces curae, perturbationes, maiores, fornicationes, insane gaudia, discordiae, lites, bella, insidia, iracundiae, inimicitiae, fallacia, adulatio, fraud, furtum, rapina, perfidia, superbia, ambitio, invidentia, homicidia, parricidia, crudelitas, saevitia, necvitia, luxuria, petulantia, inudentia, inudicitia, fornitiones, adulteria, incesta et contra naturam utriusque sexus tot supra atque inmunditiae, quas turpe est etiam dicere).’ On the negative passions as a sign of sin as inherent in human nature see Rondet, 120-21; TeSelle, 318; Wiley, 69.
Augustine also expressed the force of sin on the human condition as a ‘habit’ or ‘custom’. Habit, *consuetudo* can also be translated as ‘love affair’ or ‘illicit love’. Augustine believed that the force of sin moved the human away from a natural love of God to a love of self or the created world. In many of the instances that he employed the word, Augustine’s rhetoric has the meaning of an illicit love affair in mind. When the human person has clear sight or vision of God, this force of habit is broken:

> I say that there was free exercise of will in that man who was first formed (*Liberum voluntatis arbitrium in illo homine fuisse dico, qui primus formatus est*). He was so made that absolutely nothing could resist his will, if he had willed to keep the precepts of God (*Ille sic factus est, ut nihil omnino voluntati ejus resisteret, si vellet Dei praecepta servare*). But after he voluntarily sinned, we who have descended from his stock were plunged into necessity (*Postquam autem ipse libera voluntate peccavit, nos in necessitate praecipitati sumus, qui ab ejus stirpe descendimus*). For today in our actions before we are implicated by any habit, we have free choice of doing anything or not doing it (*Hodie namque in nostris actionibus antequam consuetudine aliqua implicemor, liberum habemus arbitrium faciendi aliquid, vel non faciendi*).

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108 The idea of ‘habit’ stemmed from Neoplatonic vocabulary. In Aristotle’s thought, ‘habit’ or ‘habitation’ was a state or condition of mind. Aristotle utilised the concept of habit in his ethics to explain how a disposition to act virtuously is developed from a mere capacity to so act. The disposition to act virtuously results from virtuous habits, and the habit is built upon virtuous activities. See W. L. Reese, ‘Habit’, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), 206.


110 *mus. 6. 11. 33 [PL 32:1181] ‘For such a delight strongly fixes in the memory what brings from the slippery senses (*Talis enim delectation vehementer infigit memoriae quod trahit a lubricis sensibus*). And this habit of the soul made with flesh, through carnal affection, in the Holy Scriptures is called the flesh (*Haec autem animae consuetudo facta cum carne, propter carnalem affectionem, in Scripturis divinis caro nominator*).’ Cf. *et symb. 10. 23 [PL 40:194] ‘But while the soul is still hankering for carnal pleasures, it is called ‘flesh’ and resists the Spirit (*Animæ vero cum carnaliæ bona adhuc appetit, caro nominator*). This resistance does not spring from the soul’s nature but from a habit of sin (*Pars enim ejus quaedam resistit spiritui, non natura, sed consuetudine peccatorum*). This habit of sin has been engrafted on our nature through human generation as a result, of the first man’s sin (*Quae consuetudo in naturam versa est secundum generationem mortale peccato primi hominis*).’
Augustine, therefore, aligned habit with the will’s sin-affected inclination or disposition, because he connected it to Adam’s first sin. ‘So it happens, that when we strive after better things, habit formed by connection with the flesh and our sins in some way begin to militate against us and to put obstacles in our way (Ideo contingit ut cum ad meliora conantibus nobis, consuetudo facta cum carne et peccata nostra quodam modo militare contra nos, et difficultatem nobis facere coeperint,).’ Only grace could reverse this, because sin’s force also affected the good intentions of the human will. ‘I think that death in this passage signifies a carnal habit which resists the good will through a delighting in temporal pleasures (Mortem significari arbitror hoc loco carnalem consuetudinem, quae resistit bonae voluntati delectatione temporalium fruendorum).’

His alignment of habit to the sinful inclination of the will also linked the force of habit to memory (memoria), which he identified with that which habituates the body. Only the Spirit’s illumination could reorient the ‘memory’ to its knowledge of God. ‘Memory’ for Augustine had a deeper and wider meaning than the modern understanding of ‘memory’. In the background of his thought on memory lies the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis understood as the experience of learning.

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112 duab. an. 13.19 [PL 42:108]
113 1 Cor 15. 54-56
114 div. qu. 70 [CCL 44a: 197]
115 cf. quant. 33.71 [PL 32:1074] ‘This force of habit is called memory when the link with those places is not disintegrated even by separation and the lapse of time (quae consuetudinis vis etiam sejunctione rerum ipsarum atque intervallo temporis non discissa, memoria vocatur,).’; mus. 6.5.14. [PL 32:1171] ‘Then a movement of the soul, conserving its force and not yet extinct, is said to be memory (Motus igitur animae servans impetus suum, et nondum extinctus, in memoria esse dicitur,); ord. 1.10.29 [CCL 29:103] ‘Does not the fact that we are overburdened by the weight of perverse habits of life and encompassed by the obscurities of ignorance trouble you (nonne vos mouet, quibus vitiorum molibus atque imperitiae tenebris premamur et cooperiamur)?’ On Augustine’s idea of the force of habit on memory see Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s, 189.
116 cf. trin. 15.21.41 [CCL 50a: 518] ‘But with regard to the Holy Spirit, I pointed out that nothing in this enigma would seem to be like Him except our will, or love, or charity which is a stronger will (De spiritu autem sancto nihil in hoc aenigmate quod ei simile videretur ostendi nisi voluntatem nostrum, vel amorem seu dilexionem quae valentior est voluntas).’ For our will, which belongs to us by nature, experiences various emotions [passions], according to whether the things which are adjacent to it or which it encounters either entice or repel us (quoniam voluntas nostra quae nobis naturaliter inest sicut ei res adiacuerint vel occurrerint quibus alliciam aut offendiam ita varias affections habet). What, then, follows from this (Quid ergo est)? Are we going to say that our will, when it is right, does not know what it should desire, what it should avoid (Numquid dicturi sumus voluntatem nostrum quando recta est nescire quid appetat, quid deuitet)? But if it does know, then doubtless it possesses its own kind of knowledge which cannot be there without memory and understanding (Porro si scit perfecto inest ei sua quaedam scientia, quae sine memoria et intellegentia esse non possit)?’
117 Augustine’s conception of memory is distinct from Plato’s conception of anamnesis. On Plato’s anamnesis see A. N. Williams, The Divine Sense: The Intellect in Patristic Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9-10. For Augustine, ‘memory’ is about ‘who the person is’, their esse as God had created humans in his image. It includes the depth of the person’s being (their whole
as bringing to consciousness that which, from earlier existence, the soul already knew. Augustine expressed the force of habit in his writing in various ways. He wrote that sin was the ‘custom of this life, the love of things that pass away’, ‘popular habit/custom or the desire of temporal and transient goods’, ‘human custom, an attachment to the carnal senses’, ‘the habit of body, being accustomed to material things’, ‘carnal custom’, (carnali consuetudini), humanity’s present corrupt state in contrast to its original perfect state.

Augustine also aligned the strong emotive passions of concupiscence, lust, and greed, as metaphors that express sin’s force on the human will. Gaffney explains that concupiscentia was understood by Augustine to come from Adam’s sin as its penalty, whereas the original Hebrew phrase was understood as an explanation of why Adam could have sinned. Augustine, therefore, referred to concupiscentia and its correlative negative passions, libido and cupidita, to express the disordered history), and their image of God. He spoke of the search for God in memory because memory retained the image of God, even if sin had caused it to be deeply hidden. He developed his notion of ‘memory’ by associating it with the unconscious or with self-awareness. Augustine connects memory with the human yearning for true wisdom or happiness found in knowledge of God. See conf 10.8.15 [CCL 27:162] ‘Yet, this is a power of my mind and it belongs to my nature; I myself do not grasp all that I am (Et vis est haec animi mei atque ad meam naturam pertinet, nec ego ipse capio totum, quod sum).’ For more on Augustine’s conception of memory see H. Chadwick, Saint Augustine Confessions: A New Translation by Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), n. 12, 185; Rigby, 612. 118 vera rel. 3 [CCL 32:189] ‘So long as it is weakened by love of things that come to be and pass away, or by pain of losing them, so long as it is devoted to the custom of this life and to the bodily senses (sed dum nascentium atque transeuntium rerum amore ac dolore sauciatur et dedita consuetudini huius vitae atque sensibus corporis).’ 119 vera rel. 6 [CCL 32:192] ‘We preferred to yield to popular custom rather than to bring the people over to our way of thinking and living (Haec sunt, quae nos persuadere populis non ausi sumus, et eorum potius consuetudini cessimus quam illos in nostrum fidem voluntatemque traduximus).’ 120 vera rel. 64 [CCL 32:229] ‘Give me a man who can resist the carnal senses and the impressions which they impose on the mind; one who can resist human custom and human praise (qui resistat sensibus carnis et plagis, quibus per illos in anima vapulauit, qui resistat consuetudini hominum, resistat laudibus hominum).’ 121 vera rel. 65 [CCL 32:229] ‘Do not strive except against being accustomed to material things. Conquer that habit and you are victorious over all (Nolite certare nisi cum consuetudine corporum. Ipsam vincite, victa erunt omnia).’ 122 vera rel. 88 [CCL 32:245] ‘Accordingly, the Truth himself calls us back to our original and perfect state, bids us resist carnal custom, and teaches that no one is fit for the kingdom of God unless he hates these carnal relationships (itaque ad pristinam perfectamque naturam nos ipsa veritas vocans praecepit, ut carnali consuetudini resistamus, docens neminem aptum esse regno dei, qui non istas carnales necessitudines oderit).’ 123 See Harrison, 190-91. 124 J. Gaffney, Sin Reconsidered (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 34. 125 On the original Hebrew phrase and later Latin translation of the Hebrew and the problems raised by the Latin translation see Gaffney, 34; I. A. McFarland, In Adam’s Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 66; Wiley, 30.
psychological force of sin on the human will. His intent was to metaphorically and analogically depict humanity’s love affair with itself and the world because humans had lost sight of God. ‘But when the Lord is neglected, intent on its servant with the carnal concupiscence it is seduced by, the soul feels the movements it gives its servant, and is less (Neglecto autem Domino intenta in servum carnali quae ducitur, concupiscentia, sentit motus suos quos illi exhibet, et minus est).’

As he did with habit, Augustine aligned the strong carnal negative passions with memory, which allowed him to also align these passions to the sin-affected will. Sin’s force on the will can only be broken when the person has clear vision or knowledge of God. The force of sin shows itself in how humanity no longer desires the creator, but desires the created material things instead. Only grace can release the human person from sin’s forceful captivity. Only Christ’s work of grace released the Christian from sin’s force of habit:

The Apostle Paul calls avarice idolatry, who can doubt that every evil concupiscence is rightly called fornication (Paulus autem apostolus avaritiam idolatriae nomine appellat, quis dubitet omnem malam concupiscentiam recte fornicationem vocari)?…Wherefore, whoever, perceives that- because of a sinful habit which will continue to drag him into captivity as long as it remains unchecked- the craving of the flesh is in rebellion against the will (Et ideo quisquis carnalem delectationem adversus rectam voluntatem suam rebellare sentit per consuetudinem peccatorum, cuius indomita violentia trahitur in captivitatem)…Who will deliver me from the body of this death (Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius)? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord [Rom. 7:24] (Gratia dei per Iesum Christum dominum nostrum).

The intention of Augustine’s rhetorical use of these carnal emotive passions was to present a picture of the uncontrolled or overpowering nature of sin and its effects on the whole human person, their mind and heart. His intent was not to identify human sexuality with sin, but to point to sin’s

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126 Harrison, 194.
127 mus. 6.5.13 [PL 32:1170]
128 Cf. mus. 6.11.33 [PL 32:1181]; lib. arb. 1.11.21 [CCL 29:225] ‘Nothing makes the mind give way to desire except its own will and free choice (nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat quam propria voluntas et liberum arbitrium).’
129 s. Dom. mon. 1.12.36 [CCL 35:39]
uncontrollable force that he believed affected all humans. Augustine’s analogy of pride, habit and carnal or negative passions function in Augustine’s rhetoric to present a picture of sin as an uncontrolled power that holds all humans generationally captive and which for Augustine could not be broken outside of the incarnation’s work of grace.

1.12 The Analogy of Sin as ‘Guilt’

Augustine used his analogy of guilt to speak about the heritability of sin’s transmission from one generation to the next. He developed this analogy as a way that could both account for God’s justice and maintain human freedom and human responsibility, without compromise to God’s sovereignty and humanity’s dependence on God. This analogy treats sin as an essentially judicial or forensic concept. There is no single Latin term that fits Augustine’s notion of guilt. His development of this forensic and judicial term can be gauged from the context of Roman law, which meant that the analogy was a helpful one for his contemporaries who lived in the day-to-day context of Roman law.

While Augustine spoke of guilt, the concept of ‘guilt’ did not feature in the soteriology of the eastern Fathers. The Greek Fathers wrote in the Greek language and had no need to engage with the Roman law context. Augustine’s Latin context which placed great value on the law for its justice, allowed him to develop a way of understanding the inherited and uncontrollable nature of sin that would provide a corrective to the nuanced soteriological issues that Pelagius and his followers raised in the early fifth century. Wiley explains that, whereas ‘righteousness’ and ‘sin’ are religious words found in scripture, ‘inherited’ is not, because it is a biological term, in that humans are said to be born into sin. The scriptural words denote and imply a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ action of choice, whereas

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130 See E. TeSelle, ‘Exploring the Inner Conflict: Augustine’s Sermons on Romans 7 and 8’, *Augustine: Biblical Exegete* (ed. F. van Fleteren & J. C. Schnaubelt; New York, Peter Lang: 2004), 313-45. TeSelle explains that sexual desire in Augustine can be an illustration of desire more generally. As an observation, the involuntary character of sexual desire was a dramatic illustration of what desire is in general.


134 See Ibid., 446.

135 Wiley, 7.
the biological term, ‘inheritance’, does not. It implied that sin was inherent in human nature, and that choice or reason could not restrain its effects on the moral nature.

Both Augustine and the Pelagians affirmed that humans possessed free will, but unlike Augustine, they did not believe in the universality of sin or that humanity could only be liberated from the effects of sin by God’s sovereign work of grace. Rather, the Pelagians believed that free will meant that humans always retained responsibility for their sin, which meant that they could choose not to sin. For the Pelagians, this understanding of free will accounted for God’s justice in his sovereign actions. God condemned in humans neither the impossible nor the unavoidable. For God to remain just meant that God should not be seen to violate human freedom, which they argued was violated in Augustine’s conception of grace.

In sum, the Pelagians argued that humans were responsible for their individual sins. Sinlessness for Christians was not only possible in Pelagian soteriology, but also obligatory. They believed that in God’s creation of humanity he had provided the information that people needed for right action, which meant that humans always retained an inbuilt capacity for perfection. The Pelagian idea of grace, therefore, meant the conditions of right action: natural freedom, the commandments, law and exhortation, Christ’s example, faith and the help of the sacraments. Their belief system espoused that human nature possessed a permanent capability for sinlessness because humans were responsible for their own sin through deliberate actions. Grace, for the Pelagians, operated externally on the Christian mind to enlighten it to the right conditions for action.

Augustine’s corrective had to account for the traditional doctrinal belief in the universality and problem of sin. It also had to account for the orthodox belief in God’s sovereign work of grace in a way that would maintain human responsibility for sin, preserve human freedom, and account for God’s justice. The way forward for Augustine was to engage originally and creatively with the conceptions of justice that his context of Roman law provided. Yet, he did so in a distinctly Christian way. Central to the idea of Augustine’s conception of ‘guilt’ is the picture of the accused standing

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136 On the background and context to Pelagius’ teaching see Collinge, 4-7. See also McGrath, Third Edition, 445.
before a judge (reatus).\textsuperscript{139} The party who stood before the judge, God, therefore stood accused of a breach of justice; what is owed to God (debitum) has to be rendered and until the debt is paid in full (meritum) there is punishment.\textsuperscript{140}

The legal modes of logic and practice of Roman law sorted out for Augustine his notion of guilt from ‘guilt feelings’, so that ‘guilt’ could be perceived in an objective way from God’s sovereign perspective, but also maintain the notion of God’s justice.\textsuperscript{141} At the same time, Augustine’s conception of ‘guilt’ differed from Roman law because it lacked a legal or moral basis. Instead, Augustine spoke of guilt being inherited, not simply as a legal debt that needed to be rendered, but as a moral debt (culpa) or as blameworthy. This understanding of moral debt accounted for God’s ‘hidden’ justice because all sin required punishment.\textsuperscript{142} It also maintained human freedom and responsibility because Augustine reasoned that all humans were blameworthy because of the transmission of original sin, which affected human nature from birth.

Prior to the soteriological issues that the Pelagians had raised, Wetzel\textsuperscript{143} explains that Augustine had assumed a relatively straightforward logic of accountability. Augustine had accounted for justice in the way that he spoke about sin as humans moving away from their dependence and love of God to love for themselves and the things that God had created:

I think you remember we were fairly satisfied in the first discussion that the mind becomes the slave of passion only through its own will (Credo ergo meminisse te in prima disputatione satis esse compertum nulla re fieri mentem suruam libidinis nisi propria voluntate). It cannot be forced to a shameful act by anything above it, nor by anything equal, for this would be unjust, nor by anything below it, for this would be impossible (nam neque a superior neque ab aequali eam posse ad hoc dedecus cogi, quia iniustum est, neque ab inferiore, quia non potest). The movement, therefore, must be due to itself, by which it turns its will to enjoyment of the creature from enjoyment of the Creator (Restat igitur ut eius sit proprius iste motus quo

\textsuperscript{139} Wetzel, 407
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 407
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 407
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 407
\textsuperscript{143} See Ibid., 407-08.
fruendi voluntatem ad creaturam a creatore convertit.) If this movement is called culpable
(Qui motus si culpae deputatur)...it is certainly not natural, but voluntary (non est utique
naturalis, sed voluntarius).144

For Augustine the proof of sin lay not in the punishment, but in its existence because of the
fall: ‘For, in truth, we should consider sin only what is sin, not what is, indeed, the penalty for sin
(Peccatum quipped illud cogitandum est, quod tantummodo peccatum est, non quod est etiam poena
peccati).’145 So even involuntary sin, or sins committed in ignorance, was proof that all humans
inherited sin, and that it was transmitted to all generations of humans. Augustine’s polemical
engagement with the Pelagian followers Caelestius146 and Julian of Eclanam147 allowed him to
technically develop his forensic analogy of guilt.148 Caelestius for instance opposed the idea that
Adam’s sin caused mortality or that it was transmitted to his posterity.149

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144 lib. arb. 3.1.2 [CCL 29:275]; cf. lib. arb. 3.1.2 [CCL 29:276] ‘So what need is there to ask the
source of that movement by which the will turns from the unchangeable good to changeable good
(Propterea quid opus est quaerere unde iste motus existat quo voluntas auertitur ab incommutabili
bono ad commutabile bonum)? We agree that it belongs only to the soul, and is voluntary and
therefore culpable (cum eum non nisi animi et voluntarium et ob hoc culpabilem).’ Cf. lib. arb. 3. 1. 1
[CCL 29:274] ‘If that movement is due to nature or necessity, it cannot deserve any blame whatever
(Si enim natura vel necessitate iste motus existit, culpabilis esse nullo pacto potest)...You should have
known for certain that the movement is not due to the will’s nature, since you are certain it deserves
blame (Nullo modo autem dubitare debuisti non esse ita datam, quando istum motum culpabilem esse
non dubitas).’
145 retr. 1.12.5 [CCL 57:38]. Cf. conf. 7.3.5 [CCL 27:94-95] ‘That the free choice of the will is the
cause of our committing evil, and your right judgement, that we should suffer for it (liberum
voluntatis arbitrium causam esse, ut male faceremus et rectum iudicium tuum ut pateremur)...More
and more, I came to observe that there lies the cause of my sin. I saw that whatever I did unwillingly
was something which I suffered rather than did actively. And I judged that this was not a fault but a
punishment, and I quickly confessed that I was not unjustly punished thereby, for I thought of you as
just (non alium quam me velle ac nolle certissimus eram et ibi esse causa peccati mei iam iamque
animadueriebam. Quod autem inuitus facerem, pati me potius quam facere videbam et id non culpam,
sed poenam esse iudicabam, qua me non intuste plecti te iustum cogitans cito fatebar).’
146 Caelestius’ date of birth is unknown. From 390 onward he was a disciple of Pelagius. Around 399
he met Rufinus the Syrian, from whom he adopted the notion that the sin of Adam affected no one
other than Adam himself. It is possible that the origins to his opposition to the idea of the
transmission of Adam’s sin can be traced to this event. For a brief biographical account see M.
147 On Julian of Eclanum (ca. 380-454) see M. Lamberigts, ‘Julian of Eclanum’, Augustine Through the
Ages, 478-79.
149 See Pelikan, 636. Caelestius was accused of heresy, by Paulinus of Milan at the Council of
Carthage in 411.
The Pelagian belief that sin could not be transmitted generationally came to the forefront with the subject of infant baptism. Although both Caelestius and Julian approved of infant baptism, they did not believe that the baptism occurred for the remission of sin, but for the infant’s sanctification. Augustine, however, following church tradition upheld the custom of baptising infants and linked baptism to the idea of inherited sin. Rondet explains that the nub of Augustine’s argument was that, if Christ’s salvific work saved all, then it was inclusive of infants. Augustine argued the church’s practice of infant baptism had been handed down for the remission of sins, and this indicated that guilt was hereditary because of original sin. Adam’s sin therefore occurred through propagation not by ‘imitation’. The Pelagians had argued that God’s grace had been given to Christians because of merit, whereas Augustine believed that the basis of grace was in God’s promise, not in the good

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150 Cf. pecc. mer. 3.5.11 [PL 44:192] ‘But at the same time infants fresh from the womb were held to be affected only by the guilt of original sin (quamvis ab utero recentissimi parvuli solo reatu essent peccati originalis obstricti).’; pecc. mer. 1.26.39 [PL 44:131] ‘And, inasmuch as they [infants] do not commit any sin in the tender age of infancy by their actual transgression, original sin only is left (quae quoniam nulla in ea aetate per suam vitam propriam commiserunt, restat originale peccatum).’ Augustine argued that in the early church original sin was assumed because infants were baptised. On the pastoral issue of baptism see Pelikan, 317; Wiley, 6-7.

151 See Wiley, 60. See also Preface to Part 1 of this thesis.

152 See Rondet, 122. See also Wiley, 74. Cf. c. Jul. 3.5.11 [PL 44:707-08] ‘Yet, this evil itself took its rise from the evil will of the first man; so that there is no other origin of sin but an evil will (Quod tamen et ipsum a mala voluntate priorum hominum sumpsit exordium. Ita nisi voluntas mala, non est cujusquam ulla origo peccati).’; c. Jul. 3.6.13 [PL 44:708-09] ‘Therefore, just as adults become guilty by a sinful action so minors become guilty by contagion from adults (Homines igitur, sicut peccati actione majores, ita minores majorum contagione sunt rei). The former become guilty from what they do; the latter, from those from whom they take their origin (isti ex eo quod faciunt, illi ex quibus originem ducent).’

153 Cf. pecc. mer. 1.26.39 [PL 44:131] ‘Now, seeing that they admit the necessity of baptising infants,—finding themselves unable to contravene that authority of the universal church, which has been unquestionably handed down by the Lord and his apostles,—they cannot avoid the further concession, that infants require the same benefits of the Mediator (Porro quia parvulos baptizandos esse concedunt, qui contra auctoritatem universae Ecclesiae, procul dubio per Dominum et Apostolos traditam, venire non possunt: concedant oportet eos egere illis beneficiis mediatoris).’

154 pecc. mer. 1.9.10 [PL 44:114-15] ‘For by this grace he [Christ] engrafs into his body even baptised infants, who certainly have not yet become able to imitate any one (Haec enim gratia baptizatos quoque parvulos suo inserit corpore, qui certe imitari aliquem nondum valent).’; On the context and background of Augustine’s argument see Rondet, 128-29.

155 Cf. gest. Pel. 14.30 [PL 44:337] ‘“The grace and assistance of God is not given for individual acts, but consists in the freedom of the will, or in the law and doctrine (Gratiam Dei et adjutorium non ad singulos actus dari, sed in libero arbitrio esse, vel in lege ac doctrina),” and also, “The grace of God is given according to our merits, for if God were to give it to sinners, he would seem to be unjust (Et iterum, Dei gratiam secundum meritum nostra dari, quia si peccatoribus illam det, videtur esse inquus). And he [Caelestius] drew his conclusion in these words: And grace itself has been placed in my will, in accordance with whether I have been worthy or unworthy (et his verbis intulisse, Propterea et ipsa gratia in mea voluntate posita est, sive dignus fuerim, sive indignus).’ Caelestius had argued that God bestowed his grace upon Christians only because of their merit. God’s grace acted as a ‘help’ to Christians so that they could accomplish good works.
work itself. For example, Augustine’s exposition of the parable of the labourers in the vineyard (Mt. 20:1-10) went against the Pelagian idea that the basis of God’s reward was on merit. Rather, its basis was God’s promise. Augustine, therefore, connected his conception of grace (gratia) to the idea of a gift, which contrasted with the Pelagian idea of ‘merit’, as it was connected to the idea of a reward.

The point that Augustine makes about sin via these three analogies (the medical analogy, the analogy of sin as a ‘power’ or ‘force’, and the analogy of ‘guilt’) is that humans have no control over their sinfulness and that sin dominates human life. Although his analogy of ‘guilt’ is not as apparent in his early soteriological writing, both the medical analogy and the analogy that portrays sin as a force continuously appear throughout his writings. This goes against Brown’s initial claim that Augustine retained the classical Greco-Roman philosophical ideal of perfection in his early thought. Once Augustine became a Christian he followed the church’s traditional scriptural teaching of the fall and sin. His use of these analogies shows that he did not agree with the classical philosophical idea of perfection or the view that humans could self-determine their own perfection outside of the work of grace. Although Brown is right to state that Pelagianism forced Augustine to elucidate theologically an orthodox Christian doctrine with regard to the problem of evil in relation to human free will and the work of grace, his view that Augustine came to hold a pessimistic view of the Christian ideal is incorrect.

In Brown’s epilogue he acknowledges that there is a definite case for doctrinal continuity in Augustine’s theology. He now believes that, as a convert, Augustine’s reading of the Neoplatonic works did not compromise the central elements of doctrine in his thought so that it is true to say that it bears little trace of discontinuity. Following early church thinking about the nature of sin, Augustine held to the same pessimistic view of the human moral condition. Sin was the reason humanity had alienated itself from God, so outside of the work of grace, the human moral nature remained incapable

156 Cf. gest. Pel. 14.36 [PL 44:342] ‘Not only says that he [Apostle Paul] had no good merits, so that he might become an Apostle, but even declares his evil deserts, in order to make manifest and to proclaim the grace of God [cf. 1 Cor. 1:31,15:9] (non solum nulla se habuisse dicit merita bona, ut apostolus fieret; sed etiam mala merita sua dicit, ut Dei gratiam manifestet et praedicet.’
157 See McGrath, Third Edition, 448-49. The repercussions of the Pelagian controversy were considerable. The two notions of ‘grace’ and ‘merit’, which came from the debate, continued to be discussed in the medieval western church and beyond.
158 See Ibid., 445.
159 See Brown, 139-50.
160 Ibid., 486, 490-97.
161 Ibid., 490-97
of gaining true knowledge of God so as to respond to God in obedience. As Vandervelde\textsuperscript{162} writes, although Augustine is portrayed as the father of the classical doctrine of original sin, he ‘did not draw a single and clear picture of his “offspring” but instead left a collage of various conceptions.’ It is a collage with a unifying centre, depicting the human person as so deeply enmeshed in sin that the only hope of salvation and reformation is the grace which results from the incarnation’s salvific work.\textsuperscript{163}

1.13 Conclusion

Although the context of the Pelagian controversy caused Augustine to articulate technically his teaching on ‘original sin’ and grace, this does not mean that he did not adhere to the doctrine of the fall and its teaching about universal sin from the beginning of his Christian life. Early theologians conceived of sin as a universal problem because they understood its universality to be the central reason for the incarnation’s work. Augustine deployed three different analogies for sin that in his writing worked to communicate the universal affects of sin on the human moral nature: the medical analogy, the analogy of sin as a ‘power’ or ‘force’, and the analogy of sin as ‘guilt’. Although the first two analogies are evident in his early soteriological thought, his analogy of ‘guilt’ became more prominent in his later work because of his polemical engagement with the Pelagians. Moreover, his development of his doctrine of ‘original sin’ can be attributed to two of the controversies that he engaged with during his life: Manichaeism and Pelagianism. Following patristic tradition Augustine’s interaction with the doctrine ‘creation from nothing’ allowed him to frame his thinking on creation, the origin of evil, sin, grace and redemption, all of which informed his creative adaptation of the Neoplatonic idea of ‘form’ and ‘participation’. His idea of ‘participation’ allowed him to speak about how sin had distorted the created human capacity for knowledge of God that only grace could restore in Christians. According to Augustine, sin operated as a deforming force on the will, which he depicted as a moral weakness in human nature expressed as ‘the passions’.

\textsuperscript{163} See Ibid., 14.
Chapter 2: Maximus and the Problem of Sin

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to show that the view held in contemporary scholarship\(^1\) that Maximus’ teaching about sin has little or no affinity to Augustine’s doctrine of original sin, is unwarranted. Any segregation between how Augustine and Maximus spoke about sin stems from the technical differences, language, and emphases, which are contextually derived and should not be viewed as distinct differences in soteriology between the two. There are three key themes in which Maximus spoke about sin that show affinity with Augustine: in some manner, all humanity was involved in Adam’s initial disobedience; sin was a universal problem in human nature and the reason behind the incarnation’s salvific work; sin had psychological effects on human nature, evidenced in how the will directed the passions towards acts of sin.\(^2\) Unlike the Origenists\(^3\) who taught that the passions were a judgement for sin, Maximus taught that the Spirit’s work of illumination upon the mind (the result of which saw the realignment of the believer’s will with God’s will) directed the passions to good action. Moreover, Maximus’ corrective of Origenist teaching determined the ways in which he spoke about sin and its corruptive effects on the human moral nature. He was concerned to provide a corrective to Origenist dualism that located the origin of sin in the soul’s pre-existent fall and not in the human choice to disobey God as it was portrayed in the Genesis story. Contrary to traditional Christian thinking that spoke about sin’s effects clouding the mind of its knowledge of God, the Origenists spoke of sin’s effects as a product of materiality, not a product of the corrupted mind itself. The ways in which Maximus spoke about sin therefore sought to correct the Origenists’ over-spiritualisation of the Christian life, which asserted the believer’s self-determination in terms of the perfection of the pre-fall state, via the intellect alone. This over-spiritualisation not only downplayed and misunderstood that human transformation was a product of grace, but denied the

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\(^2\) See Kelly, 348-52.

\(^3\) See sections 2.3 and 2.4 in this Chapter.
corruptive effects of sin on the mind, which was the reason spiritual disciplines were necessary to Christian practice.

2.2 Maximus’ Seventh Century Monastic Context

From its fourth-century inception, the monastic movement attracted people from all classes of society. It developed to express the eschatological nature of Christianity: the promise of Christ’s second coming necessitated that believers’ lives show distinctive change in the present. Ascetic disciplines such as fasting, prayer, the commitment to a simple life, and chastity were important not because they removed the effects of sin, but because they not only highlighted the reality of sin, but also the temporary nature of human life. Practices like disciplined prayer, fasting, scriptural and liturgical readings and recitation, anticipated the realities of the resurrected life. The Christian life moved along a linear horizontal biblical perspective with a focus on the eschatological resurrected life. The promise of the resurrected life informed monastic spiritual practice, reminding believers that, although they lived in the present world, they were destined for an eternal spiritual new age.

The Christian spiritual life was therefore understood to be a progression towards an eternal end, which formed the context in which most patristic writers talked about sin. The universal problem of sin was that it was understood to have derailed humanity’s progressive movement to eternal ‘rest’ with God. Sin and its punishment of death signified this ‘derailment’ as a movement away from God, placing the blame on the side of humans. The evidence of this blameworthiness was insistence on free will because humans no longer aligned their will in obedience to God’s will.

2.3 Monastic Problems

By the second half of the fourth century monasticism had firmly established itself in the mainstream of the church. Monks are recorded in Constantinople by the fifth century so that by 518

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6 See Meyendorff, Eastern Christian Thought, 50.
7 See Ibid.,50.
8 Wiley, 53.
9 See McGrath, 442; Wiley, 53.
there were sixty-seven monasteries for men, as well as communities for women in the city’s immediate surroundings. As the monastic movement grew quickly, there arose a civil need for regulation, so that from the fourth to the seventh centuries, many civil disciplinary canons were implemented that addressed the activities of monastic communities. The canons elaborate on some of the more serious problems that monastic activities caused which needed to be regulated and curbed.

In the fifth and sixth centuries educated monks, who espoused a form of ‘Origenism’ that was circulating in the monasteries of Egypt and Palestine, began to cause major disturbances. Called ‘Origenist monks’, their teaching promoted a type of ‘spiritual intellectualism’ that not only modified the very nature of monasticism, but also threatened traditional doctrine. At the heart of the issue was the nature of sin and its effect on human nature. Origenist soteriology taught that the material/corporeal body, in which the soul was imprisoned, was flawed because of sin. Their cosmology operated on the premise that the material world and body existed because of sin. Christians obtained perfection when the mind or intellect is detached from the earthly/corporeal constraints of the body. The spiritual discipline of prayer became ‘intellectual’ prayer, its aim being to dematerialise the intellect and bring it back to its primitive pre-fall spiritual state.

The Origenists held a notion that Christians achieved a state of perfection introspectively and rationally via the intellect or mind. This introspective vertical perspective replaced the traditional linear horizontal biblical perspective that had perceived the Christian life as a progression, whereby spiritual disciplines were understood as an anticipation of the Christian’s final eschatological perfection. The call to active vigilance was not a means to an end, but an essential part of the

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11 For an overview of the ecclesial disciplinary canons see A. Louth, ‘Byzantium Transforming (600-700)’, The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire c.500-1492 (ed. J. Shepard; Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2008), 244-47; See also Prassas, 8-10.


15 Ibid., 50.
believer’s progression. Threatening traditional orthodoxy, the Origenist view downplayed the universal effects of sin upon human nature and brought into question the nature of Christian freedom with reference to the active Christian life. As Maximus’ writing refers to Origenists in the present tense, this heterodox teaching continued to pose major problems to traditional orthodoxy in the seventh-century monastic setting.

2.4 ‘Origenism’ – A Catchall Term

From the late fourth century onwards, what church historians refer to as ‘Origenism’ has little to do with the third-century theologian Origen (c. 184/85-c. 253/54) and much to do with the influence of Neoplatonic thought on Christian theology as espoused by its proponents. Clark’s extensive study of the Origenist controversy, as it erupted from the late fourth century, shows that the term ‘Origenism’ is essentially a catchall term, used when traditional doctrine was threatened or contested, rather than as a specific theological view attributed to Origen as its author. Although the alleged deficiencies of Origen’s theology (those that centred on the Trinity, creation, and eschatology) can be said to serve as a basis for the disputes, to say that there was one single underlying focus that motivated the controversy during these early centuries is misleading.

Origenist doctrine was affected and transmuted by changed religious and cultural needs that brought cosmological, soteriological, anthropological and Christological issues to the forefront of the debates framing the Origenist controversies from the late fourth century. The arguments, for example, that characterised the Trinitarian debates, as related to God’s in-corporeality, resonated in the Origenist debates over the theological issues of ‘anthropomorphism’ and ‘God’s image’. These issues flowed into asceticism, where the issue of the ‘body’ predominated, with reference to the value of Christian ascetic discipline to active Christian transformation. Moreover, although from the late

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17 See Clark, Origenist, 3, 5-7.
18 Ibid., 3.
19 Ibid., 5.
20 Ibid., 5-6.
fourth century the issues that Origenist heterodoxy presented revolved around the corporeal body, by the sixth century the debate had shifted towards Christological issues.21

At its heart the debate revolved around the issue of whether sin had compromised God’s image in humans altogether.22 Reflecting both uncertainty and opposition within monastic circles, the debate involved associated issues of literal scriptural reading and asceticism. Given that sin was believed to have corrupted the material/corporeal world, the relationship of asceticism to the body, as well as the issue of human sexuality and reproduction, came under scrutiny.23 In the west the threads of the Origenist debates appear in the Christian campaigns against Manichean and astrological determinism. All of these brought to light the issue of sin and how to resolve it in light of the scriptural depictions of God’s goodness, justice and power and which further drove the Pelagian debate in the first decade of the fifth century.24

Although the controversy had reignited again in the late sixth century, it was by this time driven by Christological issues, which centred on the question of the unity and symmetry of the person of Christ in his humanity and divinity.25 Of concern was how Christ’s role in creation as a Trinitarian member was to be understood and, as a flow on from this, the Christological implications for Christian ascetic and monastic practice. The greatest interest in six-century Origenist speculation had stemmed from those Christians that had opposed Chalcedon’s Christological definitions.26 What distinguished the sixth-century crisis from that of the preceding fourth century was that, in its essence, the former was a conflict over intellectual freedom and its place within monastic life rather than a conflict over specific doctrinal issues. In part, this can be attributed to some of the earlier anti-iconic theological teaching of Evagrius Ponticus (345-399) and its implications for ‘bodiliness’; issues that centred on

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22 Clark, ‘New Perspectives’, 146-47; Clark, *Origenist*, 43-84
23 See Harding, 163.
24 Clark, *Origenist*, 6, 194-244.
25 Daley, 629.
26 Ibid., 629.
the relationship between concepts of divine incorporeality, human embodiment, and ascetic praxis.\textsuperscript{27} An example was how ascetical theories of prayer began to be argued over in the monasteries.\textsuperscript{28}

Divisions emerged between those who prioritised ascetic endeavour, such as fasting, labour, and vigils, and those who disagreed and sought ‘imageless prayer’ or intellectual prayer, debates which were also driven by Originest monks.\textsuperscript{29} Monks who were called Origenists would have extrapolated on Origen’s speculations concerning the pre-existence of souls to conclude that the human spiritual intellect (both at the beginning before the soul’s descent into the body and in the soul’s or mind’s spiritual ascent to God during intellectual prayer) became equal to Christ’s own mind.\textsuperscript{30} For orthodox thinkers the main conflict over Origenist intellectual speculation was, not how it was derived from Origen’s speculations, but how it was driven by Neoplatonic metaphysics, which proved incompatible with the traditional Christian doctrines of creation, the incarnation and the resurrection.\textsuperscript{31} For traditional thinkers, Origenist intellectualism not only compromised the doctrines of creation and sin, but in denying the goodness of materiality, it invalidated the necessity of ascetic practice for the Christian life.\textsuperscript{32}

The form of Origenism that Maximus took to task cannot be reliably constructed, yet its heterodox emphases can be discerned from his correctives.\textsuperscript{33} Origen’s theory of the pre-existence of the soul, as well as theories about the pre-existence of the body, negated traditional teaching, which taught that the soul and body had not only come into existence simultaneously, but also affirmed their created goodness.\textsuperscript{34} Maximus was familiar with Origen’s third-century writings, which meant that he was well equipped to combat these errors directly.\textsuperscript{35} His correctives remained in line with ‘tradition’\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{27} Clark, ‘New Perspectives’, 149; Harding, 165.
\textsuperscript{28} Harding, 165.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 165-66.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 165.
\textsuperscript{32} See Cooper, 67-74; Meyendorff, Eastern Christian Thought, 49-50.
\textsuperscript{33} Cooper, 73. See also T. T. Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 47.
in that he was not concerned with synthesising an original theology, but with protecting and keeping in line with traditional teaching.\textsuperscript{37} Neoplatonism had impacted Origenist thought, so that Maximus’ own knowledge of Neoplatonism aided his correction of it. Moreover, Maximus was not averse to the technicalities of Neoplatonic metaphysics because his arguments retain much of the language and concepts that were being used by the Origenists. His correctives, however, creatively rethink the philosophical language and concepts. His aim was not simply to refute Origenist dogma, but to draw Origenist proponents back into line with traditional doctrine.\textsuperscript{38}

In Origenist thinking, the fall meant that the earthly world as well as the body was flawed because they attributed materiality to sin. The soul and intellect were imprisoned in the body, so the mind was the doorway to the soul. In order to free the soul from its bodily prison, Origenists taught that Christians needed to ‘detach’ their mind from the passions (\(\alpha\pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\))\textsuperscript{39}, a teaching which Maximus attributed to the Origenists:

According to their [the ‘Origenists’] opinion there once existed a single entity of rational beings. We were all connatural with God and had our \textit{dwelling place} (Jn 14:2) and foundation in God. Then came movement from God and from this they make it out, as rational beings were dispersed in various ways, God envisaged the creation of the corporeal world to unite


\textsuperscript{38} A. Louth, \textit{Maximus the Confessor} (London: Routledge, 1996), 66.

\textsuperscript{39} See Louth, \textit{Maximus}, 36; Prassas, 39. The Greek word \(\alpha\pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\) was derived from Stoic vocabulary, and frequently appeared in early Christian literature and monastic texts. There is no English equivalent for this word, but in English translations \(\alpha\pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\) will usually appear translated by words such as ‘dispassion’, ‘detachment’, ‘impassibility’, ‘passions’ and ‘affections’. On its patristic use see G. W. H. Lampe, \textit{A Patristic Greek Lexicon} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 170-71. \(\alpha\pi\alpha\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\), \(\eta\), impassibility, insensibility, freedom from emotion, freedom from sin, detachment, tranquility Lampe writes that these senses are not always clearly distinguishable. In the Christian sense the ‘freedom from \(\tau\alpha\delta\omicron\omicron\)’ is understood as acquired only with help from God or by grace, but its stoic origin is discernable. See also Preface to Part 2 ‘Will and the Affections’ in this thesis.
them with bodies as punishment for their former transgressions. Those who hold these things think that our teacher [Gregory Nanzianzen] had intimated them in words cited above.⁴⁰

According to the Origenists, because the existence of materiality/corporeality was attributed to sin, it followed that the passions exist in humans as judgements for sin. Christians needed to extirpate the passions via their intellect or mind, and this extirpation was the aim of ἀπάθεια. Although the word ἀπάθεια is not a scriptural word it came into Christian usage out of the philosophical context. Origenists therefore spoke of ἀπάθεια as the aim of the spiritual intellect in a philosophical sense.⁴¹

### 2.5 The Patristic Idea of ἀπάθεια

In the monastic setting the idea of ἀπάθεια (passions/affections) has little do to with emotions or emotionalism and much to do with volition. It connotes an action of volition or choice, or the need for the person to remove him- or herself from something.⁴² In the Christian and biblical context⁴³ the cornerstone of the structure of ascetic practice is ἀπάθεια.⁴⁴ Far from being a transposition of the Stoic experience, the term ἀπάθεια is akin to the biblical wisdom concept of ‘love’ of God or ‘fear of the Lord’.⁴⁵ In patristic theological reflection the term is active and dynamic because the focus and driving force of the objective of ἀπάθεια is God, as can be seen in how Maximus used the word ἀπάθεια in this passage:

> Love is a holy disposition of the soul, disposing it to value knowledge of God above all created things (Ἀγάπη μὲν ἐστίν, διάθεσις ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆ, καθ’ ἦν οὐδὲν τῶν δυντῶν, τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ γνώσεως προτιμᾷ). We cannot attain lasting possession of such love while we are still attached to anything worldly (Ἀδύνατον δὲ εἰς ἐξὶν ἠλθεῖν ταύτης τῆς ἀγάπης, τὸν πρὸς τι τῶν ἐπιγείων ἔχοντα προσπάθειαν). Dispassion engenders love, hope in God engenders


⁴²Prassas, 39.

⁴³See Bamberger, lxxxi, n.233. The discovery of the Coptic Gospel of Thomas has lent support to the view that ἐπίθεια as a concept in patristic theology is rooted in the biblical world rather than the Greek philosophical world. Corresponding terminology can also be connected to writings from the Jewish ‘Rule of Community’ from Qumran.

⁴⁴Ibid., lxxxi-lixxiii.

⁴⁵Ibid., lixxii.
dispassion, and patience and forebearance engender hope in God (Ἀγάπην μὲν τίκτει ἀπάθεια· ἀπάθειαν δὲ, ἢ εἰς Θεὸν ἐλπίζει· τὴν δὲ ἐλπίδα, ὑπομονή καὶ μακροθυμία); these in turn are the product of complete self-control, which itself springs from fear of God (ταῦτας δὲ, ἢ περιεκτικὴ ἐγκράτεια· ἐγκράτειαν δὲ, ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ φόβος). Fear of God is the result of faith in God (τὸν δὲ φόβον, ἢ εἰς τὸν Κύριον πίστις).

In the patristic pastoral or ascetic context, ἀπάθεια, should be understood to be more than an ontological ascetic category. Aligned with the biblical wisdom concepts of ‘love’ and ‘fear’ of God ἀπάθεια holds teleological value. Contrary to the Origenists who thought of the passions as judgments for sin, in Maximus’ theological thought the passions retain the capacity to move the Christian away from sin towards God.

2.6 Self-love a Metaphor for Sin

For Maximus, the concept of ‘love’ is not only teleologically aligned with the passions, but is the force that re-orientates the passions towards God. Self-love (φιλαυτία) is synonymous with the will’s sinful inclination and movement away from God. Like Augustine, Maximus identified the will’s movement away from God as the origin of sin. This fragmentation of the will is the reason the sin-affected person moves away from God. Knowledge of God reorients the will, the evidence of which in the Christian life is seen in how Christians are naturally moved to love God and others. The passions/affections (ἀπάθεια) therefore work to transform the Christian life when love moves the believer towards God. Maximus contrasts this movement of the believer’s ‘love’ towards God with self-love (φιλαυτία) or self-desire, a common patristic metaphor for sin, as an expression of the person’s movement away from God. The effects of sin obscure humanity’s knowledge of God, so that

46 CC1.1-2 [PG 90:961AB]. Cf. CC1. 81-83 [PG 90:977CD-979AB]
47 Cf. CC2: 8 [PG 90:985C] ‘The one who throws off self-love, the mother of the passions, will very easily with God’s help put aside the others, such as anger, grief, grudges, and so on (Ο̣ τὴν μητέρα τῶν παθῶν ἀποφαλῶν φιλαυτίαν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ εὐχρωσίας σὺν Θεῷ ἀποτίθεται: οἷον ὀργὴν, λύπην, μνησικακίαν, καὶ τὰ ἔξη). But whoever is under the control of the former [self-love] is wounded, even though unwillingly, by the latter [the passions]. Self-love is the passion for the body (ὁ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρῶτον κρατώμενος, ὑπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου, κἂν μὴ θέλῃ, τιτωσκεῖται. Φιλαυτία δὲ ἐστὶ, τὸ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα πάθος).’ ;CC3:8 [PG 90:1020AB] ‘Self-love is the passionate and irrational affection for the body, to which is opposed love and self-mastery [self-control] (Φιλαυτία ἐστὶν ἢ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἐμπάθειας καὶ ἀλογούς φιλία· ἢ ἀντίκειται ἐγκατε ἐγκράτεια). The one who has self-love has all [is dominated by] the passions. (Ὁ ἔχων τὴν φιλαυτίαν, ἀπόλου ὅτι ἔχει πάντα τὰ πάθη).’ Cf. Augustine: c. Fort. 2. 21[PL 42: 122-23]; civ. Dei 12.6 [CCL 48:360]; lib. arb. 2.20.54. [CCL 29:272-73].
it moves people away from God, the true object of their creation. According to Maximus, only Christ’s salvific work of grace restored the created capacity of the mind to know God as its true objective:

For out of ignorance concerning God there arises self-love (Ἐκ γὰρ τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ ἀγνοίας, ἡ φιλαυτία)…God, who made nature and wisely healed it when it was sick through wickedness, through his love toward us, ‘emptied himself, taking the form of a slave’ [Phil. 2:7] (ὁ τὴν φύσιν καὶ ποιήσας Θεός, καὶ ἀσθενήσασαν ὑπὸ κακίας σοφώς ἔξωμενος, δὴ ἀγάπην τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἑαυτὸν ἑκένωσε μορφῆν δοῦλον λαβών). For our sake and from us and through us He became wholly man (ὅλος καθ’ ἡμᾶς εξ ἡμῶν δὴ ἡμᾶς τοσοῦτον γενόμενον ἀνθρωπος)…in this way the works of the devil were dissolved, and nature restored to its pure powers, and by bringing about union with him and of human beings with one another, God renewed the power of love, the adversary of self-love. This self-love is, and is known to be, the first sin, the first progeny of the devil and the mother of the passions that come after it (ἐνα καταλύσῃ τὰ ἔργα τοῦ διαβόλου, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἀχράντους ἀποδοθὰς τὰς δυνάμεις, πάλιν τὴς πρὸς αὐτὸν συναφεῖς, καὶ ἀλλήλους τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀνακαινίσῃ τὴς ἀγάπης τὴν δύναμιν, τὴν τῆς φιλαυτίας ἀντίπαλον. τῆς πρώτης ἀμαρτίας, καὶ πρῶτου γεννήματος τοῦ διαβόλου καὶ παθῶν τῶν μετ’ αὐτὴν μητρὸς καὶ οὐδῆς καὶ γινωσκομένης).”

The negative passions exist and affect human nature not because they are a punishment for sin but because human nature is impacted by sin. Sin has clouded the mind from the clear vision of God. Maximus expressed these universal affects of sin by way of the medical analogy: ‘Some temptations bring men pleasure, some grief, some bodily pain. The Physician of souls by means of His judgements

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48 Ep. 2. 397 ABC [PG 91:397 ABC]; Cf. CC2.59 [PG 90:1004 BC] ‘Guard yourself from the mother of vices, self-love, which is mindless love for the body (Πρόσεχε σεαυτῷ ἀπο τῆς μητρὸς τῶν κακῶν, φιλαυτίας, ἦτε ἐστίν ἢ τοῦ σώματος ἄλογος φιλία). For it gives birth with specious justification to the three most general of impassioned thoughts- gluttony, avarice [greed], and vainglory [self-esteem], which have their starting point in some needful demand of the body and from which the whole catalogue of vices comes about (Ἐκ ταύτης γὰρ εὐλογοφαινόως τίκτωνται οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ ἐμπεθές καὶ γενικῶτατα τρεῖς ἐμμανεῖς λογισμοί, ὁ τῆς γαστραρμαργίας λέγω, καὶ φιλαργυρίας, καὶ κενοδοξίας, τὰς ἀφομόμικρὰς ἐκ τῆς ἀναγκαίας τοῦ σώματος δὴθεν λαμβάνοντες χρέιας, ἐξ ὧν γεννᾶται ὡς ὁ τῶν κακῶν κατάλογος). You must therefore be on your guard, as we have already said, and fight against self-love with great vigilance. For when this vice [self-love] is eradicated, all the others are eradicated too (Δει οὖν, ὃς εἰρηνητή, προσέχειν ἀναγκαίως, καὶ ταύτη πολεμεῖν μετὰ πολῆς νηψεως. Ταύτης γὰρ ἀναιρουμένης, συναναιροῦνται πάντες οἱ εξ αὐτῆς).’
applies the remedy to each soul according to the cause of its passions.' Sin was a chronic disease from which humanity suffered, for which they needed a cure, and for which Christ was the remedy:

He [Christ] came to trample the wickedness into which, through deceit, our nature unnaturally fell at the instant it was created, thus depleting its whole potential. He came to bind to himself the faculty of desire (καὶ πατήσαι τὸ ποιητόν πρὸς ὁμα τῷ γενέσθαι διὰ τῆς ἀπάτης τῆς άληθείας παρὰ τῇ πυρήνῃ κατεκένωσε δύναμιν, καὶ καταδόθη αὐτῷ ἡ ἀπάτη τῆς ἐπιθυμίας δύναμιν)…that it might take on a procreative disposition fixed and unalterable in the good (τὴν ἐν τῷ ἁγιασμῷ γόνιμον ἔξων λαμβάνειν παρὰ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον).  

According to Maximus, sin’s corruption of human nature meant that the mind no longer recognised God, and only the incarnation’s salvific work could restore the mind’s capacity of its lost knowledge so that the will regained an inclination to obey God. Maximus connected the origins of sin to the first man Adam’s initial sin in the garden. According to Maximus, Adam’s disobedience had unnaturally affected what had been naturally created in humanity, the mind’s natural capacity for knowledge of God: ‘But at the instant he was created, the first man, by use of his senses, squandered on sensible things (.dynamicā τῷ γίνεσθαι τῇ αἰσθήσει διὸς ό πρῶτος ἀνθρώπος πρὸς τὰ αἰσθήτα) this spiritual capacity, the natural desire of the mind for God. In this, his very first movement, man activated an unnatural pleasure through the medium of the senses (καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν πρώτην κίνησιν διὰ μέσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐσχή παρὰ φύσιν ἐνεργομένην τὴν ἡδονήν).’ The effects of Adam’s wilful disobedience upon human nature has rendered the mind incapable of focusing its desire on God, so that the mind naturally focuses its desire on the material/corporeal things God has created instead.

49 CC2. 44 [PG 90:1000 AB] Οἱ μὲν τῶν πειρασμῶν, ἡδονᾶς· οἱ δὲ, λύπας· οἱ δὲ, ὀδύνας σωματικῶς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προσέγγισε. Κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐγκεμένην τῇ ψυχῇ αἰτίαν τῶν παθῶν, καὶ τὸ φάρμακον ὧν ἦταν τῶν ψυχῶν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν κριμάτων ἐπιτίθεναι. Cf. CC 2.46 [PG 90:1000AB]; Ad Thal. 1 [CCSG 40:47]

50 Amb. 42 : 1321B [PG 91:1321B]

51 Maximus used the adverb ἀμα to describe the immediacy of Adam’s abuse of his passible faculties at ‘the instant he was created’. This nuance of ἀμα is significant because Maximus’ intent is to indicate that Adam’s perfection historically was more potency than actuality. He avoids any implication of a ‘double creation’ of humanity, before and after the fall, as was implied in Origenist cosmology. See P. M. Blowers & R. L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ: Selected Writings from St Maximus the Confessor (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003), 85, n. 10, 97, n.3; Louth, Maximus, 73. On the patristic view of ‘double creation’, see Meyendorff, Eastern Christian Thought, 143.

52 Ad Thal. 61 [CCSG 22:85]

53 Cf. CC1.1 [PG 90:961A]
2.7 Sin and Christian Practice: A Void or a Necessity?

In their promotion of a type of ‘spiritual intellectualism’ Origenists considered the ascetic disciplines to be ineffective in practice. So they did not think of Christian disciplines as a necessary part of the Christian life. If there was any benefit to a Christian’s engagement in spiritual disciplines it was merely preparatory. Maximus’ awareness of Origenist teaching with regard to their attitude towards Christian practice is evident in the following passage:

Gregory Nazianzen: What does Wisdom have in mind for me? And what is this great mystery? Is it God’s intention that we who are a portion of God and have slipped down from above should out of self-importance be so haughty and puffed up as to despise our Creator? Hardly! Rather we should always look to him in our struggle against the weakness of the body. Its very limitations are a form of training for those in our condition.’ (Or...n 14.7) It seems that some who read these words are unable to find their true meaning even though they have expended great effort.54

The Origenists taught that apart from a rudimentary aid to intellectual development, a Christian’s overall engagement in spiritual disciplines (ασκησις – ‘ascetic struggle’)55 was void of any value to the Christian life. Origenists viewed Christian disciplines as a means to an end, as an initial stage to be accomplished in the Christian’s interior development.56 Locating the mind (νοῦς) at the centre of Christian spirituality, the Origenists promoted a type of Neoplatonic spiritualism that operated as a dualistic system that severed the mind from the body.57 As the effects of sin were located entirely in the body, Origenists taught that the mind as the spiritual centre remained unaffected by sin,

54 Amb. 7. 1068D-1069A [PG 91:1068D-1069A] ‘Εκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου, εἰς τὸ, < Τίς ἢ περὶ ἐμὲ σοφία, καὶ τί τὸ μέγα τοῦτο μισθήριον; ἢ βούλεται μοίραν ἡμᾶς ὧν ταῦτα Θεοῦ, καὶ ἄνωθεν ἡκάσταντας, ἵνα μὴ διὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἐπειράμενοι καὶ µετεωρίζομεν καταφρονώμεν τοῦ Κτίσαντος, ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα πέλας καὶ μέχρι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀνεῖ βλέπειν, καὶ τὴν συνεξετημένην ἀσθενίαν πεισαγωγὴν εἶναι τοῦ ἀξίωματος; > Τούτους τινὺς ἐνισχύσαντες τοῖς λόγοις, μηδένα, ὡς ἔσκεκυ, ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποικίλη τῆς ζητησεως ἔσκεκυ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς μισθῶν ἐκδημοικοῦν. Maximus quotes from Gregory Nanzianzen (c.329-389/390), whom the Origenists quote in justification of their practices, but which according to Maximus they have misunderstood.

55 See Prassas, 38. See also Lampe, 244. ἀσκησις, ἡ (exercise, practice, training, discipline, asceticism, austere life, religious practice, worship) This word can be translated in various ways, depending on the context. In the monastic setting the idea of ‘the word’ not only refers to disciplined and regular study of scripture, but also to the practice of ascetic or pietistic activities (e.g. prayer, liturgical recitation, fasting, celibacy, silence, self-control, moderation, developing all manner of virtuous characteristics, generosity, poverty, abstaining from self-seeking pleasures).

56 Louth, Maximus, 69.

57 See Meyendorff, Eastern Christian Thought, 50.
which contrasted with traditional Christian teaching about sin. Although Maximus believed that God had created the mind with a natural capacity for the knowledge of God, outside of the work of grace sin had rendered the mind incapable of ascertaining this knowledge.

At issue was the nature of how the ascetic topoi πρακτική/πράξεις (the active Christian life) related to the dogmatic topoi θεωρία/θεωρητική (contemplation) and θεολογία (dogmatic contemplation, intellectual activity, teaching about God). In the patristic scriptural context the dogmatic notion of θεολογία (theology) is literally understood as ‘contemplation’ of God. Unlike the modern sense of the word, theology, which implies academic study of systematic theology, the end result of θεολογία is to see the transformation of the mind, so that the mind, νοῦς, becomes illuminated and attuned to God’s will, purpose and design for creation. Integral to the patristic idea of ‘contemplation’ (θεωρητική) is θεολογία which correlates with the patristic dogmatic notion of the οἰκονομία (God’s economy of salvation). What the patristics meant by ‘God’s economy’ is God’s entire salvation plan for humanity as well as creation. In patristic scriptural thinking God’s economy is the reason why ascetic practice operates on a horizontal biblical perspective of progression. The Christian active life (πρακτική) is a progression towards an eschatological fulfilment. The Origenist notion of ‘contemplation’ departs from the patristic one, because their vertical perspective discarded

58 See Lampe, 1127. πρακτική, πρακτικός (practice, active); πράξεις, ἡ The Christian practical or active life. See also Prassas, 33-34. Maximus connected θεωρία to πράξεις. The result of Christian ‘contemplation’ is evidenced in the active life of the Christian.

59 The early church idea of ‘contemplation’ is different to the modern understanding. In the modern religious context the idea of contemplation is usually thought about in terms of ‘new age’ type meditation or introspection. In Greco-Roman philosophy the idea of ‘contemplation’ (θεωρία/θεωρητική) was thought about in terms of moving the mind towards truth. In the patristic context the philosophical idea is retained but the Christian aim was to read or reflect on the scriptural word and put it into practice. What is read, heard or recited is applied to the heart as well as the mind and this application of truth is evidence in practice. See Lampe, 647-49. θεωρία/θεωρητική can be translated as ‘contemplation’ ‘speculation’, ‘intellectual perception’, ‘seeing, beholding’, and ‘considering’. See also Burton-Christie, 150-54. The practical ethos of ‘contemplation’ was reflected literally as ‘doing the word’.

60 See Lampe, 627 -28 θεολογία, ἡ can be translated as ‘teaching about God/the divinity’.


62 θεολογία (theology) in the patristic scriptural context rests on the doctrine of the Trinity (the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit). The Trinity was the manifestation of God’s activity as recorded in the scriptures. On θεολογία (theology), see Louth, Maximus, 26; Prassas, 39; N. Russell, Fellow Workers with God: Orthodox Thinking on Theosis (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 33-34.

63 See Louth, Maximus, 26; Prassas, 31; Russell, 33. The idea of ἰδανικῆς (ascetic struggle) goes hand in hand with dogmatic theology (θεολογία and οἰκονομία). The patristic notion of ascetic struggle is fundamentally about how scripture is applied to the Christian active life.
the dogmatic concept of the oǐkonομία, which gave the Christian active life (πράκτικη) its context. Instead, θεολογία devoid of its context in God’s economy, becomes inward spiritual introspection, which was why Origenists thought of spiritual disciplines as means to an end, an aide or help to the soul by which it could reach its state of ‘rest’.

The dualistic cosmological system created by the Origenists presented an over-spiritualisation and intellectualisation of the spiritual life, which according to Maximus, underestimated the damage done by the fall on human nature:  

If, as you wrote, there are some who think this, saying that the divine philosophy belongs to those who pass over by reason and contemplation alone without ascetic struggle, I on the contrary dare to define as solely the truly fully satisfactory philosophy that true judgment concerning reality and activity, supported by ascetic struggle (κἂν τινες, ὡς γεγράφατε, τοῦτο νομίζωσιν, διὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ θεωρίᾳ μόνον πρακτικῆς δίχα τὴν κατὰ Θεῖον τῶν μετελθόντων αὐτήν φιλοσοφίαν εἰπεῖν, τούσκαυτον δὲ διηρμένην τῇ πράξει τὴν ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ὄντα κρίσιν αὐτῶν καὶ ἐνέργειαν)...as ascetic struggle is certainly connected to reason, and the judgement it involves embraced by contemplation (ὡς τῷ λόγῳ συνημμένης πάντως τῆς πράξεως, καὶ τῆς ἐπ’ αὐτὴν κρίσεως τῇ θεωρίᾳ περιεχομένης)...For philosophy is not limited by a body, since it has the character of divine power, but it has certain shadowy reflections, in those who have been stripped through the grace of philosophy to become imitators of godlike conduct of God-loving men (Οὐ γὰρ χωρεῖται σώματι, χαρακτὴρ ὑπάρχουσα θείας δυνάμεως, ἀλλὰ τινα τῶν αὐτῆς σκιάσματα, καὶ τούτο οὗ δι’ ἔαυτὴν, διὰ δὲ τοῦ τῶν γιμνοῦς τῆς κατ’ αὐτὴν χάριτος εἰς μέμησιν ἔλθειν τῆς θεοειδοῦς τῶν φιλοθέων ἀνθρώπων ἀναστροφῆς).  

Maximus believed that it was because of the corruption of the moral nature that Christian disciplines (ἀσκησις) were to be understood in light of the work of grace. Grace reoriented the mind of its knowledge of God, and it was this reorientation of the mind towards truths about God, away from sin, that necessitated the believer’s engagement in Christian disciplines. The concept of ἀσκησις is a response to the Christian acknowledgement of the sin-affected human condition.

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64 Louth, Maximus, 69.
65 Amb. 10. 1108AB [PG 91: 1108 AB]
66 See Prassas, 38.
67 See Ibid., 38.
2.8 The Patristic Notion of God's Image and Likeness

Explaining that the mind had also been corrupted by sin, Maximus took the Origenist conception of the mind as the spiritual centre of the human psyche, but explained it in the orthodox context of God having created humanity in his image and likeness. In Greek patristic thought, the image represented the unalterable created link between God and the intellectual nature he had created in humans. Whereas, due to the effects of sin, ‘the likeness’ (όμοιος/όμοιότης) had been lost at the fall, after the fall, humanity created in God’s image (εἰκόνα), retained a rational moral nature. Origenist soteriology had therefore strayed from the scriptural dogmatic tradition of the church.

Apparent in Origenist cosmology were the Neoplatonic constructs of emanation and return, which taught that the soul had fallen from its state of perfection to which it would be eventually restored. Maximus’ corrective drew on the emanation and return construct, but did so in an antithetical way. So as to preserve the created goodness of creation and present the problem of sin as a human responsibility that would not compromise God’s sovereignty over his creation, Maximus provided an account of the material/corporeal world from the standpoint of God. Believing that understanding God’s relationship to his creation would lead to the proper understanding of the Christian life, he articulated that the mind itself was responsible for sinful passions:

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68 The idea of likeness or ομοίωσις in Greek patristic thought draws from the Greco-Roman philosophical notion of ‘common properties’. There is a common property between the holy person and God, so that ‘likeness’ is closer to analogy than ‘participation’ because it accounts for the togetherness of the elements of a diverse ontological type, but in a weaker, non-constitutive way. For example, two holy people resemble each other because they possess holiness. See N. Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2, n.4. See also Chapter 1 n.53 of this thesis.

69 The conception of humanity in the image and likeness of God (cf. Gen 1:26) was a central theological anthropological theme of the patristic period. Image was understood ontologically in terms of nature or created being, and likeness was understood in terms of virtue or morality. Generally speaking the Greek fathers maintained a distinction between the two Greek terms for image and likeness. See McGinn, 243.

70 Cf. Amb 7. 1069B [PG 91: 1069B] ‘But they [‘Origenists’] do not realise how untenable their views and how improbable their conjectures, as a more reasonable argument will surely demonstrate. For if the divine is unmoved, since it fills all things, and everything that was brought from non-being to being is moved (‘Αλλ’ ἐγιόρηκαν ὡς ἀδύνατα ὑποτίθενται καὶ τῶν ἀμηχάνων κατασταχândontai, καθὼς προέων μετὰ τοῦ εἰκότος ὁ ἄλλης ἀποδείξει λόγος. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ θεόν ἀκίνητον, ὡς πάντων πληρωτικῶν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐκ μὴ δυντὸν τὸ εἶναι λαβὸν καὶ κινῆσαι…then nothing that moves is yet at rest (οὐπω δὲ οὐδεὶς κινοῦμενος ἔσται)…Those that are tending toward that which is ultimately desirable have not yet reached the end, since they have not yet come to rest (ἐπεὶ μὴ δ’ ἐκεῖνό πω φαίνει τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ φερομένων τὴν κίνησιν ἔστησαν).’ For an account on Origenist cosmology, see Cooper, 72; Pelikan, 29.

71 Louth, Maximus, 67.

72 Cf. Amb 7. 1069B [PG 91. 1069B]
These passions, and the rest as well, were not originally created together with human nature, for if they had been they would contribute to the definition of human nature (Τὰ πάθη ταύτα, ὡσπερ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ, τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων προηγομένως οὐ συνεκτίθη, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰς τὸν ὄρον ἐν συνετέλουσιν τῆς φύσεως)...on account of humanity’s fall from perfection, the passions were introduced and attached themselves to the more irrational part of human nature (ὅτι διὰ τὴν τῆς τελειότητος ἐκπτωσιν ἐπεισήχθη ταύτα, τῷ ἀλογωτέρῳ μέρει προσφυέντα τῆς φύσεως). Then, immediately after humanity had sinned, the divine and blessed image was displaced by the clear and obvious likeness to unreasoning animals (δὲ ὁ, ἀντὶ τῆς θείας καὶ μακαρίας εἰκόνος, εὕθες ἀμα τῇ παραβάσει διαφανῆς καὶ ἐπίδημον ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ γέγονεν ἢ τῶν ἀλόγων ζωῶν ὀμοιώσις). The passions, moreover, become good in those who are spiritually earnest once they have wisely separated them from corporeal objects and used them to gain possession of heavenly things (Πλὴν καλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ πάθη ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις, ὑπερίκα σοφῶς αὐτὰ τῶν σώματων μεταχειρίζονται κτήσιν).

For Maximus, the passions were not evil, but became evil when the mind directed their use in an evil way. His corrective overturned the Origenist presupposition that ascribed the passions to substance or materiality and which attributed the origin of sin to the soul falling in time into the body from its pre-existent state.

2.9 Christian Exemplarism

Origenist cosmology promoted a doctrine of the fall from an original henad that supported a primeval unity of rational, incorporeal beings. This implied that the end of all beings constituted a return and restoration to a pristine and incorporeal state. Neoplatonically-derived, its cosmology held that in the beginning all rational beings had been created equal, so that it was through God’s Word, the

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73 Ad Thal. 1. 5-15 (CCSG7:47) “Εδει γὰρ, τῆς ἀξίας τοῦ λόγου καλυφθείσης, ἵφ’ ὁν γνωμικῶς ἐπεσπάσατο τῆς ἀλογίας γνωρισμάτων ἐνδικῶς τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κολάζεσθαι, σοφῶς εἰς συναίσθησιν τῆς λογικῆς μεγαλονοίας ἔθεκεν ὀίκονομοῦντος τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Maximus’ answer quoted Gregory of Nyssa. See Blowers & Wilken, 97, n.2.

74 Proclus had promoted a Platonic metaphysical system that incorporated the ‘henads’ (‘a level of individual ones’), between ‘the One’ (monad/first principle/logos) and the divine intellect (the second principle). Henads like ‘the One’ were beyond being, but they stood at the head of the chain of causation. Within Proclus’ metaphysical system they serve to protect the One from any hint of multiplicity and draw the rest of the universe or cosmos towards the One, by connecting as an intermediate stage between the absolute unity and determinate multiplicity.

75 Cf. Amb. 7.1069A [PG 91: 1069A]

76 See Cooper, 72.
Lo,goj, Christians could contemplate and know the unique Godhead of the Father. The fall was understood to be the result of the lessening of contemplation on the unique Godhead that had led the rational, incorporeal beings to lose this state and become corporeal. The reason for God’s creation of the world was so that God could reverse this.

Drawing on Christian exemplarism, Maximus corrected these heterodox cosmological misassumptions, by placing God as creator beyond the *henads* or any other category of time and space. Allowing him to emphasise God’s sovereign and transcendent ‘otherness’ or holiness in his creation in relation to fallen creation:

God is one, without beginning, incomprehensible, possessing in his totality the full power of being, fully excluding the notion of time and quality in that he is inaccessible to all and not discernable by any being on the basis of any natural representation (Εἰς Θεός, ἀναρχος, ἀκατάληπτος, οὐλαν ἔχων τοῦ εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν δύολον· τὴν, πότε καὶ πῶς εἶναι παντάπασιν ἀπωδούμενος ἐννοιαίν· ὡς πάσιν ἐπάτος, καὶ μηδεὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐκ φυσικῆς ἐμφάσεως διεγνωσμένος). God is in himself (insofar as it is possible for us to know) neither beginning, nor middle, nor end, nor absolutely anything that is thought of as coming after him by nature (Ὁ Θεός, οὐκ ἐστι δι’ ἐαυτῶν, ὡς ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι δυνατόν· οὗτε ἀρχή, οὔτε μεσότης, οὔτε τέλος, οὔτε τὸ σύνολον ἔτερον τῶν τοῖς μετ’ αὐτῶν φυσικῶς ἐνθεωρομένων); for he is unlimited, unmoved, and infinite in that he is beyond every essence, power, and act (ἀόριστος γὰρ ἐστι καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ ἀπεριος, ὡς πάσης οὕσιας καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐνεργείας ὑπερέκειναι ἀπείρως ὅν). God had created freely, not out of necessity, but out of his love. Existing outside of, and beyond his creation, the goal of all creation was God’s own glory.

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78 Ibid., 65.
79 See Cooper, 82.
81 CK 1.1-2 [PG 90: 1084A]; Cf. CK 1.10 [PG 90: 1085D-1088A] ‘God is the beginning, middle, and end of beings in that he is active and not passive, as are all others which we so name (Ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ μοισάχης καὶ τέλος ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός, ὡς ἐνεργῶν, ἄλλ᾽ οἳ πάσχον: ὅστε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, οἷς παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ὄνομαζεται). For he is beginning as creator, middle as provider [sustainer], and end as goal, for it is said, ‘From him and through him are all beings,’ [cf. Rom 11:36] (Ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐστίν ὡς δημιουργός καὶ μοισάχης, ὡς προοιμητής καὶ τέλος, ὡς περιγραφή. Ἔξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ, φησὶ, καὶ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα).’
82 See Cooper, 82.
2.10 Sin: A Horizontal Movement Away From God

The Origenist notion of beginning (ἀρχή) and end/goal (τέλος) represented an absolute unity, and it was this movement between the beginning and end that Maximus saw needed to be corrected. Movement in the Neoplatonic system is static, in that any movement within the system is always focused upon itself. Its true logical existence is found in the contemplation of God’s essence, so that movement within the Origenist schema becomes a form of ‘rebellion’ against God. Any change and diversity in creation, seen as a consequence of the fall, is viewed to be fundamentally evil. The movement’s focus shifts to the fallen rational being’s restoration back to its perfect primeval state. Creation is depicted as ontologically and fundamentally flawed, within which the fallen beings ‘become’ (where they came to be). The fallen beings had initially enjoyed a state of ‘rest’, but their fallen status now initiated ‘movement’, stated in the Platonic triad as becoming-rest-movement (γένεσις-στάσις-κίνησις).

Maximus’ corrective viewed the created world in terms of a goal or plan/purpose (σκοπός) that was Christologically determined. He argued that the beginning and end of creation was only identical in its goodness in so far as creation had come from God. God as the sovereign and transcendent creator sustained creation outside of time and space, so that Creation was naturally oriented towards God as its goal, which affirmed its created goodness. Sin’s effects upon creation were therefore the result of humanity’s purposeful and autonomous movement away from God.

By rearranging the Platonic triad of ‘becoming–rest–movement’ to ‘becoming-movement–rest’ (γένεσις-κίνησις-στάσις), Maximus depicted what he believed to be the true nature of the movement of created beings within God’s creation as reflected in the Genesis account of the fall:

For if the divine is unmoved, since it fills all things, and everything that was brought from non-being to being is moved, (because it tends towards some end), then nothing that moves is yet at rest. For movement driven by desire has not yet come to rest in that which is ultimately

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83 Berthold, 170, n.2.
85 See Louth, Maximus, 67; Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, 133.
86 See Cooper, 82.
87 Louth, Maximus, 67.
88 Cooper, 84.
89 Louth, Maximus, 67.
desirable (Εἰ γὰρ τὸ θεόν ἀκίνητον, ὡς πάντων πληρωτικὸν, πάν ὁ τὸ ἐκ μὴ ἀντων τὸ
eῖναι λαβόν καὶ κινητόν, ὡς πρὸς τινα πάντως φερόμενον αἰτίαν, οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲν
κινούμενον ἔστη, ὡς τῆς κατ’ ἐφεσιν κινήσεως τὴν δύναμιν μήπω τῷ ἐσχάτῳ
προσαναπαύσασαν ὀρέκτῳ). Unless that which is ultimately desirable is possessed, nothing else is
of such a nature as to bring to rest what is being driven by desire (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἰστὰν ἄλλο τὸ
φερόμενον κατὰ φύσιν πέρφυκεν ἢ ἐκείνο δεικνύμενον). Therefore, if something moves it has
not come to rest, for it has not yet attained the ultimately desirable (οὐδὲν ἄρα κινούμενον
ἔστη, ὡς τοῦ ἐσχάτου μήπω τυχὸν ὀρέκτῳ). Those who are tending toward that which is
ultimately desirable have not yet reached the end, since they have not yet come to rest (ἐπεὶ
μὴ’ ἐκείνο πω φανέν τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ φερομένων τὴν κίνησιν ἔστησαν).

Maximus’ triad creatively modified the Neoplatonic triad of becoming–rest–movement as it
operated on a vertical trajectory of ‘emanation and return’ within its circular model of ‘time and
space’. This vertical movement was undergirded by the notion that God’s spiritual domain could be
abstractly entered into by virtue of the intellect. Maximus’ corrective adapted the Aristotelian pattern
of forward teleological motion, which allowed him to develop a notion of metaphysical time that was
progressively moving horizontally and historically forward. Maintaining the unity of transcendent
reality, time becomes an extension of God, so that creation was always bound to God because God is
‘unextended’, sovereign and transcendent and beyond his creation. Maximus’ triad not only worked
to protect the notion of God’s economy of salvation, the context of the incarnation’s salvific work, but
also allowed him to talk about sin as a rational human problem, which was the reason for humanity’s
alienation from God.

Maximus’ conception of time therefore worked to maintain human freedom and responsibility
in sin. It rested in his division of reality into three stages (beginning, middle and end), which he
defined by a variety of ways. The most important were ‘becoming-movement-rest’ and ‘being-
wellbeing-ever wellbeing’ (εἶναι-εὖ εἶναι-ἀεὶ εἶναι), all of which allowed him to present a positive

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90 Amb. 7. 1069B [PG 91: 1069B]
91 Meyendorff, Eastern Christian Thought, 50.
92 P. C. Plass, ‘“Moving Rest” in Maximus the Confessor’, Classica et Mediaevalia 35 (1984), 177,
259. See also Cooper, 85.
93 Plass, ‘Moving Rest’, 177-78.
view of creation. ‘Motion’ was a cosmic process characterised by space and time, in which things achieve individuality and develop towards their goal. Borrowing the Cappadocian notion of ‘extension’ (διαστήμα) for the middle member of the triad (movement), he showed that time and space are generated by motion from the beginning and the end. Although ‘motion’ could be diverted or inclined towards evil within the created realm, creation maintained its goodness. ‘Motion’ as an extension of God was ‘directed motion’ because its goal was ‘rest’.

In Neoplatonic theory all order ceased in God (the One) because the idea of unity was conceived to exist beyond knowledge. When the mind focused on God it became unaware of itself, which made it incapable of any knowledge about God. Using the dialectics of apophatic/negative theology, Maximus turned this notion on its head. Although the mind could not grasp God and his total unity, Christians knew God because the full consequences and benefits of the incarnation’s salvific work ‘moved’ them towards God. Christians therefore ‘participated’ in God as a result of Christ’s salvific work, and Maximus expressed this idea of ‘participation’ as a state of constant progression or ‘ever-motion’. Temporal historical time progressively took humanity through created nature, but humanity came to ‘rest’ beyond time in eternity, which Maximus called ‘trans-temporal’ rest. This rest was not identical with God’s own rest, because the believers’ ‘participation’ did not mean that they were subsumed into God’s being. Rather, knowledge about God was accessible to Christians because the incarnation had restored the believer’s ‘movement’ towards God.

2.11 Sin: A Free Choice of the Will

Maximus’ corrective maintained human responsibility for sin because he portrayed the origin of sin as a voluntary movement away from God. In Origenist soteriology free will involved an act of rational power by which one moved oneself towards one of the two opposing poles of good and

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95 Ibid., 260.
96 Ibid., 260-61.
97 See Cooper, 17-19. In Timaeus 28c Plato had stated: ‘To discover the maker and father of the universe is indeed a hard task, and having found him it would be impossible to tell everyone about him.’ Plato’s statement had epistemological ramifications for philosophy and theology, which have continued from ancient times into the modern age. Early Christian thinkers dealt with this by developing apophatic theology, because it enabled them to unite the apophatic to the cataphatic (what can be known about God in scripture).
98 Plass, ‘Moving Rest’, 178.
99 Ibid.,179.
Within the ‘emanation and return’ system of ‘becoming-rest-movement’ the person is pictured as oscillating between good and sinful choices from an initial position of ‘rest’. As the sequence of the movement is circular, this results in a dilemma about freedom. Like a pendulum swing, the person swings or moves backwards and forwards, repetitively between good and evil choices. Unable to escape the body and the interference of the passions they inevitably become weighted by sin, so that sin operates as the necessary ‘cause’ of the present material world, making ‘good’ a desire in humans not for its own sake, but on account of the experience of evil. The person’s freedom is therefore attributed to an intellectual power that can determine its own salvation from its evil surrounds to a primordial state of perfection outside of the material/corporeal body.

In contrast, Maximus’ soteriology maintains its notion of human responsibility in sin because the doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’ necessitated that God had naturally determined freedom in humans when he had created humanity in his image from nothing:

In the beginning humanity was created in the image of God [cf. Gen 1:26-27] in order to be perpetually born by the Spirit in the exercise of free choice and to acquire the additional gift of assimilation [likeness] to God by keeping the divine commandment (ός εἰκός, αὐτὰ σεμνύνοντες θεωρήσαι, κατ᾽ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ κατ᾽ ἀρχάς γεγενήθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἐπὶ τῷ πάντας γεννήθηκα παρὰ προαίρεσιν πνεύματι, καὶ προσλαβεῖν τὸ καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν διὰ τῆς τηρήσεως τῆς θείας ἐντολῆς αὐτῷ προσγενόμενον)...For created man could not be revealed as a son of God through deification by grace without first being born by the Spirit in the exercise of free choice, because of the power of self-movement and self-determination inherent in human nature (Οὐ γὰρ ἦν δυνατὸν ἄλλως Ἐλλὸν ἀποδειχθῆναι Θεοῦ καὶ Θεῶν κατὰ τὴν ἐκ χάριτος θέωσιν τὸν γενόμενον ἄνθρωπον, μὴ πρότερον κατὰ προαίρεσιν γεννήθεντα τῷ Πνεύματι, διὰ τὴν ἐνσώσαν αὐτῷ φυσικῶς αὐτοκίνητον καὶ ἀδέσποτον δύναμιν). The choice of good exists not because evil or sin exists but because God’s very being and nature is holy. The Holy Spirit, because of the incarnation’s work, illuminates the mind of its knowledge of God, so that humanity’s lost likeness to God is regained when the believer’s will reorients itself back to the will of the Creator.

100 Cooper, 86.
101 Ibid., 86.
102 Amb. 42. 1345D [PG 91: 1345D]
2.12 Sin: Transmitted as a Deformity Upon Human Nature

Maximus connected the origin and transmission of sin to the first man Adam’s deliberate disobedience of God’s commandment in the garden, so that in line with scriptural tradition he attributed death to sin’s punishment:

Having originally been corrupted from its natural design, Adam’s free choice corrupted along with it our human nature, which forfeited the grace of impassibility. Thus came sin into existence (Φθαρέσαι πρῶτον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν λόγου τοῦ Ἄδαμ ἢ προαιρέσις τὴν φύσιν ἑαυτῇ συνέφθειρεν, ἀποθεμένην τῆς ἀπαθείας τὴν χάριν. Καὶ γέγονεν ἁμαρτία)...Hence the mutation of human nature over passibility, corruption, and death is the condemnation of Adam’s deliberate sin. Man was not created by God in the beginning with such a corrupted nature; rather, man invented and knew it since he created deliberate sin through his disobedience. And clearly condemnation by death is the result of such sin (Κατάκρυσις οὐν ἐστὶ τῆς προαιρετικῆς ἁμαρτίας τοῦ Ἄδαμ ἢ τῆς φύσεως πρὸς πάθος καὶ φθοράν καὶ θανάτου μεταποίησις. ἤν οὐ γέγονεν μὲν ἐκ θεοῦ καταρχάς ἐξων ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ ἐγώ, τὴν προαιρετικὴν διὰ τῆς παρακοής ἁμαρτίαν δημιουργήσας. ἡς ὑπάρχει γέννημα σαφῶς ἢ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου κατάκρυσις).103

According to Maximus sin was attributed to a deformed will within human nature, so that all humans were implicated in sin. Moreover, it was because sin had deformed the will that sin remained a reality in the Christian life. The Spirit’s work and the Christian’s adoption in Christ, however, renewed human nature:

For the Spirit does not give birth to an unwilling will, but converts the willing will toward deification (Οὐ γὰρ γεννᾷ γινώμεν τὸ πνεῦμα μὴ θέλουσαν, ἀλλὰ βουλαμένην μεταπλάττει πρὸς θέωσιν.)...So even if we have the Spirit of adoption, who is himself the Seed for enduing those begotten [through baptism] with the likeness of the Sower, but do not present him with a will cleansed of any inclination or disposition to something else, we therefore, even after being born of water and Spirit (Jn 3:5), willingly sin (Καὶ οὖν ἐξωμεν τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς υἱοθεσίας, ὑπὲρ ἐστὶ σπέρμα πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σπέρματος εἰδοποιοῦν τοῖς γεννομένοις ὁμοίωσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ παρέχομεν αὐτῷ τὴν γινώμεν τῆς ἐπ’ ἄλλο ρόπης τε καὶ διαθήκης

103 Ad Thal 42: 5-10, 55-60 [CCSG 7:285-287]
The result of this led to the reformation of the believer’s will, providing the will with a renewed capacity to obey God.

In attributing the origin of sin to Adam, Maximus made use of the phrase ‘ancestral/forefatherly sin’\(^\text{105}\) (προστατορικόν ἁμάρτημα). ‘Suffering his saving passion and rising from the dead, He bestowed upon us the hope of eternal life. From condemnation of ancestral sin He absolved by obedience; by death He destroyed the power of death (cf. Heb. 2:14), so that as in Adam all die, so in Him all shall be made alive (1 Cor. 15.22).’\(^\text{106}\) Although, Maximus made no use of the terminology of ‘original sin’,\(^\text{107}\) understanding death to be the just punishment of sin\(^\text{108}\) mirrors Augustine’s\(^\text{109}\) understanding.

Maximus’ idea of ‘ancestral sin’ therefore resonates with Augustine’s idea of original sin, even if it is not technically identical with it. Moreover, it is significant that Maximus used the phrase προγονικὴ ἁμαρτία instead of προστατορικὸν ἁμάρτημα which is an unusual rendering.\(^\text{110}\) The Greek word ἁμαρτία connotes a generic condition of sin that has come from the ‘forefather’, whereas

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\(^{104}\) Ad Thal. 6: 20, 35-40 [CCSG 7:69-71]

\(^{105}\) See G. S. Gabriel, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, The Ancestral Sin (J. S. Romanides; Ridgewood, Zephyr: 1998), 7-8. The phrase προστατορικὸν ἁμάρτημα usually translated as ‘ancestral sin’ is literally ‘forefatherly sin’. The phrase was used early in church tradition to denote Adam’s transgression, as a concrete act, but unlike Augustine’s ‘original sin’ it is not directly connected to the concept of ‘guilt’. See also Lampe, 82-84 ἁμαρτία, ἡ non-theological meanings conveyed the generic idea of ‘slipping’ or ‘falling’ whereas ἁμάρτημα can emphasise sin as an individual act.

\(^{106}\) LA 1 [CCSG 40:7] [cf. PG. 90: 912BC] καὶ παθῶν τὸ σωτηρίου πάθος καὶ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστάσας, τὴν ἐπίθεσία τῆς ἀναστάσεως καὶ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς ἡμῖν ἐχαρίσατο, τὸ κατάκριμα δὲ ὑποκοῆς λύσας τῆς προγονικῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τὸ κράτος τοῦ θανάτου θεανάτω καταργήσας· ἵνα, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἅδῳ πάντες ἀποθνῄσκομεν, οὕτως ἐν αὐτῷ πάντες ὅσπερ ἐξαφανίσθομεν.

\(^{107}\) Cf. Ad Thal 61:120-25 [CCSG 22:91] ‘He [Christ] submitted to the death through suffering which in Adam’s case was thoroughly justified, but which in his own case was absolutely unjust since it did not have as its genetic root the unrighteous pleasure stemming from our forefather’s disobedience. (οὕτως καὶ τὸν διὰ πόνον τοῦ Ἄδων διακατάστασαν καταδεξάμενος θάνατον, ἐν αὐτῷ ἡλικῇ γενόμενον ἁδίκωταν, ὡς οὖν ἤχοντα τῆς ἱδίας γενέσεως ἀρχὴν τὴν ἐκ παρακοῆς ἁδικωτάτην τοῦ προστατόρος ἤδονην).’

\(^{108}\) Cf. Ad Thal 42: 5-10, 55-60 [CCSG 7:285-287]

\(^{109}\) Conf. 5.9.16.

\(^{110}\) See n. 102 above. See also P. Sherwood, St. Maximus the Confessor: The Ascetic Life, The Four Centuries on Charity (New York: Newman Press, 1955), ACW 21, 247 n.185. Sherwood comments that the phrase προγονικὴ ἁμαρτία is unusual and elsewhere only occurs LA 1.1. Maximus’ phrase is different to the usual προστατορικὸν ἁμάρτημα (forefatherly sin) but can still be translated as ‘ancestral sin’. Given the context of baptism Sherwood writes that it is tempting to translate this phrase as ‘original sin’ in this context. See also Lampe, 1142. The word προγονικός is derived from ancestors.
Adam, connotes an individual sense of sin. Maximus also communicates an idea of ‘generational sin’ in conjunction with Christian baptism, because baptism signified the re-birth or renewed life of the believer.  

Maximus further alludes to a universal concept of ‘guilt’, ‘blame’ or ‘culpability’ that he not only attributes to humanity because of sin, but is contrasted with Christ’s righteousness:

In order for unrighteous pleasure, and the thoroughly just death (δικαιοσύνη του θεανατου) which is its consequence, to be abolished…and in order for suffering human nature to be set right, it was necessary for an unjust (αδικος και πόνοι και θεανατου διακαιοσύνης, πόνος καὶ θανατος αδικώτατος ἀνέλη διάλου τὴν ἐξ ἡμοθεν ἀδικωτάτην) and likewise uncaused suffering and death to be conceived…as the consequent just end of human nature occurring in death (δι’ αὐτῆς διὰ θεανατου διακασοσύνης τέλος τῆς φύσεως)...For this reason, the Logos of God, who is fully divine by nature, became fully human, being composed just like us of an intellectual soul and a passible body, save only without sin (διὰ τούτο, θεός ὑπάρχων τέλειος κατὰ φύσιν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος γίνεται τέλειος ἀνθρωπος, ἐκ φυσης νοερας και σώματος παθητου κατὰ φύσιν παραπλησίως ήμιν χωρίς μόνης ἀμαρτίας) [cf. Heb. 4:15].

According to Maximus, it was necessary that Christ appropriate the ‘unjust’ (αδικος-literally, ‘of the unjust’) penalty of death upon himself because death was humanity’s ‘just’ penalty for sin. Again, in another passage on baptism linking death to the punishment of sin brought about through Adam, he shows that Christian baptism also signified the removal of death’s penalty:

[Death] which on Adam’s account had condemned human nature – solely for purposes of condemning sin, but in Christ it is a condemnation of sin, all who in the Spirit are willingly reborn of Christ with the bath of regeneration [Titus 3:5] are able by grace to put off their original Adamic birth (πάντες οι ἀπὸ Χριστου κατὰ θέλησιν πνιματι διὰ λουτροῡ

111 See Pelikan, 182. Pelikan writes that Maximus’ reference to Baptism sounds very like Augustine’s own doctrine of sinfulness passed on from Adam onto his future generations.
112 LA 44 [CCSG 40:119] [cf. PG 90:956A]
Although, Maximus does not engage a forensic or judicial analogy of ‘guilt’, his depiction of sin conveys a sense of humanity’s corporate responsibility for sin, implicitly, if not explicitly, because sin is traced generationally to Adam.\(^{115}\)

### 2.13 Conclusion

Neither Augustine nor Maximus develop their theological notions of sin in a systematic way, as they write to either assist the Christian life or correct matters of doctrine. The Pelagian controversy had compelled Augustine to develop his analogy of guilt, enabling him to address the issues of grace and human freedom, issues that were not raised by Origenist soteriology.\(^{116}\) For Maximus, Origenist dualism had located sin’s effects entirely in the corporeal world, not on the soul or the intellect. He was concerned to correct the over-spiritualisation and intellectualisation of the Christian life, which not only downplayed the importance of Christian practice, but spoke of the passions as a punishment for sin. The technical differences, language, and emphases in which Augustine and Maximus speak about sin are contextually driven, so that any identifiable differences in expression should not warrant a clear demarcation between western and eastern soteriology during this period of the early church. Both theologians depict Adam’s fall as the reason for the moral weaknesses displayed in human nature, which each expressed as ‘the passions’. Three key themes about sin are developed in Maximus’ depiction of sin that also featured with Augustine: all humanity is involved in some manner, in Adam’s disobedience; sin is a universal problem in human nature and the reason behind the incarnation’s salvific work; sin has a psychological effect on human nature, evidenced in how the will directs the passions. Moreover that the differences between Augustine and Maximus can be attributed to their different historical contexts highlights the steadfastness and unwavering nature of the

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\(^{114}\) Ad Thal 61:97 [CCSG 22:97]

\(^{115}\) On the similarities between Augustine and Maximus, see G. C. Berthold, ‘Did Maximus the Confessor Know Augustine?, Studia Patristica 17 (1982), 14-17; B. Neil, Seventh-Century Popes and Martyrs: The Political Hagiography of Anastasius Bibliothecarius (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 73, 78-79.

scriptural tradition that both draw on in the development of their arguments because each has sought to keep their teaching about sin in line with the ‘tradition’ (παράδοσις) of earlier Fathers.\(^{117}\)

\(^{117}\) See McGrath, 443.
Chapter 3: Jonathan Edwards and the Problem of Sin

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to show that Jonathan Edwards’ polemic on original sin was directed against ‘Arminian’ or libertarian arguments which located the basis of sin in the free choice of the will. Eighteenth-century Protestantism had increasingly become uneasy with the classical doctrine of original sin, so that the doctrine was no longer assumed as a central tenet of Christian belief. The Enlightenment rejected an entirely pessimistic view of human nature. The increasingly dominant view amongst Protestants, influenced by new libertarian arguments, was that sin arose from individual choice not because the mind was itself naturally corrupt. Edwards’ arguments sought to counteract and correct these assertions as he aimed to draw its proponents in line with the church’s traditional teaching about sin. By retaining and adapting the same philosophical language and concepts that the moral philosophers used, he sought to correct the notion that the Christian’s ability to self-determine their transformation was the product of reason alone. The distinction Edwards made between the ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ image of the human being, allowed him to overturn the anthropocentric principle of reason that had replaced the theocentric principle of grace in libertarian-affected soteriology. Moreover, Edwards’ conception of ‘personal identity’ and ‘continuous creation’ enabled him to demonstrate that the moral nature was unable to reform itself outside of the incarnation’s work of grace and the Spirit’s illumination of the mind.

3.2 Modernity: A Threat to ‘Original Sin’

From the medieval scholastic period through to the Reformation the doctrine of original sin was taken for granted by both Catholics and Protestants. Prior to the new scientific discoveries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the doctrine which expressed the universal consequences of the fall in terms of inherited guilt from Adam’s first sin upon humanity was understood to be a historical reality. For both Catholics and Protestants the historical assumption of original sin was not separated

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1 For an explanation of what ‘Arminian’ meant in Edwards’ context see section 3.4 in this chapter.
from the historical belief that the purpose of God’s salvific work was the reason for the incarnation’s work. These doctrinal teachings were adhered to because the Bible was assumed to be a reliable authoritative historical source of both human and scientific knowledge.⁴

The intellectual perspective of medieval thinkers was theocentric. They thought of God as the sovereign, transcendent creator who sustained the universe according to natural laws. God was the author of the Bible, and therefore the centre of the historical process. The scriptures were not only believed to be an authoritative source for knowledge of the past, but also disclosed the meaning and destiny of human existence in both the present and future.⁵ Theological inquiry was therefore considered foundational to scientific investigation, guided by and not separated from, the church’s traditional doctrinal decrees and the influential writings of the Church Fathers. By the sixteenth century, however, due to the new scientific discoveries and the emergence of the empirical and rational philosophers, the assumption that scripture and theological inquiry were important for scientific and epistemological knowledge was no longer assumed.

The Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophical and scientific thinkers had emerged out of a theocentric context. Yet the impact of their ideas and discoveries reconfigured and reversed the medieval theocentric perspective to that of an anthropocentric one.⁶ The first effect of anthropocentrism was that it severed human inquiry from the church’s domain and diminished the central role that theology had previously contributed to human knowledge.⁷ Renaissance humanists also introduced new critical methods for literary interpretation, which questioned the authenticity of the Bible and the dogmatic tradition as an historical authoritative source.⁸ One flow-on effect was that it brought into question the central role of the church as an interpreter and preserver of the scriptural tradition.⁹ The effects of humanist thought were evident in the Protestant reformers counteractive emphasis on sola scriptura (‘scripture alone’), against the Roman Catholic Church’s magisterium or

⁴ Wiley, 99-103.
⁵ Ibid., 103.
⁷ Wiley, 104
⁸ Ibid., 105. For example, the Renaissance period saw the development of textual criticism, the aim of which was to reconstruct the original form of the text.
⁹ Evidenced in the early church Councils that met to discuss doctrine and issues of heterodoxy.
¹⁰ The Church’s teaching authority.
ecclesial emphases. Unlike the Roman Catholic Church’s focus on its teaching authority, Protestants placed their emphasis upon scripture as its own interpreter and authority. By the seventeenth century this emphasis had established itself in the continental Pietistic movements, which emphasised the personal, individual aspects of Christian practice over church order, liturgy and the scriptural dogmatic tradition.

By the eighteenth century the validity of scripture and doctrine as an authoritative historical source was no longer taken for granted by all Protestants. The traditional doctrines of original sin and ‘creation from nothing’ no longer established certitude about the origins of sin and the universe. Both Augustine and Maximus had taken the doctrines of the fall and ‘creation from nothing’ as the starting point to their ideas about the historical necessity of the incarnation’s salvific work. If sin universally impacted the human condition, then it followed that the incarnation’s salvific work necessarily undergirded the historical process as the reason for God’s economic salvation work (οἰκονομία). Connected to this idea of the oikonomia was the concept of sacred time and history. This idea of sacred time and history centred on God’s management of the fallen world and his plan of salvation within the historical process. This resonates with the modern idea of Heilsgeschichte, the notion of God’s providential sovereign rule over his creation, which articulated the meaning and purpose of human existence.

11 Ibid., 105.
13 See Noll, 15; See also D. A. Sweeney, The American Evangelical Story: A History of the Movement (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 33-36. Although the pietistic movements were diverse, they were based on a set of convictions, practices and habits. The movement did not survive the eighteenth century in a well-organised or integrated way, but its practices, innovations and ideals had a lasting impact on the eighteenth-century evangelical movement, some of which mark evangelical practice and organisation today.
14 See Wiley, 105.
15 The early church conception of the oikonomia was about God’s dealings with humanity, God’s entire salvation plans for humanity and the world pre-eminently in relation to the Incarnation’s salvific work.
16 Salvation history or sacred history.
Enlightenment epistemology replaced the notion of sacred history (the idea that history is about God’s redemptive work and plans for humanity and the world) with the notion of *historia humana* (the idea that history is about human activity and enlightened progress). The latter was an entirely humanistic understanding of time and history devoid of supernatural power. It made the historical process one-dimensional, homogeneous, uniform, non-hierarchical and linear in nature. It accorded to human agency total autonomy and freedom. The idea of God’s providential rule was replaced by the idea that God had set the world in motion at a point and moment in time in creation. God may have established the abstract general laws of nature, but had let the world run by itself like a machine.

### 3.3 Liberty and the New Moral Philosophy

The new scientific discoveries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries posed questions about the nature of God’s providence in Protestant thought. The beginnings of the shift in Protestant thinking about God’s providence, human nature, sin and grace, arose foremost in the writings of the Dutch Reformed theologian, Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609). Influenced by the new scientific discoveries Arminius rewrote the idea of providence by substituting the intelligent design of God for the soulless and mechanical activities of physics. Prior to this period theologians had appealed to reason and scriptural revelation as two distinct and complementary sources for human knowledge. The scriptural tradition and the Bible were necessary because Adam’s sin had distorted reason and limited the human potential to reform outside of divine revelation of Christ and his work of grace. The new scientific discoveries had the consequential effect of shifting the source of knowledge away from the scriptural tradition to human reason and knowledge. Scientific discovery and empirical knowledge therefore personified the achievement of reason and produced alternate thinking to ‘a long-

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18 See Zakai, 133, 143-45.
19 Ibid., 144.
20 See McGrath, 469-70.
22 Wiley, 108.
23 See Ibid., 108.
24 See Ibid., 108.
assumed Christian cosmology, history, and articulation of the meaning and purpose of human existence.\textsuperscript{25}

Libertarian thinking and the new moral philosophy began to locate value in the individual person rather than in the corporate group.\textsuperscript{26} Humans as rational creatures possessed the innate capacity to rise and better themselves despite the circumstances they may have been born into.\textsuperscript{27} The purpose of life was deemed to be human happiness, and moral behaviour and ethics were meant to be conducive to this.\textsuperscript{28} The subject of human happiness therefore undergirded the nature of historical time (\textit{historia humana}), which was differentiated from the concept of scientific time. Scientific time is an undifferentiated linear continuum, because it states that time is linear and static in its forward progression. But historical time gave meaning to the linear continuum because it reflects on the conditions for human existence.\textsuperscript{29} Historical time admits to the possibilities for transformation that could lead to the realisation of various utopian and redemptive goals and aims.\textsuperscript{30} The notions of historical and scientific time therefore converged to influence and change radically teleological and cosmological Christian thinking in the Enlightenment context. The traditional doctrine of original sin was under threat.

\textbf{3.4 ‘Arminianism’, Sin and Grace}

The Enlightenment conception of human nature projected an optimism that rejected the pessimistic view of the human condition as expressed by the doctrine of original sin. Secular philosophy and the new sciences worked together to establish a picture of humanity that was self-sufficient, self-determining, self-transforming and high in potentiality, changing how the principle of grace was understood. Both Augustine and Maximus had understood grace as a theocentric principle. Outside of the work of grace, Christians could not transform their fallen nature. Libertarian thinking, however, replaced the theocentric principle of grace with the anthropocentric principle of reason. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 104.
\item \textsuperscript{28} See Zakai, 138-44.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 145.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 145.
\end{itemize}
'extrinsic' work of grace was thereby replaced by the 'intrinsic' work of reason. It was this anthropocentric principle of reason that informed issues of doctrine to do with sin, grace, and the nature of the believer’s transformation that was the problem for Edwards in his disputes with the ‘Arminians’.

The New England Protestant notion of ‘Arminianism’ had very little to do with the sixteenth-century teachings of Arminius and everything to do with the development of a new kind of Christian libertarian thought. Influenced by the new moral philosophy, it began to compromise the traditional ‘Calvinist’ doctrine of God’s sovereign providence and God’s election of believers. Even so, the notion of ‘Calvinism’ as Edwards used the term, was not linked to specific teaching that is historically attributed to John Calvin (1509-1564). It was rather an imprecise term that Edwards used to indicate that he was speaking about traditional orthodox doctrine in general. The counter term ‘Arminianism’ should therefore be understood as a catchall phrase connected to any theological teaching that was believed to diverge from or compromise traditional orthodox doctrine.

By the eighteenth century the ‘Calvinist Tradition’ incorporated the theological writings of various Reformed movements, largely made up of Puritan, Presbyterian, and Continental Reformed authors who came in many varieties. The American Puritans typically studied Calvinism as refracted

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31 See Wiley., 107.
32 Cf. Works 1. 131. ‘The term ‘Calvinist’ is in these days, amongst most, a term of greater reproach than the term ‘Arminian’; yet I should not take it at all amiss, to be called a Calvinist, for distinction’s sake: though I utterly disclaim dependence on Calvin, or believing the doctrines which I hold, because he believed and taught them; and cannot justly be charged with believing in everything just as he taught.’ Cf. Works 1. 132. ‘Yet I would not be understood, that every divine or author whom I have occasion to mention as maintaining that doctrine, was properly an Arminian, or one of that sort which is commonly called by that name. Some of them went far beyond the Arminians: and I would by no means charge Arminians in general with all the corrupt doctrine, which these maintained.’
33 See G. M. Marsden, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 86; Morimoto, 25, n.55. In the Religious Affections (Works 2. 278) Edwards quoted from Calvin’s Institutes Book 1.9.1. His purpose was to make reference to the Spirit’s work in opening the believer’s mind to understanding scripture, not to introduce anything new that was not already conveyed by scripture.
through both English and Continental theologians. Christians of the Arminian persuasion were ‘Calvinist’ in that they affirmed that God’s grace was essential to Christian salvation, but they argued that humans retained some natural ability attributed to reason to choose God’s grace or to resist it. For Edwards this understanding compromised not only the nature of God’s providence, but also the theocentric principle of grace. Replacing the pessimistic view of human nature, as taught in the doctrine of original sin, with a less pessimistic one, Arminian Christians possessed an elevated confidence in the ability of human reason to consistently make the right choices that would eventuate in a reformed Christian life. Edwards’ polemical use of the term ‘Arminian’ therefore signalled to his readers that he intended to make a theological stand for traditional orthodox doctrine against the growing rationalism and secular influences he perceived were leading to heterodoxy within Reformed Protestantism.

3.5 The Free Choice of the Will

Edwards’ corrective against Arminian assumptions about human nature can be gauged from his treatise *Original Sin*. The treatise was designed to refute the views of the Scottish cleric John Taylor (1694-1761), an example of those clergy whose theological thinking was then impacted by Enlightenment epistemology. Taylor argued that it was wrong to think that humans were born into

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36 Marsden, 86.

37 Holbrook, 4 n.9.


39 Edwards had begun this work in 1750, and it was published posthumously in 1758. See Marsden, 450.

40 Cf. Works 3. 102. In his ‘Author’s Preface’ Edwards wrote: ‘According to my observation, no one book has done so much towards rooting out of these western parts of New England, the principles and scheme of religion maintained by our pious and excellent forefathers, the divines and Christians who settled this country, and alienating the minds of many from what I think are evidently some of the main doctrines of the gospel, as that which Dr. Taylor has published against the doctrine of original sin. The book has now for many years been spread abroad in the land, without any answer to it, as an
sinful depravity, as this would hold God accountable and compromise his justice.\textsuperscript{41} Sin did not arise in the individual because of any naturally depraved state, but stemmed from the free choice of the will, which logically negated the idea of inherited sin.\textsuperscript{42} Sin was therefore the result of people’s misuse of their God-given natural propensity of reason, compromised when they chose to follow their base appetites and drives or ‘passions’.\textsuperscript{43}

Adam and Eve had gone astray because they had ‘prostituted reason to appetite’ which meant that their sinful act involved individual responsibility. If Adam and Eve could be held to be individually responsible, it logically followed that humans could not share Adam’s sin universally and generationally.\textsuperscript{44} Sin occurred when ‘sensual appetites and passions’ became excessive and irregular because people did not use their God-given reason to regulate and order them.\textsuperscript{45} Sin therefore originated as a voluntary action of the will, which meant that the will could control sin when it reasoned well and did not indulge the base passions or appetites.\textsuperscript{46} For sin to occur there had to first be a choice, which meant that each person was individually responsible for his or her actions and choices.\textsuperscript{47}

To this position, Edwards’ opposition was based on two key teachings communicated by the doctrine of original sin that he believed libertarian-influenced Protestants had rejected. The first was the notion of universal human depravity, the belief that humans corporately share in the sin of the first man Adam. The second was the Reformed word ‘imputation’, which conveyed the idea that sin was ‘corporately inherited’ by all humans because of Adam’s first sin. Edwards believed that the two notions went together and to reject one resulted in the rejection of the other:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{41} Cf. Works 3. 380.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Cf. Works 3. 194. See Holbrook, 43-46.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 43.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Holbrook, 44.
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 44.
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Cf. Works 3. 205. See Holbrook, 44. Taylor had conceded that humans repeatedly fell into sin, but he believed that this was because no one could be said to have been born into perfection. He analagised that life was a type of ‘probation’ where humans could be tried and purified and made fit for heaven.
\end{itemize}
By original sin, as the phrase has been most commonly used by divines, is meant the *innate sinful depravity* of the heart. But yet when the doctrine of original sin is spoken of, it is vulgarly understood in that latitude, as to include not only the depravity of nature, but the *imputation* of Adam’s first sin; or in other words, the liableness or exposedness of Adam’s posterity, in the divine judgement, to partake of the punishment of that sin. So far as I know, most of those who have held one of these, have maintained the other; and most of those who have opposed one, have opposed the other. Both are opposed by the author chiefly attended to in the following discourse, in his book against original sin.48

According to Edwards all humanity was involved in Adam’s sin, and Adam’s sin was generationally transmitted to his offspring. The moral reasoning capacity in all humans was affected by sin, so the two notions of universal depravity and imputation communicated by the doctrine of original sin, negated Taylor’s argument:

Dr Taylor’s grand objection against this doctrine, which he abundantly insists on, is this: that it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that it should be concreated with any person;…it must be by an act of God’s absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence; and that moral virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent, without which it cannot be virtue and holiness; that a necessary holiness, is no holiness…49

Taylor had argued that a person’s virtue and vice (their good and bad behaviour) presupposed the reflective choice of a moral agent. People made a choice in their mind before they acted, which presupposed individual responsibility for their actions. People were therefore capable of controlling and stopping an action that led to sin. Edwards argued, however, that to say that good and sinful actions originate from an initial reflective good or bad choice in the mind is not only a contradiction, but a self-defeating argument: ‘the antecedent good disposition, temper or affection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the general notion, not that principles derive

49 Works 3. 223. See Holbrook, 45.
their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed.\(^{50}\)

For Edwards, good or sinful actions *per se*, were not defined or given meaning by the action itself. Meaning was derived by the principle or disposition that precedes the choice in the mind before the choice has been made, and the action occurs. Choice could therefore never be connected to another antecedent choice and so on, because choice cannot be said to produce itself or come from nowhere.\(^{51}\) So sinful choices must arise out of an inherent sinful nature, otherwise there is no explanation for either good or evil: ‘Therefore that disobedient will must also come from a disobedient will; and so on, ad infinitum. Otherwise, it must be supposed, that there is some sin in the world, which don’t come from a disobedient will; contrary to the author’s dogmatical assertions.’\(^ {52}\) His arguments retained the same language and concepts that the Arminians used, because he wanted to draw them into line with traditional orthodoxy.\(^ {53}\) Edwards’ argument, however, hinged on the idea that before any choice was made in the mind, regardless of whether it was good or sinful, something had to signify that choice, and this was either a good or evil principle:

Which supposes, that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice;

and that therefore it is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a good disposition of heart, what signifies that choice? There can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appetite.\(^ {54}\)

Edwards based his idea of a good or evil principle on the doctrine of original sin because it taught that sin had entirely corrupted human nature. The will was therefore naturally inclined or disposed to sin.

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\(^{51}\) Cf. Works 1. 414.

\(^{52}\) Works 3. 378. See Holbrook, 46.

\(^{53}\) Cf. Works 1. 414. ‘Nothing that the Arminians say, about the contingence, or self-determining power of man’s will, can serve to explain with less difficulty, how the first sinful volition of mankind could take place, and man be justly charged with the blame for it. To say, the will was self-determined, or determined by free choice, in that sinful volition…is no solution of the difficulty.’

\(^{54}\) Works 3. 224.
3.6 Humanity’s Moral Image of God and Humanity’s Spiritual Image of God

According to Edwards, humans were capable of moral choice because God had created them in his image. God’s holiness, or his divine attributes were therefore the moral measure of good and evil in the choices that humans made: ‘The essential qualities of a moral agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding, to perceive the difference between moral good and evil;’

Edwards’ thinking followed the same patristic understanding that identified the rational moral nature with humanity’s creation in God’s image:

And herein does very much consist that image of God wherein he made man (which we read of, Genesis 1:26, 27 and ch. 9:6), by which God distinguished man from the beasts, viz. in those faculties and principles of nature, whereby he is capable of moral agency. Herein very much consists the natural image of God; as his spiritual and moral image, wherein man was made at first, consisted in that moral excellency, that he was endowed with.

The moral nature was retained by humans after the fall, and set them apart from the animals. Edwards then made a further distinction between the ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ image of God. The proof of the ‘natural’ image was the rational moral nature, retained after the fall, because humans possessed a free will capable of reason and choice. It was the ‘spiritual’ image of God that had been lost in humans after the fall. The proof of which was that humans had lost their knowledge of God so that they were incapable of aligning their will to God’s will in obedience.

Although the distinction Edwards made between the ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ image of God can be traced to the scholastic division of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ categories, his conception is unique. Edwards’ application of ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ resonates with the Greek patristic distinction between image (ἐικόνα) and likeness (ὁμοιότης). In the Greek patristic tradition, humans were said to possess a human rational moral nature that was retained after the fall, but it was God’s likeness that

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55 Works 1. 166.
56 Works 1. 166.
57 Works 2. 256. ‘As there are two kinds of attributes in God, according to our way of conceiving of him, his moral attributes, which are summed up in his holiness, and his natural attributes, of strength, knowledge, etc. that constitute the greatness of God; so there is a twofold image of God in man, his moral or spiritual image, which is his holiness, that is the image of God's moral excellency (which image was lost by the fall); and God's natural image, consisting in men's reason and understanding, his natural ability, and dominion over the creatures, which is the image of God's natural attributes.’ Cf. Works 3. 381.
had been lost, because they had lost their knowledge of God. What makes Edwards’ distinction unique is his nuanced application of ‘natural’ and spiritual’ image of God, which echoes the patristic nuanced distinction between ‘image’ and ‘likeness’. Edwards’ distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ operates in a similar way as the Greek patristic distinction between ‘image’ and ‘likeness’. It allows him, as it had done for the Fathers, to represent the unalterable created link between God and the intellectual nature he had created in humans, which although damaged by sin is retained. Edwards’ distinction is original in Reformed thought because it allows him to overturn the anthropocentric principle of reason, which had replaced the theocentric principle of grace in Arminian theology. The disturbing consequence of which was to distance God from his creation, thereby denying God’s providential rule in the operation of grace.

For Augustine, the Latin words ‘image’ (imago) and ‘likeness’ (similitudo) did not retain the nuanced distinction of the Greek words, so that he used the words interchangeably. As the Latin words were unable to retain any nuanced distinction, medieval scholastic theologians began to distinguish between human nature before and after sin, by utilising the categories of natural and supernatural orders. The capacities of the will and the intellect belonged to the natural order and the work of divine grace to the supernatural order. Divine gifts could therefore be said to be given to human nature that reflect capacities or powers proper to the divine, but not to human nature itself. Although sin caused the divine gifts to be taken away from human nature, it did not destroy human nature.

Both Augustine and Maximus had understood Adam’s disobedience in terms of Adam’s wanting to be like God, but in medieval times a shift in how Adam’s disobedience was understood occurred in the west. The medieval scholastic theologian Anselm (c.1033-1109) interpreted Adam’s disobedience in terms of justice, believing it to be the most significant of the supernatural gifts bestowed on human nature. The first humans having been created in a state of ‘original justice’

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58 See Rondet, 269. See also Wiley, 94.
59 On the theological anthropology of the medieval scholastics, see Wiley, 77 n. 3.
60 Ibid., 77.
61 Anselm, a Benedictine monk who became the Archbishop of Canterbury, was the preeminent theologian of this period in the west.
62 On Anselm’s anthropology, see Wiley, 77 n. 5, 77-79. The theological meaning of justitia for Anselm referred to a capacity of human nature, one that is bestowed by God on nature rather than being a capacity intrinsic to human nature.
therefore possessed the rational and moral ability to will what God wills, which was always right. Adam’s original state, the state of original righteousness ‘in’ the garden, was therefore constituted by the possession of supernatural gifts, gifts that maintained his relationship with God, enabling him to will rightly. The supernatural gifts operated to subject the mind to God, which in turn resulted in the subjection of the physical body to the rational mind. A twofold harmony thereby established itself between the mind and the body. These subjections together sustained Adam’s friendship with God, but whilst the possession of the supernatural gifts perfect human nature, they were not essential to human nature. To say that the supernatural gifts were lost, established sin as a negative: a ‘privation’ of human nature. The Fathers, like Augustine and Maximus however, held a more positive definition of sin, establishing sin as ‘a something’ - a force, bias, tendency, or inclination towards evil. Defining sin as a privation of human nature resulted in the medieval scholastics distinguishing original righteousness from the image of God. Human nature had not lost God’s image, because the ‘image’ belongs to human nature, but sin had lost the supernatural state of original righteousness, its likeness to God. After the fall, without original justice, and with the end of the state of supernatural original righteousness, the image of God remains in human nature as ‘proper to it’.

Sounding like Adam’s sin had lost something inessential to human nature, the Reformer Martin Luther (1483-1546) opposed the scholastic metaphysical distinction between ‘natural’ and

63 See Wiley, 86; See also G. Vandervelde, Original Sin: Two Major Trends in Contemporary Roman Catholic Reinterpretation (Amsterdam: Rodopi N. V., 1975), 29, 41 n. 287. Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) elaborated on Anselm’s conception of ‘original justice’, identifying its cause as ‘sanctifying grace’, so that the gift and its cause became distinct realities. Humanity were born without ‘sanctifying grace’, having ‘lost the divine presence’ in their souls. After Aquinas, Catholic teaching further collapsed the distinction between gift and cause, so that original sin began to be described as a privation of ‘sanctifying grace’ not as the ‘privation of justice’. For the reformers, the collapse between gift and cause failed to explain the ‘extrinsic’ nature of grace, which led to a neglect of emphasis on the ‘transcendent’ nature of grace.

64 A supernatural gift of virtue was added to human virtue.

65 Wiley, 79, 94.

66 Ibid., 94.

67 See Wiley, 80; Vandervelde, 26-29. As mentioned already (see footnote 28, 103 in Chapter 1) Augustine clearly spoke about sin as a ‘force’ or ‘something’ throughout his writing showing that he was following patristic tradition. That he also spoke about sin as a ‘deprivation’ or ‘absence’ is not a contradiction or negation of the other. Instead, it highlights that Augustine’s theological thought developed within the context and situation he was addressing and that it was the patristic tradition that allowed him to do so. That Augustine is historically credited with the doctrine of sin or evil as a privation of the good does not warrant a clear demarcation between western and eastern soteriology during this period of the early church.

68 Wiley, 94.

69 Ibid., 94.

70 Ibid., 94.
‘supernatural’, because it implied that human nature was not totally affected by sin.71 Equating ‘image’ and ‘likeness’, his solution was to speak about sin destroying in Adam and his descendants God’s image in its entirety.72 Luther’s intent was to communicate the totality of sin’s corruptive effects upon human nature that nothing in human nature was left untouched by sin. The Catholic medieval scholastic explanation described sin as an absence of grace, and for the Reformers this was not radical enough an explanation of sin as it lacked an emphasis on sin’s total depravity of the will.73 Yet, the early Reformers, as they developed their anthropologies differed in how they expressed the traditional view of being created in God’s image. Some views were more conservative or radical than others,74 but critical to all views was the desire to accentuate the ‘extrinsic’ work of grace upon human nature by emphasising the moral nature’s absolute proclivity to sin.

The issue in eighteenth-century Christian libertarian anthropology was over the concept of ‘original righteousness’, a conception that had been retained by the early Reformers. If sin was the result of free choice, it followed that, if the first humans were created originally righteous, then the fall not only compromised God’s justice, but also his divine grace. According to Taylor, the scriptures showed no evidence that Adam was created in ‘original righteousness’ because Adam’s fall could be attributed to the misuse of his free will and reason.75 If humans were held to be individually responsible then God’s justice and virtue were preserved because God could never be said to be the cause of sin.76 Moreover, virtue implied rational choice, and the proof that Adam had not been created in original righteousness showed itself in the misuse of the will.77 The evidence that divine grace was at work therefore showed itself in the free choice of the will to self-determine its own good.

In order to counteract Taylor’s assertions, Edwards identified ‘righteousness’ with ‘innocence’ in Adam’s moral rectitude.78 That Adam remained innocent prior to the fall was evidenced in his

71 See Wiley, 94-95. Luther took the distinction to mean that, in effect, Adam had lost something inessential to human nature, whereas sin had deprived human nature of something essential to it.
72 Ibid., 95.
73 Ibid., 95.
74 See Duffy, 605; Wiley, 95. For example, John Calvin followed a patristic understanding believing that although human nature was corrupted, it retained God’s image, whereas other reformers held far more extreme views.
77 See Holbrook, 48.
78 See Ibid., 48-49.
relationship with God in the garden. Prior to the fall Adam acted righteously in the garden, so God must have created him with a will inclined or disposed towards right action: ‘If Adam from the beginning did his duty to God, and had more respect to the will of his Creator, than to other things, and as much respect to him as he ought to have; then from the beginning he had a supreme and perfect respect and love for God: and if so, he was created with such a principle.’ From the moment of Adam’s creation he remained capable of behaving as a moral agent under the principle of right action.

According to Edwards, people had a natural tendency or propensity that made it ‘necessary’ that they act in a certain way. Their ‘affections’ and ‘instincts’ show that acts of virtue cannot simply be said to arise from a reasonable choice alone. Some actions, for example, are based on desires, something that cannot always be attributed to reason: people are not always conscious in their choices, but act instinctively. Edwards did not deny the place of reason in the choices that the will made, but he believed that ‘choice’ existed in the mind because it was God-given, and as such, needed to be rightly directed.

3.7 Edwards’ Idea of ‘Choice’

To base the reason for a person’s good and bad conduct on choice alone was logically flawed. Edwards argued that if sin was a result of choice, and if sin did not exist until the choice was made, ‘then the sinful choice must proceed from another antecedent choice’. Using the argument of regress, he explained that a sinful action arose from a necessarily sinful nature, inclination or disposition, or else there could be no explanation for either sin or virtue: ‘And so we must go back till we come to the first volition, the prime or original act of choice, because this is the origin or primitive cause of all

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79 Works 3. 228.  
80 Works 3. 229.  
81 Works 3. 230.  
82 Cf. Works 3. 225. ‘Agreeable to what Mr Hutcheson says… “I know not”, he says, “for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue, which flows from instinct of passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, virtue arises from reason. What is reason, but the sagacity we have in prosecuting any end? The ultimate end proposed by common moralists, is the happiness of the agent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct…If it be said that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this objection will hold full as strongly against the actions which flow from self-love.”’ Edwards’ quotes the Irish-Scot Presbyterian Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) in justification of his view.  
84 Works, 3. 377.  
85 See Holbrook, 45-46.
the train of evils which follow.'

Sin arose from a preceding and underlying disposition in human nature that was apparent in all humans.

According to Edwards the source of all human inclination stemmed from the heart, the focus of its love or self-love:

‘The ruin which the Fall brought upon the soul of man consists very much in that he lost his nobler and more extensive principles, and fell wholly under the government of self-love.’

The choices people made, stemmed from underlying and preceding inclinations or dispositions in the heart, and these inclinations made up ‘human nature’. Human nature had been created with dispositions or inclinations capable of distinguishing between good and bad acts, which Edwards called ‘moral rectitude’ or ‘original righteousness’. Adam possessed an inclination to love God, which Edwards referred to as ‘the principle for divine love’, thereby enabling his relationship with God. But sin had produced in human nature a propensity towards sin, moving the person away from God towards disobedience.

3.8 The Sinful Disposition

Although God had not created Adam with a sinful inclination, the inclination to sin originated in Adam’s heart, so that it was his disobedience that rendered him guilty. The outcome of Adam’s punishment saw this new sinful disposition remain a ‘confirmed’ or ‘established principle’ in his

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87 Edwards’ conception of self-love is discussed in Chapter 6.

88 Works 8. 252. Cf. Works 13. 387-89 (Misc. 301 [Sin and Original Sin]). Edwards held this thinking as a young man. ‘That is, that it is self-love in conjunction with the absence of the image and love of God, that natural and necessary inclination that man has to his own benefit together with the absence of original righteousness; or in other words, the absence of that influence of God’s Spirit, whereby love to God and to holiness is kept up to that degree that this other inclination is always kept in its due subordination. But this being gone, his self-love governs alone’

89 Works 3. 231.

90 Edwards’ idea of ‘moral rectitude’ resonates with Augustine’s idea of ‘memory’ and Maximus’ conception of the ‘natural will’. See Chapters 4 and 5 in this thesis.

91 Works 13. 389.

92 Cf. Works 3. 228,230. Taylor had argued that Adam’s moral rectitude operated by means of his ability to reflect and make choices (cf. Works 3. 227). Edwards argued that if Taylor’s view were true, then God would have created Adam with no inclination to love the creator, so how would it have been possible for Adam to make virtuous choices at all. Taylor’s answer was that Adam would choose virtue (Taylor had said that true moral rectitude could be resolved into the single principle of love), but the problem with Taylor’s line of argument was that he had already said that an act was virtuous only because of the choice that came before it. Taylor’s argument was contradictory, because Adam could not be said to have had any righteousness or perform a virtuous act (cf. Works 3. 227-28).

93 Cf. Works 3. 228-29 n. 6.;Works 3. 390. ‘The first evil disposition and inclination of the heart of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct from his first act of sin, but was included in it.’

94 Edwards’ conception of ‘established principle in the heart’ can be paralleled to Maximus’ conception of the gnomic will. See Chapter 5 in this thesis.
heart. When God created Adam as a ‘natural’ image of himself, Adam contained all the properties of human nature. He could reason, but he was in addition ‘supernaturally’ a virtuous person because of his moral rectitude or original righteousness. Adam was therefore also a ‘spiritual’ image of God because he partook of God’s superior divine principles or attributes of holiness. When Adam sinned these superior divine principles left him, being removed by God’s judgement. As a consequence, the superior principles could no longer direct the inferior or natural principles to naturally obey God, so that humans became ruled by their inferior and natural natures. According to Edwards, although sin did not originate in God, when humanity sinned, God permitted sin into his creation because he withdrew the supernatural or superior principles from humanity. The way Edwards applied the distinction he made between ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ principles therefore not only worked to preserve God’s justice in his punishment, but also functioned to account for human responsibility in sin.

Edwards used the word ‘transient’ to emphasise that Adam’s sinful disposition/inclination had not been a ‘fixed’ disposition at the time of his creation. Helm explains that according to Edwards an action was transient if it was not the expression of a settled habit in that God had not created it. Lee further explains that Edwards views ‘habit’ as a disposition, tendency or inclination. The way Edwards conceived ‘habit’ therefore differs from the modern conception of ‘habit’, conveyed as a

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95 See Works 3. 390-91. ‘(1) As the first rising of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted in his first act of sin, and the ground of the complete transgression. (2) An evil disposition of heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed principle, that came by God’s forsaking him; which was a punishment of his first transgression. This confirmed corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on his soul.’
97 Works 3. 382. ‘When man sinned, and broke God’s covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart…Therefore immediately the superior divine principles wholly ceased…The inferior principles of self-love and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone and left to themselves, of course became reigning principles; having no superior principles to regulate and control them, they became absolute masters of the heart.’
100 Works 3. 193. Cf. Works 18, 51 (Misc. 501[Fall of Man]) Edwards speculated that there must have been something transitory in the created inclinations, to make it possible for the first humans to fall away. Although he did not explain how God had created an inclination in Adam that could allow for a new inclination towards sin, Edwards acknowledged that there existed some degree of ‘mystery’ in the matter (cf. Works 3. 392-94). See Helm, ‘The Great Christian Doctrine’, 190; Holbrook, 51.
103 The scholastics had called ‘habit’ habitus.
custom or regularity in events.\textsuperscript{104} For Edwards ‘habit’ is an active and ontologically abiding power that possesses a mode of realness even when it is not exercised, so that it becomes a relational principle.\textsuperscript{105} It is a general law that covers the manner and character of actual actions and events, because sin as an abiding reality in human nature is a ‘natural constitution’.\textsuperscript{106} He therefore also referred to the sinful disposition as the ‘natural temper’ or ‘abiding nature’ within humans. In using various volitional and teleological concepts like tendency, inclination, disposition, habit and ‘frame of mind’, he sought to communicate the forceful nature of sin as it acted upon the will to move humanity away from God.\textsuperscript{107}

3.9 The Adamic Relationship to Humanity

Traditional soteriology spoke about sin as being transmitted to humanity not through imitation but by propagation.\textsuperscript{108} Edwards therefore accepted the doctrine of original sin from scriptural authority, notably Paul’s teaching\textsuperscript{109} that, when Adam sinned, humanity also sinned ‘in’ Adam, and Adam’s posterity being ‘in’ him also shares in his guilt.\textsuperscript{110} Over time two general views developed in western theology about how Adam was related to his offspring. The first view, known as the ‘realist’ view can be traced to the early church.\textsuperscript{111} This view holds that when Adam sinned, humanity was really ‘in’ him, and this realistic sense is often expressed nominally, metaphorically and analogically. Humanity shares Adam’s sin because there is a mystical union of identity between Adam and his offspring, whereas Christians, as the new humanity, are mystically ‘united’ with Christ as the ‘new Adam’.

\textsuperscript{104} See Ibid., 38.
\textsuperscript{105} See Lee, 7, 37-39. See also W. L. Reese, ‘Habit’, \textit{Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought} (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), 206. In the empirical tradition, habit gained additional functions in the forming of conceptions. Placed at the basis of all intellectual functions, the force of habit explained causality; how the world was built up.
\textsuperscript{106} See Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{107} Cf. Works 13. 358 (Misc.241: Regeneration) ‘It likewise seems reasonable to me to suppose that the habit of grace in adults is begun with an act of grace that should imply faith on it, because a habit can be of no manner of use till there is occasion to exert it…the first new thing that there can be in the creature must be some actual alteration.’ See Lee, 15.
\textsuperscript{109} Cf. Works 3. 292-305 (cf. Rom. 5:6-10; Eph. 2:3; Rom.7). Edwards argued against Taylor’s understanding of Romans 5:12-21 in the following chapter (Works 3, 306-34).
\textsuperscript{110} P. Helm, \textit{Faith and Understanding} (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 159.
\textsuperscript{111} The name ‘realist’ view is a modern conception and early church thinkers would not have made any such distinctions in the ways they spoke about humanity being incorporated into Adam’s sin.
The second view, known as the ‘federalist’ view developed out of Puritan covenant theology, and is the view that Edwards inherited.\(^{112}\) Adam is viewed as an individual, but he is someone who stands in a unique representative position to his offspring. Adam is the ‘federal head’ of humanity, whereas Christ is the ‘federal head’ of Christians (the new humanity). As humanity’s appointed representative, humans stand to benefit from or lose from whatever Adam did. So although Adam individually sinned God justly treats humans as also having sinned, because Adam’s sin is imputed to humanity which he represents.\(^{113}\) Humans therefore not only suffer the consequences of Adam’s sin, but are also implicated in it. Helm\(^{114}\) argues that Edwards did not accept either of these two views, but developed an account of Adam and his offspring that went in a different direction. Although Helm correctly notes that Edwards shows originality, Helm’s assumption that Edwards is dismissive of either view is incorrect. Edwards rather adapts his inherited Puritan ‘federalist’ view to the ‘realist’ view, using both views to account for the classical notion of human depravity, a notion that had become unacceptable to Christian libertarians.\(^{115}\) The increasing popularity of libertarian soteriology made it clear to Edwards that the Puritan ‘federalist’ view, which argued on the basis of representation alone, was not sufficient for rebutting Christian libertarian arguments, because of its emphasis on Adam’s individualism.\(^{116}\) Edwards believed that this view, when used to argue against Taylor’s ideas, led to the unorthodox idea of ‘double guilt’: ‘one guilt of Adam’s sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart’\(^{117}\) As Withrow\(^{118}\) correctly notes, Edwards argued that the guilt laid upon humanity was not simply Adam’s individual guilt, but humanity’s guilt in a corporate sense because


\(^{113}\) Some federalist theology insists upon the concept of immediate imputation in that Adam’s guilt is imputed directly onto his progeny. ‘Imputation’ carries with it the idea of ‘declaration’, so that when Adam sinned, his progeny is ‘declared’ guilty even though they had not committed the crime themselves. See Withrow, 101-02.

\(^{114}\) Helm, Faith, 161.

\(^{115}\) Cf. Works 3. 53-54.

\(^{116}\) See Withrow, 102.

\(^{117}\) Works 3. 390.

\(^{118}\) Withrow, 102.
humanity were also ‘united’ to Adam. Adam’s guilt was therefore also shared by humanity in a more realistic sense, because Edwards held a sense of humanity’s corporate ‘participation’ in Adam’s guilt.\footnote{Cf. Works 3. 391-93, n. 1. Edwards elaborated on his conception of Adam’s guilt in his footnotes.}

3.10 ‘Personal Identity’ and ‘Continuous Creation’

In order to demonstrate how humanity was truly and spiritually ‘one’ in Adam, Edwards developed his doctrines of ‘personal identity’ and ‘continuous creation’.\footnote{See Storms, 63.} In constructing his theory of ‘personal identity’ Edwards drew inspiration from John Locke\footnote{See P. Helm, ‘A Forensic Dilemma: John Locke and Jonathan Edwards on Personal Identity’, \textit{Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian} (ed. P. Helm & O. D. Crisp; Hants, Ashgate: 2003), 45-49. See also Helm, \textit{Faith}, 163-64.} (1632-1704), but it was a seventeenth-century philosophical theory known as ‘Occasionalism’\footnote{On the theory of Occasionalism see W. L. Reese, ‘Occasionalism’, \textit{Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought} (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1980), 339. On Edwards’ occasionalism see O. D. Crisp, ‘How “Occasional” was Edwards’s Occasionalism?’ \textit{Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian} (ed. P. Helm & O. D. Crisp; Hants, Ashgate: 2003), 61-77. Oliver Crisp, writing against S. H. Lee’s claim (\textit{The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards}) that Edwards never endorsed a theory of occasionalism argues that Edwards did. Although Crisp is coming from a philosophical perspective and one cannot ignore that Edwards engaged with the theory, it was Edwards’ confidence in the doctrine of original sin, alongside the doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’ that inspired his adaptation of the theory, and which caused his adaptation to stand apart from other proponents of the theory, like Malebranche. Edwards may not have rejected the theory, but he made creative use of it, in the exposition of his own theological arguments.} that lay behind his conception of ‘continuous creation’. Although Edwards drew inspiration for both theories from his intellectual context, his adaptation of them allowed him to re-establish the ‘causality’ between God and his creation as communicated by the doctrine ‘creation from nothing’. He thus preserved God’s transcendent providence over time and creation as well as humanity’s dependence on God, also retaining human freedom and responsibility as valid notions.

Locke, in developing his idea of ‘personal identity’, had wanted to answer how a person could both be presently held responsible and justly held responsible for something that had occurred in the past. Believing there had to be a way of tracing a line from the person’s present to the past, Locke connected this to ‘memory’\footnote{On Edwards’ occasionalism see O. D. Crisp, ‘How “Occasional” was Edwards’s Occasionalism?’ \textit{Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian} (ed. P. Helm & O. D. Crisp; Hants, Ashgate: 2003), 61-77. Oliver Crisp, writing against S. H. Lee’s claim (\textit{The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan Edwards}) that Edwards never endorsed a theory of occasionalism argues that Edwards did. Although Crisp is coming from a philosophical perspective and one cannot ignore that Edwards engaged with the theory, it was Edwards’ confidence in the doctrine of original sin, alongside the doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’ that inspired his adaptation of the theory, and which caused his adaptation to stand apart from other proponents of the theory, like Malebranche. Edwards may not have rejected the theory, but he made creative use of it, in the exposition of his own theological arguments.}. ‘Personal identity’ was therefore the identity of a person as a thinking conscious being, going where memory goes through time. Edwards, like Locke, believed that consciousness was necessary for personal identity, but unlike Locke, he did not think of it as sufficient
for persisting personal identity. In order to maintain humanity’s created dependence on God, and allow for human freedom, Edwards’ conception of ‘personal identity’ adapted Locke’s ideas of ‘sameness’ and ‘oneness’.

Using the example of a hundred-year old tree that grows from an acorn, Edwards explained that the tree’s growth continued in constant succession and although the tree’s appearance changed over time, it always remained the same tree. Likewise, although the body of a forty-year old man is different in appearance to when he was a baby, the man and the baby remain one person, even though the baby came first. Locke, however, had argued that the identity of the tree and the man consisted in a succession of overlapping parts, generated by growth in the case of the tree, and consciousness in the case of the person, by temporally continuous mental organisation (i.e., their memories and their train of thought). Edwards departed from Locke in that he argued that although a succession of momentary parts may be qualitatively similar, they are treated by humans and God as if it were numerically the one thing, which is all that identity through time is.

Some things, being most simply considered, are entirely distinct, and very diverse; which yet are so united by the established law of the Creator, in some respects and with regard to some purposes and effects, that by virtue of that establishment it is with them as if they were one…yet God, according to an established law of nature, has in a constant succession communicated to it many of the same qualities, and most important properties, as if it were one.

Having established his theory of ‘personal identity’, Edwards conceived his doctrine of ‘continuous creation’ as a counterpart to it. The doctrine, for example, enabled him to correct the deists who spoke of divine power as being mediated through the power given to created beings. Concerned to maintain the theocentric notion of humanity’s dependence on God, Edwards argued that

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124 Cf. Works 3. 398. ‘And if we come even to the personal identity of created intelligent beings, though this be not allowed to consist wholly in that which Mr. Locke places it in, i.e. same consciousness; yet I think it can’t be denied, that this is one thing essential to it.’ See Helm, Faith, 164.
126 Works 3. 397.
127 Works 3. 398.
129 Ibid., 193.
130 Works 3. 397-98.
identity was a succession of non-overlapping parts.\textsuperscript{132} Grounding his thinking on the doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’, Edwards argued that it was incorrect to say that nothing God created existed for more than a moment, for, if it did, what existed at an earlier moment could contribute to what exists later, enabling what exists to persist.\textsuperscript{133} To argue this way denied the doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’ because when something no longer exists, it ceases to contribute to anything, having no causal powers, and only God possessed the causal power to sustain creation from moment to moment. God therefore continuously preserved creation, upholding all forces of nature.\textsuperscript{134}

Edwards’ theory of ‘continuous creation’ therefore asserted causation. According to Edwards, God’s immediate power operated both ‘in’ that moment and ‘in’ that time, so that the existence of any and all entities at any and all times is the immediate effect of God’s power.\textsuperscript{135} A person who exists in time is caused to exist at that time because of God’s power, making God’s power ‘necessary’ and ‘sufficient’.\textsuperscript{136} God is therefore able to constitute humanity as one individual, extended through time and space by his re-creating and upholding power.\textsuperscript{137} Adam is not merely ‘representative’ of humanity, humanity instead ‘participates’ or lies ‘in’ union with Adam, not according to natural laws, but according to God’s arbitrary constitution:\textsuperscript{138}

My meaning, in the whole of what has been said, may be illustrated thus: let us suppose, that Adam and all his posterity had coexisted, and that his posterity had been, through the law of nature established by the Creator, united to him, something as the branches of a tree are united to the root, or the members of the body to the head; so as to constitute as it were one complex person, or one moral whole: so that by the law of union there should have been a communion and coexistence in acts and affections; all jointly participating, and all concurring, as one whole, in disposition and action of head:\textsuperscript{139}

Humanity, was therefore ‘truly’ and ‘properly’ partakers in Adam’s sin, and as such remained morally culpable for sin. Human nature was therefore naturally disposed towards sin:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{133} Works 3. 402. See Helm, \textit{Faith}, 165.
  \item \textsuperscript{134} Works 3. 400-02. See Helm, \textit{Faith}, 163-64; ‘The Great Christian Doctrine’, 193-94; Storms, 63-64.
  \item \textsuperscript{135} See Storms, 63-64.
  \item \textsuperscript{136} Works 3. 400.
  \item \textsuperscript{137} Helm, ‘The Great Christian Doctrine’, 194.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 194.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Works 3. 391-92, n.1.
\end{itemize}
From what has been observed it may appear, there is no sure ground to conclude, that it must be an absurd and impossible thing, for the race of mankind truly to partake of the sin of the first apostasy, so as that this, in reality and propriety, shall become their sin...And therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it on them.\textsuperscript{140}

For Edwards to be disposed towards sinful acts meant that human falleness was part of the human condition, and human nature remained fallen whether or not people acted in a fallen way.\textsuperscript{141} The moral nature was therefore unable to reform itself outside of the work of grace and the Spirit’s illumination of the mind.\textsuperscript{142}

3.11 Conclusion

Edwards’ polemic sought to correct Christian libertarian arguments that depicted sin simply as an issue of individual and rational choice. This depiction denied the total depravity of the moral nature portrayed by the doctrine of original sin. Developing a distinction between the ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ image, Edwards identified the ‘natural’ image with the created moral nature, that which continued to be retained in humans after the fall. It was the ‘spiritual’ image however, that was lost. The effects of sin clouding human rationality of its knowledge of God, making the mind naturally predisposed towards sin. What made an action good or sinful was therefore given meaning not by the action itself, but by the principle or disposition that precedes the choice before the choice is made and the action has occurred. Although the decision to sin may of itself be rational, sinful choices arose because of an inherent predisposition in human nature towards sin. Created in God’s image, humans are capable of moral choice, but God’s holiness was the moral measure of the good and evil choices that humans make. For Edwards, the notion of holiness overturned the anthropocentric principle of reason that had replaced the theocentric principle of grace in Christian thought.

\textsuperscript{140} Works 3. 407-08.  
\textsuperscript{141} See Withrow, 104.  
\textsuperscript{142} Works 3. 405.
Part 2: The Theology of the Will and the Affections

Preface

A. The Greco-Roman Philosophical Context

Entering Christian thought out of the Greco-Roman philosophical context, issues of human self-determination, the nature of human freedom, and the role of the will, were issues that aligned with the topic of the passions or affections. Christians therefore joined a discussion that had been going on in philosophical circles for centuries. For Christian thinkers, however, it was apparent that in light of their reading of scripture they needed to engage with the ethical matters raised by the philosophers. Yet they did so in a distinctly Christian way, which separated their conceptions of volition from philosophical understandings.

The speculations of ancient philosophical schools were characteristically cosmological rather than psychological. Before the advent of modern sciences, the ancients gauged the ways and workings of the world through observation. Philosophers were more concerned with establishing the rules of the observable world than they were with deciphering the inner psychology of the person. Philosophical speculation began with an investigation of the universe and its observable structure and patterns according to rules, which philosophers then applied to the human activity of thought and communication. In turning to issues of moral responsibility the philosopher’s task was to find standards of moral conduct that were as rational and generally applicable as the rules of the cosmic order.

Knowledge that led to good behaviour was deemed not only to be observably true but rational as well. Human behaviour was not affected from ‘within’ itself, but ‘outside’ itself, as good or bad

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2 Ibid., 413.
3 Ibid., 413.
5 Ibid., 1.
7 Ibid., 37.
choices were made by ‘reason’. Observation taught people that sometimes people did wrong when they knew better, so bad choices were the product of irrationality, devoid of proper reason; the result of ‘passion’ or ‘emotion’ that interfered with one’s ability to make the right choice. Although the mind was held to be capable of perceiving and evaluating a given situation with regard to the action that was required, bad choices therefore stemmed from actions that were directed against nature’s order in any given situation.

B. The Stoic View of the Passions

The Stoics brought the concept of the affections or passions to prominence. A passion was generally defined as a perturbation of the soul (πτός ψυχῆς) which consisted in an excessive or overpowering impulse. The Stoics therefore thought of the passions as contrary to nature (παρά φύσιν), irrational and insubordinate to reason. The passions were not part of the innate nature of a person where reason was located. Passions were something to be suffered or endured by humans. They were modifications of the rational faculty that not only needed to be moderated but eradicated.

The modern meaning of passions and affections is generally defined in terms of ‘feelings’ and ‘emotions’, but in Stoic thought the passions were incorporated into cognition. Although Greek and Latin terminology, Gk. πάθη/πάθος L. perturbationes, affectiones, passions, is generally translated into the English words ‘emotions’, ‘passions’ and ‘affections’, the Stoics did not think of the passions in terms of bodily sensations that affected action by felt quality alone. The Stoic idea of passion holds a cognitive element because it embodied ways of interpreting the world. The feelings that go with the experience of emotion are connected to judgements and beliefs, which are the basis or ground for which the emotion can be evaluated as true or false, rational or irrational. The Greek words πάθη and πάθος translated as either ‘passions’ or ‘affections’ are in patristic writing synonymous and

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8 Ibid., 38.
9 Ibid., 38.
10 Gardiner et al., 64.
11 Ibid., 64-65.
13 Nussbaum, 137.
14 See Ibid., 130 n. 2, 140.
15 Ibid., 140.
16 Ibid., 140.
interchangeable terms.\textsuperscript{17} The distinction that is made between the terms ‘passion’ and ‘affection’ is an entirely modern one. Although this distinction can be discerned in the writings of Jonathan Edwards, it is not the distinction which Augustine and Maximus make in their writings.

According to the Stoics, passions were excessive impulses\textsuperscript{18} (ορμή) that did not conform to the natural ends of life.\textsuperscript{19} Contrary to inner thought and reason (λόγος), passions went against rational/principal order, constitutive of ‘nature’ in general. Reason, was thought to be free from disturbance, and the term the Stoics used to designate this freedom was ἀπάθεια. Yet ἀπάθεια was not a pathological state devoid of all feeling, it was freedom from the perturbations, which prevented humans from fulfilling their rational aims in daily life.\textsuperscript{20} For example, the issue was not whether felt disturbances like anger, fear, love and hate were evil, in as much as freedom from these emotions was good, but whether the emotions displayed were of such a nature that they would secure for humans the happiness and wisdom they sought.

The Stoics therefore taught that the passions needed to be disciplined and converted into virtues.\textsuperscript{21} The mind and soul may be subjected to the passions, but when freed from their subjection, the mind and soul become strengthened. Although the Stoics taught that the passions were to be extirpated, they also acknowledged that good passions (ἐυπάθειαι, constantiae) existed such as joy (χαρά), caution/circumspection (ἐυλαβεία), as well as a virtuous type of will or determination (βουλήσις). These good passions were habits or depositions, general modes of feelings, emotions and behaviour, which could be set against the passions that were considered turbulent or disruptive, but which through habituation became virtues.\textsuperscript{22}

There were four cardinal passions or fundamental root passions that all other passions were derived from: desire, lust or appetite (Gk. ἐπιθυμία, L. libido); fear (Gk. φόβος, L. metus); delight,

\textsuperscript{17} Modern terminology generally places a more positive connotation on the word ‘affections’, whereas ‘passions’ has a more negative connotation.
\textsuperscript{18} This denoted the instinctive tendency to action and in itself, is necessary, normal and natural.
\textsuperscript{19} Gardiner et al., 65.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 65-66.
pleasure or joy (Gk. ἡδονή, L. voluptas, laetitia); and grief, distress or pain (Gk. λύπη, L. aegritudo). In Greco-Roman moral theory these four classifications turned on two axes: a distinction between good and bad, and a distinction between that which is possessed and that which yearns to be possessed. Moreover, what these passions have in common is that all can be observed in human behaviour, so that when they are seen to produce an irrational impulse (ὄρμαι), it is the movement that defines the passions in a negative direction, not the passion itself. Desire becomes an irrational inclination towards lust or appetite, fear becomes irrational recoil, pleasure and delight become an irrational elation of the mind, and pain and grief become an irrational contraction or depression of the mind.

In all schools of Greco-Roman philosophical thought, the passions were relegated to the irrational part of the soul. As the Stoics understood passions to be judgements that lay outside reason, they approached their eradication by means of therapy, πράξις. False judgements that affected reason could be removed and this was central to the task of living the wise life of φιλοσοφία. Unlike other philosophical schools of thought such as Aristotle and the Peripatetics who taught that the passions only needed to be moderated, the Stoics believed in the total extirpation of the passions. Presenting a negative view of the passions they created a portrait of the wise and happy person as someone who was totally free from passion. Such a person was ‘passionless’ and self-sufficient, regulated by a rational virtuous type of will located in reason (βουλησις) and a ‘rational uplift’ (ἔλογος ἐπαρσίς) associated with joy (χαρά), so that they obtained ἀπάθεια, a state somewhat akin to serenity.

C. The Idea of Perfection

In Greco-Roman philosophy the soul was thought about and examined foremost as it existed somewhat objectively within the Platonic metaphysical hierarchical system, rather than as a subjective individualistic concept of the inner self or ‘ego’. The philosophical idea of perfection therefore

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23 See Gardiner et al., 73; Nussbaum, 158-59.
24 Wilken, 416.
25 Gardiner et al., 73.
26 See Nussbaum, 138.
27 Ibid., 161-62.
encompassed a view that held that humans were capable of achieving happiness and excellence in life because as rational beings, possessive of free will, humans attained truth intellectually. Although early theologians drew on Stoicism as they extrapolated their moral theories in defining a Christian system of ethics, Christian theory was guided by external scriptural revelation rather than reason. Believing that sinful choices stemmed from a definite choice of disobedience against God’s commands, Christians believed that the measure of a good choice was that it was made in accordance with God’s will and purposes.29

The early Christian conception of will departed from Greco-Roman and Stoic conceptions because the Christian notion located ‘intentionality’ within the ‘intellect’ or ‘reason’ or the inner conscience of the human’s psyche or soul. In line with scriptural teaching about sin, theologians developed a psychological conception of the will that showed intentionality, a conception that was not apparent in Greco-Roman volitional theory. Augustine, Maximus and Edwards do not view sin as a condition of the passions, but a condition of the mind that arises out of the free choice of the will. Neither presents a negative view of the passions, but views the passions as acts of the will. Although Christians may feel the passions, because the Spirit illuminates their mind, the passions become acts of the will that operate in the Christian life for the benefit of right action. The Christian idea of ‘will’ located intentionality in the inner conscience of the human being’s psyche or even the ‘soul’, which was inclusive not exclusive of the focus of the human heart or desire.

Chapter 4: Augustine on the Will and the Affections

4.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to show that Augustine’s conception of will provided him with a way to place his moral theory on a theocentric platform, allowing him to demarcate Christian moral theory from Manichaean and Pelagian theory. Following traditional Christian teaching about sin’s total corruptive effects upon human nature, Augustine believed that it was the work of grace that allowed believers to make progress in holiness as they developed the passions. Although Augustine can be seen to have inherited his conception of will from his Greco-Roman philosophical context, his conception of will remains unique because it communicates intentionality. Unlike the Stoics who believed that the passions interfered with reason, and were therefore in need of extirpation, Augustine taught that the passions were part of the acts of the will. Moreover, his conception of ‘memory’ allowed him to speak about the created human psyche’s conscious natural capacity for self-determination and autonomous direction. Finally, when the Spirit illuminated the mind, awakening the believer to their knowledge of God, their will regained its natural created capacity to incline itself in obedience to God’s commands. Augustine therefore presented a picture of the mind’s intellectual, emotional and volitional aspects that worked to account for the psychology of the ‘whole person’, the mind and the heart, thereby allowing him to align love to the proper use of the passions in the Christian life.

4.2 Augustine’s Conception of Will

Augustine developed his notion of the will out of his Latin context, but his notion of will (voluntas) in the context of philosophy and Roman Law remains unique. Voluntas was established since Cicero as the standard Latin rendering of the Greek word βουλήσις (I will, I wish). Kahn explains that in pre-philosophical Latin, to do something voluntate sua is to do it spontaneously of one’s own accord. Cicero had naturally translated the Greek term ἕκοισιον (ἐκών, voluntary, willing) 1 βουλήσις is the nominalisation for the corresponding Greek verb βουλέω (will, wish, want, like). It conveyed the sense of deliberation. Cicero’s translation of the Greek philosophical terminology for ‘will’ lost its Greek nuance when translated into the limited Latin words for will velle/voluntas. See C. H. Kahn, ‘Discovering the Will: From Aristotle to Augustine’ The Question of “Eclecticism”: Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (ed. J. M. Dillon & A. A. Long; Berkeley, University of California Press: 1988), 241.

2 Ibid., 241.

3 The adjective voluntarii was in Latin the normal term for ‘volunteers’ in the army.
as *voluntarium*, and this linguistic fact had philosophical ramifications. The translation of Greek terminology into Latin linked the voluntary in an essential way to *voluntas*, whereas in Greek terminology nothing connected βολήσις to ἐκούσιον. In Roman usage *voluntas* also contained the idea of non-intentionality, placing it in need of interpretation, so that for many centuries it was used in a strictly terminological sense.⁴

A theory of will became important in the interpretation of civil law from as early as the second or first century B.C. which led to a notion of will that differed from the concept of intentionality (ἐκούσιον, πρόνοια) in Greek Law. In Greek ethical thought, will was an intellectualistic concept; any moral evaluation of the will with regard to its juridical relevance referred to the knowledge or cognition from which it originated.⁵ Never becoming an object of interpretation in Greek legal theory, inquiring into the will of a person only meant raising the question of whether he or she had acted knowingly.⁶

Roman law preferred to rely on interpretation and reinterpretation of laws, legal formulas and fixed procedures more than it did on legislation.⁷ Roman law understood ‘will’, *voluntas*, as a terminological word because courts had to ascertain the will of persons involved in a case (including that of the lawgiver) before any written application of the law could be applied. This concept of will was unknown to Greek legal theory, which did not become independent of the doctrines of ethics and politics, and came to belong to Roman jurisprudence as a discipline in its own right.⁸ In the Roman legal context *voluntas* was a juridic terminological word that had no ethical or psychological connotations attached to it, so that ‘will’ became a tool of juristic analysis.⁹ The word *voluntas* therefore designated a hermeneutical rather than an anthropological concept in Roman jurisprudence, which probably held in general Latin usage as well.

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⁵ Ibid., 135, 138.
⁶ Ibid., 138.
⁷ Ibid., 138-39, 142. Roman thought of all periods was preoccupied with legal practice and theory. Jurisprudence was the only science, which the Romans developed almost independently of Greek models.
⁸ Ibid., 141.
⁹ Ibid., 141. Only when there was a need for the concept of will to be defined rather than applied, was the psychological factor taken into account. For instance, children were thought to not have a will in the legal sense of the word because their cognition was thought to be rationally deficient.
Augustine’s Roman law context allowed him to transfer this concept of will to human ethical and moral actions and to their inner psychological decision-making.\textsuperscript{10} The idea of ‘freedom of choice’, an idea traditionally attributed to all rational beings in the Greco-Roman philosophical context, was interpreted by Augustine as free will in the human intellectual life. Every moral or religious evaluation of human activity could then be referred to the will.\textsuperscript{11} The fall had perverted the will, so humans were always bound to make choices contrary to God’s commands regardless of whether they were aware of God or not, which allowed Augustine to argue that the human will was responsible for sin. Moreover, only grace could heal human nature and cause the will to obey God. Aligning the passions with volition, Augustine could speak of sin as the reason why humans were incapable of directing the passions for the good of themselves and of others.

4.3 Augustine’s Notion of Love

The passions could be directed to good action in the believer because of love. The scriptural notion of ‘love’ was important in early Christian thought, because it was the only attribute belonging to God which humans shared with him.\textsuperscript{12} ‘Love’ was synonymous to living the wise life of philosophy (\textit{φιλοσοφία}) which early Christians associated with the ‘fear of the Lord’.\textsuperscript{13} In the Judeo-Christian tradition to gain wisdom and knowledge was equivalent to the call to obey God. To say that a person loved God was to say that they obeyed God’s commands, so that in the scriptural context ‘love’ gained both ontological and teleological value.

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\textsuperscript{10} See Ibid., 143-44.

\textsuperscript{11} See Ibid., 128.

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. 1 Cor. 13: 4-13; See especially v.13 ‘Now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love.’

\textsuperscript{13} Cf. \textit{ench.} 1.2 [CCL 46:49] ‘For man true wisdom consists in piety (\textit{Hominis autem sapientia pietas est}). This you will find in the book of the saintly Job (\textit{Habes hoc in libro sancti Iob}), for there you can read what Wisdom herself spoke to man: Behold, piety is wisdom [Job 28:28] (\textit{Nam ibi legitur quod ipsa Sapientia dixerit homini: Ecce pietas est sapientia}). But if you should ask what kind of piety she spoke of in that passage (\textit{Si autem quaeris quam dixerit eo loco pietatem}), you will find it termed more accurately in the Greek, \textit{theosebeia} (\textit{distinctius in Graeco reperies θεοσβεία}), which means “worship of God (\textit{qui est dei cultus}).” You see, in Greek, piety is also called \textit{eusebeia} (\textit{Dicitur enim Graece pietas et aliter, id est εὐσβεία}), which means “correct worship (\textit{quo nomine significatur bonus cultus}),” although this too refers principally to the worship of God (\textit{quamuis et hoc praecepue referatur ad colendum deum}).’ See L. A. Arand, \textit{Faith, Hope and Charity: St. Augustine} (tr. L. A. Arand; Westminster, The Newman Press: 1955), ACW 3.116, n.5. Cf. \textit{trin.} 14.1.1 [CCL 50a: 421] The translation of the Greek Septuagint word θεοσβεία for the Latin \textit{pietas} (filial reverence) was interpreted by Augustine as ‘worship of God’ (\textit{cultus Dei}).
Love gained ontological value because it was located in God’s holy being, exemplified in the scriptural statement ‘God is love’. Although scripture portrayed God as transcendent and set apart from his creation, his involvement in creation also implied his continuing relationship to it. That scripture spoke of God creating humanity in his ‘image’ also suggested that humans experienced love because love existed in God first. God had created humans with the propensity for knowledge of himself that led to relationship and communion with him as had been evident in Adam’s and Eve’s close relationship with God in the garden prior to the fall. Love gained teleological value because it presupposed that God had created humanity for relationship with him as well as with each other. For Augustine love was a neutral force, which could be applied to both good and bad kinds of desire that he aligned with the action of the will:

A weight is not necessarily an inclination toward the lowest level (*Pondus non ad ima tantum est*), but to its proper place (*sed ad locum suum*). When not well ordered, they are restless (*Minus ordinate inquieta sunt*); When they are in order, then they are at rest (*ordinantur et quiescent*). My weight is my love (*Pondus meum amor meus*); by it I am carried wherever I am carried (*eo feror, quocumque feror*).

The passions ‘love’ and ‘desire’ (the object of one’s love) become neutral synonymous terms for Augustine that he aligned with the action of the will. Augustine often used synonymously and interchangeably various words for ‘love’. His notion of love functions in his theological thought at

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14 Cf. 1 Jn. 4:16; Rm. 5:8
15 Cf. 1 Jn. 4:19-21 ‘We love because he first loved us.’
16 Cf. 1 Jn. 4:12 ‘No one has ever seen God; but if we love one another, God lives in us and his love is made complete in us.’
18 Conf. 13.9.10 [CCL 27:246-47]
19 Cf. civ. Dei 14.7 [CCL 48:421-22] ‘Anyone who resolves to love God and to love his neighbour as himself, not in a purely human way but according to the will of God, may certainly because of his love, be called a man of good will (*Nam cuius propositum est amare Deum et non secundum hominem, sed secundum Deum amare proximum, sicut etiam se ipsum: procul dubio propter hunc amorem dicitur voluntatis bonae*), Holy Scripture usually expresses this attitude by the word ‘*caritas*’ (*quae usitatius in scripturis sanctis caritas appelatur*), but it also uses the word ‘*amor*’ (*sed amor quoque secundum easdam sacras litteras dicitur*)...My only point has been to prove that the Scriptures of our religion, whose authority I prefer to all other writings (*libri eorum satis loquentur. Sed scripturas religionis nostrae, quaurum auctoritatem ceteris omnibus litteris anteposimus*, make no distinction between *amor, dilectio, and caritas* (*non aliud dicere amorem, aliud dilectionem vel caritatem, insinuandum fuit*). The affection of the upright will, then, is good love and that of the perverse will is
both the vertical and horizontal level. The vertical level is signified in the desire to obey God, the evidence of which shows itself in the Christian life at the horizontal level in the Christian’s relationship to others. Love’s ability to operate at both the vertical and horizontal level followed Christ’s ‘greatest commandment’ to love which for Augustine not only underpinned the Christian life but which he also connected to the idea of worshipping God.

### 4.4 Love and the Right Use of the Passions

In Augustine’s mind worshippers share something of the one they are worshipping, which forms the basis upon which he aligns love to the proper use of the passions in the Christian life.

According to Augustine, love is what causes the bad passions to be made right when they are rightly directed by it. Although Christians may feel the passions, if their will is rightly directed then the passions, regardless of whether they are experienced positively or negatively, will operate for the benefit of right action. Christians, once their will desires obedience to God, will therefore feel the gravity of their sin, hate doing evil and feel the gladness or joy in their good works:

So far as Christians are concerned, Holy Scripture and sound doctrine agree that citizens, of the holy City of God (Apud nos autem iuxta scripturas sanctus sanamque doctrinam cives sanctae civitatis Dei), who live according to God during this earthly pilgrimage of this present life, fear and desire (in huius vitae peregrinatione secundum Deum viventes metuunt cupiuntque) grieve and rejoice (dolent gaudentque) and because their love is rightly ordered

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20 “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind and with all your strength.” The second is this: “Love your neighbour as yourself.” There is no commandment greater than these. (Mt. 22:34-40; Mk 12:28-31; Lk 10:25-27)

21 Cf. ench. 1.2 [CCL 46:49].


23 Harrison, 94.
Augustine can therefore be seen not to have held a negative view of the passions. Unlike the Stoics who had taught that the passions needed to be extirpated, the passions for Augustine were not blameworthy or subject to either praise or blame. Neither did the passions interfere with reason because Augustine thought of the passions as part of the acts of the will. According to Augustine, if the moral nature took God’s commandments as the standard of what is ‘good’, this would result in the will’s natural inclination away from a sinful use of the passions towards desiring what is good: ‘It is clear, then, that the man who does not live according to man but according to God must be a lover of the good (Quapropter homo, qui secundum Deum, non secundum hominem vivit, oportet ut sit amator boni) and, therefore, a hater of evil (unde fit consequens ut malum oderit).’

Early theologians had instilled their idea of ‘the good’ from the doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’ because the doctrine stipulated that God in creating from nothing had created out of the goodness of his being. The Greek philosophers, however, had also presented a concept of the divine that was essentially good, which they also referred to as the divine principle (λόγος). Yet, unlike the Christian conception of ‘the good’, the philosophical conception was a condition rather than a personal force or attribute. For the Stoic, divine reason had fixed the universe at its inception but remained detached from it. This, in turn, did not mean that there was no ethical component in philosophy because, as a ‘way of life’, philosophy encompassed ethical or moral codes for life.

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24 civ. Dei 14.9 [CCL 48:426]. Cf. civ. Dei 14.6 [CCL 48:421] ‘Man’s will then is all-important (Interest autem quails sit voluntas hominis). If it is badly directed (quia si perversa est), the emotions will be perverse (perversos habebit hos motus); if it is rightly directed (si autem recta est), the emotions will be not merely blameless (non solum inculpabiles) but even praiseworthy (verum etiam laudabiles erunt). The will is in all these affections (Voluntas est quippe in omnibus); indeed, they are nothing else but inclinations of the will (immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt). For, what are desire and joy but the will in harmony with things we desire (Nam quid est cupiditas et laetitia nisi voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus)? And what are fear and sadness but the will in disagreement with things we abhor (Et quid est metus atque tristitia nisi voluntas in dissensione ab his quae volumus)?’

25 civ. Dei 14.6 [CCL 48:421]


27 See Ibid., 29.

28 Ibid., 29.
Augustine’s use of philosophical terminology, especially in his early theological exposition has therefore come under question. Brown\(^{29}\) and Wetzel\(^{30}\) both claim that Stoic and Platonic ideals of virtue, express Augustine’s early conviction that he believed that perfection was achievable for Christians in accordance with their reason, as can be seen in this statement from Augustine’s early work ‘On Free Will’: ‘I think you now see that it lies in the power of our will whether we enjoy or lack this great and true good (Vides igitur iam, ut existimo, in voluntate nostra esse constitutum, ut hoc vel fruamur vel careamus tanto et tam vero bono). What is so fully in the power of the will as the will itself (Quid enim tam in voluntate quam ipsa voluntas sita est)?’\(^{31}\) Brown and Wetzel argue that the reason the early Augustine can be seen to have emphasised the will’s self-determination was because his thinking about sin as a total corruption of human nature was a much later development.

The problem with such arguments is that they ignore that Augustine wrote ‘On Free Will’ in counteraction of Manichaeism. In his ‘Retractions’\(^{32}\) Augustine stated that the reason for this work was to correct the Manichaeans who denied human responsibility for sins. What separates Augustine’s conception of ‘the Good’ from a Stoic one is that the standard for his moral theory is derived not from the mind’s intrinsic ability to reason for itself but from external divine authority. The Christian capacity to self-determine right action therefore constitutes what good behaviour is in relation to God’s holy standards of virtue.\(^{33}\) The issue for Augustine was not that the will was unable to reason well. The issue was that, because sin had clouded the mind of its revelatory knowledge of God, without the work of grace, the mind remained inept at reasoning ‘the good’.

In his reference to ‘the Good’ Augustine was not adhering to a Stoic line of thought, but following the *consensus partum*. Although he can be seen to engage with philosophical terminology, Augustine does so for the benefit of his Christian doctrine. Unlike the Christian portrait of God, the


\(^{31}\) *lib. arb.* 1.12.26 [CCL 29:228] Augustine identifies the origin of sin in humans in the free choice of the will.

\(^{32}\) *retr.* 1.8.2 [CCL 57:23] ‘In fact, this discussion was taken up because of those who deny that the source of evil has its origin in the free choice of the will and who contend that, if this is so, God, the creator of all natures, is to be blamed (Propter eos quippe disputatio illa suscepta est, qui negant ex libero voluntatis arbitrio mali originem duci, et deum, si ita est, creatorem omnium naturarum culpandum esse contendunt).’

\(^{33}\) cf. *civ. Dei* 14. 6 [CCL 48:421]
Stoic conception of ‘the Good’ was incapable of intervening in human affairs, empowering humans or promising them a future life.\(^{34}\) As the Stoic conceived of divine entity as pure goodness and reason, to imitate ‘the Good’ required conduct from humans that was guided by reason alone.\(^{35}\) The ability to reason correctly therefore defined what good moral behaviour encompassed which made cultivating virtue the most important achievement in life.\(^{36}\) Greco-Roman moral theory was therefore an entirely anthropocentric concern where religion and religious practice became unemotional pursuits because emotion compromised reason.\(^{37}\)

The Stoics believed that a person’s virtue was located in the soul where pure reason resided.\(^{38}\) Matters of ethics and morality were therefore determined by an individual’s capacity to self-actualise and determine their perfection entirely through reason, so that the Stoics held a static conception of the mind. For Augustine, however, issues of morality and ethics were guided from an external divine authority or via scriptural revelation. It was God’s work or grace that illumined the mind to his standard of what was good:

> As a command is not received from him to whom the command is given (\textit{Sicut enim praeceptum non est ab illo cui praecipitur}) but from him who gives the command (\textit{sed ab illo qui praecipit}), so wisdom is not received from him who is enlightened (\textit{sic et sapienta non est ab illo qui inluminatur}) but from him [God] who gives the enlightenment (\textit{sed ab illo qui inluminat}).\(^{39}\)

Augustine’s conception of the mind posits a constant transfer of knowledge and wisdom from God to humanity.\(^{40}\) For Augustine the mind is dynamic because his concept of grace assumes both intrinsic and extrinsic qualities as it operates transcendentally and immanently in its work on the mind.

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\(^{34}\) Harrington, 29.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., 188.
\(^{36}\) Ibid., 188-89.
\(^{37}\) See Ibid., 188-89.
\(^{38}\) Ibid., 189.
\(^{39}\) \textit{lib. arb.} 3.24.72 [CCL 29:318]
4.5 The Psychology of the Will

Augustine saw sin’s affect on the will as the mind being darkened of its knowledge of God. The ‘memory’ that God had bestowed within the mind at creation enabling humans to know him was now clouded by sin. The mind, however, continued to possess the capacity and potential for this knowledge because God had created humans in his image. Augustine therefore linked ‘memory’ to the moral nature, something that all humans naturally possessed because they had been created in God’s image. Augustine was thus able to speak of the created psyche’s conscious natural capacity for self-determination and autonomous direction.

‘Memory’ for Augustine is deeply hidden in the psyche because it constantly longs for and searches for its created spiritual knowledge of God. His concept of ‘memory’ therefore resonates with Edwards’ concept of ‘moral rectitude’. Believing that people’s choices stemmed from the heart’s underlying and preceding inclinations, Edwards identified this with ‘moral rectitude’ because he believed that humans had been created in God’s ‘moral image’. Their ‘moral rectitude’ was something humans retained after the fall, which was why the mind maintains its capacity to reason morally, being able to discern right from wrong. Having lost God’s ‘spiritual image’ because of the fall, humans no longer retained their natural knowledge of God, making their moral nature corrupt: Sin produced in the moral nature a propensity towards sin away from knowledge of God. Like Edwards’ idea of ‘moral rectitude’, ‘memory’ for Augustine is the human’s autonomous capacity for moral reasoning. Moreover, as ‘memory’ for Augustine is deeply hidden in the psyche, constantly longing and searching for its lost spiritual knowledge of God, it also resonates with Edwards’ conception of the ‘spiritual image of God’ both conceptions being lost in humans because of sin.

Although ‘memory’ was a Neoplatonic concept in Augustine’s anthropology it functions as an original Christian conception. Much like the distinction Edwards had made between the moral and spiritual image of God, the way in which Augustine conceives ‘memory’ serves to get around the loss of the nuanced distinction that the Greek words εἰκών and ὁμοίωσις had conveyed when these words were translated into the Latin terms imago and similitudo. Augustine’s conception of ‘memory’ can therefore be seen to function as the missing spiritual link between the nuanced distinction that the

41 See Chapter 3 sections 3.6, 3.7, 3.8.
Greek language had conveyed by way of the ‘image’ (εἰκὼν) and lost ‘likeness’ (ὁμοιος/ὁμοιότης), a distinction made absent by the Latin words in translation. In Augustine’s anthropology, once the ‘memory’ is illuminated through the natural knowledge of God, the spiritually lost ‘likeness’ can then be recovered in the believer.

Depending on the context Augustine can be seen to have used the Latin terms *imago* and *similitudo* interchangeably. On occasion he made some distinction between *similitudo* as any form of likeness between two things and *imago* as a particular kind of likeness by which something relates to and is expressive of its source.\(^{42}\) Augustine developed a notion of *imago* as a particular kind of ‘likeness’ by which something was related to and expressive of its source, but he did so because he understood God as creator to be the source of the *imago Dei* (‘image of God’). For early Christian thinkers like Augustine, the Genesis story established that God, upon creating the first humans, had given them moral reason through which they knew ‘good and evil’ in the garden. For Augustine, both sexes had therefore been created equally in God’s image because each possessed to equal capacity a reasoning moral nature, their creation in God’s ‘image’ being the source of their moral natures.

Augustine had taken this understanding of ‘source’ from 1 Cor. 11.7, which spoke of the man being created in the image and glory of God and the woman in the glory of the man.\(^{43}\)

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\(^{42}\) Cf. *trin* 11.5.8 [CCL 50:344] ‘For what does bear some likeness to God, according to its own kind and its own measure, seeing that God has made all things exceeding good, precisely because he himself is the highest good (Quid enim non pro suo genere ac pro suo modulo habet similitudinem dei quandoquidem deus fecit omnia bona valde non ob aliud nisi quia ipse summe bonus est)? Insofar, therefore, as anything is, it is good, that is, to that extent it bears some resemblance, though very remote, to the highest good (In quantum ergo bonum est quidquid est in tantum scilicet quamuis longe distantem habet tamen nonnullam similitudinem summi boni); and if a natural likeness, then certainly right and well ordered, but if a defective likeness (et si naturalem utique rectam et ordinatam), then certainly shameful and perverse (et si autem vitiosam utique turpem atque perversam). Certainly, not everything in creatures, which is in some way or other similar to God, is also to be called his image (Non sane omne quod in creaturis aliquot modo simile est deo etiam eius imago dicenda est), but that alone to which he himself alone is superior (sed illa sola qua superior ipse solus est); for the image is only then an expression of God in the full sense, when no other nature lies between it and God (Ea quippe de illo prorsus exprimitur inter quam et ipsum nulla interiecta natura est).’

\(^{43}\) Cf. *trin* 7.6.12 [CCL 50:267] ‘But the Apostle has refuted them when he says (Refellit autem eos apostolus dicens): “A man indeed ought not to cover his head, because he is the image and the glory of God [1 Cor. 11.7] (Vir quidem non debet velare caput cum sit imago et gloria dei).” He did not say to the image, but “the image” (Non dixit ad imaginem sed imago)…But as we have already mentioned, man is said to be “to the image” on account of an imperfect likeness, and therefore, “to our image,” in order that man might be the image of the Trinity (Sed propter imparem ut diximus similitudinem dictus est homo ad imaginem, et ideo nostrum ut imago trinitatis esset homo), not equal to the Trinity as the Son to the Father, just as nearness, not of place but of a sort of imitation, may be
For Augustine the mind (mens) was therefore inclusive of both the intellectual, emotional and volitional aspects of the interior person. Greco-Roman philosophy had separated the psychological functions of the intellect and the heart so that the heart was generally viewed as the sole centre of emotion. Augustine, however, conceived the mind to be inclusive of both the emotive and the intellectual aspects of the whole person. For Augustine, the intellectual character of the mens not only involved the mind’s ability to comprehend reality, but also retained its capacity to grasp what lay beyond its understanding (‘memory’) once the mind was illumined by the Spirit. That the human was created in God’s image was expressive of God as its source not only because of its proximity or relationship to its source but also because the nature of the image was formed through conversion.

Sin had vitiated or fragmented the will, but the Spirit’s illumination reorientated the will towards God, realigning the Christian’s will with God’s will, which gave the passions a positive role in directing the fallen will. In relegating the passions to acts of the will, Augustine broke away from Greco-Roman and Stoic philosophy, which thought of the passions merely as bodily disturbances. Unlike the rational virtuous type of will which Stoic thought had located in reason (boulē) as a rational power of choice, Augustine conceived the will as a God-given power or psychological force which moved humans either towards God or away from God.

4.6 Augustine’s Trinitarian Image of the Psychology of the Human

Augustine had gleaned much of his understanding of ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ from Marius Victorinus. Victorinus had spoken of image as a relation of equality with its source because God the

signified even in distant things, but approaching it, as has been said, by a kind of similarity (non trinitati aequalis sicut filius patri, sed accedens ut dictum est quadam similitudine sicit in distantibus significatur quaedam vicinitas non loci sed cuiusdam imitationis).’ See B. McGinn, ‘The Human Person as Image of God: Western Christianity’ Christian Spirituality: Origins to the Twelfth Century (ed. B. McGinn & J. Meyendorff; New York, Crossroad: 1992), 318.

44 The Classical view attributed psychological functions to different parts of the body. Emotion and impulses resulting from emotion were viewed to be produced by the thumos which represented at the same time the vis vitalis of the living human being. The ‘heart’ (καρδία) as well as the ‘belly, gut’ (γένος) and ‘breast’ (στήθος) were parts of the body that were viewed as emotive. Whereas the abilities to perceive, plan, and think were usually attributed to the mind or intellect (νόμις) and perhaps the midriff (φρατες). See Dihle, 25-26.
45 Cf. trin. 11.5.8 [CCL 50:344] See McGinn, ‘Western Christianity’, 318.
46 Harrison, 95.
47 Marius Victorinus (281-c. 365) was a Roman orator born in Africa. He had been educated in both Greek and Latin. Augustine referred to him in the story of his conversion in Book 8 of his Confessions. The Greek Fathers had not influenced Victorinus’ theology as much as the western theologians Tertullian (160-ca. 220) and Hilary of Poitiers (315-ca. 358) had. See M. T. Clark, ‘The
perfect *imago Dei* had given rationality to humans upon their creation.\textsuperscript{48} He used the Neoplatonic Porphyrian triad of ‘being’\textsuperscript{49} to express this: ‘to be’ (*esse*), ‘to live’ (*vivere*) and ‘to understand’ (*intelligere*). The triad enabled him to express the patristic Trinitarian image of the composition of the believer (body, soul/mind and spirit)\textsuperscript{50}, a development from the Neoplatonic dual composition of the human person (body and soul/mind).\textsuperscript{51} Victorinus had used this Trinitarian image in his arguments against the Arians as a way to distinguish between the Λόγος (Word) as the true image of God and the human soul which is created *ad imaginem* (according to God’s image) after the pattern of the Λόγος.\textsuperscript{52} Allowing him to convey that the *imago Dei* in Adam (whose person had been described in Genesis 1:26 as bearing God’s own image) was the intellectual nature of God in conformity with God’s own personhood as displayed in the Trinity.

Following Victorinus’ thought, Augustine also spoke of image as having a relation of equality with its source. God the perfect *imago Dei* had given rationality to humans when he had created them. Yet, Augustine departed from Victorinus in that he said that the human was not only made *ad imaginem* (according to the image) but was also a true *imago Dei*. Augustine meant by this that God’s image existed in humans in their interior person (*homo interior*) being inclusive of both the ‘heart’ and ‘mind’. God’s image resided in the mind only as the higher dimension of the soul so that the heart and mind as a unit were involved in the choices the will made.

Augustine therefore developed a psychology of will that depicted ‘intentionality’, making his conception of will unique. The Greco-Roman philosophical view of ‘intentionality’ appeared either as a result of or as a by-product of cognition, the mode of its application or as its potential.\textsuperscript{53} In Greco-Roman philosophy, as in Stoic thought, the act of cognition was maintained entirely by reason, the

\textsuperscript{48} See Clark, 281; McGinn, ‘Western Christianity’, 318;
\textsuperscript{51} See Quasten, 311; See also Clark, 281.
\textsuperscript{52} See McGinn, ‘Western Christianity’, 316.
\textsuperscript{53} Dihle, 125.
mind in its reasoning always retaining its objectiveness, remaining independent and completely unaffected by emotion. Augustine’s conception of will differs from the Greco-Roman philosophical view of cognition (which separated will from the idea of both potential and achieved cognition) because he argues psychologically concentrating on the problem of what ‘is’ going on in the mind during the act of cognition itself. Augustine therefore developed his triad of memoria, intellectia, voluntas to account for the whole human self (mens), which he understood to be entirely spiritual.

Greco-Roman philosophy was more concerned with trying to explain which part or aspect of reality was being perceived by the intellect. The element of will only occurred before or after the act of intellectual perception, not as part of the process itself. A person was therefore understood to apply their cognitive power to an object in the outside world before the act of cognition could begin. For Augustine, however, the will actively and simultaneously partakes in the act of cognition and is not restricted to preliminary or subsequent activities. In the case of cognition, purely intellectual cognition occurs because the object of cognition is presented by the perceiver’s ‘memory’ (memoria) rather than from the corporeal or outside world. In Augustine’s moral theory, because the will

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54 Cf. trin 11.2.2ff. [CCL 40:334-39] NB. trin. 11.2.5 [CCL 50:339] ‘But the will possesses such power in uniting these two that it moves the sense to be formed to that thing which is seen, and keeps it fixed on it when it has been formed (Voluntas autem tantam habet vim copulandi haec duo, ut et sensum formandum admoueat ei rei quae cernitur et in ea formatum teneat). And if it is so violent that it can be called love, or desire, or passion, it likewise exerts a powerful influence on the rest of the body of this living being (Et si tam violenta est ut possit vocari amor aut cupiditas aut libido, etiam ceterum corpus animantis vehementer afficit).’ See Dihle, 125-26, n. 15, 232.

55 Cf. trin. 15.21.41 [CCL 50a: 518] ‘But with regard to the Holy Spirit, I pointed out that nothing in this enigma would seem to be like Him except our will, or love, or charity which is a stronger will (De spiritu autem sancto nihil in hoc aenigmate quod ei simile videretur ostendi nisi voluntatem nostrum, vel amorem seu dilectionem quae valentior est voluntas). For our will, which belongs to us by nature, experiences various emotions [passions], according to whether the things which are adjacent to it or which it encounters either entice or repel us (quoniam voluntas nostra quae nobis naturaliter inest sicut ei res adiacerint vel occurrerint quibus allicimur aut offendimur ita varias affections habet). What, then, follows from this (Quid ergo est)? Are we going to say that our will, when it is right, does not know what it should desire, what it should avoid (Numquid dicturi sumus voluntatem nostrum quando recta est nescire quid appetat, quid deulet)? But if it does know, then doubtless it possesses its own kind of knowledge which cannot be there without memory and understanding (Porro scit profecto inest ei sua quaedam scientia, quae sine memoria et intellegentia esse non possit). Note Augustine’s triad memoria, intellectia, voluntas.’ See Dihle, 125-26.

56 Ibid., 126.

57 Cf. trin. 14.10.13ff.; trin. 14.10.13 [CCL 50a: 440-41] ‘But when knowledge is begotten, and that which we have known is placed in the memory and is seen by recollection (Cognitione vero facta cum ea quae cognouimus posita in memoria recordatione revisuntur), who does not see that the retention in the memory is prior in time to the sight in recollection (quis non videat priorem esse tempore in memoria retentionem quam in recordatione visionem), as well as to the combining of both of these by the will of the third (et huius utriusque tertia voluntate iunctionem)? But again it is not so with the
reorientates towards God once the mind has been made aware of its knowledge of God, this reorientation shows how the mind (mens) is inclusive of both the intellectual and volitional aspects of the human self.\textsuperscript{58} The intellectual character of the mens not only involved the mind’s ability to comprehend reality, but could embrace its inability to grasp what lay beyond its understanding (memory), because its being is an image of God.\textsuperscript{59}

From this we are to understand that man was made to the image of God in that part of his nature wherein he surpasses the brute beasts (ut videlicet intelligamus in eo factum hominem ad imaginem Dei, in quo irrationalibus animantibus antecellit). This is, of course, his reason, or mind, or intelligence, or whatever we wish to call it (Id autem est ipsa ratio, vel mens, vel intelligentia, vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius appellatur).\textsuperscript{60}

In presenting his portrait of the mens Augustine creatively modified the Porphyrian triad of Being that Victorinus had constructed from esse/vivere/intellegere (to be/to live/to understand) to esse/nosse/velle (to be [existence] /to know [knowledge, cognition]/ to will [the will’s inclination]). Augustine’s triad enabled him to denote a picture of the internal psychological life of the human person: ‘Now, I speak of these three (Dico autem haec tria): to be, to know, to will (esse, nosse, velle).

For, I am, I know, and I will (Sum enim et scio et volo). I am knowing and willing being (sum scientis et volens); I know that I am and that I will (et scio esse me et velle ); I will to be and to know (et volo

mind (Porro autem in mente non sic est). For it is not adventitious to itself, as if to the mind already existing, there were to come from somewhere else that same self not already existing (neque enim adventicia sibi ipsa est quasi ad se ipsam quae iam erat veneri aliunde eadem ipsa quae non erat)…And, therefore, when it is turned to itself by thought, then arises a trinity, in which word, too, can at last be identified, for it is formed from thought itself, and the will which unites both (Ac per hoc quando ad se ipsum cogitatione convertitur fit trinitas in qua iam et verbum posse intellegi. Formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitazione, voluntate utrumque iungente). Here, then, we may recognise more clearly than before the image which we are seeking (Ibi ergo magis agnoscenda est imago quam quae remus).’ See Dihle, 125, n.16, 233. The appetitus mentis (the mind’s natural desire) always precedes the act of thinking (cf. trin. 9.12.18) in Augustine’s thought.

\textsuperscript{58} trin 7.6.12. [CCL 50:267] ‘For in this sense it is also said (Ad hoc enim et dicitur): “Be reformed in the newness of your mind” [cf. Rom. 12.2] (Reformamini in novitate mentis vestrae)” and to them he likewise says (quibus item dicit): “Be you, therefore, imitators of God, as most dear children [Eph. 5.1] (Estote itaque imitatores dei sicut filii dilectissimi).’ For it is said to the new man (Novo enim homini dicitur): “Who is being renewed unto perfect knowledge, according to the image of him who created him [cf. Col. 3.10] (Qui renovatur in aghanionem dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum).’


\textsuperscript{60} Gn. litt. 3.20.30 [PL 34:292]. Cf. Edwards in Works 1. 166
esse et scire). His conception of mens therefore brought together a metaphysical analysis of being that presented a Christian view of reality that did not impose a dichotomy between either of the spiritual and material/corporeal realms of the Christian’s existence. Moreover, Augustine’s conception placed the believer at a kind of central crossing-place between the spiritual and earthly realm. He further developed this triad in conjunction with another triad memoria/intelligentia/voluntas (memory/knowledge/will), which he used to account for the whole human self or mind (mens) so as to present a picture of the spiritual image of the human as it operated once the mind was awakened to its knowledge of God.

For Augustine these three faculties (memory/knowledge/will) were inseparably linked and could not work independently of the other. Human intellectual activity was impossible without the potential of objects of cognition being offered by the memory, without the faculty of reasoning, and without the moving force of the will. Augustine’s psychology of the mind (mens) with regard to human intellectual activity was a self-sustaining dynamic notion, because humans maintained their responsibility for the sinful choices they made. The locus of all understanding was therefore found entirely in the mind or soul, which worked to account for human responsibility in sin because it did not require an indispensable point of reference from the material/corporeal or outside world which could negate it.

4.7 The Holy Spirit’s Work of Illumination

Augustine applied his concept of the mens (Gk. νοῦς) to his doctrine of the Trinity, explaining the consubstantiality of the three persons, Father, Son and Spirit by the mens. If the substance of God the Supreme Being was spiritual then the substance of the soul and mind was also spiritual, because

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61 conf. 13.11.12 [CCL 27:247] Cf. civ. Dei 11.26ff. NB. civ. Dei 11.26 [CCL 48:345] ‘For, we are, and we know that we are, and we love to be and to know that we are (Nam et sumus et nos esse novimus et id esse ac nosse diligimus). And in this trinity of being, knowledge, and love there is not a shadow of illusion to disturb us (In his autem tribus, quae dixi, nulla nos falsitas very similis turbat).’ See Dihle, 233 n.17.
62 Maximus adapted Porphyrian logic in his construction of a five-fold division of being which in its Christological setting allowed him to posit a similar view of reality. See Chapter 5, n.17.
63 See Dihle, 124-25.
64 Ibid., 125.
66 Ibid., 126.
scripture spoke of humanity being created in God’s image and likeness. Interpreting this ontologically as any form of likeness between two things, Victorinus described this in terms of the special relationship between the λόγος (Christ as the incarnate divine word) and the human nature (Christ as fully human) of the second hypostasis of the Trinity. Augustine however opposed any view that restricted the likeness to just one person of the Trinity believing that generation was a term for the continuously existing relation between the Father and the λόγος. His interpretation allowed him to correlate motion and will for the divine creativity, which can be compared with the way in which the Greek Fathers used the terms δύναμις (power, capacity, potentiality) and ἐνέργεια (energy/activity). In patristic usage the way in which these Greek terms were applied came to mean something more than an ontological relationship that existed between the Godhead and the creation. They held teleological significance which turned them into dynamic terms.

The terms δύναμις and ἐνέργεια take meaning from the context of God as the Word or λόγος, who created and sustains the universe by his Word alone. The terms convey a sense of the dynamic teleological design and purpose that defines not only God’s sovereign power in creating, but also his relationship with his creation. The conception of God’s uncreated power and his activity or energies were therefore used by the Greek Fathers to express the full Christian understanding, or the simultaneous recognition, of both the total transcendence and immanence of God’s work in relation to his creation, defined by the Spirit’s work. In a similar fashion, for Augustine, it is motion and will that brings about creation. Motion and will is representative of the Spirit’s transcendent and immanent work of illumination in the believer’s mind.

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67 Ibid., 126.
68 Ibid., 126, 234 n.19.
69 Ibid., 126.
70 Dihle, 125.
71 Ibid., 126.
73 Cf. Conf. 4.15.25 [CCL 27:53 ] ‘Such was my mind at that time when I did not know that it required to be illumined by another light (Qualis in me tunc erat nesciente alio lumine illam inlustrandam esse), so that it might participate in the truth (ut sit particeps veritatis). For the soul is
For Augustine, the analogy of ‘likeness’ referred to the unity and operation of the whole Trinity (Father, Son and Spirit). Memory, knowledge, and will, as three simultaneous functions of the soul and mind (mens) unified in their operation, were individually attributable to each hypostasis of the Trinity because they functioned as spiritual substances. The three functions of the spiritual substances (memory, knowledge and will) could therefore be attributed to all three persons of the Trinity. Everything God as the supreme Being had created, whether immaterial or material, therefore owed its existence, origin and preservation to the activity of God’s word (Δόγος/Δόγοι). God had no need in his threefold existence of anything outside of himself. Transcendently self-sustaining, God in creating from nothing had created out of the goodness and holiness of his being. God’s perfect autonomy therefore had its analogy in the self-sufficient activity of the human intellect. Once the Spirit illuminated the mind with the knowledge of God, the will is activated by the mind’s self-examination so that it naturally inclines itself in obedience to God’s will.

not the very nature of truth (quia non est ipsa natura veritatis), since you will light my lamp, Lord (quoniam tu inluminabis lucernam meam, domine).’; trin. 15.21.41 [CCL 50a: 518] ‘But with regard to the Holy Spirit, I pointed out that nothing in this enigma would seem to be like Him except our will, or love, or charity which is a stronger will (De spiritu autem sancto nihil in hoc aenigmatе quod ei simile videretur ostendi nisi voluntatem nostrum, vel amorem seu dilectionem quae valentior est voluntas)... Are we going to say that our will, when it is right, does not know what it should desire, what it should avoid (Numquid dicturi sumus voluntatem nostrum quando rectа est nescire quid appetat, quid deuіet)? But if it does know, then doubtless it possesses its own kind of knowledge which cannot be there without memory and understanding (Porro si scіt profectо iste eua quaedam scientіa, quae sine memorіa et intelлегентіa esse non possіt).’ Compare with Maximus CK 2. 82-83 [PG 90:1164 ABC] ‘A heart is clean if it presents its memory of God in a condition completely devoid of shape and form and is prepared to be imprinted only by his characters by means of which it becomes visible (Каρδιά ἑστά καθαρὰ, ἢ παντάπασιν ἀνέιθουν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ άμόρφωναν παραστήσασα τὴν μνήμην· καὶ μόνοις τοῖς αὐτοῦ έτοιμον ἐνσημανθήναι τύποις, δι’ ὅν ἐμφανῆς πέφυκε γίνεσθαι)...but rather as illuminating the power of our mind with its own quality and bringing the same energy/activity to it (Άλλη’ ὡς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ποιήτη τὴν τῷ ήμετέρου νοὸς λαμπτρών δύναμιν, καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτῷ φέρουν ἐνέργειαν).’ Maximus connects the terms δύναμις and ἐνέργεια with the Spirit’s work, which resonates with Augustine’s understanding of motion and will. There is teleological design and purpose that results from the Spirit’s work of illumination as the believer’s mind recovers its knowledge of God. For Maximus, ἐνέργεια conveys a sense of both the intrinsic (God’s transcendent work) and extrinsic (God’s immanent work) nature of the Spirit’s work upon the mind which restores their relationship to the Creator.

76 Cf. trin. 12.6.6 [CCL 50:360] ‘But again, in order that we might not think that we are to believe in three gods in the Trinity, since the same Trinity is the one God, it was said (Rursus autem ne in triniteate credendos arbitrareremur tres deos cum sit eadem trinitas unus deus): “And God made man to the image of God (Et fecit, inquit, deus hominem ad imaginem dei),” which is just the same as saying “to his image (pro eo ac si diceret, ad imaginem suam).”’

77 Ibid., 126.

78 See Ibid., 126.

79 Cf. trin 15.21.41 [CCL 50a: 518] ‘But with regard to the Holy Spirit, I pointed out that nothing in this enigma would seem to be like him except our will (De spiritu autem sancto nihil in hoc aenigmatе...
Humanity was therefore also made in the image of the Trinity. The Trinity of the mind (memory, knowledge and will) was spiritually God’s image and likeness, not because the mind remembers, understands and loves itself, but because it remembers, understands and loves its maker:

Hence the Trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself (Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea dei est imago quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se) but because it can also remember, understand and love him by whom it was made (sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est). And when it does so, it becomes wise (Quod cum facit sapiens ipsa fit); but if it does not, even though it remembers itself, knows itself, and loves itself, it is foolish (Si autem non facit, etiam cum sui meminit sequi intellegit ac diligit, stulta est). Let it, then, remember its God, to whose image it has been made, and understand him and love him (Meminerit itaque dei sui ad cuius imaginem facta est eumque intellegat atque diligat).

According to Augustine when the mind recognised God as its creator, it attained wisdom. Knowledge of God therefore provided Christians with the standard or measure for ethical matters that pertain to living a wise life in the world, making Christian moral theory an entirely theocentric concern.

4.8 Augustine’s Picture of the Whole Person: the Mind and the Heart

All human knowledge and every spiritual operation in Augustine’s thought were grounded in the inner life of the Father, Son and Spirit. He therefore developed a picture of ‘the whole person’ as a Trinitarian image that functioned on the mutually cooperative principles of love and knowledge. ‘Memory’ was activated in believers because of their love of God, which was the basis for intellectual activity (the moral nature), which was mirrored in the Father’s role as the ground of procession of both the Son (understood as an act of consubstantial knowledge) and the Spirit (conceived of as one of

*quod ei simile videretur ostendi nisi voluntatem nostrum), or love, or charity which is a stronger will (vel amorem sev dilectionem quae va lentior est voluntas). For our will, which belongs to us by nature, experiences various emotions [passions], according to whether the things which are adjacent to it or which it encounters either entice or repel us (quoniam voluntas nostr a quae nobis naturaliter inest sicut ei res adiucauerint vel occurrerint quibus alliciumur aut offendimur ita varias affectiones habet).*

*trin. 14.12.15 [CCL 50a: 442-43]
*81 See McGinn, Foundations of Mysticism, 247.
*82 McGinn, ‘Western Christianity’, 319.*
equally consubstantial love.\textsuperscript{83} The intellectual self-consciousness or the self-awareness (\textit{verbum interius}) illuminated by the Spirit gave rise in the believer to true knowledge (\textit{notitia, intellectentia}). This knowledge being the source of the mind’s love evidenced in the will’s renewed desire to obey God (\textit{amor/voluntas/intentio}).

Augustine therefore perceives biblical revelation to be the necessary or prerequisite condition of the believer’s knowledge, not the sole means by which they gain their knowledge of God.\textsuperscript{84} Essentially, it is through the process of the person’s love of God that their knowledge of God is gained. God’s Trinitarian self-disclosure is therefore both illuminative and transformative, in that the Christian’s ‘participation’ in God causes them to become like God to some degree because of the spiritually transforming effects of their knowledge. Both the heart and mind are impacted which leads to the active transformation and reformation of the Christian life: \textsuperscript{85} ‘And so there is a certain image of the Trinity: (\textit{Et est quaedam imago trinitatis,}) the mind itself, and its knowledge which is its offspring, (\textit{ipsa mens et notitia eius,}) and love as a third; (\textit{et amor tertius}) these three are one and one substance (\textit{et haec tria unum atque una substantia}).\textsuperscript{86}

When the activity of love is synonymous with the action and direction of the will it means that knowledge is not isolated from practice.\textsuperscript{87} Augustine therefore connected reason and knowledge to love. According to Augustine, the distinctive element of human nature, which set humans apart from animals, was the God-given ability to relate to God and love him.\textsuperscript{88} Although sin’s effects had deformed God’s image in humanity, the work of grace reformed the image, so the believer’s love for

\textsuperscript{83} Cf. \textit{trin.} 15.23.43 [CCL 50a: 521] ‘And when they shall be cured of every infirmity and shall be mutually equal, will not be made equal to the thing that is unchangeable in its nature (\textit{Et quando inter se aequalia fuerint ab omni languor sanata}), even then that thing, which through grace shall not be changed (\textit{nec tunc aequabitur rei natura immutabili ea res quae per gratiam non mutatur}), because the creature is not equal to the Creator (\textit{quia non aequatur creatura creatori}), and will undergo a change when it shall be cured of every infirmity (\textit{et quando ab omni languor sanabitur mutabitur}).’ See McGinn, ‘Western Christianity’, 320.
\textsuperscript{84} Williams, 145.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 145.
\textsuperscript{86} \textit{trin.} 9.12.18. [CCL 50:310]
\textsuperscript{87} See McGinn, \textit{Foundations of Mysticism}, 246-247.
God was reawakened: ‘We can deform God’s image in us, we cannot reform it (Imaginem in nobis dei deformare potvimus, reformare non possimus).’

According to Augustine, for an image to be truly called an image, it was not enough for the image to be merely ‘like’ its model. It, in a sense, had to be ‘born’ of its model:

Hence, the likeness of God, through which all things were made, is properly said to be likeness (Quapropter etiam similitude Dei, per quam facta sunt omnia, proprie dicitur similitudo), but it is not like by participation in some likeness (quia non participatione alicujus similitudinis similis est), but is itself the first likeness, and whatever things God made through it are by participation in it (sed ipsa est prima similitudo, cujus participatione similia sunt, quaecumque per illam fecit Deus).

The only true image of God had been the incarnate Christ, so Christians become ‘true’ images of God because they participate in Christ, the true ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ of the Father.

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89Cf. s. 43.4.4 [CCL 44:509]; nat. et gr. 3. 3 [PL 44:249] ‘In the beginning man’s nature was created without any fault and without any sin (Natura quippe hominis primitus inculpata et sine ullo vitio create est); however, this human nature in which we are all born from Adam now requires a physician, because it is not healthy (natura vero ista hominis, qua unusquisque ex Adam nascitur, jam medico indiget, qui asana non est). Indeed, all the good qualities which it has in its organisation, life, senses, and understanding, it possesses from the most high God, its creator and shaper (Omnia quidem bona, quae habet in formatione, vita, sensibus, mente, a summo Deo habet creatore et artifice suo). On the other hand, the defect which darkens and weakens all those natural goods, so that there is a need for illumination and healing, is not derived from its blameless maker (Vitium vero, quod ista naturalia bona contenebrat et infirmat, ut illuminatione et curacione opus habeat, non ab inculpabili artifice contractum est) but from that original sin that was committed through free will (sed ex originali peccato, quod commissum est libero arbitrio).’


91Gn. litt. imp. 16.57 [PL 34:242]; trin. 7.6.12 [CCL 50:266] ‘For it was not that gods might make to the image and likeness of gods, but that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit might make to the image of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, in order that man might subsist as the image of God (non enim ut facerent dii aut ad imaginem et similitudinem deorum, sed ut facerent pater et filius et spiritus sanctus ad imaginem ergo patris et filii et spiritus sancti ut subsisteret homo imago dei). But God is the Trinity (deus autem trinita).’

92trin. 7.6.12 [CCL 50:266] ‘For it was not that gods might make to the image and likeness of gods, but that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit might make to the image of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, in order that man might subsist as the image of God (non enim ut facerent dii aut ad imaginem et similitudinem deorum, sed ut facerent pater et filius et spiritus sanctus ad imaginem ergo patris et filii et spiritus sancti ut subsisteret homo imago dei). But God is the Trinity (deus autem trinita).’ See Bonner, 154.
According to Augustine, what bound the three persons of the Trinity together was love (caritas). Love was the hallmark of the Trinity, which he identified with the Spirit’s person and work. Although Augustine had identified all three persons of the Trinity as a unified whole with wisdom, the reason he identified the Spirit with love was because he conceived the Spirit as unifying the Father and the Son. The incarnation’s work therefore began the transformation of the Christian life, but the Spirit’s work continued it. Augustine’s identification of love with the Spirit’s work shows how love exercised a comparable role within the Trinity in the way it bound all three persons. The Spirit’s work acts like a spiritual ‘glue’ that binds the Christian life to Christ’s own life because Christ in his person had been fully divine as well as human. The Spirit’s work is therefore also the giver of Christian community, the basis of union between God and the Church. The Spirit not only enabled grace to operate but also bound the believer to Christ and continued their transformation.

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93 Cf. *trin. 7.3.6* [CCL 50:254] ‘And, therefore, the Father is wisdom, the Son is wisdom, and the Holy Spirit is wisdom (Et ideo sapientia pater, sapientia filius, sapientia spiritus sanctus), and together they are not three wisdoms but one wisdom (et simul non tres sapientiae, sed una sapientia); and because there, to be and to be wise is one and the same, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one essence (et quia hoc est ibi esse quod sapere, una essentia pater et filius et spiritus sanctus).’; *trin. 15.3.5* [CCL 50a: 464] ‘All three persons of the Trinity as a unified whole are identified as wisdom not as three powers or as three wisdoms but as one power and one wisdom as one God and one essence.’

94 McGrath, 332.

95 *trin. 7.3.5.6* [CCL 50:253-54] ‘If we are, therefore, to be reformed to the image of God on account of the example which the image, equal to the Father, gives us, then it should not be wondered at, that the Scripture is referring to the Son when it speaks about wisdom, since we follow him by living wisely, although the Father himself is wisdom, as he is light and God (Non igitur mirum si propter exemplum quod nobis ut reformemur ad imaginem dei aequalis patri, cum de sapientia scriptura loquitur, de filio loquitur quem sequimur vivendo sapienter, quamuis et pater sit sapientia sicut lumen et deus).’ And the same is likewise true of the Holy Spirit, for he is that perfect love which joins together the Father and the Son and attaches us to them (Spiritus quoque sanctus siue sit summam caritas utrumque contingens nosque subiungens).’

96 Ibid., 332.

97 *trin. 15.19.37* [CCL 50a: 513] ‘Wherefore, of the sacred scripture proclaims (Quapropter sicut sancta scriptura proclamat): “God is love,” as also that love is of God, and acts in us that we may remain in God and he in us, and we know this, because he has given us his Spirit, the Spirit himself is the God who is love (Deus caritas est, illaque ex deo est et in nobis id agit ut in deo maneamus et ipse in nobis, et hoc inde cognoscimus quia de spiritu suo dedit nobis, ipse spiritus eius est deus caritus).’

98 See Ibid., 332.

99 *trin. 5.11.12* [CCL 50:219] ‘For he is the gift of the Father and the Son, since he “proceeds from the Father [cf. Jn 15:4] (Donom enim est patris et filii qua a patre procedit),” as the Lord says, and the saying of the Apostle (sicut dominus dicit, et quod apostolus ait): “He who does not have the Spirit of Christ, does not belong to him [cf. Rom. 8:9], (Qui spiritum Christi non habet hic non est eius),’ certainly refers to the Holy Spirit (de ipso utique spiritu sancto ait).’; *trin. 8.7.10. [CCL 50:284]* “Because the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us
Augustine therefore presents an intimate picture of the Spirit’s operation in the Christian life. This picture of the Spirit’s work goes against Lossky\textsuperscript{100} who has accused the western Fathers of depersonalising the Spirit’s work in the Christian life. He argues that this has led to a misplaced emphasis in western soteriologies upon the person and work of Christ to the detriment of the work of the Spirit. The Trinitarian Godhead when reduced to an impersonal principle ignores the distinct yet complementary work of the Spirit, not only in salvation, but also in the believer’s continuing transformation. Lossky’s claim is not entirely untrue, as modern Reformed soteriologies can risk downplaying the Spirit’s work on the Christian life in their emphasis on Christ’s atoning work for the sinner. Even so, Lossky’s accusation against the western Fathers is misplaced, especially with regard to Augustine whose identification of love with the Spirit highlights the Spirit’s work as a personal transformative work in the Christian life.

4.10 Love and the Will

For Augustine, love is both an ontological and teleological category that denoted intentionality, so that love is synonymous with the acts of the will. To will for Augustine is not to rationally deliberate and choose to act, it is to love something and be moved to act on that love.\textsuperscript{101} The perverted will is therefore directed by the force of desire in a bad sense manifesting as negative passions which Augustine associated with the idea of self-love, such as cupidity/greed/avarice (\textit{cupiditas}), concupiscence (\textit{concupiscentia}) and lust/desire (\textit{libido}). When the believer’s desire is focused on God, these negative passions become rightly governed by the will, and turn into good and virtuous passions.\textsuperscript{102} What matters in Augustine’s thought is the nature or disposition of the will, not

\textsuperscript{100} V. Lossky, \textit{In the Image and Likeness of God} (London: Mowbrays, 1974), 71-96. See also McGrath, 342.


\textsuperscript{102} Harrison, 95; Williams, 160.
the nature of the passions. The passions are all acts of will in accordance with what the believer is focused on.\textsuperscript{103}

According to Augustine the passions exist not to motivate or move people emotionally towards good works, but to be developed into the good passions and affections that reflect God’s character of holiness to the world.\textsuperscript{104} For Augustine, what distinguished the believer’s good works from that of the non-believer lay not in the act itself, but in the value of ‘goodness’ God bestows upon the act which originates and comes forth from his own being of holiness. Passions moved by God as their objective therefore become deifying passions, evidenced by the good works produced in the believer’s life. Although Christians did not attain perfection in their current life, Augustine believed that their good works were made ‘perfect’ because grace enabled believers to ‘participate’ in Christ’s life.\textsuperscript{105}

4.11 Conclusion

Augustine’s theory of will established his belief in humanity’s created dependence on a sovereign God in a way which acknowledged human autonomy in decision making without negating humanity’s corporate and individual responsibility in sin. Viewing the passions as an essential part of human cognition, Augustine developed a psychology of will that accounted for the whole person where the mind and heart were united in the choices the will made. According to Augustine, the passions were acts of the will in accordance with what the person was focused on. What mattered was

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\textsuperscript{103} Harrison, 93-94.
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\textsuperscript{104} Cf. civ. Dei 14.6 [CCL 48:421]; civ. Dei 14.7 [CCL 48:422] \end{flushleft}

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\textsuperscript{105} cf. civ. Dei 11.28. [CCL 48:347-48] ‘For, we do not call a man good because he knows what is good, but because he loves it (\textit{Neque enim vir bonus merito dicitur qui scit quod bonum est, sed qui diligit}). Why, then, do we not see that what we love in ourselves is the very love by which we love whatever is good (\textit{Cur ergo et in nobis ipsis non et ipsum amorem nos amare sentimus, quo amamus quidquid boni amamus})?; civ. Dei. 22.30. [CCL 48:865] ‘Only when we are remade by God and perfected by a greater grace shall we have the eternal stillness of that rest in which we shall see that he is God (\textit{A quo refecti et gratia maiore perfecti vacabimus in aeternum, videntes quia ipse est Deus}). Then only shall we be filled with him when he will be all (\textit{quo ‘eni erimus quando ipsa erit omnia in omnibus})’ [cf.1 Cor. 15:28]*. For, although our good works are, in reality, his, they will be put to our account as payment for this Sabbath peace, so long as we do not claim them as our own (\textit{Nam et ipsa opera bona nostra, quando ipsius potius intelleguntur esse, non nostra, tunc nobis ad hoc sabbatum adipiscendum inputantur; quia sin obis ea tribuerimus}).’ Augustine’s phrase \textit{Then only shall we be filled with him when he will be all (quo pleni erimus quando ipsa erit omnia in omnibus).} *The reference to 1 Cor. 15:28 is suggestive of \textit{‘perichoresis’}. Augustine has in mind the mutual interpenetration of Christ’s divine and human nature, which is the means by which the Christian is united with Christ. See also chapter 9, n.139 of this thesis.\end{flushleft}
the disposition of the will, not the type of passion that was experienced. Moreover, Augustine’s conception of ‘memory’ allowed him to speak about the created psyche’s conscious natural capacity for self-determination and autonomous direction. Linking ‘memory’ to the moral nature, he spoke of the mind having been clouded by sin as the reason humans had lost their natural created capacity for knowledge of God. Yet, Christians regained their knowledge of God, once the Spirit illuminated their mind causing their will to realign with God’s will. Augustine’s theology of the will and its role in the development of the passions or affections therefore provided him with a way to place his Christian moral theory on a theocentric platform. He thus demarcated his Christian moral theory from Manichaean, Pelagian and Greco-Roman philosophical theories which were anthropocentrically centred.
Chapter 5: Maximus on the Will and the Affections

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to show that the distinction Maximus made between the ‘natural’ and ‘gnomic’ will allowed him to place his Christian moral theory on a theocentric platform, demarcating it from Origenist as well as Greco-Roman moral theories. According to Maximus, Origenist soteriology had compromised the traditional understanding of sin, because it held that after the fall the body, not the mind, remained sin-affected. Drawing on Christological and Trinitarian language, Maximus presented a Christian view of reality that did not impose a dichotomy between the spiritual and earthly realms of human existence. His was a psychology of the ‘whole person’, the mind and the heart in the act of cognition. Drawing a distinction between the natural and the gnomic will, Maximus developed a theory of two wills for humanity that arose out of an ontology and teleology framed out of his Christology and Christian cosmology. Of significance, was his novel use of the scriptural word for will, \( \theta\iota\lambda\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma \), which referred to something qualitatively different from the notions expressed by the classical philosophical Greek words for will, like \( \pi\rho\omicron\alpha\iota\rho\omicron\sigma\iota\varsigma \) that signified a rational power of choice.

Maximus argued that, prior to the fall, the natural will, \( \theta\iota\lambda\iota\sigma\iota\varsigma \), had conformed to God’s will for his creatures in accordance with human nature as God had originally purposed, whereas the gnomic will was deliberative, and hesitated over the right path because of sin’s clouding effects on the mind. Following traditional Christian teaching about the totality of sin’s corruptive effects upon human nature, Maximus believed that it was the work of grace that reorientated the gnomic will, so that good passions and affections were produced in the Christian life. Finally, although the sin-affected gnomic will operated in natural opposition to God, as the Spirit illuminated the mind to discern its own knowledge of God, the gnomic will intentionally aligned itself with God’s will. This made the passions and affections in the Christian life all acts of the will. At issue for Maximus was that Origenist moral theory had treated spiritual disciplines as a means to an end, a way to free the mind from its bodily prison. Maximus believed however that because of the present reality of sin,
spiritual disciplines were necessary to the Christian life, the freedom to engage in them being a result of the work of grace.

5.2 The Context of Maximus’ Conception of the Will

Maximus developed his notion of will out of his seventh-century philosophical context, and like Augustine his notion of will in the context of Greco-Roman philosophical thought remains unique. Although Maximus’ conception of will bears a remarkable similarity to that of Augustine, the differences between them can be attributed to language and historical context and not to their theology. Maximus’ psychology of will was developed out of his corrective to Monothelitism\(^1\), based on his teaching of the two wills in Christ. It was within the Christological and soteriological context of the Monothelite controversy that the distinctions Maximus made between the ‘natural’ and the ‘gnomic’ will should be properly understood.

Maximus was concerned to defend the view that Christ had two wills, one human and one divine. The controversy threatened the very nature of Christ’s divine character, so Maximus’ aim was to explain why Christ’s human will was incapable of sin. For example, if Christ’s human will were capable of sin then Christ in his humanity could also be said to be without his divine will.\(^2\) In order to guard against this heterodoxy, Maximus set out to distinguish Christ’s human will as ‘natural’ from that of the ‘gnomic’ will.\(^3\) The ‘gnomic’ will affected by sin, differed from the ‘natural’ in that it had an in-built proclivity towards sin. In the environment of a fallen world this meant that the gnomic will was pulled towards bad or evil things which would lead to sin just as it could be pulled towards good things leading to virtue (ἀρετή).

The fourth-century Council of Chalcedon had acknowledged that the person of Christ had two natures (divine and human). It insisted, however, that once the two natures had come together at the

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\(^3\) Ibid., 20.
point of the incarnation they were constituted in Christ’s divine personhood as an indivisible unity, which Monenergism⁴ had also sought to affirm. Discerned in a single unique activity/energy (ἐνέργεια) of the incarnate Christ, it was later refined as a single unique will (θέλημα). This refinement drove the controversy due to the ambiguity admitted by the Greek words ‘activity/energy’⁵ (ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργητικόν) and ‘will’ (θέλημα), an ambiguity then exploited by the Monothelites.⁶ Before the Monothelite controversy, Maximus had treated θέλημα and γνώμη as synonym terms ascribing γνώμη to Christ. The subsequent ambiguity admitted by the Monothelites therefore caused him to distinguish carefully θέλημα from γνώμη so that his readers would not misconstrue his orthodoxy.

Maximus’ corrective therefore shows that he was well aware of the ambiguities admitted by the Greek terms ἐνέργεια and θέλημα.⁷ His way around the ambiguity was to employ a ‘Chalcedonian

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⁴ In seeking to retain the orthodoxy of the Chalcedonian definition, the doctrine of Monenergism affirmed Christ as one person who possessed two natures, one divine and one human but with the further assertion that the full integrity of Christ’s two natures as a single person could be expressed as a single activity/energy (ἐνέργεια). See Louth, 13.

⁵ See Louth, 56. See also C. Yannaras, Elements of Faith: An Introduction to Orthodox Theology (tr. K. Schram; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 39-48. The issue of ‘matter’ for the ancients (before the discovery in modern physics of molecular structure) was a ‘mystery’ and was dealt with epistemologically. The action and activity of God’s λόγος was therefore given effect dynamically in the ground and formation of creation. The fathers interpreted the ‘composition’ of matter as a fact of ‘activity/energy’ (ἐνέργεια). Creation was understood to be a ‘reality’ of the λόγος not from the ‘essence/nature’ of the λόγος but as ‘essence/nature’ always remaining distinct and dynamically effected in time. The three basic categories nature-hypostasis-energies summarised the mode of existence of God the world. The word ‘activity/energy’ therefore designated the ‘potentials’ of ‘nature/essence’, which made known the ‘person/hypostasis’ and its existence so that it becomes known and participable. For example, humans can be seen to have the capacity/potential to reason, to will, to love, to create, and work, which are capacities/potentialities common to the ‘essence/nature’ of being human. These capacities can then be viewed, as ‘energies/activities’ (ἐνεργεία) because they are seen to not only differentiate humans from the animals but are common to the ‘essence/nature’ of ‘being’ human in general.


⁷ The ‘one single energy or activity’ used by the non-Chalcedonians was an adaptation of the sixth-century writer, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s ‘a new energy or activity’ (Epistles 4 [PG 3:1072C]). The Monothelite controversy therefore caused Maximus to reframe his expression of ‘one single activity/energy in everything of God and the Christian’ because of the ambiguity. Cf. Amb. 7: 1076C [PG 91:1076C] ‘Through the abundant work of the Spirit it will be shown that God alone is at work, and in all things there will be only one activity, that of God and of those worthy of kinship with God. God will be all in all wholly penetrating all who are his in a way that is appropriate to each [cf. 1 Cor. 15.28] (διὰ τὴν ἐκκυκλήσασαν αὐτὴν χάριν τοῦ Πνεύματος, καὶ μόνων ἔχουσαν ἐνεργοῦσα τοὺς θεόν διέξασαν, ὥστε οἶνας καὶ μόνην διὰ πάντων ἐνέργειαν, τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄξιων θεοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ μόνου θεοῦ, ὡς διὸν ὑλοις τοῖς ἄξιοις ἀγαθοπρεπῶς περιχωρῆσαντος). It is absolutely necessary that everything will cease its willful movement toward something else when the ultimate beauty that satisfies our desire appears (’Ἀλνέγκη γὰρ πᾶσα τῆς κατ’ ἐφευ τὰ πάντα περί τι ἄλλο παίσασθαι ἐξουσιαστικῆς κυπέλλως’). Cf. Oriris. 1:33A [PG 91:33A] Περὶ δ᾽ τῆς ἐν τῷ ἐξόνῳ κεφαλαῖοι τῶν ἀπόρων τοῦ μεγάλου Γρηγορίου κεμένης μίας ἐνεργείας, σαφῆς ὁ λόγος. Τὴν ἐσομένη γὰρ κατά τὸ μέλλον τῶν ἄγιων υπογράφων κατάστασιν, ἐφ᾽ μίαν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ
logic’ conceived between the Chalcedonian Christological notions of nature/essence- ['being'] (φύσις/οὐσία) and person/hypostasis-['subsistent being'] (πρόσωπον/ὑπόστασις). In Christological and Trinitarian language the intent of the words πρόσωπον and ὑπόστασις had not only been used in the Chalcedonian definition to express the unity of Christ, but also the distinctiveness of the three members of the Trinity. The words φύσις and οὐσία therefore worked to express the duality of Christ’s human and divine nature or his consubstantiality [same substance] (ὁμοούσιον/ὁμοοουσιότης).

Maximus objected to the way in which the parallelism between Christ and the human had been used by the Neo-Chalcedonians to argue that Christ’s humanity had existed in one composite nature out of two (body and soul/mind) which allowed them to teach that Christ existed equally in one composite nature out of two (divine and human).

Maximus’ corrective followed the Cappadocian tradition, which spoke of nature as related to what was common or universal to something, and hypostasis to what was distinctive or particular to something. Although he identified hypostasis with what was common or universal, he also identified it with the substance (οὐσία) of the person as well as with what was distinguished by number from its consubstancials, enabling him to make a clear distinction between the ‘natural level’ and the ‘personal level’. Moreover, Maximus showed that both ‘activity/energy’ and ‘will’ as processes belonged to the natural level. In rational creatures ‘will’ as a process proceeds from nature, being ‘bound up in the movement’ that also proceeds from nature. The words ἐνέργεια and θέλημα were thus also an


8 See Bathrellos, 99-101; Louth, 49-51
9 See Bathrellos, 101; Louth, 50.
10 On the terms ‘hypostasis’, ‘nature’ and ‘person’ in Chalcedon Christology, see Bathrellos, 99-100; Louth, 50; Pelikan, 44-45.
11 Bathrellos, 100. To say that Christ had a composite nature led to heterodoxy. It would be neither God consubstantial with the Father nor human consubstantial with humanity, which compromised Trinitarian theology, Christology and soteriology.
12 Ibid, 102
13 The term ‘hypostasis’ had also been used by the Fathers as a formal grammatical category in order to denote the particular or distinctive differentiated being that exists on its own. The meaning was not confined to ‘person’ but was also identified with the ‘I’ of Christ (ἐγώ) so that it carried more ‘personal’ overtones than ‘hypostasis’ did. See, Bathrellos, 102, n. 18. See also Louth, 57.
14 Louth, 57.
expression of the personal, because the two words could also be used to express the particular mode (τρόπος) in which a nature moves and has its relation to others.15

5.3 Christ’s ‘Natural’ Will

The Cappadocians had expressed that which was distinctive about the subsistent beings in the Godhead with the term ‘mode of existence’ (τρόπος υπάρξεως).16 The term, allowed Maximus to suggest that at the level of ‘Being’ natures were defined by their principles, meanings and definitions, all of which could be represented by the term λόγος. At the level of the ‘natural’, ουσία (essence), φύσις (nature) and λόγος (principle) could therefore be grouped together.17 But at the level of ‘person’ [the personal], there are ‘modes of existence’ (λόγος φύσεως) where υπάρξεως (existence), υπόστασις (hypostasis), and τρόπος (the modality/mode) all belonged together.18 The processes of ‘activity/energy’ and ‘will’ therefore belonged to the ‘natural’ level (i.e. acting, willing) because, proceeding from nature, these processes were bound up with movement that also belonged to nature. It was therefore ‘the result’ of ‘activity’ and ‘will’ that was bound up with ‘person/hypostasis’ (i.e. the act done, the deed willed). Christ’s two natures (human and divine) had come together, but having come together, they constituted an indivisible unity, discerned in Christ’s single unique activity or

15 Ibid., 56-57.
16 See Bathrellos, 103; Louth, 51.
18 Cf. Amb. 1 [PG 91:1036C] ‘For the triad is truly monad, because thus it [this is the way it] is, and the monad truly triad because thus it [this is the way it] subsists (Μονάς γάρ ἀληθῶς ἡ Τριάς, ὅτι σύνεσε ἑστι, καὶ Τριάς ἀληθῶς ἡ μονᾶς, ὅτι σύνεσε ὑφεστηκέν). Thus there is one Godhead that is as monad, and subsists as triad (ἐπειδὴ καὶ μία θεότης οὐσά τε μοιάδικως, καὶ υφισταμένη τριαδικώς). If, hearing of movement, you wonder how the Godhead that is beyond infinity is moved, understand that what happens is happening in us, and not to the Godhead (Εἰ δὲ κίνησιν ἄκοις ἐθαύμασας πώς ὑπεράπτεινς κινεῖται θεότης, ἡμῶν, οὐκ ἐκείνη τὸ πάθος) For first we are illuminated with the reason [logos] for its being, then we are enlightened about the mode in which it subsists (τρόπον τὸν τὸν εἶναι λόγων αὐτῆς ἐλλαμπομένων, καὶ σύνες τοῦ τοῦ πώς αὐτῆς υφεστάναι τρόπον φωτιζομένων), for we understand that something is before we understand how it is (ἐξέπερ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ πώς εἶναι πάντως προκειμένων). Therefore movement in the Godhead is constituted by the knowledge about that it is and how it subsists that comes about through revelation to those [Christians] who receive it (Κίνησις οὖν θεότητος ἡ δὲ ἐκφάνσις γινομένη περὶ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ πώς αὐτῆς υφεστάναι τοῖς αὐτῆς δεκτικοῖς καθότητη γνώσις).’ Maximus expressed the distinction of level as that between that something is and how it is. See Bathrellos, 103, Louth, 51.
will. According to Maximus, the psychological inward struggle Christ had experienced within himself in the Garden of Gethsemane testified to this:

So his [Christ’s] flesh was acknowledged by those who saw him not to be a phantom deceiving the senses (ἵνα δείξῃ τῆς οἰκείας σαρκὸς τὴν ἀσθένειαν· καὶ ώς οὐ φαντασίᾳ σαρξ ἐγνωρίζετο τοῖς ὀρώσι, τὴν αἰσθήσιν παρακλήσιων), but he was in truth and properly a human being (ἀλλ᾽ ἀληθείας κυρίως ἀνθρώπος ἦν): to this his natural will bears witness in his plea to be spared from death that took place in accordance with the economy [God’s salvation plans] (τῆς φυσικῆς τούτῳ μαρτυρούσης θελήσεως, ἢ κατὰ οἰκονομίαν ὑπήρχε παραίτησις). And again, that the human will is wholly deified, in its agreement with the divine will itself, since it is eternally moved and shaped by it and in accordance with it ("Ὅτι δὲ πάλιν διάλογον τεθέωτο, πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον θέλημα συννεώνν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατ᾽ αὐτὸ κυνοίμων ἀεὶ καὶ τυπούσων), is clear when he shows that all that matters is perfect verification of the will of the Father, in his saying as a human being Not mine, but your will be done [cf. Lk. 22:42]

(ὅθεν ἐκ τοῦ μόνη τὴν τοῦ Πατρίκου θελήματος ἐπίκρισιν τελείως ποιήσασθαι, καθ᾽ ἢν ὡς ἀνθρώπως ἔφασκε· Μη τὸ ἐμὸν, ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν γινέσθω θέλημα).

Christ’s human nature therefore remained sinless this so that it remained natural. Christ’s human will always remained obedient to God’s will so that it operated at the spiritual and natural level/mode of the λόγος in contrast to the level/mode of the τρόπος (the created material/earthly sin-affected realm of human experience or the current human predicament). Moreover, although Christ along with all humans experienced life at the sin-affected level/mode of the τρόπος his obedience indicated that his will consistently operated in accordance with his Father’s will at the level of the λόγος. Christ’s actions therefore remained sinless, which indicated that his will was identical to his

19 Louth, 56.
20 Opusc. 7:80CD [PG 91:80CD] Cf. [PG 91: 81CD] ‘Thus he possesses a human will, according to this divine teacher [Gregory Nanzianzan], only it was not opposed to God (’Ωστε θέλειν εἶχεν ἀνθρωπινον, κατὰ τὸν θείον τοῦτον διδάκταλον· οὐ μὴν θεός καθετιον ὑπεναντιόν). But this will is not at all deliberative [the gnomic will], but properly natural, eternally formed and moved by its essential Godhead to the fulfillment of the economy (ὅτι μὴ γινομικὸν τοῦτο καθετίας, ἀλλὰ φυσικὸν κυρίως ἐτύγχανεν, ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ κατ᾽ οὐδεὶς θεότητας τυποίμενον ἀεὶ καὶ κυνοίμων πρὸς τὴν τῆς οἰκονομίας ἐκπλήρωσιν).’; Opusc. PG 91:48A [PG 91:48A] ‘Then the Incarnate Word possesses as a human being the natural disposition to will, and this is moved and shaped by his divine will (εἶχεν ἄρα τὸ περιφέρειν θέλειν ὁ σαρκομείες Λόγος ὡς ἀνθρώπος, τῷ αὐτῷ θεϊκῷ θελήματι κυνοίμενόν τε καὶ τυπούσων).’
Father’s will and that his mind was identical to God’s own mind. Christ experienced suffering and sin’s affects upon his person in the τρόπος, but his sinlessness showed the nature of his ‘true created humanity’ to the world: Christ manifested the essential nature of God’s goodness and holiness to the world because his will remained perfectly aligned to his Father’s will (always operating at the level/mode of the λόγος). According to Maximus, Christ’s humanity showed that his obedient will was natural because nothing natural was ever opposed to God:

For if anyone were to say that something natural resisted God (Καὶ γὰρ εἰ τυχὸν φαίη τις, ὡς ἀντιπίπτει Θεῷ τὴν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν), this would be rather a charge against God than against nature (αὐτοῦ μάλλον ἢ τῆς φύσεως ὑπάρχει τὸ ἐγκλήμα), for introducing war naturally to the realm of being and raising up insurrection against himself and strife among all that exists (πόλεμον φυσικῶς ἐνεργεῖσθαι τοῖς ὀδοί, πρὸς τὴν κατ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀλλήλων στάσιν καὶ μάχην).

Experiencing life at the sin-affected level/mode of the τρόπος Christ’s natural will had not been torn between alternate courses of action. His will remaining perfect in its obedience with the Godhead as it operated at the spiritual level/mode of the λόγος. Christ’s ‘true humanity’ therefore lay in stark contrast to humanity that experiences life at the sin-affected level/mode of the τρόπος. The consequences of the fall predisposed humans towards sin. Maximus believed that only the work of grace could restore the mind to its natural created knowledge of God at the spiritual natural level/mode of the λόγος.

The way in which the levels/modes of the λόγος and τρόπος function in Maximus’ soteriology resonate with Augustine’s conception of the mind (mens). By analogy Augustine had compared the consubstantiality of the three members of the Trinity, which he explained by the mens, to the human person because he held that humanity was created in God’s image. God’s substance was spiritual, so by analogy the substance of the soul and mind was also spiritual where memory/knowledge/will function as three simultaneous functions because they too were spiritual substances. Once the Spirit

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21 See Louth, 57.
22 Opusc. 7.80A [PG 91:80A]
23 See Ibid., 57-58.
has illuminated the mind’s knowledge of God (memoria), Augustine’s triad shows the restoration of the lost spiritual image restored in the believer because of the Spirit’s work.24 The triadic processes of memory/knowledge/will therefore mirror in terms of outcome, the processes of ‘activity/energy’ (ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργητικὸν) and ‘will’ (θέλημα) which Maximus’ scheme presents. Although the depiction that each theologian presents of the Spirit’s illuminating work on the mind is uniquely conceived, both present the mind’s spiritual restoration of its knowledge of God that sees the believer’s will aligned with God’s will.

5.4 The Psychology of the Gnomic Will

Maximus’ conception of a psychology of will is original in that, although he drew upon Greco-Roman philosophical volitional thought, he is noted as the first theologian to have used θέλησις in a technical psychological sense.25 Although this is true from an eastern perspective, Augustine, from a western perspective has also been credited with having developed a psychology of will that

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24 Cf. CK 2. 82-84 [PG 90:1164 ABC] ‘A heart is clean if it presents its memory of God in a condition completely devoid of shape and form and is prepared to be imprinted only by his characters by means of which it becomes visible (Καρδία ἐστὶ καθαρὰ, ἡ παντάπασιν ἀνείδους τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἀμόρφωτον παραστάσει τῆς μνήμης καὶ μόνος τοὺς αὐτοῦ ἔτοιμον ἐνημερωθήσθης τύπῳ, δὲ ἃν ἐμφανίζῃ πέφυκε γίνοιται). The mind of Christ which the saints receive according to the saying (Ὁ τοῦ Χριστοῦ νοῦς, ἂν λαμβάνεισθαι οἱ ἰδροσε, κατὰ τὴν φαμένην), “We have the mind of Christ [cf. 1Cor 2:16] (Ἡμεῖς δὲ νοοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν),” comes along not by any loss of our mental power (οὐ κατὰ στέρησιν τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν νοκρᾶς δυνάμεως ἐπηγίνεται), nor as a supplementary mind to ours (οὐδὲ ὡς συμπληρωτικὸς τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοοῦ), nor as essentially and personally passing over into the mind (οὐδὲ ὡς μεταβαίνων οὐσιώδως καθ’ ὑπάστασιν εἰς τὸν ἡμετέρου νοοῦν), but rather as illuminating the power of our mind with its own quality and bringing the same energy/activity to it (Ἄλλα ὡς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ποιότητι τῆς τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοοῦ λαμπρῶν δύναμις, καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτῷ φέρουν ἐνέργειαν). For to have the mind of Christ is, in my opinion, to think in his way and of him in all situations (Νοοῦν γὰρ ἔχειν Χριστοῦ ἐγκαθένα φήμι, τὸν κατ’ αὐτῶν νοούτα, καὶ διὰ πάντως αὐτῶν νοούτα)...For as Christ is by nature sinless in both body and soul by which he is known as man (Ὡς γὰρ ὁ Χριστὸς κατὰ φύσιν σαρκὶ τε καὶ ψυχῇ καθ’ ὃ νοεῖται ἄνθρωπος ἀνιμάρτητος ἡμῖν), so we who believe in him and who are clothed with the Spirit be in him without sin by the use of our free will (οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ πεπιστευκότες αὐτῷ, καὶ διὰ Πνεύματος αὐτῶν ἐνυδαθημένου, κατὰ προαιρέσειν ἐν αὐτῷ χωρὶς ἀμαρτίας εἶναι δυνατότεροι). Maximus’ point is that the believer is incorporated into Christ’s body in union with Christ as a bodily member so that their mind became one with Christ’s νοῦς. The Spirit illuminates the mind and engages the heart in a single unique activity/energy which enlightens ‘memory’ to its knowledge of God. Christians are granted a renewed disposition of will that moves them towards God and provides them with the capacity to freely choose not to engage in sin. The similarity of Maximus’ conception of the spiritually renewed mind to Augustine’s notion of the mens is uncanny. See Chapter 4, n. 74 of this thesis.

was unique among Greco-Roman conceptions. As a Greek volitional term, \( \text{θέλησις} \) rarely appeared as a philosophical volitional term. It was Christian thinkers who began to use and associate \( \text{θέλησις} \) with the will’s intentional choice, primarily because \( \text{θέλησις} \) was the word for will found in scripture.

As a scriptural word, \( \text{θέλησις} \) automatically distinguished itself from all other philosophical volitional words, like \( \text{προαιρεσις} \) (a word which was generated from \( \text{βούλησις} \)) which Plato had used to refer to the ‘desire for ends’.

Usually translated as ‘deliberate choice’, ‘preference’ or ‘predilection’, the term \( \text{προαιρεσις} \) was commonly found in philosophical vocabulary, and denoted the act of intellectual perception rather than the intention of the will itself.

Maximus’ essentially novel use of the word \( \text{θέλησις} \) referred to something qualitatively different from the notions expressed by the classical word like \( \text{προαιρεσις} \) which signified a rational power of choice and \( \text{βούλησις} \) which conveyed a sense of deliberation. The term \( \text{προαιρεσις} \) comes close to the modern concept of will as a deliberate or intentional choice, as it referred to the choice which the mind made out of several objectives of action. Yet, it lacks the modern determinative volitional idea of ‘will-power’ because classical philosophical ideas about volition tended to locate ‘intentionality’ within the ‘intellect’ or ‘reason’ rather than in the inner conscious make-up of the mind, soul or psyche. For example, for Aristotle \( \text{προαιρεσις} \) may appear to be voluntary which linked it to moral responsibility, but he also extended it more widely to the actions of animals and children who shared in the voluntary, but who, he believed, were incapable of anything as rational as \( \text{προαιρεσις} \) (deliberate choice).

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28 See Dihle, 20-21; Sorabji, 11-12. The term had been used by Aristotle to refer to ‘the desire of the means which would lead towards those ends’.
30 Dihle, 21.
31 Sorabji, 11.
32 See Ibid., 11-12.
The Greek \( \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \)\(^{33} \), \( \gamma \gamma \nu \omega \delta \sigma \kappa \omega \) was another classical philosophical volitional term that was used to refer to people’s specific judgements plus intentions in any given situation, or to people’s general attitudes.\(^{34} \) Actions were viewed to result from \( \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \) so it was a word which represented the ‘motive’ for action which could not simply be ascribed to the person’s nature.\(^{35} \) \( \Gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \) itself was viewed as arising from the person’s intellectual performance, so that there were times when \( \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \) and nature were seen to be in accordance, and at other times when outer compulsions or spontaneous irrational impulses from within the person contrasted with \( \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \) as possible forces that would lead to action.\(^{36} \) If unfortunate actions occurred it would not have been considered to have arisen out of human natural needs, but from the fact that \( \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \) had failed to get hold of the right action.\(^{37} \)

\( \Gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \) is therefore a term in Maximus’ vocabulary which is difficult to translate or render in another language outside of its Greek context. Moreover, Maximus cannot be seen to have always used the term consistently in his writing. Meaning given to the word by Maximus is therefore dependent on the context in which he has used it.\(^{38} \) The difficulty of understanding this word outside of its Greek context is the reason why Augustine, who also developed a unique notion of a psychology of will, did not appear to have any knowledge of this significant Greek volitional term. He is believed to have only read from the Latin translations of Greek originals that may have been available to him, as well as from the Latin Neoplatonic works. The term does not appear to have been known to him, probably because Cicero would have translated \( \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \) into one of the limited Latin terms that were used for will.\(^{39} \) Although Maximus appears to have used \( \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \) in a nuanced way, in general \( \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \) can be associated with free will, opinion, deliberation, inclination, individual attitude, and in its negative role somewhat akin to ‘individualistic will.’\(^{40} \)

\(^{33} \) \( \Gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \) can be literally translated as ‘opinion’ which is the reason it is ‘deliberative’. See G. W. H. Lampe (ed), *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 317-18. \( \gamma \nu \omega \mu \eta \), \( \eta \), can be translated as: mind, opinion, free choice, will, decision, judgement.

\(^{34} \) See Dihle, 29.

\(^{35} \) Ibid., 29.

\(^{36} \) Ibid., 29.

\(^{37} \) Ibid., 29-30.

\(^{38} \) See Toronen, 180.

\(^{39} \) See Dihle, 123-25.

\(^{40} \) Toronen, 180-81.
5.5 The Whole Person: the Head and the Heart

The way in which Maximus conceived his understanding of human freedom is made evident in his Christology. Concerned to defend the view of Christ’s two wills (human and divine), his distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘gnomic’ became a way where he could begin to discuss the issue of the effects of sin upon the moral nature itself. For Maximus, the natural will (φυσικῆς θελήσις) was not an act of cognition that was directed entirely by reason, so that the mind maintained an objectivity in the choices it made. Instead, Maximus understood the natural will as being intentionally affected by the psyche’s conscious desire, which showed that the heart and mind were both involved in decision making. Maximus’ depiction of the natural will may be contrasted with προαιρέσις which denoted the objective ‘act’ of intellectual perception rather than the ‘motive’ or ‘intention’ of the will itself:

They say that natural will, or will is a capacity desirous of what is in accordance with nature,

(Θέλημα φασὶν εἶναι φυσικῶν, ἢγουν θέλησιν, δύναμιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὀντὸς ὀρεκτικῆν), a capacity which holds together in being all the distinctive attributes which belong essentially to a being’s nature (καὶ τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ φύσει προούσιτων συνεκτικῆν πάντων ἰδιωμάτων).

The substance, being naturally held together by this, desires being and living and moving in accordance with perception and intellect (Γοῦτῳ γὰρ συνεχομένη φυσικός ἢ ὀυσία, τοῦ τε εἶναι καὶ ζῆν καὶ κινεῖσθαι κατ’ αἰσθησίν τε καὶ νοῦν ὀρέγεται), striving for its own natural and complete existence (τῆς σωκείας ἐφειμένη φυσικῆς καὶ πλῆρους ἀνάστητος). A thing’s nature has a will for itself (Θελητικὴ γὰρ ἑαυτῆς), and for all that is set to create its constitution, (καὶ τῶν ὡς σύστασιν αὐτῆς ποιεῖσθαι πέφυκε), and it is suspended in a desiderative way over the rational structure of its being, the structure in accordance with which it exists and has come into being (καθέστηκεν ἡ φύσις· τῷ τοῦ εἶναι αὐτῆς λόγῳ, καθ’ ὃν ἔστι τε καὶ γέγονεν ὀρεκτικῶς ἐπιρημένη). That is why others, in defining this natural will (Διόπερ ἐτεροὶ τοῦτο τὸ φυσικῶν ὀριζόμενοι) say that θέλημα is a rational and vital desire (Θέλημα φασὶν εἶναι, ὀρεξζων λογίκῆν τε καὶ ζωτικῆν), whereas προαιρέσις is a desire,
based on deliberation, for things that are up to us (τήν δὲ προαιρέσειν, ὄρεξιν βουλευτικήν τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν).\(^{41}\)

It was not θέλησις but προαιρέσεις that Maximus used to express rational-deliberative choice.\(^{42}\) Maximus’ definition of the natural will as ‘a capacity desirous of what is in accordance with nature’ emphasised the will’s non-rational, instinctive, and desirous aspect, where reason played no significant role in the mind’s operations. According to Maximus, this was what distinguished προαιρέσεις from the ‘natural will’, its operation reflective of God’s image within his likeness:

[The natural will] is a capacity desirous of what is in accordance with nature (Δύναμις ύπάρχει τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος ὀρεκτική). For every being, especially rational beings, desire what is in accordance with nature, having been given by God according to his essence the capacity of that for its own constitution (Πάν γὰρ εἰ τὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ μάλιστα λογιλῶν, φυσικῶς τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος ὀρέγεται, καὶ τούτου παρὰ Θεοῦ λαβὼν κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ἔχει τὴν ἐαυτοῦ).\(^{43}\)

Reflective of God’s image, it was the natural will that accounted for the psychology of the ‘whole person’, mind and heart. Maximus’ use of θέλησις came close to the variant Stoic term οἰκείωσις which was expressive of the natural attachment that newborn babies and animals had to their mothers for sustenance and nourishment.\(^{44}\) Creating humanity in his image, God had bestowed the natural will in the moral nature, so that when the Spirit illuminated the mind of its knowledge of God it became automatically aware of this knowledge. The moral nature was therefore conducive of the psyche’s conscious natural capacity for self-determination or autonomous direction, which

\(^{41}\) Opusc.1 [PG 91:12C-13A] ‘So θέλησις is not προαιρέσεις (Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν προαιρέσεις ἢ θέλησις), if θέλησις is a simple rational and vital desire (εἰτερ ἢ μὲν θέλησις ἀπλή τις ὄρεξις ἐστὶ, λογική τε καὶ ζωτική), whereas προαιρέσεις is a coming together of desire, deliberation and judgement (ὅ δὲ προαιρέσεις, ὀρέξεως καὶ βουλής καὶ κρίσεως σύνοδος). For it is after first desiring that we deliberate (Ὃρεγόμενοι γὰρ πρῶτον βουλευόμεθα), and after having deliberated that we judge (καὶ βουλευόμενοι, κρίνομεν), and after having judged that we deliberately choose what has been shown by judgement better in preference to the worse (καὶ κρίναντες, προαιρούμεθα τοῦ χείρονος τὸ δειχθὲν ἐκ τῆς κρίσεως κρεῖττον). And θέλησις depends on what is natural, προαιρέσεις on what is up to us and capable of being brought about through us (καὶ ἢ μὲν, μόνον ἠρτηται τῶν φυσικῶν ἢ δὲ, μόνον τῶν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, καὶ δι᾽ ἡμῶν γίνεσθαι δυναμένων).’ The translation is taken from Sorabji, 21.

\(^{42}\) Bathrellos, 123.

\(^{43}\) Opusc. 16 [PG 91:192B]

\(^{44}\) Sorabji, 21.
established a portrait of humanity’s created dependence on a sovereign God that did not negate humanity’s individual or corporate responsibility in sin.

Prior to the fall, in the first humans, the natural will had conformed to God’s will because the object of desire ‘in’ the garden was God. After the fall, God’s likeness in humans had been lost, evidenced by Adam and Eve’s wilful disobedience, so that humans no longer naturally conform to God’s will. Although humans continue to maintain their moral nature it is their natural will that has ceased to operate, being replaced by the sin-affected gnomic will. The gnomic will was deliberative and hesitated over the right path because of sin’s corruptive effects upon the moral nature, so that for Maximus it operated synonymously with self-love. Operating in opposition to God’s will, the gnomic will was predisposed towards sin, showing that the origin of sin lay in the choices that the will made:

For evil consists in nothing else than this difference of our gnomic will from the divine will (’Εν ουδενὶ γὰρ ἄλλῳ καθέστηκε τὸ κακὸν, εἰ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῇ πράᾳ τὸ θεῖον θέλημα διαθάρρῃ τοῦ κατὰ γνώμην ἡμετέρου θελήματος), which occurs by the introduction of an opposing quantity (ἡτταν πάντως ἀντικειμένη συνεισάγεται ποσότης), thus making them numerically different (καὶ ὁ ταύτης διηλογικὸς ἀριθμός), and shows the opposition of our gnomic will to God (δεικνὺς ἦμῶν τὴν πράᾳ τὸν Θεόν τοῦ γνωμικοῦ θελήματος ἀντιπάθειαν).

The gnomic will therefore functioned in all humans because its likeness to God had been corrupted by sin. Yet, to say that the gnomic will was directed by the focus of its desire did not mean that the will was irrational or illogical in its actions:

For the rational nature has the natural ability and rational appetite [proper to it] (Τὸ γὰρ φύσει λογικῶν, δύναμιν ἔχει φυσικὴν τὴν λογικὴν ὑπεξεῖν). This is called the ‘faculty of will’ of the rational soul (ἡττας καὶ θέλησις καλεῖται τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς). It is according to this [faculty] that we consider when willing (καθ’ ἦν θέλοντες λογιζόμεθα), and in considering, we choose the things which we would [will] (καὶ λογιζόμενοι, θέλοντες βουλόμεθα). And when willing

45 Cf. CC2: 8 [PG 90:985C]; CC3: 8 [PG 90:1020AB]
46 Opusc. 3.56BC [PG 91:56BC]
we also inquire (Καὶ θέλοντες, ζητοῦμεν), examine, deliberate, judge (σκεπτόμεθα τε καὶ
βουλεύομεθα, καὶ κρίνομεν), are inclined toward, elect, impel ourselves toward, and make use
of a thing (σκεπτόμεθα τε καὶ βουλεύομεθα, καὶ κρίνομεν, καὶ διατιθέμεθα, καὶ
προαιρούμεθα, καὶ ὄρωμεν, καὶ κεχρήμεθα). ⁴⁸

According to Maximus the sin-affected will acted intentionally and deliberately in its choice
to sin, so the gnomic will also encapsulated both the irrational and rational self-determining aspects of
the soul or mind.⁴⁹ Moreover, although Maximus believed that the natural will was contained in the
moral nature of all humans, sin had spoiled its natural desire to obey God. Yet, despite sin’s effects
upon the moral nature, Maximus’ idea of willing was also something that was rooted within the nature
of human rationality:

For they think that it is the natural appentency of the flesh endowed with a rational soul (Καὶ
gὰρ φυσικὴν τῆς νοερᾶς ἐφικμαίης σαρκὸς), and not the longing of the mind of a particular
man moved by an opinion, that possesses the natural power of the desire for being, and is
naturally moved and shaped by the Word towards the fulfilment of the economy [God’s
salvation plans]. And this they wisely call the will (ἀλλ’ οὔ τὴν γνωμικὴν τοῦ τινος
ἀνθρώπου, νοῦ κινήμασι διανοήσαντες ὀρέξει, ἐχοῦσαν τῆς τοῦ δύνα τοῦ φυσικῆ κἐφέσεως
dύναμιν, φυσικῶς κινομένην τε καὶ τυπομένην ὑπὸ τοῦ Λόγου πρὸς τὴν τῆς οἰκονομίας
ἐκπλήρωσιν, θέλημα σοφῶς προσηγόρευσαν), without which the human nature cannot be (οὔ
χωρίς εἶναι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν, ἀδύνατον). For the natural will is ‘the power that longs
for what is natural’⁵⁰ and contains all the properties that are essentially attached to the nature
(Θέλημα γὰρ ἐστὶ φυσικόν, δύναμις τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἄνυτος ὀρεκτικῆ, καὶ τῶν οὐσιωδῶς τῇ
φύσει προσόντων, συνεκτικὴ πάντων ἰδιωμάτων). ⁵¹

⁴⁸ Pyrrh. 25 [PG 91:293BC]
⁴⁹ Bathrellos, 125.
⁵⁰ Maximus had ascribed this definition of will to Clement of Alexandria in Opusc. 26 [PG 91:276C].
See Louth, 218 n.3.
⁵¹ Opusc. 3 [PG 91:45CD, 48A]
According to Maximus, it was because God had created humanity in his image and likeness that they had been created to desire that which was natural, so that their movement always remained self-determined and autonomous despite the effects of sin on the moral nature.\textsuperscript{52}

5.6 The Holy Spirit’s Work of Illumination

The Spirit’s work in illuminating the mind of its knowledge of God also united the operation of the mind with the heart. Grace therefore enabled the believer’s will to act in accordance with the natural choice to obey God.\textsuperscript{53} According to Maximus, the Spirit’s work caused the believer’s will to operate freely in a movement that was ‘natural’ to it, which results in the transformation and reformation of the Christian life:

God, who has promised you everlasting happiness [cf. Tit. 1:2] (’Ο ἐπαγγελιάμενος σοι Θεὸς τὰ αἰώνια ἄγαθα) and placed in your heart the pledge of the Spirit [cf. 2 Cor. 1:22] (καὶ τὸν ἁγίασμα τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ δεδωκὼς), has enjoined you to tend to your behaviour so that the inner man, freed from the passions (ἐνυπελείασθαι σε τοῦ βίου, ἵνα ὁ ἐσω ἀνθρώπος τῶν παθῶν ἔλευθερωθείς), might begin here and now to enjoy this happiness. (ἀρέσεται ἀπευθεῖν τῆς τῶν ἀγάθων ἀπολαύσεως).\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{52} Cf. Amb. 42.1345D [PG 91:1345D] ‘For created man could not be revealed as a son of God through deification by grace without first being born of the Spirit in the exercise of free choice, because of the power of self-movement and self-determination inherent in human nature (Ὅ γὰρ ἦν δυνατὸν ἄλλος Υἱὸν ἀποκαθήθηκε Θεοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐκ χάριτος θέωσιν τῶν γενόμενον ἀνθρώπων, μὴ πρότερον κατὰ προαιρέσεις γενηθέντα τῷ Πνεύματι, διὰ τὴν ἔνσωσιν αὐτοῦ φυσικῶς αὐτοκινήτην καὶ ἀδέσποτον δύναμιν).’; cf. Pyrrh. 61 [PG 91:304CD] ‘And again, if nature [moves without reason] in irrational beings, and moves in man by virtue of his own free will, then man is by nature a being endowed with will (Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἀγέι μὲν ἡ φύσεις ἀγέται δὲ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐξουσιαστικῶς κατὰ θέλησιν εἰσομένῳ· ἄρα φύσεις θελητικὸς ὁ ἀνθρώπος). And again: if man was made after the image of the blessed and super-essential Godhead, and if the divine nature be self-determined, then he is by nature endowed with free will (Καὶ πάλιν, εἰ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τῆς μακαρίας καὶ ὑπερουσίου Θεότητος ὁ ἀνθρώπος γεγένηται· αὐτοεξουσίους δὲ φύσει η θεία φύσις· ἀρα καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος, ὡς αὐτῆς δύτως εἰκῶν, αὐτοεξουσίους τυγχάνει φύσει· εἰ δὲ αὐτοεξουσίως φύσει, θελητικός ἄρα φύσεις ὁ ἀνθρώπος). For it has been stated already that the Fathers defined the will as self-determination (ἐξερήτηται γὰρ ἡ θεία· ὡς τὸ αὐτοεξουσίων θέλησιν ὄρισαντο οἱ Πατέρες). And that will really exists in all men (’Εν πάσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐνυπάρχει τὸ θέλειν).’; cf. Pyrrh. 25 [PG 91:293B-296A]. See Bathrellos, 124-25; Louth, 60-61.

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. Amb. 42.1345D [PG 91:1345D]

\textsuperscript{54} CC4.78 [PG 90:1068B]; Cf. CK 1:46 [PG 90:1100B] ‘The circumcision of the heart in Spirit is the complete stripping away of the natural actions of sense and mind with respect to sensible and intelligible things by the presence of the Spirit, who directly transfigures the entire body and soul altogether into something more divine (Ἐν πνεύματε περιτομῇ καρδίας ἐστιν, ἡ γενομένη τῶν κατ’ αἰσθήσειν καὶ νοῦν περὶ τὰ αἰσθητά καὶ τὰ νοητά φυσικῶν ἐνεργειῶν παντελῆς περιαίρεσις· διὰ τῆς
Moreover, like Augustine, the desire of believers for God presupposed their knowledge about God. The one who loves God prefers knowledge of him to all things made by him and is constantly devoted to it by desire. The believer’s will is inclined towards good works not because of the knowledge about God that the mind regains, but because the heart has become fully engaged, causing the mind to understand and apply its knowledge in line with God’s purposes. For Maximus, the Spirit’s work of illumination is a dynamic work on the Christian life: ‘but rather as illuminating the power of our mind with its own quality and bringing the same energy to it. For to have the mind of Christ is, in my opinion, to think in his way and of him in all situations.’ The psychological operations of the ‘heart’ (καρδία), naturally move the believer’s will towards God, because the heart is where both reason and emotion operate and coexist within human nature. The Spirit’s work of restoring God’s likeness to believers causes them to participate fully in the fullness of God’s life.

5.7 The Gnomic Will and Christian Practice

Origenist dualism had located sin’s affects entirely in the corporeal world and body, not on the mind or soul itself. Origenists therefore thought of spiritual disciplines as aids to the soul and mind, a means to help the intellect escape its bodily imprisonment and assist its return to its primeval pre-fall state. Following traditional teaching about the totality of sin’s corruption of human nature, Maximus believed that because sin was a present reality of the human condition, spiritual disciplines were not simply aids to the Christian life, but necessary to it. Although the consequences of the fall had predisposed the gnomic will towards sin, grace provided the gnomic will with the capacity to choose...
that which was in accordance with it.\textsuperscript{59} Thinking of sin as a product of γνώμη that has turned from what is natural, Maximus does not identify the gnomic will specifically with human fallenness because the gnomic will retains the capacity to deliberate and choose to obey God.\textsuperscript{60}

Although the gnomic will may operate in opposition to God at the sin-affected level of the τρόπος, grace reorients its operation so that it can begin to function in accordance with the natural will at the spiritual level/mode of the λόγος.\textsuperscript{61} According to Maximus, because the gnomic will maintained its capacity to deliberate, then the believer was free to engage in good works. ‘For nothing that is natural, and certainly no nature itself, would ever resist the cause of nature [God] (Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν φυσικῶν, ἐστι αὐτή καθάπαξ ἢ φύσις τῷ αἰτίῳ ποτ’ ἂν ἀντιπίπτει τῆς φύσεως), nor would the intention, or anything that belongs to intention, if it is agreed with the logos of nature (ἄλλ’ οὐδὲ γνώμη καὶ ὅσα γνώμης ἐστίν, ὁπηνίκα μέντοι τῷ λόγῳ συννεεῖτι τῆς φύσεως).’\textsuperscript{62} This occurred when the Christian sought to imitate God. The Christian’s will aligned itself with God’s will, so that they would produce good works: ‘Only God is good by nature, and only the one who imitates God is good by his will (Φύσει ἁγαθὸς μόνος ὁ Θεὸς· καὶ γνώμη ἁγαθὸς, μόνος ὁ θεομίμητος). His plan is to join the wicked to himself who is good by nature in order that they may become good (Σκοπῶς γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐστι, τῷ φύσει ἁγαθῷ τοὺς ποιημοὺς συνάψαι, ἵνα γένωται ἁγαθοί).’\textsuperscript{63}

Maximus’ understanding of the gnomic will effectively connects πράκτικη/πράξις (the active Christian life) to θεωρία/θεωρητική (contemplation). The connection between πράκτικη/πράξις and θεωρία/θεωρητική shows that it is the Christian’s knowledge of God that provides them with the standard measure for ethical living: ‘See, the Lord bestowed on us the method of salvation and has given us eternal power to become sons of God (cf. Jn 1.12; Ps. 82.6). So finally then our salvation is in

\textsuperscript{59} McFarland, 95-97.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{61} See Bathrellos, 132; Toronen, 182.
\textsuperscript{62} Opusc.7.80A [PG 91:80A]
\textsuperscript{63} CC4.90 [PG 90:1069C]
our will’s grasp.” For Maximus, grace provides the means by which the believer remains free to train the gnomic will so as to produce good works in the Christian life.

Maximus’ conception of the gnomic will can be seen to function in a technical way, partly because he developed it out of the Christological polemics he used to correct Monothelite arguments. Yet, to view his conception strictly in a technical sense misses the psychological aspects of what the concept communicated and expressed in his writing. Γνώμη, for Maximus also expresses the continual personal conflict experienced by the psyche in its inability to acknowledge God as the Creator and therefore obey him. Maximus’ idea of γνώμη is also evocative of the modern expression ‘his or her second nature has taken over’, an expression that Augustine’s concept of ‘habit’ also evoked. In other words, γνώμη for Maximus was a concept that was expressive of sin’s force on the psyche itself.

The sin-affected individual may be aware of what they ought to do but ‘psychologically’ cannot accomplish it, and even when they do, they will inevitably fall into sin all over again. This conception of γνώμη therefore also holds parallels with Edwards’ idea of ‘moral rectitude’ as it operates in conjunction with his idea of the ‘established principle in the heart’. According to Edwards all humans possess a ‘moral rectitude’ because they were created in God’s moral image, which is why the mind can distinguish between good and evil. Created in God’s spiritual image, Adam and Eve were created with the principle for divine love evidenced in the garden by their natural inclination to obey God. The fall causes God’s spiritual image to be lost, evidenced by a new sinful disposition established as a ‘confirmed’ principle in the heart of all humans. God’s withdrawal of his supernatural and superior principles meant that humanity was ruled by an inferior base nature, unsupported by the superior principles. Edwards’ idea of ‘moral rectitude’ evokes Maximus’ idea of

65 Cf. CC2. 35,36 [PG 90:996CD] ‘There are many things done by men which are noble in themselves but still because of some reason are not noble (Εἰςι πολλὰ τινα φύσει καλὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γνώμῃσθαι, ἄλλη οὐ καλὰ πάλιν διὰ τινα αἰτίαν)...God searches the intention of everything that we do, whether we do it for him or for any other motive (Πάντων τῶν πράττομεν ὑπ’ ἡμῶν τὸν σκόπου ζητεῖ ὁ θεὸς· εἴτε δ’ αὐτὸν πράττομεν, εἴτε δ’ ἄλλην αἰτίαν).’
66 See Chapter 1 section 1.13 in this thesis.
67 See Chapter 3 sections 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 in this thesis.
the natural will as it operates at the spiritual level/mode of the λόγος. It presents a picture of the spiritually enlightened moral nature that was created to be conscious of its knowledge of God before the effects of sin clouded this knowledge. The Spirit’s illumination of the mind, causing the ‘established principle in the heart’ to show itself in the believer’s inclination to obey God, holds parallels with how Maximus’ reformation of the gnomic will is able to function at the spiritual level of the λόγος because of the Spirit’s work of illumination.

5.8 Love and the Affections

According to Maximus the purpose of πράκτικη/πράξεις is to restore the image to the divine likeness what had been created natural in humans at the level of the λόγος before the fall. The cultivation of the passions and affections in the Christian life therefore begins the process of restoring the lost ‘likeness’ to the ‘image’. In the early church, asceticism was the evidence of the Christian’s freedom, viewed as something that was liberating and restorative rather than as oppressive and unnatural. This understanding of asceticism and the nature of spiritual disciplines contrasts with the modern western mindset which views asceticism as something unnatural and in opposition to human freedom. Maximus’ emphasis on the will, however, shows how asceticism for him is not a coercive activity, but a voluntary endeavour.

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68 Ep. 3 [PG 91:409A] ‘In this way he has shown in himself what is the tropos and the logos of the image and how God in a manner proper to him created our nature in the beginning similar to his own nature and a manifest likeness of his goodness (καὶ δεῖξεις ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, τίς τοῦ κατ’ εἰκόνα λόγου ὁ τρόπος· καὶ πῶς ἐκαύω ὁ Θεὸς πρεπόντως κατ’ ἀρχάς, ὁμοίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν, καὶ τῆς ἴδιας ἀγαθότητος ἀριστήλον ἀπεικόνισμα δημιουργήσας κατέστησαν).’ The translation is taken from Toronen, 182. See Parry, ‘Theology of Asceticism’, 53.

69 Cf. CC 2.47 [PG 90:1000C] ‘There are certain things which check the passions in their movement and do not allow them to advance and increase, and there are others which diminish them and make them decrease (Εἰς τινα ιστώντα τὰ πάθη τῆς κυνήγεως, καὶ μὴ ἔωσιν προβήναι εἰς αὔξησιν καὶ εἰς ἔτερα ἐλαττοῦντα, καὶ εἰς μείωσιν ἁγουσια). For example, fasting, hard labour, and vigils do not allow concupiscence to grow, while solitude, contemplation, prayer, and desire for God decrease it and make it disappear (Οἶον, νηστεία καὶ κόπος καὶ ἀγρυπνία, οὐκ ἔωσιν αὔξειν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἀναχώρησις δὲ καὶ θηριὰ καὶ προσευχὴ, καὶ ἔρως εἰς Θεὸν, ἐλαττοῦσιν αὐτὴν, καὶ εἰς ἀφανισμὸν ἁγουσια). And similarly is this the case with anger (Καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θημοῦ δὲ ὁμοίως: for example, long-suffering, the forgetting of offences, and meekness check it and do not allow it to grow, while love, almsgiving, kindness, and benevolence make it diminish (Οἶον, μακροθυμία καὶ ἀμισθικακία καὶ προστής, ἰστισίων αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἔωσιν αὔξειν ἁγάπη δὲ καὶ ἐλεημοσύνη καὶ χρηστότης καὶ φιλανθρωπία, εἰς μείωσιν ἁγουσια).’


71 See Ibid., 55.

72 Ibid., 55.
Believing that the virtues were natural because they had been inherent in God’s very goodness, Maximus held that, because humans were created in God’s likeness, they had been designed to manifest the virtues naturally. Sin in perversion of the virtues, however, meant that the resultant vices could not be considered to be natural. Unlike the natural virtues, the vices and negative passions could not exist at the level of λόγος because they had not been inherent in humanity’s created state prior to the fall, and this was what made the passions and affections central to the progress of the virtuous life. Maximus did not believe that Christians acquired the virtues because of their engagement in spiritual disciplines, but he believed that the development of the passions and affections were the evidence of the progressive transformation and reformation of the Christian life:

Asceticism, and the toils that go with it, was devised simply in order to ward off deception, which established itself through sensory perception (‘Η ἁσκησις, καὶ οἱ ταύτα ἐπόμενοι πάνω, πρὸς τὸ μόνον διαχωρίσαι τὴν ἐμφυρεῖσαι δι’ αἰσθήδεως ἀπάτην τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπεισόδησαν τοῖς φιλαρέτοις). It is not [as if] the virtues have been newly introduced from outside, for they inhere in us from creation, as has already been said (οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἔξωθεν προσφάτως ἐπεισαγαγεῖν τὰς ἁρετάς· ἐγκειότα, γὰρ ἦμιν ἐκ δημιουργίας, ως εἰρηται)...For example: he that is not foolish is intelligent, he that is not cowardly is bold, he that is not intemperate is temperate, and he that is not unrighteous is a righteous man (Ὁ γὰρ μὴ ἀφρων, φρόνιμος· καὶ ὁ μὴ δειλὸς ἡ θρασίς, ἀνδρείας· καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀκόλαστος, σωφρων· καὶ ὁ μὴ ἅδικος, δίκαιος). Reason in a natural state, is justice; anger, is courage; desire, temperance (Κατὰ φῶςιν δὲ ὁ λόγος, φρόνισις ἑστι· καὶ τὸ κριτήριον, δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς, ἀνδρεία· καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία, σωφροσύνη). Consequently, with the removal of things contrary to nature only the things proper to nature are manifest ("Ἀρα τῇ ἀφαιρέσει τῶν παρὰ φῶςιν, τὰ κατὰ φῶςιν καὶ μόνα διαφαίνεσθαι ἔξωθεν).
Christian good works manifest as ‘good’ because the ‘goodness’ is an inherent characteristic of the goodness of God’s own being. The ‘goodness’ originates from God, not from ‘outside’ of what God created as a natural manifestation in the moral character of all humans prior to the fall. According to Maximus, as Christians develop good passions and affections they manifest God’s own virtuous characteristics to the world, giving his moral theory a theocentric centre, demarcating it from the anthropocentric focus of Origenist as well as from Greco-Roman philosophical theories.

Following the Greek philosophical tradition Maximus likened the passions or affections to the vices because they could hinder genuine spiritual growth. Yet, he differed from the philosophical tradition in that he taught that the passions when directed by love were turned into good passions. Believing that the passions had initially been part of God’s creation, he believed that without the passions Christians could not make any progress in the virtues:

The passions, moreover, become good in those who are spiritually earnest once they have wisely separated them from corporeal objects and used them to gain possession of heavenly things (Πλὴν καλά γίνεται καὶ τὰ πάθη ἐν τοῖς σπουδαίοις, ὅπηρίκα σοφῶς αὐτὰ τῶν σοματικῶν ἀποστάσεις, πρὸς τὴν τῶν αὐθανάμων μεταχειρίζονται κτήσει). For instance, they can turn desire into appetitive movement of the mind’s longing for divine things (οἱ ῥόημα καὶ ἡ σαρκικὴ ἀπόστασις ἀνατέθει τὸν θεῖον ἐξανακλάσθηναι), pleasure into unadulterated joy of the mind when enticed toward divine gifts (τὴν ἐπιθύμησιν δὲ τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς θείους χαρίσματα τοῦ νοοῦ σεληνικής ἐνεργεύουσαν ἀπόμονα), or fear into cautious concern for imminent punishment for sins committed (τὸν δὲ φόβον τῆς

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78 CC1.35-36 [PG 90:968AB] ‘A blameworthy passion is a movement of the soul contrary to nature. (Πάθος ἐστὶν ψυχῆς παρὰ φύσιν.) Detachment is a peaceful state of the soul in which it becomes resistant to vice (Απάθεια ἢστεν εἰρηνικὴ κατάστασις ψυχῆς, καθ’ ἢν δικαίως γίνεται ψυχή πρὸς κακὰν.)’ Maximus made a distinction between a passion that is a mark of the human sinful condition and a ‘blameworthy passion’, which is contrary to nature, and is voluntary. See G. C. Berthold, Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 88 n.21.

79 Cf. CC3.71 [PG 90:1037CD] ‘The blameworthy passion of love engrosses the mind in material things (Πάθος ἐστὶν ψυχῆς παρὰ φύσιν.) The praiseworthy passion of love binds it even to divine things (πάθος ἐστὶν ψυχῆς παρὰ φύσιν.)’ For generally where the mind devotes its time it also expands, and where it expands it also turns its desire and love, whether this be in divine and intelligible things which are its own or in the things of the flesh and the passions (Εἰς τὸν κακὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸν νοὸν ἐν αὐτῶν γίνεται ψυχή, οὐδὲ ἀποτελεῖται ἐν αὐτῶν.) See Neil, 268-269.

80 The early church warrant for this view is 2 Cor 10.5 where Paul’s λογισμοί (thoughts) are understood to refer to the passions.
mellou, shj evpi. plhmmelh, masi timwri, aj profulaktikh n evpime, leian
), or grief into corrective repentance of a present evil (τὴν δὲ λύσην διορθωτικὴν ἐπὶ παρόντι κακῷ
metamelēian). ...The spiritually earnest use the passions to destroy a present anticipated evil
(τοῖς πάθεσι τούτοις πρὸς ἀναίρεσιν χρώμενοι παροῦσις κακίας ἢ προσδοκωμένης), and to
embrace and hold to virtue and knowledge (καὶ κτῆσιν καὶ φυλακὴν ἁρετῆς τε καὶ γνώσεως).
Thus, as I have already suggested, the passions become good when they are used by those who
take every thought captive in order to obey Christ [2 Cor 10.5] (Kala ou=ν, ὡς ἔφην,
ta«τα τυγχάνει διὰ τὴν χρήσιν ἐν τοῖς πάν νόημα αἰχμαλωτίζουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπακοὴν τοῦ
Χριστοῦ).81

Much like Augustine, Maximus’ notion of love can also be seen to function in his theological
thought at both the vertical and horizontal level.82 The passions moved by God as their objective, are
evidenced in the horizontal level in the Christian’s love of others: ‘When a person loves someone, he
is naturally eager to be of service. So if one loves God, he is naturally eager to do what is pleasing to
him. But if he loves his flesh, he is eager to accomplish what delights it.’83 Maximus therefore
understood love synonymously with the acts of the will because it transformed negative passions into
positive ones.84 The passions were therefore not irrational or insubordinate to reason, but an actual part
of the act of the will:

the four cardinal passions and interprets them in a classical way. His classification of the four passions
turned on two axes: a distinction between good and bad and a distinction between that which one
possesses and that which one yearns to possess. The movement toward the good and evil can also be
discerned in Augustine reference to the four cardinal passions (cf. mor. 1.15.25 [PL 32:1322]). See
Tollefsen, 180-81.
82 CC1.16 [PG 90:964CD] ‘He who loves me, says the Lord, will keep my commandments [cf. Jn.
14:15, 23] and “this is my commandment, that you love one another’ [Jn. 15:12] (Ὁ ἀγαπῶν μεν, ἐπιτεθηκεν ὁ Κύριος, τὰς ἐνσωματικοὶς 
μου πράξεις· αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ ἔμμη, ἵνα ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους). Thus he who does not love his neighbour fails to keep the commandment, and so cannot love the Lord
(Ὁ ὁν μὴ ἀγαπῶν τὸν πλησίον, τὴν ἐντολὴν οὐ τηρεῖ. Ὁ δὲ τὴν ἐντολὴν μὴ τηρῶν, οὐδὲ τὸν
Κύριον ἀγαπήσει ὁ λαλῶν).’
83 CC3.10 [PG 90:1020B] ‘Ον τις ἀγαπᾷ, τούτων πάντως καὶ σπεύδει θεραπεύειν. Εἰ οὖν τὸν Θεόν
tis ἀγαπή, πάντως καὶ τὰ ἀρετὰ αὐτῷ σπεύδει σποιν, εἰ δὲ τὴν σάρκα, τὰ ταύτην τέρποντα ἐκτελεῖν. Cf. CC4.37 [PG 90:1056C] ‘Stop pleasing yourself and you will not hate your brother; stop
loving yourself and you will love God. (Μὴ ἐσο αὐτάρκης, καὶ οὐκ ἐσο μισάδελφος· καὶ μὴ ἐσο
φιλάνθρωπος, καὶ ἐσο Φίλοθες).’
84 Cf. CC3.66, 67 [PG 90:1036D-1037AB] ‘Knowledge of divine things without passion does not
persuade the mind to disdain material things completely, but rather resembles the mere thought of a
thing of sense (Ἡ ἀνευ πάθους τῶν θείων γνώσεως, οὐ πεῖθε τῶν νοε ἔις τέλος καταφρονεῖν τῶν
What this means is that if Scripture mentions anything about the passions in connection with God and the saints (Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ θεοῦ τι τούτων εἴρηται τῇ γραφῇ ἢ ἐπὶ ἀγίων), the following applies: in connection with God, the passions are mentioned for our benefit, revealing the saving and beneficial movements of divine providence accommodated in a way that befits our own experience (ἔπι μὲν θεοῦ, δι’ ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἡμῖν προσφεύως διὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων παθῶν τὰς σωστικὰς ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγαθομορφοῖς τῆς προσῳας προδόους ἐκφαίνοντος); with reference to the saints, on the other hand, when the passions are mentioned it is because the saints cannot convey in corporeal speech their spiritual inclinations and dispositions toward God apart from human passions (ἔπι δὲ τῶν ἀγίων, ὡς οὐκ ἄλλως δυναμένων τὰς περὶ θεῶν νοερὰς αὐτῶν σχέσεις τε καὶ διαθέσεις διὰ φωνής προενέγκαι σωματικῆς, χωρὶς τῶν ἐγνωσμένων τῇ φύσει παθῶν).

Maximus’ alignment of love to the acts of the will gives love both its teleological and ontological value, making it synonymous with all forms of passions, such as desire, delight, joy, and fear. When the object of the believer’s desire is God, love moves the passions in a positive direction so that the passions are identical with the action of the will. For example, using a word play Maximus provides an interpretation of the negative passions of desire, ἐπιθυμία (concupiscence/lust) and ἔρως (erotic love), when directed by love ἀγάπη (the scriptural word for love) are transformed in the Christian life into good passions: ‘For the mind of the one who is continually with God even his concupiscence abounds beyond measure into divine desire (Ὅτινος ὁ νοῦς διαπαντὸς ἐστι πρὸς Θεῶν, τούτου καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία εἰς τὸν θείον ὑπερήψεις ἔρωσι) and whose entire irascible element is transformed into divine love (καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ὀλοστὸς εἰς τὴν θείαν μετετράπη ἀγάπην).’

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85 Ad. Thal. 1 [CCSG 7:49]
86 CC2.48 [PG 90:1000CD] ‘For by an enduring participation in the divine illumination it has become altogether shining bright, and having bound its passible element to itself it, as I said, turned it around to a never-ending divine desire and an unceasing love, completely changing over from earthly things to divine (Τῇ γὰρ χρονίᾳ τῆς θείας ἐλλάμψεως μετουσίᾳ, ἀλας φωτεινῆς γεγονός, καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν...')
In another passage Maximus showed how both fear (θυμός) and concupiscence (ἐπιθυμία) transform into scriptural love (ἀγάπη) and joy (χαρά) in the Christian life: ‘I say fear and concupiscence are transformed, the one into the love other into joy (θυμὸν λέγω καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν, τὸν μὲν εἰς ἀγάπην, τὴν δὲ εἰς χαρὰν μεταβαλῶν).’\(^7\) When God is the object of the Christian life, even self-orientated or self-pleasing passions turn into good passions and desires that not only reform the Christian life, but also benefit the believer’s relationship with others. For Maximus, what mattered was not whether the passions were negative or positive, but how the Christian exercised their will. For example, although more negative passions like ἐπιθυμία, ἔρως and θυμός can be observed to inflict pain or harm to the human life, when directed by God as their objective, even the negative passions become deifying passions, that effectively ‘beautify’ and ‘perfect’ the Christian life.

5.9 Conclusion

Maximus’ teaching on the will was directed by a Christian ontology that he developed out of his Christology and Christian cosmology. Drawing a distinction between the natural and gnomic wills, he presented a Christian view of reality that did not impose a dichotomy between the spiritual and earthly realms of the human life, enabling him to account for the psychology of the ‘whole person’, the mind and heart in the act of cognition. His innovative use of the scriptural word for will, θέλησις, referred to something qualitatively different from other notions of will found in Greco-Roman philosophy, expressed by words like προαίρεσις (which signified a rational power of choice) and βουλήσις (which conveyed a sense of deliberation). According to Maximus, the passions were not an aspect of irrationality, but integral to rationality making them part of the acts of the will. What mattered was not whether the passions were negative or positive, but how Christians exercised their will. Maximus’ theology of will therefore corrected the Origenist ascetic view which thought of spiritual disciplines as aids to the mind, a way to free the mind from its bodily prison. Believing that sin had totally corrupted the human condition, Maximus believed that spiritual disciplines were necessary to the Christian life, the freedom to engage in them being a result of the work of grace. His

αὐτοῦ μέρος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν συφίλισας, εἰς ἔρωτα θείον, ὡς εἰρητικαὶ ἀκατάληκτοι, καὶ ἀγάπην ἀκατάπαιστον, ἔστρεψαν, ὅλως ἐκ τῶν ἐπιγείων ἐπὶ τὸ θείον μεταγεγομένως.’ See Wilken, 418-19. His word play fills the biblical term with the echoes that are heard in desire as ἐπιθυμία is transformed into ἀγάπη. Maximus may have followed Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite [PG 3: 709A-709D] who used a similar word play.

\(^7\) Amb. 6 [PG 91:1068A]
theology of the will therefore allowed him to place his Christian moral theory on a theocentric platform, demarcating it from both Origenist and Greco-Roman moral theories.
Chapter 6: Jonathan Edwards on the Will and the Affections

6.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to show how Edwards’ theology of the will and the affections provided him with a way to place his Christian moral theory on a theocentric platform, allowing him to demarcate it from Enlightenment libertarian theories. For Edwards, the increasing influence of libertarian thought upon reformed Protestantism, associated with the emergent new moral philosophies, posed a threat to the traditional doctrine of original sin. In addition, the context of the Northampton revivals¹ had impressed upon him the necessity to account for the validity of the affections in the Christian life. In constructing his idea of will, Edwards sought to provide a defence of the revivals against its detractors, the more rationalist clergy who derided what they perceived to be the emotional excesses of the revivals. Edwards also wanted to provide a corrective to another group of clergy who supported the revivals, but some of whom had depreciated the importance of good works in the Christian life. He therefore developed a morphology of conversion that provided a way in which genuine affections could be distinguished from false ones. Attributing the Spirit’s work of illumination on the mind as the reason why Christians were able to make the right moral choices, he developed a psychology of will that worked to account for the ‘whole person’, the mind and heart in the act of cognition. Finally, believing that sin’s effects predisposed the mind towards sin, Edwards held that spiritual disciplines were necessary to the Christian life, the freedom to engage in them a result of the work of grace. According to Edwards, when the Spirit illuminated in the mind its knowledge of God, the believer’s will intentionally aligned itself in accordance with God’s will, which made the affections all parts of the acts of the will. What mattered for Edwards was how Christians exercised their will. If the object of their desire was God, then their development of the affections ultimately led to the reformation of the Christian life.

6.2 Edwards’ Context of the Awakening

The Great Awakenings impacted Edwards’ thinking on the nature of Christian conversion and inspired him to account for the validity of the affections in the Christian’s life. Edwards wrote *Religious Affections* as a continuation of the tracts that he had written in defence of the Awakenings because he wanted to explain the ‘true’ nature or characteristics of the active Christian life. His aim was to defend the revivals against its ‘Old Light’ detractors, such as Charles Chauncy (1705-1787), who derided what they perceived to be the emotional excesses of the revivals. Edwards also wanted to provide a corrective to the emphases of some of the more extreme ‘New Lights’, who in support of the revivals had depreciated the importance of good works in the Christian life. They believed that the Christian’s assurance of salvation rested entirely on the immediate work of the Spirit at the moment of conversion. Whereas the Old Lights had become more influenced by the rationalism of

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3 Edwards often used the adjective ‘true’ in his writing (e.g. true religion, true virtue, true Christianity). The purpose of which was to communicate to his readers that he intended to explain the biblical view on the matter.


9 See Holifield, 151.
libertarian thought, the more extreme New Lights had been influenced by antinomianism\textsuperscript{10}, which denied that good works could be taken as evidence of Christian salvation.\textsuperscript{11}

From his youth Edwards had been concerned with the morphology of Christian conversion.\textsuperscript{12} His interest in it is evident in his \textit{Life of David Brainerd}\textsuperscript{13} (1749) as well as in his early idealist portrait, the \textit{Apostrophe to Sarah Pierpont}\textsuperscript{14} (c. 1723). As noted by Bebbington\textsuperscript{15}, the notion of ‘conversion’ was a key theological concern for eighteenth-century ‘evangelicals’\textsuperscript{16}, one that remained paramount for Edwards throughout his life. His thinking on conversion also followed the Puritans in that he understood conversion as an individual’s personal experience where a person’s sorrow for sin and the Spirit’s illumination led to the conversion ‘event’.\textsuperscript{17}

The Enlightenment context also encouraged Edwards to provide an account of Christian conversion. The new scientific discoveries encouraged Christian thinkers to take a more psychological and clinical look at the nature of the individual conversion experience. For example, the new psychology of John Locke (1632-1704) provided Edwards with insight into the nature of the mental act itself, of which he made creative use in his theology. It enabled Edwards to speak of the inner

\textsuperscript{12}The morphology of Christian conversion was important to both the Puritan and the Pietistic movements. See Eversley, 120; Goen, 26. On Edwards own conversion experience and its impact on his theological thought, see A. Zakai, \textit{Jonathan Edwards’s Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of Enlightenment} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 51-81.
\textsuperscript{13}Works 7.
\textsuperscript{14}Works 16. 789-90.
\textsuperscript{15}See D. W. Bebbington, \textit{Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s} (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 2-3, 5-10. See also Noll, 16-19.
\textsuperscript{17}See Eversley, 120.
dynamics of the Christian religious experience in a way that would commend his traditional Christian beliefs to others.\textsuperscript{18}

Edwards sought to define conversion specifically in relation to the Spirit’s operation in the Christian life, which made the work of the Spirit a key focus in his *Religious Affections*: ‘There is great power in spiritual affections; we read of the power which worketh in Christians, and of the Spirit of God being in them, as the spirit of power…yea of the working of God’s mighty power in them.’\textsuperscript{19}

Aligning the development of the affections to the Spirit’s work, his morphology sought to validate the affections in the Christian life. Although Edwards acknowledged that during the revivals some of the manifested affections had proved to be false, he wanted to provide a way in which genuine affections could be distinguished from false ones without invalidating the importance of the affections in the Christian life altogether.\textsuperscript{20}

### 6.3 Edwards’ Notion of the ‘Affections’

Edwards used the term ‘affections’ in a far more technical way than had the early theologians Augustine and Maximus. Early theologians made no differentiation between the terms passions and affections, the terms being used synonymously and interchangeably, having been translated into the Latin words *perturbationes, affectiones, passiones*, from the Greek words πάθη and πάθος.\textsuperscript{21} This interchangeability was also maintained because the passions were theologically understood to be acts of the will. In the thought of both Augustine and Maximus what mattered was not whether the passions were bad or good but how the Christian exercised the will. By the eighteenth century, however, a distinction had begun to emerge between the two English words ‘passions’ and ‘affections’, although their meanings could still overlap. A further complication was that no standard technical definition had developed over time for either of these terms.\textsuperscript{22}


\textsuperscript{19} Works 2.133. Cf. Works 4.150; Works 2. 197 ‘Affections that are truly spiritual and gracious, do arise from those influences and operations on the heart, which are spiritual, supernatural and divine...We find that true saints, or those persons who are sanctified by the Spirit of God, are in the New Testament called spiritual persons.’

\textsuperscript{20} Works 4. 285.

\textsuperscript{21} See Preface to Part 2 in this thesis.

It is therefore difficult to pinpoint how the terms ‘affections’ and ‘passions’ were understood and used in the eighteenth century. The terms were often, if not always, used synonymously. The standard scholastic definition spoke of the passions as motions of the sensitive (sensory, feeling, emotion) appetite in response to goods or evils, with associated bodily changes. This was undergirded by the scholastic principle that all actions, even wrong actions, were governed by the choice of what appears to be good at that moment. Reason points to what appears to be morally good, or generally good, and commands the will to incline itself towards that good. The sensitive appetite, which serves the passions, then inclines towards ‘the good’ that which appears ‘good’ for the agent at the time. The passions were therefore generally associated with feeling, not indifference. They were understood to be positive, appetitive motions. The term ‘affections’ was therefore often preferred to ‘passions’, because the general term ‘passions’ implied passivity.

In the preceding century the term ‘affections’ had been used to refer specifically to the emotions of will or the higher soul, whereas ‘passions’ was confined to the emotions of the sensitive appetite in reference to material/earthly things. It therefore became common for moral philosophers to align the term ‘affections’ with reason and the term ‘passions’ with animal instinct or irrationality because the scholastic view had aligned reason to the ‘will’. The will was not a common passion which sprang from the sensitive appetite, but a function of the intellect, with the special task of controlling the passions lodged in the sensitive appetite. The Enlightenment idea of will, much like the Stoic one, understood the will to be the instrument of reason in how the passions were governed, an understanding that departed from how Augustine and Maximus thought of the passions as part of the act of the will.

The technical differentiation that had begun to be made in the eighteenth century between ‘passions’ and ‘affections’ had both historical and logical justification. It grew out of the desire to bring feelings and emotions into the moral and ethical life in an effective way, whilst also retaining a...
barrier against turbulent and irrational passion.\textsuperscript{31} The differentiation therefore became a way to protect the integrity of the faculty of will as part of the rational appetite and not the sensitive appetite, and it was this differentiation that Edwards followed.\textsuperscript{32} He defined the ‘passions’ as inclinations that overpowered the individual, which they could not control, and defined ‘affections’ as the active responses made by a person to another person, or to an object, evoked by an idea or understanding of the nature of what affects the person:

The \textit{affections} and \textit{passions} are frequently spoken of as the same; and yet, in the more common use of speech, there is in some respect a difference; and affection is a word, that in its ordinary signification, seems to be something more extensive than passion; being used for all vigorous lively actings of the will and inclination; but passion for those that are more sudden, and whose effects on the animal spirits are more violent, and the mind more overpowered, and less in its own command.\textsuperscript{33}

The differentiation allowed Edwards to align the ‘affections’ with rationality and the ‘passions’ with irrationality, and he maintained this differentiation for two reasons. First, he wanted to show that the affections were necessary and essential to Christian practice and not a hindrance to it:

‘True religion, in great part, consists in holy affections’.\textsuperscript{34} Secondly, he wanted to argue against his rationalistic detractors, like Chauncy, who had relegated the affections to irrational and emotional human behaviour. Chauncy had argued that it was the ‘enlightened mind’ (enlightened by doctrine and the scriptural word) and not ‘raised affections’ (emotional experience) that guided the Christian life.\textsuperscript{35} Edwards wanted to show that the affections were not a hindrance to human rationality, but an essential part of it. He also wanted to show that the Enlightenment new moral philosophies had imposed a false dichotomy between ‘emotion’ and ‘reason’, or the ‘heart’ and the ‘mind’.\textsuperscript{36} Edwards aligned the affections with rationality, because he believed that the Christian life not only involved

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 90, n. 54.
\textsuperscript{32} Smith, ‘Religious Affections’, 101.
\textsuperscript{33} Works 2. 98.
\textsuperscript{34} Works 2. 95. See Smith, ‘Religious Affections’, 104. Edwards sometimes referred to affections as ‘heart’ or ‘experimental’ religion.
\textsuperscript{35} See Fiering, \textit{Seventeenth-Century Harvard}, 142-43; Marsden, 285. See also McClymond & McDermott, 313.
\textsuperscript{36} See Smith, ‘Religious Affections’, 105.
rational faith, but that the believer’s faith also necessitated the engagement of their heart, what his
Puritan forebears had referred to as ‘the whole person’.

6.4 The Whole Person: the Head and the Heart

Puritan tradition had described faith as more than rational assent, emphasising that emotions
and experience were part of human rationality. Even so, the traditional scholastic faculty psychology
that the Puritans had inherited impeded them in their efforts to point to ‘the whole person’ as the
subject of faith, because it proved inadequate for expressing the unity of a subject. The problem lay
in the distinction that had been made between the mind, the will, and the emotions (passions),
distinctions that continued into the Enlightenment context in which Edwards was educated. Puritan
thinkers had sought to portray faith as the response of the whole person. Yet in delineating what was
involved in that response they alternately emphasised the mind and the will as the principle faculty of
the act of faith, the effect of which was to separate the acts of the will from the affections. Puritan
faculty psychology conceived the human faculties as distinct entities with separate functions, the
psyche being divided into distinct faculties. This brought with it the temptation to describe the nature
of the faith act in terms of distinct operations rather than in terms of the unity of the human subject.
Edwards, like his Puritan predecessors, wanted to account for personal unity in the act of faith, but he
did not want to be frustrated in his efforts by faculty psychology, which in its application forced a
separation between the mind and heart.

Breaking away from the faculty distinctions that the Puritans had made, Edwards separated
‘reason’ from ‘understanding’. He did this in a way similar to that of the counter-Enlightenment
Pietists and the later Romantics of the next century. Confining ‘reason’ to the judgment of whether
objects perceived in the mind correspond with real experience, Edwards connected ‘understanding’ to

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37 Cherry, 12-13. For example, the English Puritan John Preston (1587-1628) had written in his The
Breast Plate of Faith and Love (1630) that the subject of faith is ‘the whole heart of man’. Preston’s
image of the ‘whole heart’ united the mind with the heart in the will’s assent to God.
38 See Ibid., 12-13. For example, John Calvin had described faith as a knowledge that reached ‘the
depths’ of the heart (Institutes 3.2.36).
39 Ibid., 13.
40 See McClymond & McDermott, 314.
41 Ibid., 13-14.
42 Ibid., 14.
43 Ibid., 14.
44 Guelzo, ‘Learning is the Handmaid’, 10.
the power to make moral judgments and connections. According to Edwards it was ‘understanding’ that lay behind the mechanical action of ‘reason’, which linked ‘reason’ to ‘will’. Simple perception therefore becomes subjectivised by the internal ‘disposition’, or by the ‘heart’, which then moves the person to acts of volition:

With regard to the exercises of this faculty, perhaps in all nations and ages, is the heart. And it is to be noted, that they are these more vigorous and sensible exercises of this faculty, that are called the affections. The will, and the affections of the soul, are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination of the soul, but only in the liveliness and sensibleness of exercise...In some sense, the affection of the soul differs nothing at all from the will and inclination, and the will never is in any exercise any further than it is affected.

The mind and heart were united in operation together, and it is this capacity that Edwards called ‘the will’. Edwards therefore abandoned a two-stage model of action in which the mind first knows and deliberates and then commands the will to act. In its place he adopted a radical single-stage model in which perception, inclination and action all moved together in one united immediate action, which allowed him to speak of affections as acts of the will. According to Edwards, even if affections were not identical to the will, they were still acts of the will because they involved both the mind and heart in a united immediate action. The will’s inclination is expressed in its actions, and the

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45 Works 2. 96 (cf. Misc 1340). ‘It may be inquired, what the affections of the mind are? I answer, the affections are no other, than the vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and the will of the soul. God has indued the soul with two faculties: one is that by which it is capable of perception and speculation, or by which it discerns and views and judges of things; which is called understanding. The other faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and view things, but in some way inclined with respect to the things it views or considers; either is inclined to ’em, or is disinclined, and averse from ’em…This faculty is called by various names: it is sometimes called the inclination: and, as it has respect to the actions that are determined and governed by it, is called the will: and the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, is often called the heart.’ See Guelzo, 10.

46 Ibid., 10.

47 Works 2. 96-97. Edwards abandoned a two-stage model of action in which the mind first knows and deliberates and then commands the will to act. In its place he adopted a radical single-stage model in which perception, inclination and action all moved together in one united immediate action.

48 See Guelzo, ‘Learning is the Handmaid’, 10; Guelzo writes that for Edwards the key to understanding human action was the quality, not necessarily of the reasoning powers, but of the combined performance of the inclination, heart and will.

49 Ibid., 10.
heart’s inclination is expressed by the mind.\textsuperscript{50} The will, therefore, does not will itself because of reason, but the whole person wills, the heart being also engaged in rationality. For Edwards there was no act of the intellect that was ever separate from the act of the will. The affections were therefore also part of the act of the will, which put Edwards’ thinking in line with the way that both Augustine and Maximus thought about the will.

6.5 Edwards’ Idea of ‘Sense of the Heart’

Edwards developed a notion he called ‘a sense of the heart’ that enabled him to show how the affections were acts of the will. He conceived this notion by differentiating between a person who had a merely ‘notional understanding’ or rational understanding of a thing as opposed to a ‘sense of the heart’, which caused their mind to be inclined towards a thing.\textsuperscript{51} For example, the non-Christian’s mind displayed a ‘notional’ or ‘rational’ understanding of God, whereas the Christian’s mind contained a ‘sense’ or ‘lively apprehension’ of God.\textsuperscript{52} On conversion, a Christian’s knowledge of God engaged their heart, which resulted in an inclination to obey God, where a non-Christian’s knowledge about God remained inert:

There is a twofold understanding or knowledge of good, that God has made the mind of man capable of. The first, that which is merely speculative or notional: as when a person only speculatively judges, that anything is, which by the agreement of mankind, is called good or excellent, viz. that which is most to general advantage…And the other is that which consists in the sense of the heart:…In the former is exercised merely the speculative faculty, or the understanding strictly so-called, or as spoken of in distinction from the will or disposition of the soul. In the latter the will, or inclination, or heart, are mainly concerned.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} Smith, ‘Religious Affections’, 104. Edwards made these distinctions so that he could preserve the integrity of the self against the division into separate faculties. In his thought there is no separate entity or faculty that corresponds to the word ‘will’ it is simply the whole person’s capacity/potential to act that is called ‘will’.


\textsuperscript{52} Works 14.75-77 [1734 Sermon: A Spiritual Understanding of Divine Things Denied to the Unregenerate]. Cf. Works 16, 747-48, 792-96; Works 17. 413 ‘A true sense of the divine and superlative excellency of the things of religion; a real sense of the excellency of God, and Jesus Christ, and of the work of redemption, and the ways and works of God revealed in the gospel.’

\textsuperscript{53} Works 17. 413-14 [1733 Sermon: A Divine and Supernatural Light].
Just as it had been for Augustine and Maximus, Edwards also believed that the Christian’s love of God presupposed their knowledge about God. The inclination to produce good works in the Christian life was for Edwards not dependent upon biblical revelation as the sole means of divine knowledge. Scriptural revelation may be a prerequisite to knowledge, but according to Edwards the believer’s heart also needed to be fully engaged. Moreover, that sin was also a reality of the heart as well as the mind, indicated to Edwards that spiritual disciplines were necessary to the Christian life:

‘This spiritual knowledge is a practical knowledge, that which is accompanied by practice of what is known. Those that spiritually know Christ, they keep his commandments.’ Edwards’ idea of ‘sense of the heart’ can therefore be seen to hold its basis in the early Christian understanding of ‘heart’ as the spiritual centre of the person. He would have taken this view for granted because he had inherited it from his Puritan forebears. For Edwards, love is both an ontological and teleological category because it denoted intentionality, making it synonymous with the act of will. Edwards could therefore connect love to the proper use of the affections: ‘The Scriptures do represent true religion, as being summarily comprehended in love, the chief of the affections, and fountain of all other affections.’

Works 14. 81-82 ‘Now though natural men may have considerable knowledge in divinity, yet it has not this effect upon them. They may read and study, for hours together, and leave off with the same heart as they had when they began, and carry the same temper and disposition. The second difference between this spiritual knowledge of divine things, and other knowledge, as to their effects, is that the one purifies the life, the other doth not. This spiritual knowledge is a practical knowledge, that which is accompanied with practice of what is known. Those that spiritually know Christ, they keep his commandments.’

Works 14. 82.

See T. Erdt, Jonathan Edwards: Art and The Sense of the Heart (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980), 1-20. There had been a presumption that Edwards’ idea of ‘sense of the heart’ had been derived from his reading of John Locke but the idea was a fundamental concept in Calvin’s sensus suavitatis as it related to the doctrines of regeneration and Christian assurance. See also Smith, ‘Religious Affections’, 106.

The idea of ‘sense’, linked to the Spirit’s work of illumination appeared as a topic of discourse in Puritan theological writings many of which Edwards had access to. Similar ideas appear in the theology of Richard Sibbes (1577-1635), John Owen (1616-83), John Flavel (1630-91) and Philip Doddridge (1702-51). John Owen (1616-83) in his A Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit (1674) had sought to provide a complete analysis of the Spirit and its central importance to the Christian life. The passages quoted by Edwards from Owen in Religious Affections concerned the difference between a common work of the Spirit as it operates on ‘the affections’ and a spiritual operation in the proper sense. See Smith, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, 53, 68-69. Edwards cites Richard Sibbes in his Religious Affections (cf. Works 2.53, 69, 433) and made extensive use of Doddridge’s ‘Family Expositor’ listing several volumes of his practical theology and sermons in his Catalogue (See Works 26.44, 68-69). On the idea of ‘sense’ in the early church, see A. N. Williams, The Divine Sense: The Intellect in Patristic Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

6.6 The Holy Spirit’s Work of Illumination

In his development of his concept of ‘sense’, Edwards had been influenced by Locke’s empirical analysis of the mind that affirmed that the mind became fuelled with ideas through sense experience.\(^{59}\) Locke had hypothesised that if people could not be certain of God through ordinary cognition then it followed that religious experience was unable to be trusted.\(^{60}\) In creating an idea of God that was neither innate nor derived directly from sense experience, Locke allowed for an idea of ‘inspiration’ that could bring ‘original revelation’ to the mind of the inspired individual. Yet, this could only be said to be knowledge in the ‘true sense’ within the mind of the person who first experienced it.\(^{61}\)

Edwards took Locke’s principle that knowledge was rooted in ‘sense experience’ but creatively adapted it.\(^{62}\) Taking the empiricist principle that knowledge is gained from sense perception, he reinterpreted it, so as to establish that spiritual perception was greater than any assurance that could be gained by the mind’s ability to reason about God.\(^{63}\) Founding his idea of ‘sense’ alongside his understanding of conversion, Edwards believed that ‘original revelation’ occurred at the moment the Spirit illuminated the mind: ‘Hence the work of the Spirit of God in regeneration is often in Scripture compared to the giving of a new sense, giving eyes to see, and ears to hear…This new spiritual sense, and the new dispositions that attend it, are no new faculties, but are new principles of nature.’\(^{64}\) Believing that the Spirit was responsible for the ‘immediate apprehension’ of the mind’s knowledge of God, Edwards was following his Puritan heritage, yet he also owed his idea of ‘immediate apprehension’ to the Cambridge Platonists\(^{65}\) who had also drawn on the traditional early church idea.


\(^{60}\) See McClymond & McDermott, 151-53, 162.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 162, 383.


\(^{63}\) McClymond & McDermott, 163.


of ‘spiritual light’ and ‘spiritual sense’ in which, and through which, the things of God are said to be grasped.\textsuperscript{66}

The Cambridge Platonists held a deep aversion to the influence of materialistic empirical philosophy upon theology because of its negation of spiritual experience as a factor of revelation.\textsuperscript{67} The premise of their thinking was the compatibility of reason and faith and the view that the mind was itself equipped with the principles of knowledge and morality. Educated as Puritans, the Cambridge Platonists reacted against forms of Calvinist ‘voluntarism’ which emphasised God’s arbitrariness in his divine sovereignty. They believed this potentially compromised the scriptural depictions of God’s goodness and love.\textsuperscript{68} Their pastoral concern was that this arbitrariness would lead people to despair, as they could not be certain of God’s goodness and love. In order to reassure people that religion was not inaccessible they affirmed Neoplatonic metaphysics\textsuperscript{69} as a positive metaphysical framework that would aid theological understanding. In allowing for harmony between faith and reason, this metaphysics did not dichotomise or negate either corporeal or spiritual realms of the Christian life.

Edwards developed his idea of ‘sense’ to convey how spiritual knowledge was something that was not only related to, but which could also be developed through, rational means. Believing the Cambridge Platonist assumption in the harmony between faith and reason, he outlined two ways of thinking and understanding. Calling the first ‘cognition’ or ‘opinion’, Edwards explained that ‘cognition’ consisted of putting ‘signs’ in the mind, instead of the ‘actual’ ideas of the thing that is signified. The latter results in knowledge becoming dim and transient.\textsuperscript{70} According to Edwards what truly activated ‘sense’ was the second kind of knowledge and understanding which he called

\textsuperscript{66} See Williams, 1-2, 34, 72-78, 89, 106-8, 114, 143-50, 182, 226.


\textsuperscript{70} Works 18. 458-59. See McClymond & McDermott, 378-79.
‘apprehension’: ‘apprehension, wherein the mind has a direct ideal view or contemplation of the thing thought of…is what is vulgarly called a having A SENSE. ’Tis commonly said when a person has an ideal view of any thing of this nature, that he has a sense of it in his mind’71 This ‘apprehension’ was located in the part of the will Edwards had aligned to the heart illuminated by the Spirit’s work on the mind. Edwards’ idea of ‘sense of the heart’ therefore portrayed the Spirit’s work of illumination on the mind as an affective dimension where faith and reason operated in unity.72

6.7 Love and Self-Love, the Affections and the Virtues

During the Enlightenment period, the traditional biblical portrayal of divine love had become inert, being replaced by the libertarian benevolist conception of ‘self-love’. The benevolist idea holding that humanity is by nature inherently benevolent or altruistic. From a humanistic perspective, this conception was interpreted anthropocentrically in terms of the desire for self-preservation because it was connected to the idea of human ‘happiness’. This conception of self-love departed from how self-love had been conceived by early theologians, including Augustine and Maximus, who had aligned the notion of self-love with sin. Extrapolating on the benevolist notion, Edwards found a way to speak about the biblical conception of divine love. Tracing love back to its first principles, Edwards showed how love was a naturally created principle that God had imparted in humans upon their creation in his image.73 The fall had corrupted love which was the reason why the heart and mind were driven by selfish desires. But sin had not obliterated the value of ‘self-love’ because love was a natural characteristic of God’s very being.74 The problem was ‘selfishness’, the sin-affected anthropocentric

71 Works 18. 458-59.
72 Works 2. 282 ‘Thus a holy person is led by the Spirit, as he is instructed and led by his holy taste, and disposition of heart; whereby in the lively exercise of grace, he easily distinguishes good and evil, and knows at once, what is a suitable amiable behaviour towards God, and towards man…and judges what is right, as it were spontaneously, and of himself, without a particular deduction, by any other arguments than the beauty that is seen, and goodness that is tasted.’ Cf. Works 18. 459-60. See McClymond & McDermott, 379.
73 Cf. Works 8. 264. ‘Self-love is the sum of natural principles, as divine love is of supernatural principles.’ See P. Ramsay, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, The Works of Jonathan Edwards: Freedom of the Will (ed. P. Ramsay; New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957), I.16. Edwards used the word ‘principle’ in the sense of the Latin principium or the Greek ἀρχή, meaning the source or beginning or spring of disposition and action. It could also mean the direction, shape or contours of the heart and life, because the root of the word ‘arche-type’ or the ἀρχή is a formative power in Plato’s ‘ideas’ such as in justice, beauty and triangularity. See also Fiering, Moral Thought, 159; McClymond & McDermott, 541; J. E. Smith, ‘Christian Virtue and Common Morality’, The Princeton Companion to Jonathan Edwards (ed. S. H. Lee; Princeton, Princeton University Press: 2005), 147.
74 Works 8. 252-253, 263-64 ‘It is no branch which springs out of that root of self-love as natural affection and civil friendship, and the love which wicked men may have one to another. It is
focus of ‘self-love’ that impacted the human condition, not self-love itself. Sin having corrupted self-love meant that it was no longer directed by divine love, a notion Edwards also called ‘compounded love’. He had reasoned that the principle of ‘self-love’ was one’s ability to value what he or she was inclined to value, so that when God became the object of human desire, self-love was moved by divine love not selfishness.

When God became the object of desire, the believer’s virtuous actions were essentially holy acts, not merely ‘moral’ acts. The Christian’s good works manifest as ‘good’ and ‘holy’ because the ‘goodness’ and ‘holiness’ is an inherent characteristic of God’s own being, placing Christian moral theory on a theocentric foundation and demarcating it from benevolist theory. According to Edwards, humans can only gauge true happiness when they know God: ‘A natural [man] may love others, but ’tis some way or other as appendages and appurtenances to himself. But a spiritual man loves others as of God, or in God, or some way related to him.’ Just as had been the case for Augustine and Maximus, love for Edwards is signified by the will’s inclination to obey God evidenced in the Christian life at the horizontal level in the Christian’s relationship to others. He therefore conceived love to be an aspect of the act of the will, because when God became the sole object of the believer’s desire, the affections transformed the Christian life:

For love is not only one of the affections, but it is the first and chief of the affections, and the fountain of all the affections. From love arises hatred of those things which are contrary to what we love, or which oppose and thwart us in those things that we delight in: and from the various exercises of love and hatred, according to the circumstances of the objects of these

something of a higher and more noble kind. Self-love is the sum of natural principles, as divine love is of supernatural principles.’ Cf. Works 13. 387-389 (Misc. 301 [Sin and Original Sin]). See Fiering, Moral Thought, 261; McClaymond & McDermott, 541.


76 Works 18. 74-75. (Misc. 530. [Love to God. Self-love]).


78 Works 2. 107. ‘and represents it as the fountain from whence proceeds all that is good, in 1 Cor. 13 throughout; for that which is there rendered “charity” in the original αγάπη the proper English of which is “love.”’

79 Works 18. 533 (Misc. 821 [Self-love. Common Grace. Saving Grace]).

80 Works 2.106-07 ‘So our blessed Saviour represents the matter, in answer to the lawyer, who asked him, which was the great commandment of the law. “Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind: this is the first, and great commandment; and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets” (Matt. 22:37-70).’
affections, as present or absent, certain or uncertain, probable or improbable, arise all those other affections of desire, hope, fear, joy, grief, gratitude, anger, etc. From a vigorous, affectionate, and fervent love to God, will necessarily arise other religious affections: hence will arise an intense hatred and abhorrence of sin, fear of sin, and a dread of God’s displeasure, gratitude to God for his goodness, complacency and joy in God when God is graciously and sensibly present, and grief when he is absent, and joyful hope when a future enjoyment of God is expected, and fervent zeal for the glory of God. And in like manner, from a fervent love to men, will arise all other virtuous affections towards men.  

In Greco-Roman philosophy the idea of ‘virtue’ was etymologically related to humanity and nearly always defined as a human excellence or perfection that was characteristic of human nature. Virtues were thought of as necessarily human qualities because they were thought to be perfections of character connected to the nature and ends of human beings. The classical philosophical ideal of virtues therefore had teleological and ontological value, which can be taken as the reason why early theologians like Augustine and Maximus incorporated the virtues and passions into their idea of will. Virtues were human dispositions that not only made their possessors good, but which were constitutive of a good moral life. By the seventeenth-century moral philosophers had reduced this general ideal of virtue to a unilateral moral entity they called ‘benevolence’ to which all the traditional classical theories of virtue were also reduced.

The moral philosophers had related this idea of virtue to natural feeling or a ‘moral sense’. The view that humanity was inherently benevolent or altruistic stemmed from the classical idea of ‘habituation’, whereby someone acquired a virtue through repetitive performance. Holding to the doctrine of original sin, Edwards did not agree with the benevolist theory, but used its structured theory to argue against it. Denying that the benevolist notion of ‘moral sense’ was true virtue, Edwards argued that, apart from God and the work of grace, the true nature of virtue could not be

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82 Ibid., 1.
83 Ibid., 2.
84 Ibid., 2.
85 Ibid., 2.
86 McClymond & McDermott, 538.
87 Fiering, Moral Thought, 10; McClymond & McDermott, 533.
understood, which made his idea of ‘virtue’ more than a moral category. According to Edwards the ‘moral sense’ was a person’s conscience, and true virtue was produced as a consequence of the Spirit’s work, which inclined the believer’s will to act in accordance with God’s will. The work of grace therefore not only ensured that Christians are necessarily free to engage in good works, but also accounted for their individual responsibility to see their life reformed.\(^{88}\)

Edwards’ account of the virtues therefore departed from the benevolist view that treated the virtues as a multiplicity of qualities rather than as a singular entity.\(^{89}\) He spoke of a range of ‘natural’ virtues and affections such as justice\(^{91}\), gratitude\(^{92}\), anger\(^{93}\), pity\(^{94}\) and familial love\(^{95}\), which when moved by love promoted the common good of society and restrained vice.\(^{96}\) Some of the virtues that he considered to be outstanding in the Christian life were longsuffering, kindness, meekness, gentleness, forgiveness, mercy, quietness and humility because these were observed by way of the good relationships the believer cultivated with others.\(^{97}\) Edwards therefore differentiated between a range of virtues which, whilst all related to love, were not reducible to it:

If it be, all that is distinguishing and saving and true Christianity be summarily comprehended in love, then hence Christians may try their experience whether it be real Christian experience. If it is so, they have love in them; it works by love, or issues in love. True discoveries excite love in the soul, and draw forth the heart in love. They dispose to love to God as the supreme good. They unite the heart to love in Christ. They incline the heart to flow out in love to God’s people. They dispose the heart to love to all mankind.\(^{98}\)

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\(^{88}\) See Smith, ‘Christian Virtue’, 163-64, n.20.

\(^{89}\) Cochrane, 1.

\(^{90}\) Natural Virtues were virtues thought to be common to human nature and echo the four cardinal virtues in Stoic thought.

\(^{91}\) Cf. Works 8. 569-72, 582, 617.

\(^{92}\) Cf. Works 8. 579-81, 584, 617.

\(^{93}\) Cf. Works 8. 580, 583-84.


\(^{95}\) Cf. Works 8. 584, 601.

\(^{96}\) McClymond & McDermott, 541.


\(^{98}\) Works 8. 145. See McClymond & McDermott, 538.
Moreover, it was because Edwards aligned love to the acts of the will, showing its teleological and ontological value, that he was able to show how the virtues and affections were identical with the act of the will itself.

6.8 Edwards’ Aesthetic Conceptions of ‘Beauty’ and ‘Excellency’

Edwards had discerned that a problem in eighteenth-century reformed Protestantism was that it had begun to follow the benevolists in identifying ‘virtue’ with ‘beauty’, which collapsed the notion of ‘beauty’ into a subjective concept. Neoplatonic thought, however, depicted beauty as an objective property. Edwards’ idea of ‘sense’ as a spiritual apprehension bore a relationship to the aesthetic Neoplatonic concepts of ‘Beauty’ and ‘Excellency’ because God was the source of the Christian’s spiritual apprehension. Edwards’ notion of ‘beauty’ and ‘excellency’, along with love, has ontological value because they originate and come forth from God’s being of holiness: ‘Holiness is a most beautiful and lovely thing…’Tis the highest beauty and amiableness, vastly above all other beauties. ’Tis a divine beauty, makes the soul heavenly and far purer than anything here on earth.

Edwards’ conception of ‘beauty’ and ‘excellency’ are therefore functionally dynamic theological terms which take on teleological value.

Beauty and excellency therefore function as more than subjective notions in Edwards’ moral theory. Objectivity for Edwards did not signify a lack of passion or a stifling of emotion in the Christian life, but indicated that the believer could see the things about God that are true and respond to the truth accordingly. The ontological foundation of ‘beauty’ and ‘excellency’, as proportion and structure, therefore allows Edwards to develop a theological framework from which he is able to give both spiritual meaning and eternal meaning to the believer’s good works in the current life. Although

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99 Cf. Works 8. 539. ‘Whatever controversies and variety of opinions there are about the nature of virtue, yet all (except some skeptics who deny any real difference between virtue and vice) mean by it something beautiful, or rather some kind of beauty or excellency.’ See Fiering, Moral Thought, 112, n.18. The comparison between virtue and beauty was often so indefinite as to make exact interpretation impossible.
101 Cf. Works 6. 332 (“The Mind” [1]) ‘There has nothing been more without definition than excellency, although it be what we are more concerned with than anything else whatsoever.’ See Delattre, 4, 22-24; Wainwright, 46.
102 Works 13. 163 [Misc. a (Of Holiness)].
103 Cf. Works 2. 258. See Delattre, 23; McClymond & McDermott, 71; Wainwright, 46.
Christians could never be said to attain perfection in their current life, what distinguished the believer’s good works from that of the nonbeliever lay not in the act itself, but in the value of ‘goodness’ which God bestowed upon the act. Edwards therefore used the phrase ‘consent to being’ to express how the believer’s will naturally consented to God: inclined itself towards God: ‘True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to Being in general. Or perhaps to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a general good will.’

When weighted by love, the affections for Edwards are the proof of the harmonious relationship between faith and reason in the Christian life. When God is the object of the Christian life, all the affections effectively ‘beautify’ and ‘perfect’ the Christian life. Operating as synonyms of the will, the affections, ‘delight’, ‘joy’, and ‘desire’, therefore function as corollaries of ‘beauty’ and ‘excellency’:

So God glorifies himself towards the creatures also two ways: (1) by appearing to them, being manifested to their understandings; (2) in communicating himself to their hearts, and in their rejoicing and delighting in, and enjoying the manifestations which he makes of himself. They both of them may be called his glory to the more extensive sense of the word, viz. his shining forth, or the going forth of his excellency, beauty and essential glory ad extra. By one way it goes forth of his towards their understandings; by the other it goes forth towards their wills or hearts. God is glorified not only by his glory’s being seen, but by its being rejoiced in, when those that see it delight in it: God is more glorified than if they only see it; his glory is then received by the whole soul, both by the understanding and by the heart. God made the world that he might communicate, and the creature receive, his glory, but that it might [be] received both by the mind and heart.

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104 Works 8. 540. Cf. Works 8. 131. ‘All that virtue which is saving, and distinguishing of true Christians from others, is summed up in Christian or divine love...And the Apostle’s mentioning so many and so great things, and then saying of them all that they profit nothing without charity, we may understand that there is nothing which avails anything without it.’ See Fiering, Moral Thought, 326; Ramsey, 31.

105 Works 13. 495 (Misc. 448 [End of the Creation]. Cf. Works 2. 93. ‘Whom having not seen, ye love: in whom, though now ye see him not, yet rejoice with joy unspeakable, and full of glory.’ (1 Pet. 1:8) In these words, the Apostle represents the state of the minds of the Christians he wrote to, under persecutions they were then subjects of.’
Edwards’ notions of ‘consent to being’, ‘beauty and excellency’ operate for him in a similar fashion as Maximus’ conception of the spiritual level/mode of λόγος had operated for him. Both conceptions go towards presenting a portrait of the Christian’s spiritual modality of life, typified in the will’s natural inclination to obey God. Edwards understood the consent underlying all beauty as a ‘type’ or shadow, whereas he understood moral excellency as the antitype or substance. The beauty of Christians therefore consisted in a comprehensive and well-ordered moral and spiritual character free from disproportion and deformity: ‘Another thing wherein those affections that are truly gracious and holy, differ from those that are false, is beautiful symmetry and proportion.’ Edwards’ schema can therefore also be compared with Augustine’s portrait of the enlightened mens, where memory/knowledge/will operate as three simultaneous functions of the mind because they were spiritual substances. By analogy, when believers act on their true knowledge, spiritually they become ‘true’ images of God. The similarity with Augustine and Maximus stems from Edwards’ engagement with Neoplatonic metaphysics. Although Edwards appears to have been drawn to Neoplatonism based on his reading of the Cambridge Platonists, his motivation to engage with its metaphysics can be traced to his belief in the traditional doctrine of ‘creation from nothing’, just as early theologians had discerned from scripture that everything God had created owed its origin and preservation to the activity of God’s Word (Λόγος Λόγοι). Edwards’ adaptation of Neoplatonic metaphysics therefore sought to present a Christian view of reality that did not impose a dichotomy between the spiritual and earthly realms of the Christian life and, importantly, did not negate the importance of either realm.

6.9 Conclusion

Although Edwards acknowledged that, during the revivals, people had exhibited affections which had proved to be false, his morphology of conversion sought to provide a way in which the

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106 Cf. Works 11. 152; 13, 434 [Misc. 362 (Trinity)] ‘For indeed the whole outward creation, which is but the shadows of beings, is so made as to represent spiritual things.’ See Fiering, Moral Thought, 82 n.79; McClymond & McDermott, 116-17 n.3.
107 Works 2. 365. Cf. Works 8. 338. See McClymond and McDermott, 98-100. Edwards’ idea of beauty fits closer to the neoclassical proportioned ideal of beauty than to the ideal of beauty that is identified with the later nineteenth-century Romantic Movement because his idea was inclusive of disproportion. Beauty in its highest sense was beauty when it was considered in the broadest context with respect to the generality of things (cf. Works 6.344). For a comparison of Edwards ‘eternal language’ and the later Romantic poet, literary critic and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) see S. Piggin & D. Cook, ‘Keeping Alive the Heart in the Head: The significance of “Eternal Language” in the Aesthetics of Jonathan Edwards and S. T. Coleridge’, Literature and Theology 18 (2004), 383-414.
development of genuine affections in Christians could be distinguished from false ones. Edwards developed a psychology of will that enabled him to account for the psychology of the ‘whole person’, the mind and heart in the act of cognition. According to Edwards the affections were integral to rationality making them part of the acts of the will. What mattered was not whether the affections were negative or positive, but how Christians exercised their will. Believing that sin’s affects predisposed the mind towards sin, Edwards held that spiritual disciplines were necessary to the Christian life, and the freedom to engage in them a result of the work of grace. In connecting his idea of ‘sense’ to the Christian’s spiritual apprehension, Edwards notions of ‘consent to being’ and ‘beauty and excellency’ provided him with a theological framework which gave eternal and spiritual meaning to good works in the current Christian life, and which also validated the necessity for the believer to engage in spiritual disciplines, placing his Christian moral theory on a theocentric platform.
Part 3: The Patristic Doctrine of Deification

Preface

A. Deification: an Early Church Metaphor

In light of Christ’s restorative work, the Fathers developed a triadic conception of the Spirit-filled Christian composed of body, soul/mind and Spirit.¹ This triadic conception bespoke of a new modality of life granted to Christians because of the Spirit’s dispensation and the new age Christ had established for them. The incarnation’s salvific work had therefore restored God’s likeness to the believer, and the Fathers expressed this restoration using the terminology of deification. The English word, ‘deification’, comes from the Latin term deificatio, which takes its meaning from the Greek theosis (θεωσία).² The patristic doctrine of deification incorporated various images and ideas drawn from the scriptural tradition: imitation of God (cf. Mt. 5:48, Jn. 14:12, Eph. 5:1); taking on God’s nature (cf. Ps. 82:6, Jn. 10:34, 2 Pet. 1:4); being indwelt by God (cf. Job 32:8, Jn. 14:17, Rom. 8:16); being reformed by God (cf. Jn. 3:6, Eph. 4:24, Rom. 12:2); being conformed to Christ (cf. Phil. 3:21, Rom. 8:29, 2 Cor. 3:18, 1 Jn. 3:2); as well as the idea of the final restoration of the cosmos (cf. Hab. 2:14, Is. 32:17, 1 Cor. 15:28).³

The scriptural passages are not just concerned with the afterlife or events connected to Christ’s second coming, but hold implications for Christians in the present life. Although some of the themes subsumed by the doctrine of deification are eschatological, what draws the themes together is an entire corpus of doctrine informed and given meaning by the incarnation’s work.⁴ Moreover, an immediate consequence of the incarnation’s work causes eschatology to bear on the present, which is suggestive of an ongoing and progressive transformation of the Christian life, which salvation enacts.

³ The Greek word θεωσία is not only a difficult word to define but has suffered form an anachronistic approach in its treatment. The closest English equivalent to θεωσία is deification or divinisation. See Finlan & Kharlamov, 2-3; C. Mosser, “The Earliest Patristic Interpretations of Psalm 82, Jewish Antecedents, and the Origins of Christian Deification,” Journal of Theological Studies 56 (2005), 30-31.
What makes the doctrine a difficult one for modern theology lies in its inability to be singularly defined or quantified by any one of these scriptural verses, passages or ideas. Beginning life as an early church soteriological metaphor, deification, unlike the soteriological metaphor of justification, has not been susceptible to technical definition. Whereas the doctrine of justification has received technical definition, defined by scriptural passages that address or express Christ’s atoning work in judicial terms, or in terms of Christ’s restored righteousness of the believer, the doctrine of deification remains unquantifiable, primarily because θεωσίς is not a word found in scripture. The doctrine of deification therefore remains an abstract notion, which has made it difficult for Protestant theology to grasp.6

B. The Terminology of Deification

In the early scriptural tradition, three key scriptural texts were aligned and identified with the doctrine of deification: Psalm 82:6 ‘You are gods; children of the Most High, all of you’; John 10:34 ‘Is it not written in your law, “I said, you are gods”?; and 2 Peter 1:4 ‘You...may become participants of the divine nature.’ Although these texts should not be taken as definitions for the doctrine, when they appear in the writings or sermons of early Fathers, the texts indicate the author’s engagement with the doctrine.

The terminology identified with deification arose out of Greek vocabulary specifically to do with ‘making into god’ or ‘deifying’. A survey of deification language in patristic writings shows that a variety of Greek terminology and vocabulary was used in the communication of the concept.7 For example, special attention can be given to the vocabulary groups in all their grammatical forms, for ‘union’ (ἐνωσίς), ‘participation’ (μετούσια from μετέχω; μέθεσις; μετάληψις from μεταλαμβάνω), ‘partaking’ (μετοχος), and ‘communion’ (κοινωνία from κοινωνέω).8 There are also five groups of Greek words that appear in patristic writings which point to making a god or to deifying: ἀποθέω/ἀποθέων/ἀποθέωσις; θεοποιέω/θεοποίησις; θεοκείμω/θεοκείμησις; ἐκθέω/ἐκθείμω/ἐκθέωσις/ἐκθεωσικός; θεόω/...  

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5 Finlan & Kharlamov, 3.
8 Finlan & Kharlamov, 6.
Although the subject-verb sets such as θεός εἰμί ‘to be god’ and θεός γίγνομαι ‘to become god’ also appear this does not necessarily connote a strong literal meaning of ‘becoming god’ or being ‘deified’.  

The Greek term θεώσις, a term specifically identified as the word for deification, was coined in the fourth century by Gregory Nanzianzen. He distanced it from any possible Neoplatonic connection on the grounds that θεώσις did not appear in any non-Christian philosophical writings. By the sixth century a more formal definition began to develop for θεώσις when Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite defined and qualified θεώσις as ‘the attainment of likeness to God, so far as it is possible for the Christian’. This definition and qualification was inherited by the following century, so that Maximus can be seen to engage with the doctrine in his writings as a theological topic in its own right.

C. Deification: the Three Key Texts (Psalm 82:6, John 10:34 and 1 Peter 1:4)

Although the beginnings of the doctrine can be traced to the first century, it took many centuries before θεώσις became a term that showed susceptibility to more nuanced technical definition. Moreover, when early theologians first engaged with the doctrine they treated it as a theological metaphor. The implications of the metaphor were clear to its first Christian recipients. Not needing to be spelled out, the theological context of the utterance enabling them to construe the meaning. Yet as time progressed and historical contexts changed, the need to guard against heterodoxy caused the same truth that was originally expressed in metaphorical language by the early Byzantine period to be expressed conceptually and dogmatically. As Soskice explains, metaphorical theological concepts, which began outside the standard lexicon, gradually became lexicalised over time due to changing theological needs.

9 Ibid., 6.
10 Ibid., 6-7
11 On Gregory’s coinage of the term, see Russell, Deification, 214-15.
13 Ibid., 1.
14 See Finlan & Kharlamov, 1; Russell, Deification, 1, 215.
15 Russell, Deification, 1.
16 Russell, Deification, 1.
Early church doctrines that began as metaphorical theological conceptions often prove objectionable to modern academic study. Metaphor suffers from terminological imprecision and as such is not deemed acceptable to academic and scientific writing falling into the category of fiction and poetry.¹⁸ Prior to the advent of modern scientific discovery, metaphors for the ancients disclosed a way of looking at and understanding the world.¹⁹ In much the same way, in identifying deification with the three key scriptural texts of Psalm 82:6, John 10:34 and 1 Peter 1:4 early theologians were disclosing their understanding of Christian salvation.

The scriptural text Psalm 82:6 was commonly cited as the chief proof-text for the doctrine of deification, specifically because of its metaphorical appeal. Even so, contemporary scholarship held a view that the Fathers’ citation of it had nothing to do with the origin of the doctrine, the citation occurring only later to bolster its biblical warrant.²⁰ Upon examining the earliest extant interpretations of Psalm 82, Mosser²¹ however has demonstrated that the chief significance of the psalm lies in its declaration of divine sonship. The psalm was understood to predict distinctive aspects of Pauline and Johannine soteriology making the most significant phrase the declaration of divine sonship, not the declaration of godhood.²² Early Christians therefore read the psalm as a descriptive summary of salvation history that lay at the heart of the gospel message.²³

Patristic interpretations went on to adapt antecedent traditions that read Psalm 82: 1, 6-7 as summarising salvation history from Adam’s fall to the eschatological restoration, which the incarnation’s salvific work fulfilled.²⁴ Elements of this tradition are attested in the gospel of John, which Jesus himself drew on, as well as in other Second Temple and Rabbinic Jewish texts, which read Psalm 82 in the context of eschatological judgment and salvation.²⁵ The Fathers can therefore be seen to have read the declarations of Psalm 82 through the lens of the doctrine of recapitulation discerning Christ typologically as the ‘new Adam’ who enacted and fulfilled God’s economic

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¹⁹ Louth, 19-20
²⁰ See Mosser, 30-34.
²¹ Ibid, 30-74.
²² Ibid., 30,72-74.
²³ Ibid., 73.
²⁴ Ibid., 30, 59-60.
²⁵ See Mosser, 30, 60-65; N. Russell, *Fellow Workers with God: Orthodox Thinking on Theosis* (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 56-64.
salvation plans. They saw Psalm 82:6-7 as a summary of salvation history that consisted in two parts: the first related to the creation and fall of Adam and the second saw the eschatological reversal of the fall in the resurrected Christ. Christ is the second Adam who bestows his incorruption, immortality and glory upon those who are joined to, or united with him.26

Many elements of the first part of this summary are found in the Jewish tradition, in Second Temple Rabbinic texts and other Jewish literature that were independent of Psalm 82.27 The New Testament Christians believed, however, that the messianic age had dawned in Jesus, establishing for them the second part of the summary.28 Given the Christian belief in the advent of the messianic age, Johannine and Pauline soteriology described the believer’s transformation in terms of Christian adoption, so that early Christians saw the declarations of Psalm 82:6 fulfilled in Christ’s redemption of the sinner.29 The doctrine of deification insisted on the inseparability of Christ’s work on the cross and Christ’s divine spiritual origins, spiritually shared by Christians in a realistic sense because of their spiritual rebirth.30 The doctrine therefore centred on the entire consequences of the incarnation’s salvific work for the Christian life now that the eschatological spiritual age had dawned.

26 Mosser, 64-65.
27 Ibid., 65-72
28 Ibid., 72.
29 Ibid., 72.
Chapter 7: Augustine and the Patristic Doctrine of Deification

7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to show that, although the patristic doctrine of deification has been rarely associated with the theology of the western Fathers, Augustine frequently engaged with it. Moreover, for him the doctrine could be seen to operate as a rhetorical tool, drawing together aspects of doctrine that worked to give meaning and shape to the Christian life. This made deification integral to Augustine’s soteriology, Christian anthropology, Christology, pneumatology and eschatology because in its pastoral application the doctrine functioned to communicate a robust view of the Christian’s salvation. Augustine’s adaptation of deification in his soteriological anthropology worked to locate the Christian’s sanctification at the spiritual level of the divine because his adaptation insisted on the inseparability of Christ’s work on the cross and Christ’s divine spiritual origins, both of which also belong to Christians because of their spiritual adoption. Augustine could equate deification with Christian adoption because the concomitants of deification were the incarnation and the Trinity. According to Augustine, the incarnation’s salvific work had spiritually refashioned human nature, so that the Christian’s identity could not only be said to lie in Christ as the model of ‘true humanity’, but in a far more realistic sense. He presented this realistic sense in his portrait of the Spirit-filled Christian as God’s image and instrument in the world, enabling him to correlate the Christian’s deification with Christ’s justification of the Christian. Finally, his engagement with deification allowed eschatology to inform the issue of Christian ethics and morality in the Christian’s present life, so that his theology of the will and the affections came to be not only framed by the Christian’s deification, but climaxed in it. This understanding placed Christian moral theory upon a theocentric foundation, not an anthropocentric one. Augustine’s moral theory was thus demarcated, not only from the moral theory of the Manicheans and Pelagians, but also from Greco-Roman philosophical theories.

7.2 The Soteriological Metaphor of Deification

The metaphor of deification\(^1\), \(\theta\varepsilon\omega\sigma\iota\zeta\), was an important component of early patristic theology, which has generally been associated with the writings of the Greek Fathers and not with the Latin

Fathers. Augustine’s theology is therefore said to have rarely dwelt on the subject. Overall, western scholarship has dismissed a notion of deification in his theology. One reason for this can be attributed to the scarcity of Latin vocabulary for deification in Augustine’s works. Yet a study in how often the words deificari and deificatus appear in Augustine’s writings is an insufficient determinant of the importance of the doctrine in his soteriology. A word study on its own does not take into account references Augustine made to Psalm 82:6 which taught deification without actually employing the word and phrases he used that evoked the Alexandrian ‘exchange formula’ (God became human, so that the human could become divine).

In early scriptural tradition the exchange formula expressed the ‘mystery’ that encapsulates the incarnation’s mediatory work of salvation for the Christian. The mystery was that if God had assumed human nature in the personhood of Christ and was crucified as a man, then Christ’s death and resurrection implied that a change had occurred in the nature of the Christian as well. The incarnation’s work had joined humanity to God. Christ’s mediatory role therefore signalled that in a ‘realistic’ sense a spiritual change had also occurred in the nature of the believer whereby their nature could never be said to be quite the same again.

The other reason can be traced to the early twentieth-century influence of Adolf von Harnack who claimed that the early theologian’s idea of deification was a reflection of the ‘hellenisation’ of

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5 See Bonner ‘Deification’, 369. When the computer serving the contributors of the Augustinus Lexikon, was asked to furnish references to how often the words deificari and deificatus and their various forms appear in Augustine’s work, it only supplied fifteen examples. Seven of which were irrelevant to the theology of deification. The computer was not programmed to identify phrases such as those that occur in Augustine’s exegesis of Psalm 82, ‘that Christ became man that we might become gods’.
early Christianity.\textsuperscript{7} Von Harnack’s influence is evident, for example, in the western scholar Benjamin Drewery\textsuperscript{8} and the English eastern scholar Philip Sherrard\textsuperscript{9} who both claim that there is no evidence of deification in Augustine’s theology. They argue this despite the mid-twentieth century studies by the Catholic scholars Victorino Capanaga\textsuperscript{10} and Gerhart Ladner\textsuperscript{11} who found evidence of deification in Augustine’s theology. Furthermore, the failure of seeing any evidence of deification in Augustine’s theology also ignores the fact that Augustine was aware of how the Greco-Roman conception of deification was employed in the non-Christian religious context in the fifth-century and that the Christian notion was distinct from it. In the \textit{City of God} Augustine voiced his displeasure with non-Christian religious practices that deified and worshiped notable leaders or royal persons.\textsuperscript{12} He wrote that this type of deification was not only human-made and deceptive, but that it dishonoured God. It was antithetical to the Christian notion of deification, which was a result of the work of grace.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[9] P. Sherrard, \textit{The Greek East and Latin West: A Study in the Christian Tradition} (Limni: Denise Harvey & Company, 1992), 37-43, 141-64. The revolution in western European thought that gave birth to the modern west lies in both Augustine’s and Aquinas’ failure to follow the patristic thought of deification.
\item[11] Ladner, 153-283.
\item[12] Cf. \textit{civ. Dei} 18.16 [CCL 48:606-07] After Troy’s fall, the hero Diomedes was made a god by the gods, yet he was powerless to reconvert his companions back into men after they had been turned into birds as punishment from the gods. See also Puchniak, 131.
\item[13] Cf. \textit{civ. Dei} 22.30 [CCL 48:863-64] ‘For, it is one thing to be God, another to be a sharer in the divine nature (\textit{Aliud est enim esse Deum, aliud partcipem Dei}). God, by his nature cannot sin, but a mere sharer in his nature must receive from God such immunity from sin (\textit{Deus natura peccare non potest: particeps vero Dei ab olio accepit, ut peccare non possit}). It was proper that, in the process of the divine endowment, the first step should be a freedom not to sin, and a last a freedom even from the power to sin. The first gift made merit possible; the second is a part of man’s reward (\textit{Servandi autem gradus erant divini muneres, ut primum daretur liberum arbitrium, quo non peccare homo posses, novissimum, quo peccare non posses, atque illud ad comparandum meritem, hoc ad recipiendum praemium pertineret}). Our nature, when it was free to sin, did sin (\textit{Sed quia peccavit ista natura cum peccare potuit}). It took a greater grace to lead us to that liberty which frees us from the very power to sin (\textit{largiore gratia liberator, ut ad eam perducatur libertatem, in qua peccare non possit}). Just as the immortality that Adam lost by his sin was, at first, a mere possibility of avoiding death, but, in heaven, becomes the impossibility of death, so free will was, at first, a mere possibility of avoiding sin, but, in heaven, becomes an utter inability to sin (\textit{Sicut enim prima immortalitas fuit quam peccando Adam perdidit, posse non mori, novissima erit non posse mori: ita primum liberum arbitrium posse non peccare, novissimum non posse peccare}).'
\end{footnotes}
Vladimir Lossky, a prominent eastern scholar, has also argued that while the eastern Fathers taught deification the Latin Fathers did not. According to Lossky this is because western theology has treated the doctrine of redemption as an isolated doctrine that interprets the ramifications of Christ’s redemption of humanity exclusively in judicial terms. This isolation occurred outside the general body of early Christian teaching which drew on images of restoration and deification in order to communicate that Christ’s redemption not only restored humanity, but the entire created order. In western theology, this has resulted in the development of the doctrine along three lines: the problem of original sin; the restitution of sin on the cross; and the appropriation of the saving results of Christ’s work to the Christian. Although this view is not incorrect, its fixation on the judicial aspects of Christ’s death has neglected a doctrinally-robust view of Christ’s redemption. It downplays the implications of Christ’s resurrection and ascension as well as the Spirit’s dispensation, which are also important elements of the doctrine of redemption, but are treated somewhat like an appendix to Christ’s work of atonement.

In today’s modern context, there is truth in Lossky’s claim that the fundamental soteriological emphasis that has dominated western theology has been the doctrine of justification. Yet to claim that the Latin Fathers rarely engaged with deification is misplaced and anachronistic. Anachronism, especially with regard to difficult and generally unfamiliar theological concepts, like deification, has a tendency to occur when scholars (regardless on which side they stand on the east and west divide) read or interpret the theological concept from the work of later theological writers. This more often than not occurs when contemporary scholars fail to examine the doctrine as it appears in the specific historical

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15 Lossky, 97-99. See also N. Russell, *Fellow Workers With God: Orthodox Thinking on Theosis* (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 47.
16 Lossky, 99-102 Lossky traces the beginnings of the focus in the west of seeing Christ’s redemption in purely juridical terms to Anselm of Canterbury.
17 Ibid., 108. See Preface to Part 1 in reference to Irenaeus’ idea of ‘Recapitulation’.
18 Ibid.,98, 102-03.
19 Lossky,102-03. In recent years Protestant evangelicals have also noted this. See for example R. Clifford & P. Johnson, *The Cross is Not Enough: Living as Witnesses to the Resurrection* (Grand Rapids: BakerBooks, 2012).
20 For an historical overview and account of the reasons why the doctrine of justification became the central metaphor of salvation in the west, see R. Chia, ‘Salvation as Justification and Deification’, *Scottish Journal of Theology* 64 (2011), 125-39.
and didactic context that belongs to the early theologian who engaged with it. This type of anachronistic approach to doing theology has at times led to deification often being misunderstood and misinterpreted and at other times even to being ignored and denied.

### 7.3 Augustine’s Newly Discovered Sermons

In recent decades few studies have sought to examine deification in Augustine’s theology. The discovery of the Dolbeau sermons, however, has shed new light on the importance of the doctrine in his theology. The sermons show that Augustine engaged with deification in the context of his practical or ‘task’ theology. Task theology is the study of how theologians engage doctrine to address the pastoral concerns of the Christian life. For early Christian thinkers, doctrine was important both for the purpose of pastoral instruction (encouragement, instruction and warnings) and for theological correction (in response to heresy). The Dolbeau sermons show that Augustine’s engagement with the doctrine was motivated by his desire pastorally to instruct his Christian listeners.

In 1990 Francois Dolbeau discovered the sermons within the Municipal Library of Mainz, Germany. Examination of the sermons has revealed that prior to their disappearance in the late fifteenth century the sermons were copied by at least a dozen scribes. That their circulation ceased was probably due to the varied subject matter of their content. The content is connected to a specific historical occasion or context which meant that the sermons were less relevant to the doctrinal or liturgical needs of the church during the medieval period. The sermon that concerns deification is

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22 See Bonner, ‘Deification’, 369-86; Chadwick, 246-48; Puchniak, 122; Russell, Deification, 329-32. Gerald Bonner’s 1986 article can still be taken as the most definitive study on deification in Augustine’s theology.


24 On ‘task theology’ see G. D. Fee & D. Stuart, How to Read the Bible for All Its Worth (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 58, 86.

25 The sermons were first called by the French name, les semons de Mayence and are cited as the ‘Dolbeau sermons’. See Brown, 443-45; Rotelle, 13.

26 See Rotelle, 13-14 That the sermons dropped out of circulation helped to protect them from too many inroads or changes by medieval copyists. The sermons therefore provide the reader with a pristine ‘snapshot’ of Augustine’s voice in the early fifth century.

27 Ibid., 13-14. In some cases the subject of the discourse is specialised. Its context is connected with the society of the late fourth and early fifth century, which in practice excluded any reuse in the medieval period. It may also be ‘chance’ that caused some of the sermons, which dealt with topics that concerned the liturgical life of the church to be overlooked.
known as Dolbeau 6\textsuperscript{28}, which contains a homiletic exposition of Psalm 82:6. In the sermon Augustine gives voice to deification as he makes a distinction between the moral lives of Christians with that of non-Christians.\textsuperscript{29} He makes the distinction by connecting the concept of a ‘deifying God’ (\textit{deificatorem deum}) to three soteriological themes throughout the sermon: spiritual warfare, the eschatological vision of salvation history, and the gathering members of the al ‘body of Christ’\textsuperscript{30}

7.4 Deification: Christ’s Descent and Ascent and ‘The Exchange’

To date Gerald Bonner’s 1986 study has remained the most definitive account on deification in Augustine’s theology.\textsuperscript{31} The discovery of the Dolbeau sermons a few years after Bonner’s study was published validates his initial insights. In his study Bonner\textsuperscript{32} cites fifteen examples of the words \textit{deificari} and \textit{deificatus} clustered together usually in reference to Psalm 82:6. That Augustine’s citations are clustered around the Psalm shows that he founded his notion of deification upon a traditional scriptural basis as is evident in Dolbeau 6. ‘On Psalm 81 (82): God has stood up in the synagogue of gods (\textit{Deus stetit in synagoga deorum}).’\textsuperscript{33} Augustine’s notion of deification was not founded on a Neoplatonic basis, but followed the early church tradition, as can be seen in Sermon 81:

The grace of God came to you and ‘gave you the power to become the sons of God’ [cf. Jn 1:12] (\textit{Accedit vobis gratia Dei, debit vobis potestatem filios Dei fieri}). Hear the voice of my Father saying (\textit{Audite vocem Patris mei dicentis}), ‘I have said, you are gods and all of you children of the Most High’ [Ps. 82:6] (\textit{Ego dixi, Dii estis, et filii Altissimi omnes}). Since then they are men, and are sons of men (\textit{Quoniam homines filii hominum}), if they are not the children of the Most High, they are liars (\textit{si non filii Altissimi, mendaces}); for, ‘all men are liars’ [Ps. 116:11] (\textit{quia omnis homo mendax}). If they are the sons of God (\textit{Si filii Dei}), if they have been redeemed by the Saviour’s grace (\textit{si gratia Salvatoris redempti}), if purchased with

\textsuperscript{28} Dolbeau 6 is also known as Mainz 13 or Sermon 23B.
\textsuperscript{29} Puchniak, 123.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 123.
\textsuperscript{31} See Ibid., 122.
\textsuperscript{32} Bonner, ‘Deification’, 384; See also Puchniak, 123-24.
\textsuperscript{33} Dolbeau 6.1 [Dolbeau: 97]; Dolbeau 6.1 [Dolbeau: 97] ‘More incredible still is what has already been bestowed on us, (\textit{Incredibilius est quod iam nobis praestitum est,}) that one who was God should become a human being. (\textit{ut qui deus erat homo fieret.}) And indeed we believe that that has already happened, (\textit{Et illud quidem iam factum credimus,}) while we wait for the other thing to happen in the future. (\textit{alterum future exspectamus.}) The Son of God became a son of man, (\textit{Filius dei factus est filius homines,}) in order to make sons of men into sons of God. (\textit{ut filios hominum faceret filios dei.})’
his precious blood (*si pretioso sanguine comparati*), if born again of water and of the Spirit (*si aqua et Spiritu renati*), if predestined to the inheritance of heaven (*si ad haereditatem coelorum praedestinati*), then indeed they are children of God (*ute filii Dei*). And so thereby are gods (*Ergo jam dii*)…Acknowledge Christ and by him as man ascend up to God (*Agnosce Christum, et per hominem ascende ad Deum*).\(^{34}\)

The Christian’s deification was achieved by grace because of the incarnation.\(^{35}\) Augustine therefore spoke of deification in conjunction with the soteriological theme of Christ’s ascent and descent. The incarnation had salvifically incorporated Christians into Christ’s body:

For all who are reborn are made his members (*Quia omnes qui renascuntur, membra ipsius fiunt*), and Christ alone who is born of Mary is one Christ (*et solus Christus de Maria natus unus est Christus*), and with his body the one Christ is the head (*et cum corpore suo caput unus est Christus*). Therefore it was his will to say (*Hoc ergo dicere voluit*): *No man hath ascended into heaven but he that descended out of heaven* (*Nemo ascendit, nisi qui descendit*). No man has therefore ascended except Christ (*Non ergo ascendit, nisi Christus*). If you wish to ascend (*Si vis ascendere*), be in the body of Christ (*esto in corpore Christi*).\(^{36}\)

That Christ was fully human and fully divine in his nature indicated that not only was his death necessary for salvation but also his resurrection and ascension because the incarnation restored God’s

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\(^{34}\) s. 81.6 [PL 38:503]. Note Augustine’s use of the Johannine theme and his reference to Baptism and the Spirit. References that are indicative of the Christian’s renewed and transformed nature. Cf. Dolbeau 6.1 [Dolbeau: 97] ’Still it is not enough for our God to promise us divinity in himself, (*Parum tamen fuit deo nostro promittere nobis in se divinitatem*) unless he also took on our infirmity, (*nisi et nostrum susciperet infirmitatem*) as though to say, (*tamquam dicens*): “Do you want to know how much I love you, (*Vis nosse quantum te diligam*), how certain you ought to be that I am going to give you my divine reality? (*quam certus esse debas daturum me tibi divinum meum?*) I took to myself your mortal reality. (*Accepi mortale tuum*).”…More incredible still is what has already been bestowed on us, (*Incredibilius est quod iam nobis praestitum est*) that one who was God should become a human being, (*ut qui deus erat homo fieret*).…The Son of God became a son of man, (*Filius dei factus est filius homines*), in order to make sons of men into sons of God. (*ut filios hominum faceret filios dei*).’ Note Augustine’s rhetorical engagement with the patristic exchange formula (*Filius dei factus est filius homines, ut filios hominum faceret filios dei*), which works to frame and express for him the incarnation’s redemptive, salvific, and restorative work in the Christian’s salvation.

\(^{35}\) Bonner, ‘Deification’, 371-72; See also Puchniak, 124.

\(^{36}\) s. 294.10.10 [PL 38:1341]
likeness in the Christian. The incarnation was the means by which believers participated in Christ’s divine nature and were united to Christ:

God, therefore, having been made a just man, intercedes for sinful man (Deus itaque factus homo iustus, intercessit Deo pro homine peccatore). For there is no harmony between the sinner and the just man, but between man and man (Non enim congruit peccator iusto, sed congruity homini homo). Accordingly, by uniting the likeness of his own humanity with us, he has taken away the unlikeness of our iniquity (Adiungens ergo nobis similitudinem humanitatis suae, abstulit dissimilitudinem iniquitatis nostrae), and having been made a sharer [partaker] of our mortality, he has made us a sharer/partaker of his divinity (et factus particeps mortalitatis nostrae, fecit [nos] participes divintatis suae).

Although Augustine can be seen to have made frequent appeal to Psalm 82:6 which shows his engagement with deification he made no such appeal to the other traditional key text 2 Peter 1:4. That Augustine omitted any citation of this text caused Drewery to claim that this was proof that Augustine did not teach deification. Drewery argues that no contemporary biblical exegete would associate Psalm 82:6 and John 1:12 with teaching on deification, which also discounts Augustine’s reference to the Psalm as a direct appeal to the doctrine. On the point of modern exegesis Bonner concedes to Drewery. Instead Augustine believed that his teaching on deification was founded upon scriptural tradition because he was not constrained by the literal and historical considerations that condition modern exegesis. Although it is true that Augustine’s exegesis should not be compared with modern exegesis, Bonner’s line of argument remains flawed. Contextualised study undertaken by

38 trin. 4.2.4 [CCL 50:164] cf. Conf. 10.42.67 [CCL 27:192] ‘A mediator between God and men [cf. 1 Tim. 2.5] should possess something like unto God and something like unto men (Mediator autem inter deum et homines oportebat ut haberet aliquid simile deo, aliquid simile hominibus). Were he like men on both counts, he would be far away from men; so, he would not be a mediator (ne in utroque hominibus similis longe esset a deo aut in utroque deo similis longe esset ab hominibus atque ita mediator non esset).’
39 Russell, 325.
40 See Drewery, 49-54.
both Mosser\textsuperscript{42} and Russell\textsuperscript{43} have shown that, even in light of modern exegesis, the purpose of Jesus’ quotation of Psalm 82, within the context of John 10:33-36, is not merely proof of his divinity, but also of Christ’s drawing attention to the adoption of his followers in light of his divinity.

The twenty-first century practice of biblical exegesis and hermeneutics may differ in context to that of the early theologian, but the problem with the comparison lies in its anachronistic approach. It fails to see that the reason Augustine engaged with deification was because its orthodoxy had been mandated in the scriptural tradition of the early church. Augustine’s avoidance of 2 Peter 1:4 was probably because the Pelagians quoted the text in justification of their teaching.\textsuperscript{44} Caelestius, for example, had appealed to 2 Peter 1:4 to argue that the soul had the power to be without sin, just as God did. Given the context of the Pelagian controversy, Augustine avoids the text so that his teaching on deification will not be misconstrued with Pelagian soteriology, and not because he was unaware that 2 Peter 1:4 was a key text used to appeal to deification.

7.5 Deification: Christ’s Mediator Work and the Holy Spirit’s Work

In the Dolbeau Sermons, Augustine’s exposition of Psalm 82:6 ties the doctrines of the incarnation and redemption to the means of deification in the believer. Deification was a result of Christ’s mediating work and was not something Christians could develop by independent means. In the believer it was a consequence of the Spirit’s work of illumination:

To what hope the Lord has called us (\textit{Ad quam spem vocaverit nos dominus deus noster}), what we now carry about with us (\textit{quid modo geramus}), what we endure (\textit{quid toleremus}), what we look forward to (\textit{et quid exspectemus}), is well known (\textit{notum esse}), I don’t doubt to your


\textsuperscript{43} See N. Russell, \textit{Fellow Workers with God: Orthodox Thinking of Theosis} (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 55-64. Psalm 82 was a well-known text in Rabbinic tradition. It was originally used to address Adam and Eve at the time of the fall or to the Israelites in the desert when they worshipped the golden calf.

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. gest. Pel. 35.65 [PL 44:357-58]. Caelestius had cited 2 Peter 1:4 in defence of his argument that the soul is without sin, which Augustine sees as an incorrect rendering of the passage. It was common for early theologians to not appeal to the same texts that their heterodox opponents did. Maximus in his seventh-century context also made no direct appeal in his teaching on Christian deification (See Chapter 8 n.10 in this thesis). On how the Pelagians engaged with this text see Russell, \textit{Deification}, 332. For a helpful explanation on the patristic connection of 2 Peter 1:4 with the doctrine of deification see Russell, \textit{Fellow Workers}, 65-69.
graces (*non dubito caritati vestrae*). We carry mortality about with us (*Gerimus mortalitatem*), we endure infirmity (*toleramus infirmitatem*), we look forward to divinity (*exspectamus divinitatem*). For God wishes not only to vivify (*Vult enim deus non solum vivificare*), but to deify us (*sed etiam deificare nos*). When would human infirmity ever have dared to hope for this, (*Quando hoc sperare humana infirmitas auderet*), unless divine truth had promised it (*nisi divina promitteret veritas*)? But divine truth did promise this (*Sed promisit non solum divina veritas*), as we have said (*ut diximus*); and that we are going to be gods (*et quia dii futuri sumus*), not only did it promise this (*non solum hoc promisit* - and because it made the promise (*et quia promisit*), it is of course true (*utique verum est*), because such a faithful maker of promises does not deceive (*quia nec tam fidelis promissor fallit*)…We mustn’t find it incredible (*Non nobis videatur incredibile*), brothers and sisters (*fratres*), that human beings become gods (*deos fieri homines*), that is, that those who were human beings become gods (*id est ut qui homines erant dixi fiant*).45

The Spirit’s work enabled Christians to participate in Christ, something that had previously been impossible because of sin:46

For this enlightenment is indeed our participation in the Word, namely, of that life, that is, which is the light of men (*Inluminatio quippe nostra participatio verbi est, illius scilicet vitae quae lux est hominum*). But were utterly incapable and by no means fitted for this [participation] on account of the defilement of our sins (*Huique autem participationi prorsus inhabiles et minus idonei eramus, propter immunditiam peccatorum*).47

Deification was a result of Christ’s mediatory work, which in turn meant that the Spirit’s work soteriologically grounded the notion of deification in Christology.48 Christians therefore derive their spiritually-changed status directly from Christ’s mediatory work in conjunction with the Spirit’s work. This Christological teaching had been implicit in the Alexandrian ‘exchange formula’, with which

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45 *Dolbeau* 6.1 [Dolbeau: 97]
46 See Bonner, ‘Deification’, 79.
47 *trin*. 4.2.4 [CCL 50:163]
Augustine engaged: ‘He who was God was made man to make gods those who were men (Deos facturus qui homines erant, homo factus est qui Deus erat).’

7.6 Deification: Justification and Spiritual Adoption

The nature of the exchange between Christ and the sin-affected human allowed Augustine to equate deification with the spiritual adoption of the Christian, which was a result of grace. ‘God, you see wants to make you a god (Deus enim deum te vult facere); not by nature, of course, like the one he begot (non natura, sicut est ille quem gennit); but by his gift and by adoption (sed dono suo et adoptione).’ It is the equation with spiritual adoption which enabled Augustine to engage with the doctrine nominally, analogically and metaphorically in his soteriology.

Furthermore, the context of spiritual adoption also allowed Augustine to speak of deification in relation to Christ’s justification of the believer. Augustine also makes clear that Christians are deified by grace, and that the Christian’s deification did not mean that they were subsumed into God’s being:

See in the same Psalm those to whom he says (Videte in eodem psalmo quibis dicat), ‘I have said (Ego dixi), You are gods and children of the most highest (Dii estis, et filii Excelsi omnex); but you shall die like men, and fall like one of the princes [Ps 86:6-7] (vos autem ut homines mortiemi, et sicut unus ex principidus cadetis).’ It is evident then that he has called men gods (Manifestum est ergo, quia homines dixit deos), that are deified of his grace (ex gratia sua deificatos), not born of his substance (non de substantia sua natos). For he justifies (ille enim iustificate) who is just through himself and not of another (qui per semetipsum non ex alio iustus est); and he deifies (et ille deificat), who is God through himself, and not by partaking of another (qui per seipsum non alterius participatione Deus est). But he who

49 s. 192.1.1 [PL 38:1012] The English translation is taken from Bonner, ‘Doctrine of Man’, 87. cf. en. Ps. 58.1.7 [CCL 39:734] ‘The teacher of humility and partaker of our infirmity (Doctor autem humilitatis, particeps nostrae infirmitatis), giving us participation of his divinity (donans participationem suae divinitatis), he descended so that might both teach and be the way (ad hoc descendens ut viam doceret et via fieret), and has deigned most highly to commend his humility to us (maxime suam humilitatem nobis commendare dignatus est).’
50 s. 166.4.4 [PL 38:909] The English translation has been taken from Bonner, ‘Deification’, 88.
51 Bonner, ‘Deification’, 375-376; See also Puchniak, 125.
52 See Bonner, ‘Deification’, 378; Puchniak, 125.
justifies (Qui autem iustificat), deifies (ipse deificat), in that by justifying he does make sons of God (quia iustificando, filios Dei facit). ‘For he has given them power to become the sons of God [Jn. 1:12] (Dedit enim eis potestatem filios Dei fieri).’ If we have been made sons of God (Si filii Dei facti sumus), we have also been made gods (et dii facti sumus): but this is the effect of adoption by grace (sed hoc gratiae est adoptantis) and not generated by nature (non naturae generantis). 53

In the early church’s soteriological and Christological context, the metaphors of justification and deification drew from the notion of the Christian’s union with God/Christ via analogy. The Christian in some ‘real’ sense was incorporated into Christ’s body because of Christ’s death. 54 By analogy it also followed that believers were incorporated in some ‘real’ sense in Christ’s resurrected body as well. The difference between the two metaphors therefore lies in how the location of the believer’s sanctification is understood. 55 In the notion of justification, the Christian’s sanctification is located within the believer because of the incarnation’s atoning work on their behalf. When Christians are incorporated into Christ because of his atoning death and his resurrection, the Christian in a ‘realistic’ sense shares Christ’s divine eternal home even though they continue to reside and experience life in the sin-affected world. 56 In the context of the exchange, the believer’s spiritual adoption therefore functions as a signal or marker for deification because Christ has restored his righteousness on Christians. 57

The theocentric nature of the Christian’s deified position in Christ is apparent in Augustine’s moral theory. Good works or deeds are made ‘good’ because their value, what makes the act or behaviour ‘good’ originates and comes forth from God’s own goodness at the divine level as Christians participate in God’s divine life. 58 In this way Augustine frames his theology of the will and the affections by integrating it with deification, as can be seen in the context of sermon 166. Augustine

53 en. Ps. 49. 2 [CCL 38:575-76]
55 The idea of the Christian being declared holy. Consecrated as holy and/or being ‘set apart’ as holy.
56 See Ibid., 32.
57 See Mosser, 72; Williams, 32. ‘Both schemes of sanctification draw on the notion of union, but whereas the latter locates sanctification within the creature and in via, the former locates it at the level of the divine and insists upon the inseparability of life in via and in patria.’
58 See Chapter 4, section 4.10 of this thesis.
 instructs believers not to lie because the Spirit’s work of illumination is a deifying work. Although the believer’s transformation would not be completed until the eschaton, the Spirit’s work resulted in the continuing transformation and reformation of the Christian life in the present:

Do not lie my brothers (Nolite ergo mentiri, fratres). For you were formerly the old man (Jam enim veteres homines eratis), but you have now come to God’s grace (accessistis ad gratiam Dei) and have been made a new man (facti estis homines novi). The lie pertains to Adam and the truth to Christ (Mendacium ad Adam pertinet, veritas ad Christum). ‘Put away lying, and speak the truth [cf. Eph. 4:25] (Deponentes ergo mendacium, loquimini veritatem),’ so that this mortal flesh which you now have from Adam (ut et caro ista mortalis quam adhuc habetis de Adam) may, after it is renewed by the spirit (praecedente novitiate spiritus), because it deserves renewal and transformation in the time of the resurrection (mereatur et ipsa innovationem et commutationem tempore resurrectionis suae); and so the whole man being deified (ac sic totus homo deificatus), may cleave to the perpetual and unchanging truth (inhaereat perpetuae atque incommutabili veritati).59

For Augustine, the deification of the believer was the foundation for all moral and ethical matters that concerned the Christian life in the present life. Augustine also made clear that the believer’s deification was not something that would be fulfilled in their current life but something that would be perfected at the eschaton:

Our full adoption, then as children, is to happen at the redemption of our body (Adoptio ergo plena filiorum in redemptionem fiet etiam corporis nostr). It is therefore the first-fruits of the Spirit which we now possess, by which we have truly become children of God (Primitias itaque spiritus nunc habemus, unde jam filii Dei reipsa facti sumus); for the rest, indeed, as it is by hope that we have been saved and renewed, we are the children of God (in caeteris vero spe sicut salvi, sicut innovate, ita et filii Dei). But in as much as we are not yet actually saved (re autem ipsa quia nondum salvi), we are also not yet fully renewed (ideo nondum plene innovate), nor fully sons of God, but children of the world (nondum etiam filii Dei, sed filii

59 s.166.4.4 [PL 38:909] The English translation has been based on Bonner’s translations, ‘Doctrine of Man’, 87-88.
saeculi). We are therefore advancing in renewal and holiness of life, - and it is by this that we are children of God, and by this also we cannot commit sin; - until at last the whole of that by which we are kept as children of this world is changed into this (Proficimus ergo in renovationem justamque vitam per quod filii Dei sumus, et per hoc peccare omnino non possumus, donec totum in hoc transmutetur, etiam illud quod adhuc filii saeculi sumus); for it is owing to this that we still sin (per hoc enim et peccare adhuc possumus).\footnote{pecc. mer. 2.8.10 [PL 44:157]; Cf en. Ps. 49.2 [CCL 38:576] ‘The rest that are made gods, (Ceteri qui fiunt dii;) are made by his own grace, (gratia ipsius flunt;) and are not born of his substance, that they should be the same as him, (non de substantia eius nascentur ut hoc sint quod ille;) but that by favour they should come to him, (sed ut per beneficium pervieniant ad eum,) and be co-heirs with him. (et sint coheredes Christi.)’ Augustine used the theme of the Christian being a co-heir with Christ in the context of deification because he saw believers as the current beneficiaries of Christ’s salvific work through grace. 60}

In this soteriological context, the Christians’ good works were testament to their deified position in Christ which was due to their spiritual adoption.

7.7 Deification: an Eschatological Reality

The patristic doctrine of deification provided early theologians with the means to account for and give meaning to both the earthly and spiritual realms of the Christian life, which did not negate or create a division between the two. Christians’ spiritual status and the eternal home for which they are destined remains consequentially connected to their current experience of life in the sin-affected world, as can be seen in Dolbeau 6. In the sermon, Augustine can be seen to engage with the exchange formula. In so doing he used a word play on the Latin word for ‘god’ which in the passage operates to highlight the difference between the Christian’s spiritual status and that of the non-Christian:

And because all who make are of course better than the ones whom they make (Et quia omnis qui facit melior est utique eo quem facit), now see what gods the pagans worship (iam videte quos deos adorent pagani), and what God is worshipped by all of you (et quem deum adoretis vos). You worship the God who makes you into gods (Vos adoratis deum, qui uos facit deos); while they worship gods they make, and by making and worshipping them they lose the chance of becoming gods themselves (illi autem adorant deos, quos faciendo et adorando perdunt ut ipsi dii fiunt) and by making false gods they fall away from the true one (faciendo falsos cadunt a vero). And on those indeed, which they make, they do not bestow the reality
of being gods (Et illis quidem quos faciunt non praestant ut dii sint), but only of being called what they are not (sed vocentur quod non sunt). 61

Augustine’s play on the word ‘god’ works to show that Christian deification is about the ramifications of the believer’s identity in Christ as a spiritual person. Compared to non-Christians, whom Augustine likened to the ‘dumb idols’ (mutis simulacris), the spiritual reality of Christians is the true reality. Christians become ‘truly human’ because the incarnation has restored God’s image and likeness in them. Augustine expressed this in the sermon using the psychological language of the ‘inner self’ (interior homo). When the Christian engages in sinful behaviour and when they choose to follow the ways of the world, they distort God’s image and likeness in them. In so doing the believer fails to claim their deified position. 62

Deified Christian filled with a renewed inner sense given to them by the Spirit discern and clearly see their ‘unlikeness’ to God. Only grace enables Christians to reform and transform their life. 63 ‘But if we have the Spirit of God (Si autem habemus spiritum dei), we not only discern for ourselves (non solum discernamus nos), but also distinguish ourselves from the caricatures that are idols (sed et a simulacris).’ 64 The Spirit’s illuminating work continues the work of deification but its work does not curtail the believer’s individual responsibility to war against sin in their daily life. 65

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61 Dolbeau 6.3 [Dolbeau: 98]
62 Dolbeau 6.5 [Dolbeau: 100] ‘So the inner self has all the senses (Omnia ergo interior homo habet)-God has given them (dedit deus)- but does not wish to use them (sed uti non vult), and wishes to become like the caricature, the idol, he himself has fashioned (et vult fieri simulis simulcro quod ipse formavit)... “How can humans become like dumb idols? (Unde similes possunt fieri homines mutis simulacris)?” Well according to this likeness which we are suggesting (Sed secundum istam similitudinem quam commendamus), if the inner self becomes somehow or other insensitive, stupid (si fiat insensatus quodammodo homo interior), he becomes in a certain manner like an idol (fit ad quondam modum similis simulacro et), and having ruined in himself the image of the one by whom he was made (perdita in se imagine eius a quo factus est), he wishes to take on the image of the one which he has made (eius quem fecit vult capere imaginem).’ Note Augustine’s word play with the Latin words for ‘likeness’ (similitudo) in referenced to God’s image (imago Dei) and the Latin word idol (simulacro), which is a corruption and deformity of God’s image. In the sermon Augustine condemns non-Christian religious idolatry, in order to convey to his Christians listeners not to fall into the temptation of following the non-Christians in their ungodly practices. See Puchniak, 128.
63 Dolbeau 6.6 [Dolbeau: 100] ‘But by giving human beings his Spirit he also enables them to pass judgment (Sed dando spiritum suum facit et homines iudicet), not from themselves (non per seipsos), not in virtue of their nature(non a seipsis, non natura sua), not by any merit of theirs (non merito suo), but by his grace and gift (sed gratia illius et dono illius).’
64 cf. Dolbeau 6.6 [Dolbeau: 100]
65 Dolbeau 6.7 [Dolbeau: 100-01] ‘The truth in fact is (Vere enim), brothers and sisters (fratres), that people who do not distinguish themselves from these are to be lamented (dolendi sunt homines qui inde se non discernunt), not that those who do so are to be praised (non laudandi qui discernunt)... but
earthly life, albeit a temporal one, does not excuse Christians for engaging in the sinful lifestyle or behaviours of their non-Christians peers.

Augustine also saw a relation between deification and ecclesiology. The life and activity of the church (the preaching, the liturgy, the hymns, the sacraments and scriptural reading) operated as a testament and witness to the ability of Christians to discern their deified status and live in accordance with it:

I have the impression (Videor mihi), brothers and sisters (fratres), that I am discerning gods in the midst (discernere utcumque in medio deos); but it’s not me, (sed non ego), it’s the word of God (verbum dei), whether it is being preached on or being sung or being read (siue tractetur siue cantetur siue legatur), that’s what really has the force and power to make the discernment (ipsum habet vim potentiamque discernendi).

In the sermon, Augustine connects the believer’s endurance and perseverance in suffering to deification. Christians who endured through trials and suffering and abstained from sin would not only be in future receipt of immortality, but in eternity their endurance would result in the immortal possession of deification. Although deification may begin in the believer’s present life it would only be fulfilled eschatologically. The believer’s deification was therefore not something that occurred for Christians because of an isolated event or in isolation from others. In the Christian life deification was

if they were like them, or if they made themselves like them (cui, si esset similis vel si se faceret simile)…they will never kill God’s work in themselves (non in se interficiet opus dei).’

66 See Chapter 8 section 8.3 in this thesis. Maximus’ deification theology also bore on his ecclesiology.

67 Dolbeau 6.9 [Dolbeau: 102] ‘Be afraid to be the associate of demons [cf. 1 Cor. 10:20] (time socius esse daemoniorum), in case you are both thrown together into the eternal fire (ne simul mittamini in ignem aeternum). For notice (Adendite enim), brothers and sisters (fratres), what I am saying (quid dicam): you cannot be the associate of an idol even if you want to be (Socius esse idoli, etsi velis, non potes); but being the associate of demons is something you will be if you want to be, won’t be if you do not want to be (socius autem daemoniorum, si velis, eris, si nolis, non eris).’

68 Dolbeau 6.11 [Dolbeau: 103] ‘Indeed, it was our very nature that first sinned (Etenim ipsa natura nostra prima peccavit), and we derive from there what we are born with (et ducimus inde quod nascimur). Let us put up with our condition (Feramus condicionem nostrum). The creator says, “I will recreate you (Dicit creator: ‘Recreabo vos’); I created you mortal (quoos mortals creavi), I will recreate you immortal (recreabo immortales). Put up with your condition (Ferto condicionem tua), so that you may receive your possession (ut recipias possessionem tuam).’
outworked at the horizontal level in the Christian’s relationship to others. Augustine communicated this via his analogy of a craftsmen’s furnace (fornax artifices). ⁶⁹

In the furnace the straw and gold burn together. The non-Christians are likened to the straw and the Christians to the gold. The flames as they burn metaphorically depict the temporal life in the world, where both the non-Christian and Christian coexist and where both experience trials and suffering. Non-Christians may at times appear to thrive and outshine them in the present world (the straw may burn with brilliant splendour in the present fires) but this will not last. At the eschaton the Christians will be the ones who will shine like gold as God rewards them for their faithfulness, endurance and perseverance.

Augustine speaks about that deification as an eschatological fulfilment at the conclusion of the sermon. The believer’s future hope is expressed via Augustine’s analogy of an olive oil press. ⁷⁰ The press is likened to the temporal world where both the non-Christians (the dregs) and the Christians (the pure oil) co-exist. Again, the non-Christians may appear to prosper as they indulge their sinful passions (for example: lust, avarice, theft, corruption, fornication, self-pleasure) but God will remove them at the eschaton. Just as the olive press in its function separates the dregs from the pure oil, God’s judgement will separate the Christians from the non-Christians. Augustine therefore urges believers in light of their future perfection to be ‘the pure oil’ and not manifest the sinful passions:

Be the oil which is separated from the dregs inside (Oleum esto quod ab amurca intus separetur), not that which is carried out by them outside (non quod ab illa foras emittatur)...How is it that you see some people blaspheming under oppression (Unde est quod vides alios in pressuris blasphemantes), others giving thanks under oppression (alios in pressuris gratias agentes), those murky (illos nigros), these limpid and shining (illos lucidos)? How can this be, if not that what is sung for the oil presses is being fulfilled (unde hoc, nisi quia impletur quod cantatur pro torcularibus)? So then, don’t find fault with the one who is coming to press (Noli ergo reprehendere eum qui venit premere), because he is coming to discern (quia venit discernere); acknowledge rather the time of discernment (tempus potius

⁷⁰ Dolbeau 6.15 [Dolbeau: 105-06]
agnosce discretionis), and you will not have a tongue given to twisting the truth (et non habebis linguam supplantationis).\textsuperscript{71}

Moreover, Augustine also believed that although deification was the result of grace it did not mean that the capacity towards sin has ceased being a reality for the Christian life:

The souls in bliss will still possess the freedom of the will, though sin will have no power to tempt them (Nec ideo liberum arbitrium non habebunt, quia peccata eos delectare non poterunt). They will be more free than ever- so free, in fact, from all delight in sinning as to find, in not sinning, an unfailing source of joy (Magis quippe erit liberum a delectatione peccandi usque ad delectationem non peccandi indeclinabilem liberatum). By the freedom which was given to the first man, who was constituted in rectitude, he could choose either to sin or not to sin; in eternity, freedom is more potent freedom which makes all sin impossible (Nam primum liberum arbitrium, quod homini datum est, quando primo creatus est rectus, potvit non peccare, sed potvit et peccare)…. For, it is one thing to be God, another to be a sharer in the divine nature (Aliud est enim esse Deum, aliud participem Dei). God, by his nature cannot sin, but a mere sharer in his nature must receive from God such immunity from sin (Deus natura peccare non potest: particeps vero Dei ab ollo accepit, ut peccare non possit).\textsuperscript{72}

It was grace that ensured that Christians were able to live in light of their deified status which did not negate their responsibility in the reformation and transformation of their life.

\section*{7.8 Deification and Christian Practice}

The patristic doctrine of deification enabled Augustine to discuss the shape of Christian salvation and give meaning to Christian practice in light of a broad spectrum of soteriological themes that are given meaning by the incarnation and the Trinity. The end result is the communication of a robust view of the Christian’s salvation, because the doctrine takes on its meaning not only from Christ’s redemption, but also from his resurrection. The doctrine gains meaning and shape, not only by way of Augustine’s soteriology, but also his anthropology, Christology, pneumatology and

\textsuperscript{71} Dolbeau 6.15 [Dolbeau: 106]
\textsuperscript{72} civ. Dei 22.30 [CCL 48:863]
eschatology. The incarnation’s salvific work has spiritually refashioned human nature, so that the Christian’s identity cannot only be said to lie in Christ as the model of ‘true humanity’, but in a far more realistic sense.

According to Bonner, because Augustine’s notion of deification is informed by his doctrine, it is separated from the area of mystical or contemplative theology. Although Bonner is correct to note that deification for Augustine is grounded in the dogmatic, he errs in the distinction he makes between ‘dogmatic’ and ‘contemplative’ theology. Early theologians did not make this kind of distinction. What a modern theologian may mean by the term ‘contemplative’ and ‘mystical’ is informed by modern philosophical thinking that has isolated reason and knowledge from experience and practice. This has meant that doctrinal concepts, like deification, that are not easily categorised as stand alone ‘concrete and objective notions’, are treated as suspect or suspicious and even as enemies to doctrine. The main reason why western Reformed thought has misunderstood the value of this ancient soteriological doctrine for pastoral instruction is because it cannot reconcile it with the doctrine of justification. Justification is not only an objective notion, but it is ‘concretely quantifiable’. That Christ’s death atoned for sin is an objective concept. In contrast, deification is an abstract notion because its focus lies not on the Christian as a sinner, but on the Christian as a renewed spiritual person. The spiritually abstract or subjective nature of the doctrine has also been tarnished by the ‘new age’ movement, which has helped to make the doctrine an alien one in the contemporary western theological mindset.

In the early church context contemplative theology was not divorced from the dogmatic. What was meant by contemplative theology was the experience of knowing God through scripture. When Christians read scripture or recited the liturgy (privately or corporately) the purpose was not primarily to gain scriptural knowledge in itself, but to interiorise it. For Christians this meant that they came to an understanding of their relationship to God in light of the dogmatic. The ‘interiorisation’ of

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73 Bonner, ‘Deification’, 382.
75 See Chapter 2 section 2.7 in this thesis.
scripture or the Λόγος (Word) is the foundation of the early church idea of praxis, πρᾶξις (the active life of practice) and contemplative theology, θεωρία, which was co-joined with ‘theology’ (θεολογία).

In the ascetic and monastic context, what was meant by πρᾶξις is literally ‘doing the word’. As a result, no dichotomy is therefore imposed on the active Christian life between knowledge and reason and experience and practice.

All theology for Augustine is dogmatic and contemplative. Although affirming of Bonner’s study, Puchniak asserts that the delineation between the dogmatic and contemplative tasks is a modern separation and not one that Augustine would have made. Augustine’s notion of deification is dogmatic in so far as it is a sound scriptural articulation of a robust spectrum of doctrine. But it is contemplative in so far as he sought to use it to coax and deepen faith towards practice and inward change.

The Christian’s participation in the divine nature was tantamount to the believer’s participation in God’s own Trinitarian life. The incarnate Christ in joining his likeness to the believer was the reason Christians, according to Augustine, displayed God’s image: the Christian was spiritually an image of the ‘Image’. Yet the Christian’s deification remained something that

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77 Puchniak, 125.
78 Ibid., 125.
79 Ibid., 125.
80 Augustine’s conception of mens emerged out of a Trinitarian framework (see Chapter 4 sections 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 in this thesis). His conception of the mens holds within it an idea of the Christian’s active imitation of Christ because Christ was and remains the true image of the Father. On the idea of imitation in the Judeo-Christian context see H. K. Harrington, Holiness: Rabbinic Judaism and the Graeco-Roman World (London: Routledge, 2001), 182-84. Harrington writes that whereas the idea of sin in the Judeo-Christian tradition was understood as a negative movement or force away from God the idea of holiness was understood as a positive force towards God. Holiness is therefore the ‘other side of the coin’ of sin.
81 Cf. trin. 14.2.4 [CCL 50a: 426] ‘But what better thing has been created in its nature than that which has been made to the image of its Creator (Quid vero melius in eius natura creatum est quam quod ad sui creatoris imaginem facta est)? It is, therefore, not in the retention, contemplation, and love of the faith which will not be always (Non igitur in fidei retentione, contemplatione, dilectione, quae non erit semper), but in that which will be always, that the image is to be found which ought to be called the image of God (sed in eo quod semper erit invenienda est quam dici oporteat imaginem dei).’; trin. 4.2.4 [CCL 50:164] ‘For there is no harmony between the sinner and the just man, but between man and man (Non enim congruity peccator iusto, sed congruity homini homo). Accordingly, by uniting the likeness of his own humanity with us, he has taken away the unlikeness of our iniquity (Adiungens ergo nobis similitudinem humanitatis suae abstulit dissimilitudinem iniquitatis nostrae), and having been made a sharer of our mortality, he has made us a sharer of his divinity (et factus particeps...
Augustine qualified. Even in eternity when Christians could be said to have achieved perfection they could never be said to become equal to God or be subsumed into God’s very being, as can be discerned from the following passage:

I, in fact, think that even when there will be established in us a justice (Ego quidem hoc sentio, quia etiam cum fuerit in nobis tanta justitia) so great that nothing at all can be added to it (ut ei addi omnino nihil possit), the creature will still never become equal with the creator (non aequabitur creatura Creatori). However, if others believe that our progress will be so great that we shall be changed into the substance of God (Si autem aliqui putant tantum nostrum futurum esse provectum, ut in Dei substantiam convertamur), and thus become altogether what he is, (et hoc efficiamur prorsus quod ille est) they ought to consider how they support this opinion (viderint quemadmodum astraunt sententiam suam): - for my part, I confess that I am not convinced (mihi hoc fateor non esse persuasum).

Deification for Augustine lies at the heart of his thinking about the meaning and nature of Christian redemption. Yet it also lay behind the meaning and nature of the church’s ecclesiology as it was analogically appropriated through the believer’s participation of the sacraments of baptism and the Eucharist. These sacraments testified to the transformation and reformation of the Christian life, the final transformation of which would be realised eschatologically.

7.9 Conclusion

Augustine can be seen to have engaged with the patristic doctrine of deification frequently in his theology. His adaptation of the doctrine was informed by a broad spectrum of soteriological
themes that operated to give meaning to the Christian life, which in turn was given meaning by the incarnation and the Trinity. Moreover, his adaptation of the doctrine worked to locate the Christian’s sanctification at the spiritual level of the divine. For Augustine, the Christian’s deification was a product of Christ’s mediatory role. Its focus was not on the sinner, but on the Christian life because of the believer’s spiritual adoption. This understanding allowed him to correlate deification with Christ’s justification of the Christian. Christ was not just a model to be emulated by the Christian, but the agent of the new creation as human nature was refashioned in conformity with God’s image and likeness. This allowed him to speak of the Christian’s deification as a consequence of the Spirit’s work of illumination. The Spirit continued the work of reforming and transforming the Christian life, although Christians would not be perfected until the eschaton. Moreover, Augustine’s adaptation of the doctrine of deification allowed eschatology to inform the issue of Christian ethics and morality in the Christian’s present life, so that it worked to place his moral theory on an entirely theocentric foundation. It accounted for both the spiritual and earthly concerns of the Christian life without negation of either, and importantly without enforcing a dichotomy between the two.
Chapter 8: Maximus and the Patristic Doctrine of Deification

8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to show how Maximus’ theology engaged with the patristic doctrine of deification, so that it is informed by many aspects of his theology. His application of the doctrine took soteriological and Christological meaning from the full implications of the incarnation’s salvific work for both the Christian and the world, which made the concomitants of the doctrine the incarnation and the Trinity. His soteriological anthropology could therefore equate deification with Christian adoption because of the incarnation’s fully human and divine nature and Christ’s mediatory work. Maximus could therefore speak of deification as a product of Christ’s justification of Christians, the proof of which was the believer’s new disposition of will. Christ was not only the agent of the exchange, but the means by which the will’s new disposition operates at the natural spiritual level/mode of the λόγος. The incarnation’s salvific work has spiritually refashioned human nature, so that the believer’s identity not only lay in Christ as the model of ‘true humanity’, but in a far more realistic sense. This realistic sense is presented by Maximus in a similar fashion as had occurred with Augustine in his portrait of the Spirit-filled Christian as God’s image and instrument in the world. This understanding allowed deification to inform his eschatology, and made Christian moral theory a theocentric concern not an anthropocentric one so that it worked to demarcate his moral theory from both Origenist and Greco-Roman theories. Maximus’ own writings are more copiously cited in this chapter, because he had so much to say on the subject of deification.

8.2 Deification: Love and Christian Practice

Maximus’ engagement with the patristic doctrine of deification has been studied in depth.\(^1\) He inherited the doctrine from the Alexandrian tradition and the Christology and soteriology grounded in,

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and informed by, the ‘exchange formula’: ‘God became human, so that humans could become divine’. The doctrine in his work drew meaning from Johannean and Pauline scripture and from the traditional key texts with which it was identified: John 1:13 and Psalm 86:2. Although Maximus frequently incorporated the language of participation in his soteriology, it only goes towards inferring his knowledge of the other key text identified with deification, 2 Peter 1:4. His works show that he made no direct appeal to this text with reference to deification.

In its application, the doctrine of deification worked to inform many aspects of his theology such as his soteriology, anthropology, Christology, pneumatology and eschatology. It brought together a broad spectrum of soteriological themes that were given meaning by the incarnation and the Trinity, which allowed him to communicate a robust view of Christian salvation. The doctrine achieved this because it was Christologically centred. It allowed early theologians, like Maximus, to extrapolate on the incarnation’s work for both the Christian and the world, the end result of which gave meaning and shape to the nature of Christian salvation itself.

The doctrine was not focused on the sinner, but on the Christian life. Christ’s mediatory role had established a new modality of life for the believer whereby their nature could never be said to be quite the same again. McFarland writes that Maximus’ understanding of deification suggests that,

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3 See Russell, Deification, 266-67. Maximus spoke about the Christian’s participation in the general context of the Christian participating in God’s attributes and gifts. Russell suggests that the reason Maximus made no direct appeal 2 Peter 1:4 was due the Monothelite Controversy. It avoided a direct appeal to the text because he did not want to draw his readers’ attention to participation in a φύσις (God’s nature/essence) understood in terms of οὐσία (God’s substance). It implied that a change had occurred in the believer, which subsumed them into God’s being. Although Russell’s theory makes sense of the Monothelite context it may be over-reaching. In his seventh-century context, Maximus would have taken for granted that 2 Peter 1:4 was a text that had long been connected to the patristic doctrine of deification as would his Christian readers. There may therefore have been no warrant for him to directly appeal to a text that in scriptural tradition had long been taken for granted.


whilst the will is the means by which the Christian lives out their identity before God (i.e., as a rational creature, humans were created to be autonomously free in their choices), the choices that believers make are not the source of their identity. ‘Their source is God, such that the fulfillment of what it means to be human is to have one’s will fixed steadily on God’s.’ It is this new disposition of will in Christians, which restores their likeness to God and results in the visible reformation and transformation of the Christian life.

Much like Augustine had done, Maximus engaged with deification in the context of his practical or ‘task theology’. The incarnation’s salvific work had changed human nature in a ‘realistic’ sense because Christians were spiritually reborn people. They possessed a will that was capable of naturally inclining itself away from sin towards love of God and his commandments. ‘For nothing is more truly godlike than divine love, nothing more mysterious, nothing more apt to raise up human beings to deification.’ Their spiritual rebirth also implied that the Christian life was closely related to God’s economic salvation plan.

In contrast to all sin-affected humans, Christ, who was both fully human and divine, had remained perfectly obedient in the disposition of his will. His natural will always operated at the natural spiritual level/mode of the λόγος. His death, resurrection and ascension consequentially worked to unite the Christian to himself because of his human and divine identity. United in Christ, Christians shared Christ’s spiritual eternal home in a ‘realistic’ sense because they were united to Christ’s spiritual life at the natural level or mode of the λόγος. The Christian mind now illuminated by

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6 Ibid., 102.
7 On ‘task theology’ see Chapter 7 section 7.3 in this thesis.
8 Ep. 2 [PG 91: 393B]
9 Ep. 2 [PG 91: 393BC] ‘For it has gathered together in itself all good things (ὅτι πάντα ἐν ἰαυτή συλλαβοθέν ἦ σὲ καλὰ) that are recounted by the λόγος of truth in the form of virtue (ὅταν τής ἄληθείας ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀρετής ἐξεὶ διέξει), and it has absolutely no relation to anything that has the form of wickedness (καὶ πάντων ἁσχέτως τῶν ἐν κακίας ἐξεὶ κατειλημμένων ἀπόκιστα), since it is the fulfillment of the law and the prophets (ὡς πλήρως νόμου καὶ προφητῶν) [cf. Matt. 22:40; Rom. 13:10]. For they were succeeded by the mystery of love, (ὅτι διαδέχεται τὸ τῆς ἁγίατις μυστήριον) which out of human beings makes us gods (τὸ ἡμᾶς θεοὺς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ποιεῖν), and reduces the individual commandments to a universal meaning [λόγος] (καὶ συντέμνον τρὸς τὸν καθόλου λόγον τῶν ἐντολῶν τῶν καιροῦς). Everything is circumscribed by love according to God’s good pleasure in a single form (ὅτι οὐ πάντες κατ’ εὐδοκίαν μονοειδῶς περιέχονται), and love is dispensed in many forms in accordance with God’s economy [salvation plan] (καὶ ἐξ οὐ πολυτρόπως κατ’ οἰκονομίαν ἕκδικοινται).’
the Spirit’s work was fully conscious of its true knowledge of God, just as Adam and Eve had been in
the garden prior to the fall.

Christ was not only the agent of the exchange but the means by which the Christian’s new
disposition of will operated at the natural spiritual level/mode of the λόγος. The work of grace meant
that the Spirit-filled Christian possessed a free and intentional capacity to love and obey God. As the
agent of the exchange Christ’s personhood was therefore more than just a model of ‘true humanity’.
His sinless obedience, evidenced by the way in which his will naturally aligned itself to God’s will,
was a testament to his ‘true humanity’. Christ was not only the greatest testament of God’s love in his
sacrifice for humanity’s sin, it was also a testament of the Christian’s deification:10

For it [divine love] has gathered together in itself all good things that are recounted by the
logos of truth in the form of virtue (ὅτι πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῇ συλλαβοῦσα ἐχει τὰ καλὰ, ὡς τῆς
ἀληθείας ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀρετῆς εἶδει διεξει), and it has absolutely no relation to anything that
has the form of wickedness, since it is the fulfilment of the law and the prophets [cf. Mt.
22:40; Rom. 13:10] (καὶ πάντων ἀσχέτως τῶν ἐν κακίας εἶδει κατελημμένων ἀφόκισται, ὡς
πλήρωμα νόμου καὶ προφητῶν). For they were succeeded by the mystery of love, which out of
human beings makes us gods (οὓς διαδέχεται τὸ τῆς ἀγάπης μυστήριον, τὸ ἡμᾶς θεοὺς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων
ποιοῦν), and reduces the individual commandments to a universal meaning [logos]
(καὶ συντήμουν πρὸς τὸν καθόλου λόγον τῶν ἐντολῶν τοὺς μερικοὺς). Everything is
circumscribed by love according to God’s good pleasure in a single form, and love is
dispensed in many forms in accordance with God’s economy [salvation plan] (ὥς οὗ πάντες
κατ’ εὐδοκίαν μονοειδῶς περιέχονται, καὶ ἐς οthren πολυτρόπως κατ’ οἰκονομίαν ἐκδίδονται).11

According to Maximus, faith and conversion mean that the lost likeness to God in all sin-
affected humans is restored in the believer. Since the Christian gains true knowledge of God, the sin-
affected gnomic will now possessed the capacity to operate in accordance with the natural will at the

11 Ep. 2 [PG 91:393BC]
level/mode of the λόγος.12 Christ is the one who has established and brought about this spiritual new modality of life for believers, which supports the notion that the incarnation’s work is also a deifying work in the Christian life.13

The Christian’s deification is ontological because Christians are united with Christ. Their spiritual identity stems from the natural spiritual level/mode of the λόγος14 because they fully participate in Christ’s divine nature.15 Spirit-filled Christians as they take on the mind of Christ actively seek to obey God’s will showing that they share Christ’s spiritual eternal home16. Yet the participation of believers in Christ is also what makes the nature of their deification teleological or purposeful. In other words, the spiritual realm simultaneously bears on, and gives meaning to, the current life as it is experienced and lived at the level/mode of the τρόπος (the created material/corporeal sin-affected realm of human experience or the current human predicament). As the Christian experiences life in the sin-affected world, they also continue to move towards their eternal destiny. Their eschatological future has ramifications for the issue of Christian ethics and morality in the present. Moral choices, decisions and actions matter because their basis is founded upon a

12 Ep. 2 [PG 91:393BC] ‘Love alone properly speaking (Ἀυτὴ μόνη, κυρίως εἰπεῖν), proves that the human person is in the image of the Creator (κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Κτίσαντος τὸν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα παρίσταται), by making his self-determination submit to reason, not bending reason under it, (τῷ μὲν λόγῳ σοφῶς τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ὑποτάσσομαι: τούτῳ δὲ τὸν λόγον οὐχ ὑποκλίνουσα) and persuading the inclination to follow nature and not in any way to be at variance with the logos of nature (καὶ πείθουσα τὴν γνώμην κατὰ τὴν φύσιν παρείσθησθαι, μηδαμῶς πρὸς τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως στασιάζουσα). In this way we are all (καθ’ ἄν ἑπαντείς), as it were, one nature, so that we are able to have one inclination and one will with God and with one another, not having any discord with God or one another, whenever by the law of grace, through which by our inclination the law of nature is renewed, we choose what is ultimate (ὡσπερ μὲν γνώμην καὶ θέλημα ἐν, θεῷ καὶ ἄλλης ἔχειν δυνάμεθε, οἱ δὲ θεὸν καὶ ἄλλης διάστασις ἔχοντες, ὃς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τῆς χάριτος, δι’ τὸν νόμον τῆς φύσεως γνωμικῶς ἀνακαίνισμον, ἁμείησθεν πρακριμοῦσθε). For it is impossible for those who do not cleave first to God through concord to be able to agree with others in their inclination (λημέριζαν γὰρ τοὺς μὴ πρῶτον θεῷ καθ’ ὀμνόνων συναφθέντας, ἁμαρτής συμβαίνειν δύνασθαι κατὰ τὴν γνώμην).’

13 Ep. 2 [PG 91:404BC] ‘Because of this, the Creator of nature himself (Διὸ ταύτην, αὐτὸς ὁ τῆς φύσεως ποιητὴς)-who has ever heard of anything so truly awesome (τὸ φρεκτὸν δύνατο καὶ πράγμα καὶ ἄκουσμα)-has clothed himself with our nature, (τὴν φύσιν εὐδόκησε τὴν ἡμέτέραν) without change uniting it hypostatically to himself (ἐνώσας ταύτην ἀφρέκτως ἐσωτήρ καθ’ ὑποστάτων), in order to check what has been borne away, (ἔνα στήσθη τοῦ φέρεσθαι) and gather it to himself (καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν συναγερέσθαι), our nature may no longer have hand in him in its inclination (καθ’ ἑαυτὴν συναχθέσαι, καὶ μηδέν ἔχουσαι πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἡ ἑαυτὴν κατὰ τὴν γνώμην διάγορον). In this way he clearly establishes the all-glorious way of love (καὶ φανεράν καταστήσει τὴν πανδιάνδραν τῆς ἁγίατος ἀδών), which is truly divine and deifying and leads to God (τῆς θείας ὀντος καὶ θεσποίου, καὶ πρὸς θεῶν ἐγγονῆς).’

14 See Chapter 5 Section 5.3.

15 On the sense of ‘participation’ see Chapter 1 section 1.6 in this thesis.

theocentric concern, not an anthropocentric one, which is also why believers retain their autonomous freedom in the transformation and reformation of their life.

Although Christ’s salvific work has promised that the full perfection of his followers will be a future event, it is the work of grace that undergirds the believer’s responsibility to strive towards their own transformation and reformation. When Christians engage in spiritual disciplines their ‘likeness’ to God is restored, and is the reason why Maximus spoke of πράξεις (the active Christian life) as leading to deification. In this soteriological context, Christian asceticism functions to restore God’s image to God’s ‘lost likeness’, compromised and lost in humanity by the effects of sin after the fall. Spiritual disciplines were, therefore, a necessary part of the Christian active life. Hence, the Christian’s spiritual training, their pursuit of holiness, was a wholly theocentric endeavour, not an anthropocentric one. For Maximus it demarcated the idea of Christian spiritual training from both the Origenists, who thought of spiritual disciplines as a means to an end; and from Greco-Roman philosophy, as both thought of spiritual disciplines in a wholly anthropocentric way. Spiritual disciplines were understood within an anthropocentric context, as aids to disciplining or taming the body so as to free the mind from its material/earthly prison so that the mind in its reasoning could reach a pure intellectual height. For Christians, however, their belief that sin’s effects also corrupted the mind was what made spiritual disciplines necessary to the Christian life.

Maximus’ theology of the will and the affections is therefore not only framed by the Christian’s deification, but climaxes in it, and is evident in his teaching on Christ’s summation of the greatest commandment: 17

Love is therefore a great good (Μέγα οὖν ἀγαθόν ἢ ἀγάπη), and of goods the first and most excellent good (καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ἐξαίτετον ἀγαθόν), since through it God and man are drawn together in a single embrace (ὡς Θεὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον δι’ ἑαυτῆς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐχουσα συνάπτουσα), and the creator of humankind appears as human (καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπον τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ἄνθρωπων διεσῴζειν ἐκαστευχόσειν), through the undeviating likeness of the deified to God in the good so far as it is possible to humankind (διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεομίστου πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν κατὰ τὸ ἄγαθόν ὡς ἐφικτὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀπαραλλαξάν). And the interpretation of love is: to love the Lord your God with all your heart and soul and power,

17 See Russell, Deification, 265.
and the neighbour as oneself [Cf. Lk 10:27] (ἡν ἐνεργεῖν ὑπολαμβάνω, τὸ ἀγατῆσαι Κύριον
tὸν Θεὸν εὑ ὡς ἅλης τῆς καιρίας καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως, καί τὸν πλησίον ὡς ἑαυτὸν). 18

In this theocentric context, the Christian’s good works become ‘holy’ or ‘deifying’ works because the value of the ‘goodness’ originates and comes forth from God from the natural spiritual level of the λόγος. Yet the deifying value of good works does not originate from the believer’s own actions. United to Christ, the believer participates in God’s divine nature and as such the Christian’s good works participate in his goodness and holiness. Although Christians can never be said to attain perfection in their present life, their good works are made ‘perfect’ in the sense that God continually bestows eternal value upon them:

The first two of these19 [i.e., being and eternal being] he grants to the essence, the second two [i.e., goodness and wisdom] to its faculty of will; that is, to the essence he gives being and eternal being, and to the volitive faculty he gives goodness and wisdom in order that what he is by essence [nature] the creature might become by participation. For this reason he is said to be made “to the image and likeness of God” [cf. Gen 1:26]...Every rational nature indeed is made to the image of God; but only those who are good and wise are made to his likeness.20

Good works become the visible evidence to the world that Christians spiritually belong to the natural spiritual level of the λόγος. It is this soteriological context that distinguished the good works achieved by Christians from those of non-Christians.

κακῶν ἀντὶ κακοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἀπολαμβάνομεν κατὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν. Τὴν γὰρ συγχωρήσαντον τῶν παραπτωμάτων ἡμῶν ἐν τῇ συγχωρήσαντον τῶν ἁδελφῶν εὐρίσκομεν· καὶ τὸ ἔλεος τοῦ κυρίου ἐν τῇ ἐλεημοσύνῃ τοῦ πλησίου ἐγκέκριμαται...Ἰδοὺ ἔχαρισεν ἡμῖν ὁ κύριος τρόπον σωτηρίας, καὶ ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν ἔξοδον γενέσθαι τέκνα θεοῦ· (cf. Jn. 1:12; Ps 82:6) καὶ ἐν τῷ θελήματι ἡμῶν ἐστὶ λοιπὸν ἡ σωτηρία ἡμῶν. Δέωμεν οὖν ἑαυτούς τῷ κυρίῳ ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου, ἵνα ὁλοκληρὼν αὐτὸν ἀντιλαμβάνωμεν. γενέσθαι θεόν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ τούτου ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν, φύσει ὅν θεός καὶ δεσπότης. Note the references that allude to the scriptural passages Jn. 1:12 and Ps 82:6 and the exchange formula γενέσθαι θεόν ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ τούτου ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν, φύσει ὅν θεός ‘Let us become gods through him, for on that account he became man, who is by nature God.’

19 In bringing into existence humanity’s rational and intelligent nature, God in his supreme goodness has communicated to it four of the divine attributes, by which he maintains and preserves his creatures: being, eternal being, goodness and wisdom. See the first half of CC3.25.

20 CC3.25 [PG 90:1024BC] Τούτων τὰ μὲν δύο τῇ οὐσίᾳ παρέχει· τὰ δὲ δύο, τῇ γνωμῇ ἐπιπροάδιστοι· τὴν ἁγιάσθητα καὶ τὴν σοφίαν· ἵνα ἄπερ ἐστὶν αὐτὸς κατ’ οὐσίαν, γίνηται ἢ κτίσις κατὰ μετουσίαν. Διὰ ταύτην, καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ ομοίωσιν θεοῦ λέγεται γενενθηκε... Καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα μὲν, πάσης φύσεις λογική ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ· καθ’ ομοίωσιν δὲ, μόνοι οἱ ἁγαθοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ.
8.3 Deification: the Spirit’s Work of Illumination

According to Maximus, the believer’s mind was able to operate at the spiritual level/mode of the λόγος because of the Spirit’s continuing work of illumination. For instance, he correlated the activity of the Spirit with the Christian rite of baptism. Baptism was connected to the idea of spiritual rebirth, which in turn was connected to the idea of eternal life, which was attributed to the Spirit’s work. The symbols of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord’s Supper point to the fulfillment of both the present and future realities of Christian salvation, which the Spirit’s work not only fulfils but also continues. The Spirit’s work therefore undergirds early Christian thinking about the importance of the believer’s participation in the sacrament of baptism as well as the Eucharist.

For Maximus, Christology, pneumatology and soteriology all had a bearing on ecclesiology. Believers’ participation in the sacraments therefore functions as more than a reminder of the past event of their conversion. Their participation is a real and active testament to the reality of the fulfillment of their salvation. In the ecclesiological setting, the sacraments function to hold Christians to account in how they live their present life in light of their promised eternal life because of what the incarnation has salvifically achieved and fulfilled. Moreover, all the activities that incorporate the life of the church, the reading of scripture, the singing of songs and hymns, the spoken word, liturgy, prayer as well as the sacraments operate from out of the Christological and soteriological setting of the incarnation and the Trinity. The Church’s life bears witness and testimony to the progression of the Christian life, not only because Christians are Spirit-filled but also because they are destined for eternity. The promise and fulfillment of the believer’s eternal future therefore simultaneously bears on and gives meaning to their current life.

As seen in the example of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper, the doctrine of deification therefore informed issues of ecclesiology. ‘Through them, in making us who conducts himself worthy as best he can in Christ, it brings to light the grace of adoption which was given through holy baptism in the Holy Spirit and which makes us perfect in Christ.’

As the Christian life was held to account to make
progress in holiness, the Spirit’s illuminating work resulted in sinful passions being turned into good in the Christian life. The evidence of the Spirit’s work of ‘perfecting’ the believer was partly discernable in the good affections that were cultivated by the Christian in their day-to-day life. In the passage below Maximus shows how Christians were to cultivate sinful passions into godly ones because of their salvation:

Instead, let us with all our strength and zeal render ourselves worthy of the divine gifts in pleasing God by good works (ἀλλὰ πάσῃ δυνάμει τὲ καὶ σπουδὴ παραστήσωμεν έαυτούς ἄξιοὺς τῶν θείων χαρισμάτων δι᾽ ἐργῶν ἀγαθῶν) not being occupied as are “the pagans who know not God,” (cf. 1 Thess. 4:6) with the passion of concupiscence (1 Thess. 4:5) (εἰσαρεστοῦντες τῷ θεῷ, μὴ ἀναστρεφόμενοι κατὰ τὰ ἐθνὰ τὰ μὴ εἰδότα τὸν θεὸν ἐν πάθει ἐπιθυμίας) but as the holy Apostle [Paul] says (ἀλλὰ καθὼς φησὶν ο ἄγιος ἀποστόλος), putting to death our members which are rooted in earth: (Νεκρώσαντες τὰ μέλη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς) fornication (πορνείαν), impurity (ἀκαθαρσίαν), passion (πάθος), evil desire (ἐπιθυμίαν κακήν) and covetousness which is idolatry (καὶ τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἢτις ἐστὶν εἴδωλολατρία) from which comes God’s wrath on the sons of disobedience (δι᾽ αὐτῶν ἐρχεται ἡ ἐργὴ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπὶ τοὺς νόις τῆς ἀπειθείας), and all wrath, animosity, foul language, and lying (ἀργὴν τε πᾶσαν καὶ θημὸν καὶ αἰσχρολογίαν καὶ ψεύδος), and to sum up (καὶ συντόμως εἶπεῖν), putting aside the old man which is corrupted by the lusts of illusion with his past deeds and lusts (πάντα τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν φθειρόμενον κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης ἀπόθεμενοι σὺν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις), let us walk in a manner worthy of God who has called us to his kingdom and his glory (ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ περιπατήσωμεν τοῦ καλέσαντος ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βασιλείαν καὶ δόξαν), having clothed ourselves with heartfelt compassion (ἐνυπασμένους σπάλαγχνα οἰκτικροὺς), with kindness (χρηστότητα), humility (ταπεινοφροσύνην), meekness (πραότητα) and patience (μακροθυμίαν), bearing with one another in love and forgiving one another (ἀνεχόμενοι ἀλλήλων ἐν ἀγάπῃ καὶ χαριζόμενοι ἑαυτοῖς) if one has a complaint against the other just as Christ has forgiven us (ἐάν τις πρὸς τινα ἔχῃ μομφήν, καθὼς καὶ ο Χριστὸς ἐχαρίσατο ἡμῖν), and over all these let us clothe ourselves with love and
peace (ἐπὶ πάσα τέ τῶν σύνδεσμων τῆς τελειότητος, τὴν ἀγάπην καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην), the bond of perfection, to which we have been called in one body, in short, (εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐκλήθημεν ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι, καὶ Ἰνα συνέλαβον εἴπω) the new man who is constantly renewed in full knowledge according to the image of the one who created him (τὸν νέον ἀνθρωπόν τὸν ἀνακαινοῦμεν εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτοῦ).  

According to Maximus, the Spirit’s work of perfection would not be fully realised in the Christian life until the eschaton: ‘But in the future age, he drinks this [wine] anew (Ἄλλ’ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι αἰῶνι πέντε τούτοι καινόν), that is, renewed by the Holy Spirit, as, through the ecstatic and intoxicating participation of good things, he brings those who are worthy to perfection, gods by grace (τουτέστιν ἀνακαινοῦμεν διὰ τοῦ ἀγίου πνεύματος καὶ θεοῦς χάριτι τοὺς ἀξίους ἀπεργαζόμενος διὰ τῆς ἐκστατικῆς καὶ μεμεθυσμένης τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετουσίας).’  

The eschatological fulfilment of the believer’s deification had its beginnings in the current life, but would not be fully realised until the eschatological age:

The hope of his calling is detachment in the midst of action, in keeping with the Lord’s own way of life (Ἡ τῆς κλήσεως ἐλπίς ἐστίν η κατά τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κυρίου πολιτείαν διὰ πράξεως ἀπάθεια). And ‘the wealth of the glory of his inheritance in the saints’ [cf. Eph. 1:18-19] is the wealth of the knowledge of truth (πλοῦτος δὲ τῆς ἀδίκης τῆς κληρονομίας αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς ἀγίοις ἐστίν ὁ κατὰ τὴν γνώσιν τῆς ἀληθείας πλοῦτος). And ‘the exceeding greatness of his power’ is deification that will be bestowed upon the worthy, since it is beyond nature and, by grace, will make gods of human beings (ὑπερβάλλον δὲ μέγεθος τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ ἐστίν ἢ τοῖς ἀξίοις δωρηθησομένη θέωσις, ὡς ὑπὲρ φύσιν οὕσα καὶ θεοῦς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων κατὰ χάριν τοὺς μετάχους ἀποτελοῦσα).’

The believer’s future perfection had already been sealed by Christ’s mediatory work. The nature of Christ’s mediatory work ensured that an exchange had taken place.

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22 Myst. 24 [CCSG 69:66-67] In this passage, Maximus weaves together the Pauline texts: Col 3:5-6, 8-9, 12-13; Eph. 4:22, 5:6; 1 Thess. 2:12. See G. C. Berthold, Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 225, n.143. Berthold explains that the renewal is seen by Maximus in its moral implications.

23 QD.180 [CCSG 10:123]

24 QD. 61 [CCSG 10:48]
7.4 Deification: Justification and Spiritual Adoption

Christ’s mediatory work encapsulated the ‘mystery’ of the incarnation’s salvific work. Christ had descended from his divine eternal home and had ‘emptied himself’ (κενόσης). Remaining fully divine he had taken on a fully human nature. There was a reciprocal relationship between Christ and the Christian’s deification because Christ had joined humanity to himself. 25 ‘Undoubtedly he calls “counsel” of God the Father the mysterious self-abasement 26 of the only-begotten Son with a view to the deification of our nature, a self-abasement in which he holds enclosed the limits of history.’ 27

Christ’s fully human and divine nature undergirded the theology of the exchange, because Christ had incorporated the means of the mediation between God and humanity. The fact that Maximus related the patristic doctrine of deification to the divine incarnation was therefore an echo of the Alexandrian exchange formula. 28 The context of the spiritual renewal of the believer’s position in Christ further allowed early theologians, like Maximus, to also equate the doctrine of deification with the doctrine of Christian adoption. Spiritually speaking, that Christians were spiritually reborn by the Spirit’s work, implying that they were related to Christ not only in name but also in a far more ‘realistic’ sense, because scripture referred to them as the sons and daughters of God, just as Christ was referred to as God’s son. Maximus wrote:

In becoming incarnate, the Word of God teaches us the mystical knowledge of God because he shows us in himself the Father and the Holy Spirit (Θεολογίαν μὲν γὰρ διδάσκει σαρκοϊμένος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος, ὡς ἐν ἑαυτῷ δεικνύς τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον)...He gives adoption by giving through the Spirit a supernatural birth from on high in grace, of which divine birth the guardian and preserver is the free will of those who are thus born (Τὸν Θεολογίαν δὲ δίδωσι, τὴν ὑπὲρ φύσιν ἀκοιμήν διὰ Πνεύματος ἐν χάριτι δωρεάμενος γέννησιν· ἣς ἐν Θεῷ φυλακῇ τε καὶ τήρησις ἐστιν, ἢ τῶν γεννομένων προαίρεσις). By a

25 See Ladner, 154. The Christian was now joined with Christ so that their human nature could never be said to be quite the same again.
26 The term self-abasement (κενόσης) was a common patristic term for the incarnation, founded upon Paul’s use of the verb form in Phil 2.7. See Berthold, 120, n. 9.
28 See Berthold, 120, n. 9.
sincere disposition it cherishes the grace bestowed by careful observance of the commandments it adorns the beauty given by grace (διαθέσει γνησία τὴν δοθείσαι στέργωσα χάριν, καὶ τῇ πράξει τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐπιμελῶς τὸ κατὰ χάριν δοθὲν ώραίζουσα κάλλος). By the humbling of the passions it takes on divinity in the same measure that the Word of God willed to empty himself in the incarnation of his own unmixed glory in becoming genuinely human (καὶ τοσοῦτον τῇ κενώσει τῶν παθῶν μεταποιουμένη θεότητος, ὡς ο ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος τῆς οἰκείας ἀκραφίνους δόξης, οἰκονομικῶς ἑαυτὸν κατὰ θέλησιν κενώσας, γενόμενος ἄλθως κεχρημάτικεν ἄνθρωπος). 30

Christian adoption meant that Christians shared in Christ’s divine life. In other words, Christ had made known to the Christian the mystery of God’s inner Trinitarian life. In the gospel of John, Christ had been depicted as the ‘bread of life’. Maximus therefore spoke of Christ as the ‘noetic’ food that believers needed to feed on, not only so that they could be sustained in the Christian life, but which also ensured their participation in Christ’s divine life. It was the nature of Christ’s salvific work that reformed the gnomic will so that it functioned in Christians in accordance with Christ’s natural will, which resulted in active obedience to God’s commands.

29 See Ibid., 120-21 n. 17. This term is not used in the psychological sense of temperament but in the deliberative sense of the state of the will.
30 Or. Dom. 2 [PG 90:876CD-877A]
31 In the context of patristic apophatic theology the incarnation reveals positive knowledge about God. The incarnation reveals ‘theology’ in the Trinitarian life of the Father. Cf. Or. Dom. 2 [PG 90:876C] ‘In becoming incarnate, the Word of God teaches us the mystical knowledge of God because he shows us in himself the Father and the Holy Spirit (θεολογίαν μὲν γὰρ διδάσκει σαρκούμενος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος, ὡς ἐν ἑαυτῷ δεινῷ τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἁγιόν).’
32 God was made known to believers through Christ’s personhood.
33 Or. Dom. 2 [PG 90:877C] ‘He gives a sharing in the divine life by making himself food for those whom he knows and who have received from him the same sensibility and intelligence (Ζωῆς δὲ θείας ποιεῖται μετάδοσιν, ἐνδώμοι ἑαυτὸν ἐργαζόμενος, ὡς οἶδεν αὐτὸς, καὶ οἱ παρ’ αὐτοῦ τοιαύτῃ αἰσθήσιν νοερὰν εἰληφότες). Thus in tasting they know with a true knowledge that the Lord is good (cf. Ps. 34:9), he who mixes in a divine quality to deify those who eat, since he is and is clearly called bread of life [cf. Jn 6:35, 48, 51] and of strength (ὥστε τῇ γεύσει ταύτης τῆς βρώσεως, εἰδέναι, καὶ ἐπίγνωσιν ἅλθος, ὅτι χρητός ὁ Κύριος, ποιότητι θεός πρὸς θεάναι μετακινεῖν τοῖς ἔσσοντες αὐτόν ἀλθον̣ς καὶ δυνάμεως ἄρος καὶ ὅν καὶ καλούμενος).’ See Berthold, 121 n. 25. Berthold notes that the patristic theme of the Word (Λόγος) as food was a common theme in the early church, which was frequently used by Origen. See also Russell, Deification, 268. The Λόγος as the spiritual food for Christians is also a clear allusion to the Lord’s Supper or the Eucharist.
34 Or. Dom. 2 [PG 90:880A] “‘and having broken down the dividing wall of hostility, by abolishing in his flesh the law of commandments and ordinances, [he created] in himself one new man in place of two, so making peace and reconciling”[cf. Eph. 2:14-16] (καὶ τὸ μεσότοιχον τοῦ φρεγμοῦ λύσας, τὸν νόμον δηλούσας τῶν ἐντολῶν σαφὴν ἐν ὀδηγίᾳ ταῖς δύο ἔκτεσις εἰς ἐνα καὶ ἀνθρώπων, ποιῶν εἰρήνην καὶ ἀποκαταλάβοις) us through himself to the Father and with each other in such a way that we no longer have a will opposed to the principle of nature and that thus we be as changeless
Deification was a result of the work of grace in the believer’s life and their spiritual adoption was indicative of the new disposition of the will, which they now possessed:

Finally, sons and daughters are the ones who out of neither fear of threats or desire of promised things but rather out of character and habit of the voluntary inclination and disposition of the soul towards good never become separated from God (υἱῶν δὲ, οἵ μὴτε φόβῳ τῶν ἡττελμένων μὴτε πόθῳ τῶν ἐπηγεγεμένων ἀλλὰ τρόπῳ καὶ ἔξει τῆς πρὸς τὸ καλὸν κατὰ γνώμην τῆς ψυχῆς ῥοπῆς τὸ καὶ διαθέσεως μηδέποτε τοῦ θεοῦ χωρίζόμενοι)...They have become as much as possible by deification in grace what God is and is believed by nature and by cause (τούτῳ κατὰ τὴν ἐν χάριτι θέσιν ἐνδεχομένως ὑπάρχουσιν ὅπερ ὁ θεὸς κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ ἔστι καὶ πιστεύεται).³⁵

The will’s new disposition was evidenced at the horizontal level in the believer’s relationship to others: ‘The clear proof of grace is the voluntary disposition of good will toward those akin to us whereby the man who needs our help becomes as much as possible our friend as God is and we do not leave him abandoned and forsaken but rather with fitting zeal we show him in action the disposition which is alive in us with respect to God and our neighbour.’³⁶

Maximus was therefore also able to speak of deification as a product of Christ’s justification of the believer, the proof of which was discerned by their good works. In the context of Christ’s mediatory work, deification was a direct result of the Christian’s justification, which made the doctrine of deification the other side of the doctrine of justification:

For a work is proof of disposition (ἐργον γὰρ ἀπόδειξεις διαθέσεως). Now nothing is either so fitting for justification or so apt for divinisation (Οὐδὲν γὰρ οὔτε πρὸς δικαιοσύνην οὔτω

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³⁵ Myst. 24 [CCSG 69:65-66] Maximus qualifies deification in this passage by using τούτῳ κατὰ τὴν ἐν χάριτι θέσιν This qualification ensures that there is no suggestion that Maximus is teaching that the Christian was subsumed into God’s being.

Whereas the doctrine of justification extrapolated on what the incarnation’s salvific work beneficially achieved for the sinner, the doctrine of deification extrapolated on the significance and meaning of Christian salvation now that the sinner was saved.

7.5 Deification: Perichoresis and God’s Cosmic Scope of Salvation

Maximus further expressed the believer’s new disposition of the will in the context of God’s entire economic plan for salvation. He did so by drawing on the Trinitarian language of perichoresis, which earlier Fathers had developed from the Neoplatonic principle of reciprocity or emanation and remanation. His engagement with the language of perichoresis allowed him to express the meaning behind God’s purpose in creation, which in turn gave meaning to the purpose and nature of salvation itself. God had created so that he could communicate his divine fullness to his creation, which had been the entire intent of the scope (σκοπός) of his plan for creation from the very beginning. In saving humanity, God brought believers into his own Trinitarian life so that they too fully participated in the scope of his salvation plan for the entire cosmos:

If then rational beings come into being, surely they are also moved (Εἰ τοίνυν γενητά υπάρχει τά λογικά καὶ κινεῖται πάντως), since they move from a natural beginning in “being” (ὡς εἰς ἁρχής κατὰ φύσιν διὰ τὸ εἶναι) toward a voluntary end in “well-being” (πρὸς τέλος κατὰ γνώμην διὰ τὸ εὖ εἶναι κινούμενα). For the end of the movement of those who are moved is “eternal well-being” itself (Τέλος γὰρ τῆς τῶν κυνωμένων κινήσεως αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἁεὶ εὖ εἶναι ἐστὶν), just as its beginning is being itself which is God (ὡσπερ καὶ ἁρχὴ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ὁ πρῶτος ὁ θεός), who is the giver of being as well as of “well-being” (ὁ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι δοτὴρ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι χαριστικός). For God is the beginning and the end (ὡς ἁρχὴ

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37 Myst. 24 [CCSG 69:68]
38 See ‘Christian Exemplarism’ in Introduction.
From him come both our moving in whatever way from a beginning and our moving in a certain way toward him as an end (ἐξ αὐτοῦ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς κινεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἀρχῆς, καὶ τὸ πῶς κινεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ὡς τέλος ἔστιν). Christians became integral participants in the entire scope of God’s salvation plan because God’s plan was Christologically determined and fulfilled, having its beginning and end in the salvific work of the incarnate Λόγος, Christ.

For Maximus, God’s cosmic salvific plans moved along a linear historical trajectory and distinguished itself from Origenist teaching that thought of the Christian’s movement within a static circular construct of emanation and return, ‘becoming-rest-movement’. Origenists thought of the Christian’s soul as having fallen from its pre-existent primal state where it had then been trapped in a material/corporeal sinful body. Their moral theory promoted a spiritual intellectualism that they believed would free the soul or mind from its sin-affected earthly entrapment. The Christian’s free will entirely involved an act of rational power by which the mind moved towards one of the two opposing poles of good and evil. The believer’s movement, oscillated backwards and forwards between good and sinful choices, from an initial position of ‘rest’, which made the system an inward anthropocentric one in the way it functioned. Origenist moral theory thought of Christian ascetic disciplines, not as necessary to the continuation of the Christian life, but as a means to end. As aids to the soul, these disciplines would help set the mind free from the sin-affected corporeal body.

In Origenist soteriology, the soul’s fall was communicated by way of a descending triad of ‘rest – fall - corporeal birth’ (στάσεις- κίνσεις- γένεσις) where the soul had originally enjoyed rest, from

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39 Amb. 7.1073C [PG 91:1073C] cf. Amb 7.1077C [PG 91:1077C] ‘If by reason and wisdom a person has come to understand that what exists was brought out of non-being into being by God (Τίς γὰρ λόγῳ εἰδὼς καὶ σοφίᾳ τὰ δύτα ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύτος παρὰ Θεοῦ εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρέχθαι …would he not know that one Logos is many logos (οὐχὶ πολλοὶ ἔσται λόγοις τῶν ἐνα λόγων)? This is evident in the incomparable differences among created things (τῇ τῶν γεγονότων ἀδιαφρότης συνθετικόντων διαφορῇ). He will also know that the many logos are the one Logos to whom all things are related and who exists in himself without confusion (ὅπως ἐν αὐτῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα τε καὶ ἕαυτα ἀσύγχυτον ἰδιότητα; Καὶ πάλιν ἐνα τοῖς πολλοῖς, τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῶν πάντων ἀναφορᾷ δι’ ἐκαίνων ἀπαγχύτως ὑμάρχοντα), the essential and individually distinctive God, the Logos of God the Father (ἐνοπλόσιοι τε καὶ ἐνυπόστατον τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ Πατρὸς Θεόν Λόγον). He is the beginning and cause of all thing (ὡς ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν τῶν ὀλίγων). Maximus’ thinking is grounded in the inner principles, λόγοι that derive from God’s being (Λόγος) and which continuously communicate God’s beauty and being throughout creation.’

40 See Chapter 2 sections 2.10 and 2.11 in this thesis.
where it had fallen, and where it had been brought into its present condition of corporeal existence.\textsuperscript{41}

Maximus counteracted this heterodox triad by creatively constructing his own descending triad whereby he reformulated an opposing ascending triad, ‘being- wellbeing - ever wellbeing’ (\textit{εἰναι- εὖ εἰναι- ἀεὶ εἰναι}). The ascent of his triad was theocentric in its orientation because its movement implied that the believer was progressively changing into God’s likeness. He developed this out of the Pauline theme of Christ being in the Christian and the Christian being in Christ (Gal. 2:20).\textsuperscript{42}

The originality of Maximus’ triad can be seen in his adaptation of the Neoplatonic principle of reciprocity. Maximus’ adaptation of the principle neither negates nor imposes a dichotomy between the spiritual and earthly realms in which Pauline scripture had depicted the believer’s position in Christ. Maximus’ schema is historically linear in its scope and in its movement because Christ had, not only become incarnate typologically in the scriptures, but historically in the flesh and spiritually in the Christian.\textsuperscript{43} The Christian’s will remains free because of its realignment with Christ’s will (as the gnomic will surrenders to Christ). The resultant transformation and reformation of the Christian life, to which the good works of believers testify, move them forward in accordance with the scope of God’s salvific plans as fulfilled in Christ.\textsuperscript{44} As the Christians’ will consents to God’s being, so they, in a

\textsuperscript{41} See Russell, \textit{Deification}, 274.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 274.
\textsuperscript{43} Thunberg writes that for Maximus ‘contemplation’ is inseparable from scriptural interpretation, and that the whole process of contemplation takes place in the Spirit. See L. Thunberg, \textit{Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor} (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1965), 371-73. See also Russell, \textit{Deification}, 274.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Amb. 7. 1076BC} [PG 91:1076BC] ‘And later St Paul (Καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν ὁ θεοπάσιος Παῦλος), as though he denied himself and did not have his own life, said (ὡςπερ ἁπαντὸν ἀρρηστὸς καὶ ἔρημος ἔχειν ἔτι ζωὴν μὴ εἰδὼς): It is no longer I who live but Christ who lives in me (Ζῶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔτι ἐγώ-ζῇ γάρ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστῷ)[Gal. 2:20]. Do not be disturbed by what I have said (Μὴ ταραττότω δὲ ὑμᾶς τὸ λεγόμενον). I have no intention of denying free will (Οὐ γὰρ ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου γίνοσθαι φήμα). Rather I am speaking of a firm and steadfast disposition (ἄλλα θέσιν μᾶλλον τὴν κατὰ φύσιν παγιάν τε καὶ ἀμετάθετον), a willing surrender* (ἡγούσιν ἐκχώρησιν γνωμικὴν,) so that from the one from whom we have received being we long to receive being moved as well (ἐκ τὸν ἤδειν ἤμεν ὑπάρχει τὸ εἰναι καὶ τὸ κυνεῖσθαι λαβέν τοις ποθήσαν). It is like the relation between an image and its archetype (ὡς τῆς εἰκόνος ἀνεξανθώσης πρὸς τὸ ἄρχετυπον).* The expression ἐκχώρησιν γνωμικὴν is a difficult phrase to translate into English language. For a brief explanation of the phrase see Blowers & Wilken, 52 n.19. For a detailed analysis and discussion of the phrase see P. Sherwood, \textit{The Earlier Ambigua of Saint Maximus the Confessor and His Refutation of Origenism} (Rome: Orbis Catholicus, 1955), 128-37.
‘realistic’ sense, become God’s instrument in the world.\(^{45}\) For Maximus, the evidence of the believer’s deification lies in the realignment of their will in accordance with the scope of God’s goal or end of creation:

Since it lays hold of God’s power [activity/energy] (ὡς τῆς θείας ἐπειλημμένης ἐνεργείας) or rather becomes God by divinisation and delights in the displacement of those things perceived to be naturally its own (μάλλον δὲ Θεός τῇ θεώσει γεγενημένης, καὶ πλέον ἡδομένης τῇ ἐκστάσει τῶν φύσικῶν ἐπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ δυντῶν καὶ νοοῦμενων). Through the abundant grace of the Spirit it will be shown that God alone is at work, and in all things there will only be one activity/energy that of God and those worthy of kinship with God (διὰ τὴν ἐκκενήσασαν αὐτὴν χάριν τοῦ Πνεύματος, καὶ μάνον ἠξουσιών ἐνεργοῦσα τὸν Θεὸν δείξασαν, ὡστε εἶναι μίαν καὶ μόνην διὰ πάντων ἐνεργειάν, τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄξιῶν Θεοῦ). God will be all in all wholly penetrating all who are his in a way that is appropriate to each [cf. 1 Cor 15:28] (μάλλον δὲ μόνου Θεοῦ, ὡς ὅλον ὅλους τοῖς ἄξιοις ἀγαθοπρεπῶς περιχωρήσαντος).\(^{46}\)

Maximus’ soteriology resonates with Edwards’ aesthetic paradigm of ‘consent to being’, because for Maximus the affections, ‘joy’, ‘desire’ and ‘delight’ are corollaries of God’s beauty, and as such become synonyms of the Christian’s will as it realigns itself with God’s salvation purposes for the world:

For if we know God our knowledge of each and everything will be brought to perfection, and, in so far as possible, the infinite, divine and ineffable dwelling place [cf. Jn. 14:2] will be ours to enjoy (τῆς ἐκάστου καὶ ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ τῶν μετὰ Θεῶν γνώσεως ἡμῖν περιποιηθήσης, καὶ τῆς ἀπείρου καὶ θείας καὶ ἀπεριλήπτου ἀπολαυστικῶς ἡμῖν ἀναλόγως ὑποκειμένης τε μόνης καὶ

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\(^{45}\) See N. Russell, *Fellow Workers with God: Orthodox Thinking on Theosis* (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2009), 36.

\(^{46}\) Amb. 7. 1076C [PG 91:1076C]; Amb. 41.1308B [PG. 91:1308B] ‘The person unites the created nature with the uncreated through love (καὶ τέλος ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις, καὶ κτισθῆν φύσιν τῇ ἀκτίσει δι’ ἀγάπης ἐνόσας...showing them to be one and the same through the possession of grace (ἐν καὶ ταύτην δείξει κατὰ τὴν ἐξὶ τῆς χάριτος), the whole [creation] wholly interpenetrated by God (ὁλὸς ὄλων περιχωρήσας ὅλως τῷ Θεῷ) and become completely whatever God is (καὶ γενόμενος πᾶν ἐν τί πέρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός), save at the level of essence/being (χωρὶς τῆς κατ’ οὐδὰν παύστης).’ Cf. civ. Det 22.30 [CCL 48:865]. The patristic doctrine of perichoresis (Latin: *circumincessio*) developed out of Trinitarian theology and is used by Maximus to express the spiritual union of the Christian with Christ. The doctrine was also used as a rule for interpreting the mutual interrelation between Christ’s human and divine natures (see Chapter 9 n.138 in this thesis). Maximus qualifies his engagement with the doctrine by stating that he did not mean that the Christian was subsumed into God’s essence.
metechoiméni). For this is what our sainted teacher [Paul] said in his famous philosophical aphorism (Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ πάνυ φιλοσοφοῦμεν κατὰ τούτον τὸν θεοφόρον διδάσκαλον):

“Then we shall know as we are known” [1 Cor 13:12], when we mingle our god-formed mind and divine reason to what is properly its own and the image returns to the archetype for which it now longs (ἐπιγνώσεσθαι ἡμᾶς ποτε ὡς ἐγνώσημεθα, ἐπειδὰν τὸ θεοειδὲς τοῦτο καὶ θεῖον φάσκοντος τὸν ἡμέτερον οὐν τε καὶ λόγον τῷ οἰκείῳ προσμείζομεν, καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν ἀνέλθη πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυμον, οὔ υἱὸν ἔχει τὴν ἐφεσιν).”

As had also been the case for Edwards, in Maximus’ aesthetics, the affections: ‘joy’, ‘desire’ and ‘delight’, function as corollaries of God’s divine beauty. They are deifying affections because they become synonymous with the realignment of the believer’s will to the entire scope of God’s salvation plan, which reaches its goal at the eschaton.

Origenist soteriology spoke of the soul as having fallen from its pre-existent state of rest. The Origenists, for example, had interpreted Gregory Nanzianzen’s expression that believer’s were a ‘portion of God’ as evidence that the soul/mind in its primeval state had been a part of God’s being from which it had fallen. ‘For he knew [Gregory Nanzianzen] that if we progress in a straight course, led by reason and by nature toward that which has been impressed on our being by the Logos, as far as possible, without any searching whatsoever (for only in searching is there the possibility of stumbling

47 See P. M. Blowers & R. L. Wilken, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ: Selected Writings from St Maximus the Confessor (Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003), 62 n. 50. Maximus cites Gregory Nanzianzen Oration 28.17.

48 Amb. 7.1077AB [PG 91:1077AB]

49 Cf. Amb. 7. 1076CD-1077A [PG 91: 1076CD-1077A] ‘It is absolutely necessary that everything will cease its wilful movement toward something else when the ultimate beauty that satisfies our desire appears (’Ανάγκη γὰρ πᾶσα τῆς κατ’ ἔφεσιν τὰ πάντα περὶ τι ἀλλὸ παύσασθαι ἐξουσιαστικῆς κυνήσεως, τοῦ ἐσχάτου φανέντος ὀρκετοῦ καὶ μετεχομένου). In so far as we are able we will participate without being restricted, as it were, being uncontainably contained (καὶ ἀναλόγῳ τῆς τῶν μετεχόντων δυνάμει ἄχρωτως, ἵν’ ὦποια ἐπίκα, χωρομένου). All our actions and every sublime thought will tend eagerly towards that end “in which all desire comes to rest and beyond which they cannot be carried. For there is no other end towards which all free movement is directed than the rest found in total contemplation by those who have reached that point” (πρὸς ὃ πᾶσαι σπεύδῃ πολιτεία τοῦ ὑψίλου καὶ διάνου, καὶ εἰς ὃ πᾶσαι ἔφεσις ἵσταται, καὶ ὑπὲρ ὃ οὐδεμίως φέρεται· οὔτε γὰρ ἔχει, καὶ πρὸς ὃ τεῖνε πᾶσα σπουδαῖος κύνης, καὶ οὔ γενομένους πάσης θεωρίας ἀνάπαυσις), as our blessed teacher [Gregory Nazianzan] says (φησιν ὃ μακάριος οὕτω διδάσκαλος). For nothing besides God will be known, nor will there be anything opposed to God that could entice one to desire it (Ὅτε γὰρ ἦσται τι ἐκτὸς θεοῦ τότε δεικνύμενον, ἢ θεῶν ἀντιπροσώπου δοκοῦν, ινα τινὸς ἔφεσιν πρὸς αὐτὸ ἰσχύει δελεασία). Instead, when God’s ineffable majesty is made known, all intellectual and sensible things will be encompassed by him (πάντων περιληφθέντων αὐτῷ ἕσητω τε καὶ αἰσθήτων κατὰ τὴν ἄφφασιν αὐτοῦ ἐκφάνασιν καὶ παραστασιν).’

and going wrong), we too will know things in a godlike way.\(^{51}\) Maximus argued that Gregory’s expression was really only expressive of the believer’s consent to God’s being of holiness:

Instead they have kept themselves wholly chaste and steadfast, confident in the knowledge that they are to become instruments of the divine nature [cf. 2 Pet. 1:3-4] (διεσώσαντο δὲ μάλλον σωφρόνως ἑαυτοὺς ὄλους καὶ ἀπαρατρέπτους, ὡς θείας ἀργανα φύσεως, καὶ ὄντας καὶ γενησομένους εἰδότες). The fullness of God permeates them wholly as the soul permeates the body, and they become, so to speak, limbs of a body, well adapted and useful to the master (οὐς δὲ ὅλου ὀλος περιφός ὁ Θεὸς τρόπον ψυχῆς, ὀσπερ μέλη σώματος ἁρτία καὶ εὐχρηστα τῷ εὐχρηστα τῷ Δεσπότῃ γενησομένους). He [God] directs them [Christians] as he thinks best, filling them with his own glory [cf. 2 Pet. 1:3] and blessedness (πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν μεταχειρίζεται, καὶ τῆς οἰκείας πληροὶ δόξης τε καὶ μακαριστοτος), and bestows on them unending life beyond imagining and wholly free from the signs of corruption that mark the present age (ζωὴν διδοὺς καὶ χαριζόμενος τὴν ἀεὶδιον τε καὶ ἀνεκκαλλην, καὶ παντάπασι παντὸς ἑλευθέραν γνωρίσματος συστατικῆς ἱδιότητος τῆς παρούσης καὶ διὰ φθορᾶς).\(^{52}\)

Christian spiritual disciplines, πράκτικη/πράξεις (the active life), were therefore necessary to the transformation and reformation of the Christian life.

### 7.6 Deification: an Eschatological Fulfilment

The endurance, vigilance and perseverance of believers in their active life would result in the immortal possession of deification in eternity:

He gives them life, not the life that comes from breathing air, nor that of veins coursing with blood, but the life that comes from being wholly infused with the fullness of God (συνισταμένης ζωῆς, ἢν οὐκ ἄρη εἰςπυκάμενος, οὐδ’ αἵματος ὁχεῖτο τοῦ ἥπατος ἀποφρέωντες συνιστῶσιν, ἀλλὰ Θεὸς ὅλος ὅλος μετέχομενος). God becomes to the soul (καὶ ψυχῆς τρόπον πρὸς σῶμα τῇ ψυχῇ) [and through the soul to the body] what the soul is to the body (καὶ διὰ

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\(^{51}\) *Amb. 7. 1085D-1088A* [PG 91: 1085D-1088A] Ἡδει γὰρ, ὥσις πρὸς ὅ ἐχομεν οὐσία τε καὶ λόγῳ τὰς ἐμφάσεις κατὰ λόγον καὶ φύσιν εὐθυγράμμους ἀπλῆ προσβαλέ, καὶ ἡμεῖς, πάσης τῆς οἰκείας χρωμῆς, περὶ ἡ μόνην ἐστι τὸ πνεῖμα καὶ σφαλλεισθήθη θεοεἰδῶς κατὰ τὸ ἐφυκτὸν τὰ πάντα εἰσόμεθα

\(^{52}\) *Amb. 7.1088BC* [PG 91:1088BC] cf. *Amb. 10.1108B* [PG 91:1108B] ‘Through participation in the Good they too have put off the shamefulness of evil to become worthy of being portions of God (ἐφ’ ὃ τῇ μετοχῇ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τὸ τῆς κακίας αἵμαχος ἀποθεμένους τῆς τῶν ἀξίων Θεῶ γενέσθαι μοίρας).’
Christians lived between two ages, the age of the flesh ‘sarkosis’ and the age of ‘deification/theosis’. The age of ‘sarkosis’ is experienced at the current historical level of the sin-affected ἄρσος but because Christ had descended into this level (taking on a fully divine and human nature) the result of his salvific work had established the age of ‘deification/theosis’. Further, being united to Christ meant that believers also entered into this age. Although they experienced life at the age of ‘sarkosis’, they were to live in the light of the eschatological age of ‘theosis’ to which they belonged. Christ’s resurrection and his ascension into heaven had inaugurated this age for believers, although this would not be fully realised for them until the eschaton.

He who, by the sheer inclination of his will, established the beginning of all creation, seen and unseen, before all ages and before the beginning of created beings, had an ineffably good plan for those creatures (Ὅς πάσης κτίσεως, ὡράτης τε καὶ ἀφοράτου, κατὰ μόνην τοῦ θελήματος τὴν ῥωπὴν ὑποστήρας τὴν γένεσιν πρὸ πάντων τῶν αἰῶνων καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς τῶν γεγονότων γενέσεως τὴν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς ἀφράστως ὑπεράγαθον εἰχὲ βουλήν). The plan was for him to mingle, without change on his part, with human nature by true hypostatic union (ὅ ἐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν ἀτρέπτως ἐγκραθήσει τῇ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῆς καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἀληθοῦς ἐνώσεως) to unite human nature to himself while remaining immutable, so that he might become a man (ἐαυτῷ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἀναλλοίωτος ἐνώσει τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην, ἐν’ αὐτὸς μὲν ἀνθρώπος γένηται), as he alone knew how (καθὼς οἶδεν αὐτός) and so that he might deify humanity in union with himself (ὅτι δὲ ποιήσει τῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐνώσει τὸν ἀνθρώπον). Also, according to this plan, it is clear that God wisely divided “the ages” between those intended for God to

53 Amb. 7. 1088C [PG 91:1088C]
54 See Blowers & Wilken, 34; Russell, Deification, 286-87.
become human, and those intended for humanity to become divine (μερίσας δηλοντι σοφώς
tοις αἰώνας καὶ διορίσας, τοις μὲν ἐπ’ ἐνεργεία τοῦ τὸν ἀνθρώπον ποιήσας θεόν).  

God had already predetermined the end (τέλος) of the ages because of the incarnation’s
salvific work which had climaxed in Christ which guaranteed the age to come:

In these new ages God will show the immeasurable riches of his goodness to us [Eph 2:7]
(kαθ’ οὖς τὸν ὑπερβάλλοντα πλοῦτον τῆς χρηστότητος αὐτοῦ εἰς ἡμᾶς δείξει ὁ θεὸς), having
completely realised this deification in those who are worthy (ἐνεργήσας τελείως ἐν τοῖς
ἀξίωσις τῆς θέωσιν). For if he has brought to completion his mystical work of becoming
human, (Εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνθρωποποιηθήναι μυστικῆς ἐνεργείας κἄλυφε πέρας) having
become like us in every way save without sin [cf. Heb 4:15] (κατὰ πάντα τρόπον χωρὶς μόνης
ἀμαρτίας ήμῖν ὁμοιωθεῖς), and even descended into the lower regions of the earth where the
tyranny of sin compelled humanity (καὶ εἰς τὰ κατωτέρα μέρη τῆς γῆς καταβάς, ἔνθα τὸν
ἀνθρώπον ἀπεώσατο τῆς ἀμαρτίας ἢ τυραννίς), then God will also completely fulfil the goal
of his mystical work of deifying humanity (πάντως καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τῷ θεωθήναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον
μυστικῆς ἐνεργείας λήψεται πέρας) in every respect, of course, short of an identity of essence
with God (κατὰ πάντα τρόπον, χωρὶς μόνης δηλοντι τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν κατ’ οὐσίαν
ταυτότητος); and he will assimilate [his likeness] humanity to himself and elevate us to a
position that the natural magnitude of God’s grace summons lowly humanity, out of a
goodness that is infinite (ὁμοιώσας εἰς τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ υπεράνω πάντων τῶν οὐρανῶν
ἀναβιβάσας, ἔνθα τὸ τῆς χάριτος φύσει μέγεθος ὑπάρχων προσκαλεῖται διὰ τὴν ἀπερίαν τῆς
ἀγαθότητας τὸν κάτω κείμενον ἀνθρώπον).

Ad Thal. 22 [CCSG 7:137]
Russell, Deification, 287.
Ad Thal. 22 [CCSG 7:137,139]. Cf. Ad Thal. 22 [CCSG 7:139] ‘We too should therefore divine the
“ages” conceptually, and distinguish between those intended for the mystery of the divine incarnation
and those intended for the grace of human deification, and we shall discover that the former have
already reached their proper end while the latter have not yet arrived. In short, the former have to do
with God’s descent to human beings, while the latter have to do with humanity’s ascent to God.
(Διέλοιμον οὖν καὶ ἡμῖς τῇ ἑπιφανείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων, καὶ ἀφορίσαμεν τοὺς μὲν τῷ μυστηρίῳ τῆς θείας
ἐνανθρωπίσεως, τοὺς δὲ τῇ χάριτι τῆς ἀνθρωπώτητος θεώσεως, καὶ εὐρισκόμεν τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὸ
οίκειον δύτας τέλος, τοὺς δὲ οὕτω παραγενομένους. Καὶ συνετός εἰπεῖν, τῶν αἰώνων οὶ μὲν τῆς
tου θεού πρὸς ἀνθρώπων εἰσὶ καταβάσεως, οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς θεοῦ ὑπάρχουσιν
ἀναβάσεως).’
Christ, as the beginning, middle and end of all ages, had established a new modality which Christians experience in the present historical age. Although Maximus clearly taught that Christians would be perfected in eternity, he did not mean that he believed that they would be subsumed then into God’s being. Instead, their perfection would continue on into eternity infinitely. The Christian could only ever be said to grow closer and closer to God’s own being of holiness, but never be subsumed into it. This is seen in the following passage, where Maximus’ spoke of the Christian’s deification as something which continued in eternity:

Meanwhile the modes of the virtues and the principles of those things that can be known by nature have been established as types and foreshadings of those future benefits (δόν τύποι καὶ προχαράμματα καθεστήκασιν οἱ τρόποι τῶν ἁρετῶν καὶ τῶν γνωσθήκατε φύσει δυναμένων οἱ λόγοι). It is through these modes and principles that God, who is ever willing to become human, does so in those who are worthy (δι’ ὧν ὁ θεός ἀεὶ θέλων ἐν τοῖς ἄξιοις ἄνθρωπος γίνεται). And therefore whoever, by the exercise of wisdom, enables God to become incarnate within him or her and, in fulfilment of this mystery (Μακάριος οὖν ὁ μετὰ τὸ ποιήσαι διὰ σοφίας ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸν θεόν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου μυστηρίου πληρώσας τὴν γένεσιν) undergoes deification by grace, (πάσχων τὸ γενέσθαι τῇ χάριτι θεὸς) is truly blessed because that deification has no end (ὅτι τοῦ ἀεὶ τούτῳ γίνεσθαι πέρας οὐ λήψεται).

The Christian’s deification was a ‘mystery’ which the incarnation had fulfilled for the Christian, but it was not something that could be ever quantified or measured by the mind. Even the Christian’s good works could only provide a sense of their future perfection. They were merely ‘types’ or ‘foreshadowings’ of their future perfection.

58 Ad Thal 22 [CCSG 7:139] ‘Or rather, since our Lord Jesus Christ is the beginning, middle, and end of all the ages, past and future, [it would be fair to say that] the end of the ages—specifically that end which will actually come about by grace for the deification of those who are worthy—has come upon us in potency through faith (‘Ἡ μάλλον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ μεσότης καὶ τέλος ἐστὶ πάντων τῶν αἰώνων τῶν τε παρελθόντων καὶ ἄνωτων καὶ ἐσομένων ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰσοίος ὁ Χριστός, εἰκότως εἰς ἡμᾶς κατήρνεται δυνάμει τῆς πίστεως τὸ κατ’ εἶδος ἐνεργεία κατὰ τὴν χάριν ἐσάμενον ἐπὶ θεωρεῖ τῶν ἄξιων τέλος τῶν αἰώνων.’

59 Ad Thal. 22 [CCSG 7:143]. Cf. Works 2. 202, 376. There is similarity between Maximus’ idea of the Christian’s deification not reaching an end point in eternity and Edwards’ picture of the never-ending asymptomatic progress of the Christian in eternity; ever getting nearer to God’s divine holiness and being, but never being subsumed into God.
7.7 Conclusion

Maximus’ engagement with the patristic doctrine of deification established the doctrine as the soteriological outcome of Christ’s work of grace in the Christian life. He spoke of the Spirit’s work as a deifying work because the Spirit’s illumination of the believer’s heart and mind enabled continual reformation and transformation. Deification was a product of Christ’s salvific mediatory work, which allowed him to correlate the deification of believers with their spiritual adoption. Moreover, deification was for Maximus the other side of the believer’s justification. He presents a portrait of Spirit-filled Christians as God’s image and instrument in the world given meaning by their eschatological future. This future is established and sealed by Christ’s salvific work, and it simultaneously bears on the Christian’s current life. The applicatory value of the doctrine functioned to inform the issue of Christian ethics and morality in the Christian’s present life. It worked to give Christian moral theory a theocentric centre, not an anthropocentric one. The doctrine gave meaning to the practical life of Christians because it worked to account for both the spiritual and earthly concerns of the Christian life without negation of either, and without enforcing a dichotomy between the two. Moreover, because the doctrine is informed by a wide spectrum of theology: soteriology, anthropology, Christology, pneumatology and eschatology, it works to inform and give meaning to the shape of the Christian life in the present in light of the believer’s eschatological future.
Chapter 9: Jonathan Edwards and the Patristic Notion of Deification

9.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to show that despite an absence of terminology for deification, or *theosis*, in Jonathan Edwards’ writings, the patristic doctrine of deification framed many aspects of his theology because of its scriptural foundation. Five key themes can be identified in his theology that show his engagement with the doctrine of deification as based in biblical tradition: the Christian’s participation in the divine nature; Christ’s descent and ascent; the patristic idea of ‘recapitulation’; the Christian’s union with God/Christ; and the progression of the Christian soul in eternity.¹ His adaptation of the doctrine enabled him to account for both the spiritual and earthly concerns of the Christian life. It extrapolated on the full consequences and benefits of the incarnation’s work for both the Christian and the world, which made the incarnation and the Trinity its concomitants. For Edwards, Christians were not merely united with Christ simply in name, but also, in a realistic sense, which saw him engage with the doctrine nominally, analogically and metaphorically in its application. Moreover, his pneumatology was critical to understanding the value of the doctrine in his soteriological framework because the Holy Spirit was concomitant to both God’s and Christ’s work. Understanding the Christian life as progressing towards an eternal end, the ways in which he engaged with the doctrine allowed him to communicate his ascetic, pastoral and ethical concerns for the active Christian life. According to Edwards, when Christians sought to develop good virtues and affections, they not only shared God’s trait or characteristic of holiness but they showed his holiness to the world.

9.2 Western Scholarship’s Unease With Deification

Although scriptural in its early church foundations, the patristic doctrine of deification has not gained the credence of an established soteriological doctrine in the west. Even so, there has been growing interest in the doctrine from the western sphere of the church.² Edwards’ engagement with the doctrine, however, has held little interest for western scholarship, most probably because the doctrine in the west

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¹ These themes are adapted from the four tenets of *theosis*, which have been identified as characterising the soteriology of Jonathan Edwards, John and Charles Wesley and George Whitefield. See K. Schuler, ‘The Influence of Theosis on Early Evangelicalism’, MA, McMaster University, 2007.
² See n.5 in Introduction of this thesis.
has had a history of being misunderstood. Pelikan, however, a convert to eastern orthodoxy, recognised that deification characterised Edwards’ soteriology. Edwards did not use the terms ‘deification’ or ‘theosis’ in his writing, but he quoted repeatedly from 2 Peter 1:4, a key text traditionally identified with the doctrine. Claghorn therefore acknowledges the existence of the doctrine in Edwards’ theology, but identifies it as a product of Edwards’ ‘enthusiasm’, which led to some accusing him of ‘monism’ and ‘pantheism’. Claghorn’s acknowledgement only goes so far as to affirm that Edwards can be taken to speak in a way that may be at odds with traditional western Calvinism or reformed thought, but this does not nullify the biblical authenticity of the doctrine in Edwards’ thought.

One reason for the lack of interest is because the patristic doctrine of deification is systematically categorised under the area of Christian mysticism. Theological notions placed under this category have proved difficult to conceptualise and technically quantify because they fall under the realm of the ‘abstract’, which can be difficult for technical and systemised exegetical study to apprehend and comprehend. Another difficulty is that deification or theosis are not words found in scripture, which can make exegetical study difficult, requiring an understanding of the contextual basis that gave this soteriological notion its shape.

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6 Being, or becoming one, with the divine substance.

7 Identifying God with the universe, or regarding the universe as a manifestation of God.

8 See McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 139; See also McClymond & McDermott, 410.

9 The history of modern New Testament study shows that ‘mysticism’ has been a difficult concept to quantify and technically define. See C. R. Campbell, Paul and Union with Christ: An Exegetical and Theological Study (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2012), 59-61.
A good example of how the doctrine of deification is misunderstood in reformed Protestant thought can be seen in Campbell’s recently published exegetical-theological study on the New Testament theme ‘union with Christ’. The study aims to explore the ways in which the theme ‘union with Christ’ relates to four major spheres of Paul’s theological thought: the work of Christ; Trinity; Christian living; and justification. Campbell believes that the theme in Paul’s writings is important, but also obtuse. He concludes that the terms union, participation, identification, incorporation, define ‘union with Christ’. That western scholarship has difficulty with understanding deification is evident in that Campbell does not wish to identify ‘union with Christ’ with deification, keeping the doctrine at arms length. From the patristic perspective, Campbell fails to understand the scriptural contextual basis of the doctrine, whereupon ‘union with Christ’ is an incarnational theme that informed the doctrine as it was shaped and given meaning by the full consequences of the incarnation’s salvific work. Informed by a broad spectrum of soteriological themes the doctrine developed to express and give meaning not only to Christian salvation but how salvation was shaped.

Although Campbell’s exegetical-theological approach notes the breadth of the theology that encompasses this theme, as well as how it is shaped by metaphor, the problem with his approach is its inherent reductionism. Campbell’s attempt to quantify, measure and technically elucidate ‘union with Christ’ has resulted in a tautologous definition. In patristic understanding, the terms, ‘union’, ‘participation’, ‘incorporation’, and ‘identification’ operate as implicit reiterations of the theme ‘union with Christ’, so that the New Testament theme functions synonymously alongside the soteriological metaphor of deification. The doctrine is not only informed by all the elements that Campbell concludes characterise the theme ‘union with Christ’, but also communicates it. The Trinity, the incarnation and the

11 On Campbell’s exegetical-theological approach and methodology see Campbell, 21-23, 28-29, 406.
12 Ibid., 21.
14 Ibid., 406.
15 Ibid., 63. Campbell does say that if deification is broached it should be treated in a qualified sense.
16 See Chia, 129. See also Campbell, 327-52. Campbell acknowledges that the theme ‘union with Christ’ in Pauline thought takes its life from the full implications of the incarnation’s work.
Spirit’s work as they speak to the Christian life all become concomitants to the doctrine and together give the doctrine its biblical foundations.

Although there is diversity in the way that early theologians described deification, the different emphases or elements are not the immediate markers of deification. One sure marker, in patristic writing, is the reference to the believer’s participation in the divine life, which was always carefully distinguished from the idea of divine indwelling. Even so, the reference to participation in the divine nature should not be taken as the technical definition for the doctrine. Instead, as a marker, it shows the nominal, analogical, metaphorical qualities that the doctrine provided theologians for didactic and rhetorical expression. Moreover, the Christian’s union with Christ was conceived as humanity’s incorporation into God, rather than as God’s incorporation of humanity. The doctrine was about a God who had invited the Christian to share in his divine life, not to be subsumed in it, and this understanding can be perceived in Edwards’ own engagement with the doctrine.

9.3 The Patristic Doctrine of Deification in Edwards’ Theology

Edwards’ engagement with the doctrine of deification drew on the scriptural themes which can also be discerned in Augustine’s and Maximus’ own adaptation of the doctrine. Moreover, he engaged with the doctrine nominally, analogically and metaphorically in its application evidenced in Religious Affections:

There is no work so high and excellent; for there is no work wherein God does so much communicate himself, and wherein the mere creature hath, in so high a sense, a participation of God; so that it is expressed in Scripture by the saints being made “partakers of the divine nature” (II Peter. 1:4), and having God dwelling in them, and they in God (1 John 4:12, 15-16 and ch.3:21), and having Christ in them (John 17: 21; Rom. 8:10), being the temples of the living God (II Cor. 6:16), living by Christ’s life (Gal. 2:20), being made partakers of God’s holiness (Heb.

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19 Ibid., 32. ‘Both schemes of sanctification draw on the notion of union, but whereas the latter locates sanctification within the creature and in via, the former locates it at the level of the divine and insists upon the inseparability of life in via and in patria.’
20 Ibid., 32.
21 Ibid., 36.
12:10), having Christ’s love dwelling in them (John 17:26), having his joy fulfilled in them (John 17:13), seeing light in God’s light, and being made to drink of the river of God’s pleasures (Ps. 36:8-9), having fellowship with God, or communicating and partaking with him (as the word signifies) (1 John 1:3).  

Quoting from 2 Peter 1:4, a key scriptural text traditionally identified with deification, potentially shows that he is engaging with the doctrine. His quotation of Johannine and Pauline scripture builds and draws out the analogical and metaphorical picture of the believer as a ‘partaker in the divine nature’, drawing out the meaning and significance of their relationship to God. The Christian’s soteriological position in Christ’s life is drawn out analogically and metaphorically by the scriptural quotations with which he has chosen to interact. The Christian is represented as God’s ‘temple’, ‘God dwelling in the believer, and the believer dwelling in God’, the believer ‘seeing God’s light’, the believer ‘drinking of the river of God’s pleasure’, the believer living Christ’s life and having Christ’s love dwelling in them. The analogical and metaphorical imagery provides the sense of the ‘realistic’: Christians are ‘reformed’ or ‘transformed’ because of their salvation. The nominal, ‘in name’, is their real and substantial union and dispositional position in Christ. His adaptation of the doctrine works to draw out the soteriological implications that together shape and give meaning to Christian salvation.

9.4 ‘Justification’ Versus ‘Deification’

The greatest problem that Edwards’ notion of deification has presented western reformed theology is how to reconcile the doctrine with what has come to be thought of, at least in the Reformed Protestant church, as its most central soteriological doctrine, ‘justification by faith’. In general, post-Reformation theologians had been comfortable with depicting the concept of ‘justification’ as a juridical concept, so they used forensic and imputational terms when they spoke about the believer’s justification by faith.  

Chia explains that several factors contributed to the different approaches and emphases in western and eastern soteriologies. These factors had to do with different historical contexts and language.

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22 Works 2. 203.
23 See Chia, 125-27; Withrow, Becoming Divine, 137.
24 Chia, 125-28.
For example, when Augustine emphasised the forensic aspect of justification, he formulated his conception by making use of the pedagogical hermeneutics of Roman law.\textsuperscript{25}

By the end of the fourth century, Latin Christianity was acutely experiencing the traumatic decline of the Roman Empire, whereas the eastern part of the empire began to experience the rise of Byzantium.\textsuperscript{26} Christians in the west became concerned with the issue of God’s justice, and this profoundly influenced western soteriological thought.\textsuperscript{27} This focus was not as relevant to the eastern part of the empire, given its different historical context and geopolitical social landscape.\textsuperscript{28} In the west the metaphorical image of justification prevailed, whereas in the east it was the metaphorical image of deification that endured.

As both metaphors developed within their respective realms, they became more and more technically defined and qualified by the traditions that claimed them.\textsuperscript{29} Whereas the western church’s soteriological focus fell on articulating God’s justice in the world, the focus of the eastern church fell on articulating the intention of God in his creation, and thus humanity’s purpose and goal of existence.\textsuperscript{30} The doctrine of justification, today, with reference to western scholarship, operates as a technical and judicial concept. Although this holds much value, it has neglected the scriptural metaphorical foundations that gave the doctrine its life in the early scriptural tradition.

The language barrier of Greek and Latin salvific terminology can be evidenced from the sixteenth century, when the first contact was made between the Reformers of the west and the patriarchs of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{31} It was not that the Reformers were ignorant of Greek vocabulary, but that biblical and theological salvific terminology assumed different meanings for the two traditions. For example, the juridic term ‘justify’ in the Augsburg Confession was translated into Greek as ‘sanctify’ in the version sent to the eastern patriarch Jeremiah II of Constantinople. In itself, this was not an issue over semantics, but showed real theological differences and emphases between the west and the east. In light of the idea

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 45.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 41-45.
\textsuperscript{28} Chia,126.
\textsuperscript{29} See McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 154-55. Broadly speaking the history of the creeds and confessions in modern Christendom is a story of increasing exclusivity.
\textsuperscript{30} Hinlicky, 51. See also Chia, 126-28.
\textsuperscript{31} See Chia, 126-27.
of ‘God’s salvation economy’\(^{32}\) (οἰκονομία), the Greek translation of the Latin ‘justify’ into Greek as ‘sanctify’ from δικαίος\(^{33}\) and its affiliate words, δικαιοσύνη, δικαιόω, δικαίως, δικαίωσις, would have fitted the eastern understanding.

The eastern church did not understand ‘justification’ simply as a ‘juridic’ term. The Greek word δικαίος drew meaning from its context. As it appeared in scriptural use, as used by Paul, it also retained metaphorical value because of the way Paul applied it in his soteriological context. In English translation δικαίος can mean ‘justify’, but it can also mean, depending on its context, ‘made righteous’ and ‘sanctify’, or it can mean all of these at once. Unlike the Reformed context, the eastern context did not separate the notion of ‘justification’ from ‘sanctification’, so metaphorically, the understanding of justification is bound to forgiveness of sin and deliverance from sin’s consequences of death, which results in sanctification\(^{34}\). In the context of God’s salvation plans, the idea of sanctification is not separated from the righteous effects of Christ’s penalty for sin.\(^{35}\) The eastern emphasis was therefore not an unorthodox one, but it would have been misunderstood by the early Reformers, and vice versa.\(^{36}\)

9.5 Deification: a Ground for Justification?

The question of how to reconcile the soteriological doctrines of deification and justification has tended on the whole to be either ignored or dismissed in western Protestant thought. Understandable, then, is the dismay and anxiety for Reformed scholarship caused by Edwards’ well-known statement, ‘What is real in the union between Christ and His people, is the foundation of what is legal; that is, it is something really in them, and between them, uniting [them], that is the ground of the suitableness of their being accounted as one by the Judge’.\(^{37}\) On the one hand, the statement shows that Edwards’ theological thought follows the classic Protestant Reformed teaching on justification by faith. On the other hand, his

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\(^{32}\) The early church idea of God’s economy. History is seen from the supernatural perspective, of God redemptive plans and purposes for the world and humanity, or as the cosmic scope of God’s salvation plans as fulfilled by the incarnation’s work.

\(^{33}\) δικαίος can be translated into English as ‘conforming to the standard, will, or character of God’. It can also mean upright, righteous, good, just, right, proper, honest, fair’, or ‘in right relationship with God.’

\(^{34}\) Sanctification is understood as the act or process of acquiring holiness.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 127.

\(^{36}\) See McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 154-55.

statement also insists that salvation is acceptable to God in and through the Christian’s union with God, which is also the ground for their justification.38

Adding further fuel to the fire, Edwards in a discourse on Justification by Faith Alone, wrote that faith was not the only ‘condition’ of justification, in the ordinary meaning of ‘condition’.39 He argued that the Christian’s agreeing and consenting disposition or the will’s inclination towards God could be understood as faith, hope, belief and obedience, and especially as love, because he believed that grace was an immanent work of the Spirit.40 This caused Schafer41 to believe that aspects of Edwards’ theology were at odds with the central Reformed doctrine of justification, and that his conception of ‘faith alone’ had been considerably enlarged. Without using the term ‘deification’, Schafer therefore alludes to the notion in Edwards thought.42

On the surface Edwards appears to stress the Christian’s union or incorporation in Christ as the basis for their justification over the Reformed teaching of legal imputation, which appears to deemphasise faith as a transcendent work of grace. With this in mind, Morimoto43 put forward a thesis for a ‘Catholic concern’ in Edwards’ soteriological outlook. According to Morimoto, Edwards understood the act of faith to be a virtuous ‘habit’ or ‘disposition’; that is ‘infused’ rather than ‘imputed’ at the point of conversion. Faith is something that is waiting to be activated prior to justification, which corresponds to the medieval Catholic understanding of gratia creata (created grace).44 Morimoto sees in Edwards’ statement a ‘well-

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38 See McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’,140; McClymond & McDermott, 411; Withrow, Becoming Divine, 137.
39 Works 19. 152. ‘That…without which…a thing shall not be, we in such a case call it a condition of that thing: but in this sense faith is not the only condition of salvation or justification, for there are many things that accompany and flow from faith, that are things with which justification shall be, and without which it will not be, and therefore are found to be put in Scripture in conditional propositions with justification and salvation in multitudes of places: such are "love to God," and "love to our brethren," "forgiving men their trespasses," and many other good qualifications and acts. And there are many other things besides faith which are directly proposed to us, to be pursued or performed by us, in order to eternal life, as those which, if they are done or obtained, we shall have eternal life, and if not done or not obtained, we shall surely perish.' Cf. Works 19. 149,158.
40 See McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 140; McClymond & McDermott, 411;
41 T. A. Schafer, ‘Jonathan Edwards and Justification by Faith’, Church History 20 (1951), 55-67. See also McClymond, 139-40; McClymond & McDermott, 410-11.
42 Schafer, 56-58, 60. Schafer cites Works 13. 344-45.
44 See McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 140; McClymond & McDermott, 411.
balanced’ combination of the Protestant principle *gratia increata* (uncreated grace) and *gratia creata*. In other words, Edwards is saying that the Spirit (uncreated grace) operates in and through the new disposition (created grace). Morimoto concluded that Edwards mediates between both the Catholic and Protestant traditions, ‘arguing for an abiding reality of salvation in humanity, while not undermining God’s sovereign grace.’ Morimoto is correct to point out that Edwards’ soteriology shows a creativity that distinguishes him from his classic Reformed roots. In fact, his soteriology highlights the transformative inner power of grace, which for him effectuated a qualitative change or the reformation and transformation of the Christian life. In light of this, Edwards’ view resembles the eastern church’s idea of justification, because the Christian’s sanctification is not only achieved by Christ’s death, but is also not separated from the righteous effects of Christ’s penalty for sin over death.

What on the surface appears to be an overt separation between justification and sanctification can be seen primarily in the controversies that arose about grace after the Reformation, which saw ‘grace’ isolated as a subject to be treated separately from theology as a whole. After the Reformation, this separation of grace from the life and disposition of God as a whole was rendered more extreme so that distinct theologies of grace became a key element in the demarcation between Protestant and Catholic. It was assumed that the Protestant was justified by imputed grace, ‘extrinsic’ to the person, whilst the Catholic was made righteous by imparted or infused grace, ‘intrinsic’ to the person. The Protestant

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45 Morimoto, 8. See also Withrow, *Becoming Divine*, 152.
47 See Ramsay, ‘Editor’s Notes’, 69-70. Edwards held a similar conception of the Spirit’s work with the Puritan Richard Sibbes (1577-1635). Important is Sibbe’s idea of the conjunction of the Word and the Spirit, from Sibbes’ *The Bruised Reede and the Smoking Flax* (1630). Sibbes wrote: ‘God, joining with the soul and spirit of a man whom he intends to convert, besides that inbred light that is in the soul, causeth him to see a divine majesty shining forth in the Scriptures, so that there must be an *infused* establishing by the Spirit to settle the heart in this first principle…that the Scriptures are the word of God…The word is nothing without the Spirit; it is animated and quickened by the Spirit.’
48 Chia, 127.
50 Ibid., 3.
51 Ibid., 3.
emphasis fell on transcendence and the Catholic on immanence.  

52 Newey\textsuperscript{53} writes that exclusive emphasis on either characteristic is not wholly fair, and became a detriment to both sides, because in the Patristic period neither transcendence nor immanence was expressed adequately apart from the other. Edwards therefore used the category of ‘infusion’ to unpack the multilayered reality of conversion.\textsuperscript{54} As Edwards wrote: ‘Conversion is nothing but God’s causing such an alteration with respect to the mind’s ideas of spiritual good.’\textsuperscript{55}

Edwards’ statement works to resolve the rift that had been imposed on grace and that had placed transcendence in opposition to immanence. The issue is resolved because of the incarnation’s work, in which Christians also participate. Christ’s transaction and imputation of righteousness upon a person begins the reformation and transformation of the Christian life. This is where Edwards’ Christian moral theory begins.\textsuperscript{56} Morimoto’s belief that Edwards’ innovative thinking has much to offer western soteriology is correct, yet this does not mean that Edwards has subliminally or unintentionally followed a Catholic line of thought.\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} McClymond & McDermott, 381. Although the sixteenth-century Protestant reformers had refrained from using the term ‘infusion’, the seventeenth and eighteenth-century reformed scholastic theologians retrieved the idea from Catholic discussions. Amongst them was the German-Dutch theologian Peter van Mastricht, \textit{Theologia Theoretico-Practica} (1682). Mastricht was a favourite theologian of Edwards (see Works 26.47). On how Mastricht described conversion as an illumination, see C. Cherry, \textit{The Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Reappraisal} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), 26.
  \item \textsuperscript{55} Works 13. 381 (Misc. 284). Compare Augustine, \textit{Conf.} 4.15.25 [CCL 27:53] ‘Such was my mind at that time when I did not know that it required to be illumined by another light (\textit{Qualis in me tunc erat nesciente alio lumine illum inlustrandam esse}), so that it might participate in the truth (\textit{ut sit particeps veritatis}). For the soul is not the very nature of truth (\textit{quia non est ipsa natura veritatis}), since you will light my lamp, Lord (\textit{quoniam tu inluminabis lucernam meam, domime}).’ Compare Maximus CK 2. 79-83 [PG 90:1162CD] ‘The mind of Christ [cf. 1 Cor. 2.16] (\’O τοῦ Χριστοῦ εἶναι λεγάμεθα)...comes along not by any loss of our mental power (οὐ κατὰ στέρησιν τῆς εὐ̔ν ή̔μἑν νοκρᾶς δυνάμεως ἐπιγίνεται), nor as a supplementary mind to ours (οὐ̔δὲ ώς συμπληρωτικὸς τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοὸς), nor as essentially and personally passing over into our mind (οὐ̔δέ ώς μεταβαλλόν τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοοῦ), but rather as illuminating the power of our mind with its own quality and bringing the same energy to it (ἀλλ’ ώς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ποιότητι τῆς τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοοῦ λαμπρῶν δύναμις, καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν αὐτῆς φέρων ἑνέργειαν). For to have the mind of Christ is, in my opinion, to think in his way and of him in all situations (Νῦν γὰρ ἔχειν Χριστοῦ ἐγὼγέ φημι, τὸν κατ’ αὐτὸν νοοῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν νοοῦντα).’ Cf. CK 83 [PG 90:1164B]
  \item \textsuperscript{56} Cf. Works 2. 396, 398 ‘But if the old nature be indeed mortified, and a new and heavenly nature infused; then may it well be expected, that men will walk in newness of life, and continue to do so to the end of their days.’; ‘Godliness in the heart has as direct a relation to practice, as a fountain has to a stream, or as the luminous nature of the sun has to beams sent forth, or as life has to breathing, or the beating of the pulse, or any other vital act; or as a habit or principle of action has to action: for ‘tis the very nature and notion of grace, that ‘tis a principle of holy action or practice. Regeneration, which is that work of God in which grace is infused, has a direct relation to practice.’
  \item \textsuperscript{57} Morimoto, 2, 9.
\end{itemize}
The problem with Morimoto’s thesis, as Withrow has rightly discerned, is Edwards’ New England context. As Morimoto has acknowledged, the context of Edwards’ treatise was to provide a corrective for the Arminian and antinomian ideas that he believed compromised traditional church doctrines. Edwards was not concerned with correcting Catholic soteriology. Rather, he wanted to correct the errors he perceived to be inherent in his New England Enlightenment-affected context. Edwards was under no illusion about the fact that eighteenth-century Protestant Christian thinking on ethics and morality was being driven and informed by Enlightenment epistemology, which compromised traditional doctrines.

Some western scholars have attempted to resolve their unease with Edwards’ soteriology by seeking to prove that he was foremost Reformed and Calvinistic in his framework. Ramsay, for example, focused attention on Edwards’ definite soteriological affinities to John Calvin. Another scholar, Cherry, argues that Edwards’s pneumatology is thoroughly Reformed because it teaches that the act of faith is dependent on the Spirit’s work (through which one is justified). Waddington also adds that in Edwards’ pneumatology the Spirit is the exercise of faith and love in the Christian’s life. The Spirit remains active, but its activity is distinct, never merging with the believer’s life. Christians are thereby united to Christ, but their righteousness (accepted on their behalf by Christ), remains Christ’s. For Waddington, this maintains the idea of imputation, so that Edwards cannot be referring to a doctrine of deification, but is merely talking about the doctrines of regeneration or sanctification.

Contemporary Protestant scholarship has found it difficult to understand Edwards’ soteriological thought outside of the rigid confines of a systematised and compartmentalised theological framework. As Withrow states, the problem with the debate is partly that scholars have tried to make Edwards more ‘consistent’ than he actually is. Such scholars have missed the significance of Edwards’ originality, in

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58 Withrow, Becoming Divine, 156.
60 Cherry, 29-43.
62 Ibid., 362-63, 367.
63 In theological usage, ‘regeneration’ means spiritual rebirth. It is the idea that God has brought Christians to new life from a previous life of subjection to death. The concept of regeneration is related to the New Testament notion of Christians ‘being born again’ (cf. Jn. 3:3-8; 1 Pet. 1:3).
64 Withrow, Becoming Divine, 154.
how he developed and used an orthodox notion of deification that enabled him to give meaning to both the spiritual and earthly concerns of the Christian life. For Edwards, the incarnation’s salvific work establishes a new modality of life for Christians, and this new modality, as it is informed by a broad spectrum of soteriological themes, speaks directly to Edwards’ ascetic pastoral concerns for the Christian life.

9.6 The Christian’s ‘Awakening’

These ascetic pastoral and ultimately theological concerns are paramount in Edwards’ thinking about Christian salvation. As McClymond and McDermott\(^\text{65}\) state: ‘For Edwards, no salvation or true apprehension of God exists apart from conversion and regeneration.’ In his writing the most significant term he used for the conversion experience was ‘Awakening’, a word inherited from the Puritans who described Christian salvation as an ‘awakening’. Edwards called the New England revivals ‘Awakenings’ because he believed them to be the result of the Spirit’s work.\(^\text{66}\) He related the ‘Awakenings’ to the historical process, whereby he understood God to be active in history as he operated through the Spirit. He referred to this as the ‘History of the Work of Redemption’\(^\text{67}\), because he believed that the purpose of God’s salvific work was the restoration of the fallen creation.

Today, the term ‘awakening’ has virtually disappeared from contemporary evangelical vocabulary. Words or phrases used to describe Christian conversion are ‘saved’, ‘born again’ ‘converted’ and ‘believes’.\(^\text{68}\) These words are indicative of an event having occurred, and as such are static in nature. The word ‘awakening’\(^\text{69}\), however, inferred a process. The conversion event was thought of as the beginning of the Christian life; the Christian life was a ‘process’ or a ‘progression’, something that needed to be persevered in. The word ‘awakening’ is dynamic in nature, and correlates with the pastoral and ethical concerns for the Christian life. It assumes that the active Christian life requires perseverence, vigilance and effort from Christians. Although Edwards believed that Christians were sanctified because

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\(^{65}\) McClymond & McDermott, 19.

\(^{66}\) Cf. Works 4.107, 116, 122, 125, 149, 158, 167, 174.

\(^{67}\) Composed of a series of Edwards’ sermons, the History of the Work of Redemption was published posthumously in 1774. He had previously presented his conceptions of time together with the meaning of history in a series of sermons entitled under the same heading in 1739. See A. Zakai, Jonathan Edwards’s Philosophy of History: The Reenchantment of the World in the Age of Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 220-21.

\(^{68}\) Schuler, 55, 57.

\(^{69}\) John Wesley and George Whitefield also used the same terminology and Wesley employed a similar idea of a process in the development of his holiness theology.
of Christ’s righteousness, he also believed that holiness was something Christians needed to develop and in which they needed to make progress.

9.7 **Edwards’ Cosmic Vision**

Edwards’ connection of the Christian life to Christ’s cosmic redemptive work became more apparent to him during the context of the New England revivals. The revivals stimulated his thinking about God’s work on a cosmic scale, which he believed not only informed the Christian life, but also the life of the church. His understanding of time and history, however, went against the conceptions of history that were developing during the Enlightenment period and he developed his notion of ‘God’s work of redemption’ in part, as a response to these developments. The Enlightenment’s scientific culture had profoundly influenced the sense of time, especially in regard to the meaning and purpose of the historical process. The meaning of history was no longer solely about a supernatural order beyond and above the historical process, and this affected the traditional Christian teleology of history, the ramifications of which are apparent in today’s western worldview.

The Enlightenment emphasised humanity’s autonomy in the historical process. The Christian Deists, for example, depicted God outside and uninvolved with his creation. God had set the world in motion after establishing abstract general laws of nature, so that the world ran itself like a machine. Along with the idea of human autonomy came the idea of progress, the view that humanity was progressing or advancing steadily from primitive barbarism to reason. The Enlightenment vision brought with it utopian ideals of civilisation, which diminished the early church conception of sacred history. Thus, the religious vision of understanding time and history as the drama and tragedy of God’s salvific and redemptive plans and purposes in the world, the idea of the οἴκονομία, was replaced by the idea of *historia humana*. The depiction of history was that of a chronicle or annal where human events and achievements were recorded.

Edwards borrowed the Enlightenment’s ideas of ‘progress’ and ‘process’, but he developed them in an antithetical way. His belief that God was directly related to the created order, and that humanity and

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70 Zakai, 144.
71 Ibid., 144.
72 See Ibid., 144.
73 Ibid., 6, 95. The Enlightenment idea of ‘progress’, for example, informed in part, the British Empire’s ethos for colonisation.
creation was entirely dependent on God, led him to rethink the idea of ‘progress’ in history. He understood every historical event to be tightly interwoven into a theological and teleological framework that focused on God’s salvific plans for the created world and eternity.⁷⁵ He conceptualised his idea of time and history as God’s progression to a goal that finds its fulfilment in eternity: ‘All revolutions from the beginning of the world to the end, are doubtless but various parts of one scheme, all conspiring for the bringing to pass the great event which is ultimately in view.’⁷⁶

Theocentric in its focus, Edwards’ idea of progress had a teleological or purpose-driven goal to see God’s restoration of the fallen creation. His idea contrasted with the Enlightenment idea of time and history, which was anthropocentric, its focus being one-dimensional, homogeneous, symmetrical, uniform, non-hierarchical and empty and deprived of any redemptive or eternal significance.⁷⁷ The mechanical notion of empty, uniform, secular time influenced the modern process of separating the idea of God’s grace in the affairs of humanity from time itself. The notion of ‘secular’ time as opposed to ‘sacred’ time denied a theistic interpretation of the historical process.⁷⁸

In order to counteract this Enlightenment notion of time, Edwards developed his soteriology with a cosmic dimension, which shows affinities with Maximus’ own cosmic vision. He believed that God’s greatest purpose was the redemption of creation, its fulfilment being in the eschaton.⁷⁹ Edwards’ idea of progress fitted closely to his idea of ‘Awakenings’, which in turn gave meaning to the active Christian life. It was necessary for Christians to develop holy affections and virtues as they progressed in their current lives because eternity was also a progressive state for Christians.⁸⁰ According to Edwards, death was the beginning of the resurrected life of perfection, and the believer’s current life was a shadow of this spiritual reality.

⁷⁵ Works 18. 93.95. (Misc. 547) ‘There is doubtless some design that God is pursuing, and scheme that he is carrying on, in various changes and revolutions that from age to age happen in the world; there is some certain great design to which providence subordinates all the successive changes that come to pass in the state of affairs of mankind…The Christian revelation gives us a most rational account of the design of God in his providential disposition of things,…It gives us an account of the principal parts of the scheme, in the principal providences from the beginning of the world to the end of it, and particularly of the manner how all shall be perfected in the consummation of all things.’ Edwards wrote this after he had given a sermon in Boston, entitled God Glorified in the Work of Redemption, July 8, 1731. See Zakai, 201.

⁷⁶ Works 18. 93-94.

⁷⁷ See Zakai, 143-44.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 144-45.

⁷⁹ See Gibson, 66-67.

Edwards’ cosmic vision was therefore informed by the idea of the believer’s infinite and eternal ‘progress’. He wrote: ‘The Work of Redemption is a work that God carries on from the fall of man to the end of the world’ and the whole scheme of divine providence was ‘reducible to that one great work of Redemption’.

His soteriological schema resonates with the early church idea of ‘God’s salvation economy’ (οἰκονομία). It is this cosmic schema that frames and gives biblical authenticity and meaning to the patristic doctrine of deification and is the reason Edwards’ engaged with it. At the heart of Edwards’ cosmic vision is his conviction that God had reconciled the world to himself because of the incarnation’s work. Moreover, although his teaching on deification is grounded upon the incarnation’s salvific work, it was his eighteenth-century milieu that provided the context for its development.

9.8 The Cambridge Platonists

Although secular eighteenth-century moral philosophy was indebted to the Protestant thought of the preceding century, by the late seventeenth-century moral philosophers had begun the process of converting into secular and naturalistic terms crucial parts of the Christian heritage. In order to reverse this, Edwards interacted with and assimilated the moral philosophy of his time so as to convert it back into the language of Christian belief. The English Puritan Reformed tradition may have been Edwards nearest theological antecedent, but it was his intellectual context that allowed him to adapt the Enlightenment’s philosophical epistemological influences for the extrapolation and correction of Christian orthodoxy. Moreover, it was his confidence in his inherited Christian dogmatic tradition that provided him with the freedom as well as the impetus to make creative use of the philosophical and epistemological influences for the benefit of orthodoxy.

In the early church the patristic doctrine of deification, although Christian in origin, developed alongside the early theologians’ engagement with Neoplatonic metaphysics. Likewise, Edwards also appears to have drawn significant elements of his spiritual thought from the Cambridge Platonists, who themselves drew on and engaged with Neoplatonic thought. Like Edwards, they held a deep aversion to

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83 Ibid., 60-61.
the influence of materialistic empirical philosophy on theology and sought to connect the material/corporeal to the spiritual in their writings. They not only defended the term ‘deification’ in their writings, making it an idea central to their theological reflections, but appealed to 2 Peter 1:4 as its proof. Henry More, for example, had applauded the connection of Neoplatonism with the metaphysical theology of the patristics because in its application it allowed them to resolve, communicate and bridge the gap between the spiritual and material or corporeal realms of human existence. Edwards was exposed to the Cambridge Platonists as a young man, and it was more than likely their writings that introduced him to the biblical origins of the patristic doctrine of deification. Even so, his understanding of the doctrine can also be traced to the influence of eastern patristic theology as it was refracted out of medieval thought into Puritan thought. Edwards therefore developed his ideas through Puritan writings and discussions with his Yale tutors, as well as through Cambridge Platonist writings.

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85 See Watts, 183. Along with Henry More, Edwards rejected the seventeenth-century pleasure-pain principle/system. Based on physical qualities, the system posited true pleasure as being dependent entirely on sense perception. Edwards, like More, believed that this empirical principle negated the necessity of God and attacked the system in a later work, called The Nature of True Virtue.

86 See Patrides, 70, 101, 148-49. For example, Ralph Cudworth quoted the Alexandrian exchange principle referencing the principle to 2 Peter 1:4 in a sermon he gave to the House of Commons on March 31, 1647. John Smith also referenced the doctrine in many of his sermons. Both John Smith’s Select Discourses (1660) and Ralph Cudworth’s True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678) are included in Edwards’ Catalogue (See Works 26.281-82, 269-74, 292, 300, 315). See also McClymond & McDermott, 413.


89 Wilson-Kastner, 317.
The link between Neoplatonism and the early church was an essential one. It assisted early theologians to frame, extrapolate and communicate the spiritual and earthly realms of Christian existence in a way that did not compromise humanity’s and creation’s dependence on the Creator. The fundamental difference between Neoplatonism and the theologian who engaged with its metaphysics was that early Christian thinkers did not believe the corporeal body to be an impediment to the soul/intellect.

Although Edwards drew some of his inspiration from the Cambridge Platonists, he held the traditional Christian view that God’s creation of the corporeal world was good. He affirmed that a direct participation in God involved the Christian’s body as well as their soul and intellect. Edwards therefore thought of the composition of the Christian, just as the Church Fathers had done, as a Trinitarian composition of body, soul/mind and Spirit, which made the Trinity, the incarnation and the Spirit’s work concomitant to how early theologians thought about the notion of Christian deification.

9.9 Edwards’ Key Themes of Deification

Although Edwards does not use the words ‘deification’ or *theosis* in his writings, there are five key themes that show that he engaged with the patristic doctrine of deification. These are Christian participation in the divine nature, Christ’s descent and ascent, the patristic idea of ‘recapitulation’, the

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90 See Christian Exemplarism in Introduction, Part A.
91 See Dockrill, 60-64. See also McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 142-43.
93 See McClymond & McDermott, 416.
Christian’s union with God/Christ, and the progression of the soul into eternity. These themes spring from Edwards’ Christology because they are all a consequence of the incarnation’s work.\(^{94}\)

In his first published sermon, *God Glorified in Man’s Dependence*,\(^{95}\) Edwards extrapolated on the significance of humanity’s dependence on the Creator, given the incarnation’s salvific work. Although humanity remains dependent on God, God has saved humanity for a purpose. The purpose is to abide in the life of holiness, made possible only because of Christ’s fully divine and human natures:

We are dependent on God’s power through every step of our redemption. We are dependent on the power of God to convert us, and give faith in Jesus Christ, and the new nature... 'Tis a work of creation: “If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature’ (II Cor. 5:17);...The redeemed have all their inherent good in God. Inherent good is twofold; 'tis either excellency or pleasure. These the redeemed not only derive from God, as caused by him, but have them in him. They have spiritual excellency and joy by a kind of participation of God. They are made excellent by a communication of God’s excellency: God puts his own beauty, i.e. his beautiful likeness, upon their souls. They are made “partakers of the divine nature,” or moral image of God (II Pet. 1:4). They are holy by being made “partakers of God’s holiness” (Heb. 12:10)...In these things the redeemed have communion with God; that is, they partake with him and of him.\(^{96}\)

Edwards’ theology of deification stems from the consequences of the incarnation’s work, which has transformed believers and allows them to partake in God’s holiness, or share in God’s characteristic of holiness. In Edwards’ Trinitarian framework, the Spirit as the agent of the incarnation, not only begins Christian ‘conversion’, but also continues it.\(^{97}\) The Spirit operates as the bond between the two natures of Christ, which made Christ one (fully human and fully divine) in his personhood.\(^{98}\) The Spirit’s work is therefore also a deifying work in the Christian life because the incarnation’s salvific work has united Christians to Christ.

\(^{95}\) The sermon was delivered in Northampton in 1730 and later preached to a meeting of clergy in Boston on July 8, 1731, after which it went into circulation in New England and Britain as a pamphlet. Edwards cites 1 Corinthians 1:29-31 at the beginning of the sermon. Some of the themes from this sermon also reappear in his later work on the Trinity.
\(^{96}\) Works 17. 205, 208.
\(^{98}\) Works. 13. 528-32 (*Misc.*487).
9.10 The Holy Spirit, the Incarnation and Deification

According to Edwards, the Spirit’s work is concomitant to the incarnation’s work because it was also God’s own work in that God is the beginning and end of his creation. ‘It was more easily the Holy Spirit’s work to bring the world to its beauty and perfection out of the chaos, for the beauty of the world is the communication of God’s beauty. The Holy Spirit is the harmony and excellency and beauty of the Deity…’ The Spirit’s work was therefore also the incarnation’s work, because its work acted like a spiritual ‘glue’ that bound the believer’s life to Christ’s own life. Edwards expressed this idea in several Miscellanies connected to the incarnation, which followed his understanding of consent and excellency. The Spirit as the agent in the incarnation brings consent between two infinitely inequitable divine and human natures. Harmony of knowledge and will between both the divine and human nature is therefore made possible by the Spirit’s work. The Spirit not only brings consent between the sinner and Christ, but also brings the consent between the divine and human nature of Christ into one will.

The parallels between the Spirit’s work in the incarnation and the believer’s union with Christ inform Edwards’ controversial statement on justification. The Spirit’s work is the point at which both the transcendent and immanent qualities of grace transform the human will and align it with Christ’s. The Spirit is not only the agent of the exchange between Christ and the sinner, but also the agent of the believer’s new spiritual modality. Edwards wrote: ‘It appears that the Holy Spirit is the holiness, or excellency and delight of God, because our communion with God and with Christ consists in our partaking of the Holy Ghost.’ Christ’s redemption exchanges the sinner’s fallen condition for his own perfect true humanity, in which the believer ‘partakes’. Edwards’ conception of the Spirit as the agent of the incarnation echoes Chalcedon Christology. Fallen humanity is taken up and healed by the incarnation,

99 Works 13. 384 (Misc. 293).
100 Withrow, 157 n.76.
102 Withrow, Becoming Divine, 158.
103 Works 13. 409 (Misc. 330).
which makes the ‘unknowable’ God fully known to humanity.\(^{104}\) The incarnation is therefore the point of contact between God and humanity. In overcoming the distance between God and humanity, Christ is the means of the believer’s union with and participation in his divinity.

The Spirit’s unification of the two natures in Christ therefore works to unite Christ to the minds and souls of those he has saved. Christians are united in Christ’s perfect will spiritually, and they share, inherit and possess all that the Father has given the Son:

By virtue of the believer’s union with Christ, he doth really possess all things…the whole universe, bodies and spirits, earth and heaven…are as much the Christian’s as the money in his pocket, the clothes he wears, or the house he dwells in, or the victuals he eats…by virtue of the union with Christ; because Christ, who certainly doth possess all things is entirely his…\(^{105}\)

For Edwards, the union of Christ’s two natures is a true or realistic model for the believer’s union with Christ.\(^{106}\) Spirit-filled Christians, united with Christ, show ‘true humanity’ to the world in a realistic sense as they progress in a life characterised by holy living.

9.11 Christ’s Descent and Ascent and Christ’s Recapitulation

Edwards’ picture of union with Christ also echoes the early church’s Christological theme of Christ’s descending so that humanity could ascend, a theme which had been evident in both Augustine’s and Maximus’ deification theology.\(^{107}\) The Son gave himself over in place of fallen humanity and exchanges the human condition for his own, so that Christ not only pays the penalty in an atoning

\(^{104}\) See Gibson, 51-52.

\(^{105}\) Works 13. 183-84 (Misc. ff). See also Withrow, Becoming Divine, 126-27.


\(^{107}\) Works 18. 368-69 (Misc. 741). Cf. Works 18.241-42 (Misc 681). Compare Augustine s. 294.10.10 [PL 38:1341] ‘Therefore it was his will to say (Hoc ergo dicere voluit): No man hath ascended into heaven but he that descended out of heaven (Nemo ascendit, nisi qui descendit). No man has therefore ascended except Christ (Non ergo ascendit, nisi Christus). If you wish to ascend (Si vis ascendere), be in the body of Christ (esto in corpore Christi).’ Compare Maximus Ad Thal. 22 [CCSG 7:139] ‘In short, the former have to do with God’s descent to human beings, while the latter have to do with humanity’s ascent to God (Καὶ συντάξεός εἰπεν, τῶν αἰώνων οἱ μὲν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους εἰσὶ καταβάσεως, οἱ δὲ τῆς τῶν ἁθρώπων πρὸς θεὸν ὑπάρχουσιν ἀναβάσεως).’ Both Augustine and Maximus used the patristic ‘katagoge’ Christological theme of Christ’s ‘descent’ and ‘ascent’ Christ had descended so that Christians could ‘ascend’. Gk. (καταβάσεως...ἀναβάσεως) L. (descendit... ascendit).
transaction, but communicates to humanity his righteous being. The idea of Christ’s descent and ascent is closely linked to the idea of Christ’s ‘recapitulation’.

In a Miscellany on the ‘Kingdom of Christ’ Edwards wrote: ‘consider that those who are saved by the gospel are doubtless advanced to a far greater happiness than Adam would have enjoyed.’ He believed that Christ had brought a new standing to believers, a standing recovered from the ruined world:

That the recovery of the world from confusion and ruin is by Christ…and that the first thing that was done in order to the recovery of the ruined world, was the giving of Jesus Christ to be the light of the world to put an end to its darkness and confusion. (2) As the light was the first thing come out of darkness and confusion…so Christ was in a sense the first that rose out of the dismal darkness, ruin and death that was occasioned by sin (Acts 26:23; Col.1:18; 1 Cor. 15:20, 23; Rev.1:5).

According to Edwards, Christ had traversed and reversed the corrupted effects upon creation and brought with it something far greater for Christians than if Adam had never sinned: ‘Hence we may learn how vastly HIGHER and more glorious the happiness is that is purchased for the elect by Christ, than that

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108 Gibson, 66.
109 Ireneaus’ doctrine of Recapitulation related to the meaning of and effect of Christ’s salvific work where Christ is seen to be the new Adam and where he succeeds where the first Adam had failed. See also Schuler, 66.
110 Works 13. 309 (Misc. 158 [Kingdom of Christ]). Cf. Works 20. 153-54 (Misc. 894 [Covenants. Perfection in Holiness. Adam’s Innocency and Gospel Holiness Compared]). ‘Though holiness, or the spiritual image of God, be in its principle and habit the same, yet the circumstances men may be in, and the different relation to God, and different manner of God's dealing with us and discovering himself to us, and the work he appoints us, and the views and expectations that are given us, and pursuits that are appointed us—the exercises of it—may be most diverse. So gospel holiness differs greatly from the holiness of man in innocence: man had the Holy Ghost then, as the Spirit of God; but now he must have it as the Spirit of the Son of God, the Spirit of a Redeemer, a Mediator between God and us, and a spiritual husband, etc. A man now, in order to a being perfectly holy, or coming up to his duty, now must be vastly more holy, must love God in an unspeakably higher degree, than he needed in order to perfect, sinless holiness in his first estate. Because in perfection of holiness is not only to be considered the capacity of our nature, but the manifestations God gives us of himself, and the obligations he lays us under: then a man is perfectly holy, when his love to God bears a just proportion to the capacities of his nature, under such circumstances, with such manifestations as God makes of his loveliness, and benefits that he receives from him, etc. A creature of the same capacity can see more of God's loveliness under some circumstances, than others. Adam's perfection in holiness did not render utterly impossible that he should love God more, let God make what further manifestations of himself he would, or whatever further obligations he might receive from God. 'Tis probable that some Christians have had higher exercises of love to God, than ever our first parents had, and yet were exceeding far from sinless perfection, which they had. The occasion we have to love God now is infinitely greater than that which they had. 'Tis probable that some Christians have had higher degrees of spiritual joys, than ever Adam had.’
111 Works 18. 284-85 (Misc. 702).
which Adam would have obtained if he had stood.\textsuperscript{112} The incarnation’s descent undoes and reverses Adam’s sin because Christ is fully human and divine. Christ’s union with humanity leads Christians to an experience of the divine life that is unable to be experienced outside of the incarnation’s work. Christ’s ‘true humanity’, is shared by believers in a realistic sense not only as a result of their salvation, but also as a result of their on-going spiritual transformation.

\textbf{9.12 The Christian’s Union With and Participation in Christ and the Spirit}

Within this Trinitarian context, the Spirit is the foundation of the union between Christ and the Christian.\textsuperscript{113} For Edwards the Trinity is not only the means of the incarnation, but also the means of the Christian’s spiritual or deified ontological transformation. Edwards’ Trinitarian soteriological framework, however, has drawn criticism. Hastings\textsuperscript{114} claims that deification theology has caused Edwards to conceive an idea of Christian assurance that is anthropocentrically focused on the human self. Edwards’ soteriology therefore promotes personal experience and introspection over and above Christ as the rightful object of the believer’s assurance.\textsuperscript{115} Hastings\textsuperscript{116} argues that Edwards did not develop a fully Trinitarian account of Christian assurance, which he believes has resulted in a mistaken emphasis on the believer’s sanctification over their justification, which has blurred the distinction between justification and sanctification in Edwards’ soteriology. According to Hastings, Edwards emphasises the Spirit’s work as the nexus of that communion, rather than the full communal work of the Trinity. This mistaken emphasis invites monism and makes Christian assurance dependent, not on Christ’s work of justification, but on human subjectivity.\textsuperscript{117} Christian assurance is displaced from its Christological centre and located in a subjective anthropocentric experiential one, so that Edwards’ ‘spirituality is more characterised by introspection than by agency.’\textsuperscript{118}

The problem with Hastings’ thesis lies in the dichotomy he creates between knowledge/reason and experience/practice. He fails to see that Edwards’ Spirit-Christology affirms that the unity of the

\textsuperscript{112} Works 18. 515 (Misc. 809).
\textsuperscript{113} Pauw, 146.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 437, 454-55.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 454-55.
\textsuperscript{118} Hastings, 437.
Spirit with the believer is involved at one and the same time in their ‘whole person’ (mind/reason and heart). In Edwards’ thinking the believer’s assurance is not a subjective act in isolation from Christ’s work of justification. Rather, their assurance and sanctification affirm Christ’s justification of them, which is an objective act. The ‘subjective’ affirms the ‘objective’, because of the Spirit’s work, so that any dichotomy between the believer’s knowledge of Christ’s work and their response to that knowledge is a false one.

For Edwards the Spirit’s work is not isolated from the Trinity’s own communal work. Instead the Spirit’s work is the key to understanding the transcendent and immanent qualities of grace at work in Christ’s act of justification, as evident in Edwards’ statement: ‘What is real in the union between Christ and His people, is the foundation of what is legal.’ The Spirit’s work is not isolated from Christ’s work as the ‘agent’ of justification, but it continues as the ‘agent’ of Christ’s work in the progressive transformation of the Christian life. Contrary to Hastings’ claims, Edwards’ deification theology does not overemphasise the pneumatological union of the Christian with God, at the expense of the incarnational union of God with and for humanity in Christ, but the Spirit is the ‘agent’ of the union, not merely in name, but also in a ‘realistic’ sense.

This ‘realistic sense’ can be seen in how Edwards linked the Spirit’s work to his idea of ‘sense’ or ‘sense of the heart’, evident in his 1733 sermon *A Divine and Supernatural Light*[^119]:

The Spirit of God acts in a very different manner in the one case…He may indeed act upon the mind of the natural man; but he acts in the mind of the saint as an indwelling vital principle…But he unites himself with the mind of the saint…actuates and influences him as a new, supernatural principle of life and action…Holiness is the proper nature of the Spirit of God. The Holy Spirit operates on the minds in the godly, by uniting himself to them, and living in them, and exerting his own nature in the exercise of their faculties…1. A true sense of the divine and superlative excellency of God, and Jesus Christ, and of the work of redemption, and the ways and works of God revealed in the gospel…He that is spiritually enlightened truly apprehends and sees it, or has a sense of it…This light is such as effectually influences the inclination, and changes the nature

[^119]: See Schuler, 64. Edwards inferred deification or *theosis* from the Transfiguration account in this sermon and quotes Matthew 16:17. The Transfiguration is significant because in patristic tradition, Christ’s transfiguration is held up to be a model for what Christians will experience. It proves the union between Christ’s human and divine nature and is the future expectation of all Christians. Christians share or partake in Christ’s divinity, just as Christ partook in humanity.
of the soul. It assimilates the nature to the divine nature, and changes the soul into an image of the same glory that is beheld.\(^{120}\)

Although Edwards did not use the terminology of ‘participation’ or ‘union’ in the passage above, his Spirit-Christology affirms that the unity of the Spirit and the Christian involved their whole person, their mind and heart. The Spirit unites the believer’s mind and heart to Christ, so that in taking on Christ’s divine nature they reflect his image to the world. Their union with Christ, their ‘participation’ in Christ, fills them with a renewed inner sense, given to them by the Spirit, which causes them to discern clearly their knowledge of God. Thus, the Christian’s will, in aligning itself with Christ’s perfect will, results in obedience to God’s commands and purposes, leading to the ongoing development of holy affections and virtues in the Christian life.

Edwards’ connection of the Spirit’s work to deification shows affinity with both Augustine\(^{121}\) and Maximus.\(^{122}\) He follows these early theologians in that he understands the Spirit’s work in the Christian life as a dynamic work. The Spirit’s work continues the renewing of the mind and heart of believers, so that they can discern spiritual things, by which they maintain the capacity to obey God. In the mindset of all three theologians, in God’s Trinitarian life there is no end point to the Spirit’s work. Because believers are united with Christ, thereby participating in his divine life, there is also no endpoint to the Spirit’s work in the Christian life, now and in eternity. Edwards’ pneumatology is theocentric because although Christians maintain responsibility in their reformation, the success of their transformation has been made dependent on what Christ’s salvific work has already achieved for them. Edwards depicted this in "Charity and Its Fruits," in which he described the Spirit’s work as a deifying work of grace in the Christian’s life.

\(^{120}\) Works 17. 411,413.

\(^{121}\) Compare, Augustine Dolbeau 6.6 [Dolbeau: 100] ‘But by giving human beings his Spirit he also enables them to pass judgment (Sed dando spiritum suum facit et homines iudicet), not from themselves (non per seipsum), not in virtue of their nature (non a seipsis, non natura sua), not by any merit of theirs (non merito suo), but by his grace and gift. (sed gratia illius et dono illius).’

\(^{122}\) Compare Maximus Confessor Amb. 42.1345D [PG 91:1345D] ‘For created man could not be revealed as a son of God through deification by grace without first being born of the Spirit in the exercise of free choice, because of the power of self-movement and self-determination inherent in human nature (Οὐ γὰρ ἡν ἰσαρχὴν ἄλλος Υἱὸν ἀποδεικνύει Θεὸν καὶ Θεὸν κατὰ τὴν ἐκ χάριτος θεωσίαν τὴν γενόμενον ἁναθρωσίαν, μὴ πρὸ τοῦ προσέρχεσθαι γεννηθῆναι τῷ Πνεύματι, διὰ τὴν ἐνσώσαν αὐτῷ φυσικός αὐτοκίνητος καὶ ἀδέσποτον δύναμιν).’; Myst. 24 [CCSG 69:66] ‘Through them, in making us who conducts himself worthily as best he can in Christ, it brings to light the grace of adoption which was given through holy baptism in the Holy Spirit and which makes us perfect in Christ (διὰ τῶν ἐκκατὼν ἡμῶν καλῶς μάλιστα πολιτεύομεν ἀναλόγως ἐκείνῳ, κατὰ Χριστὸν ἡμιουργοῦσα, τὸ διὸ διὰ τοῦ ἀγίου βαπτίσματος ἐν Πνεύματι ἀγίῳ χάρισμα τῆς υιοθεσίας εἰς φανέρωσιν ἄγει κατὰ Χριστὸν τελειώμενον).’
The Spirit’s work is therefore the key to understanding both the transcendent and immanent qualities of grace in justification and deification:

But when the Spirit by his ordinary influences bestows saving grace, he therein imparts himself to the soul in his own holy nature; ...By his producing this effect the Spirit becomes an indwelling vital principle in the soul, and the subject becomes a spiritual being, dominated so from the Spirit of God which dwells in him and whose nature he is a partaker [II Pet. 1:4]. Yea, grace is at it were the holy nature of the Spirit.  

According to Edwards, the Spirit operates as a vital or operative principle within the believer as it aligns itself to the will. It impresses God’s own will on the believer’s mind and heart by communicating God’s knowledge to them. The Spirit also activates this knowledge which is the reason Christians possess the natural capacity to obey God. In Edwards’ words, the Spirit stirs both the mind and the heart to action, directing the will to obedience:

And the influences of the Spirit of God in this, being this peculiar to God, and being those wherein God does, in so high a manner, communicate himself, and make the creature a partaker of the divine nature (the Spirit of God communicating itself in its own proper nature). This is what I mean by those influences that are divine, when I say that truly gracious affections do arise from those influences that are spiritual and divine.

Only God could reveal knowledge about himself, and this knowledge could only be communicated to Christians because of the Spirit’s work.

9.13 Love and Deification

In a sermon on the ‘Beautiful Vision’ Edwards aligned love to the Trinitarian inner work of God that deifies the believer. ‘This very manifestation that God will make of himself that will cause the Beautiful vision will be an act of love in God.’ According to Edwards, it is God’s love that unites

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123 Works 8. 158.
124 McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 150; McClymond & McDermott, 420.
125 Works 2. 203–04.
128 Works 8. 724–25. See Ramsey, ‘Appendix III’, 725 n. 2. Edwards’ words make clear why the Incarnation (God-man) is central to the beautifical vision, and why heaven as a progressive state was
Christians to God. It is this unification, or ‘participation’, which gave love its teleological and ontological value, making it synonymous with will. Similarly, the same occurs with the affections of ‘joy’, ‘desire’ and ‘delight’ because these affections are also weighted with the same teleological and ontological value. The affections become deifying affections when they are moved by ‘love’ of God as their objective: ‘Love desires union. They shall therefore see this glorious God united to themselves and see themselves united to him…God with them and God in them as they in God. Love desires the possession of its object.’

Edwards’ notion of Christian deification therefore involved the believer’s full participation in the Trinity:

Enjoy God as partaking with Christ of his enjoy[ment] of God, for they are united to him and are Glorified and made happy in the enjoyment of God as his members…They being in Christ shall partake of the love of God the Father to Christ, and as the Son knows the Father, so they shall partake with him in his sight of God as being as it were parts of him…Herein they shall enjoy God in a more exalted and excellent manner than man would have done if he had never fallen.

The attribute of love functions relationally in Edwards’ notion of deification. Christians are incorporated into God’s divine life as a kind of expanding family relationship. Edwards’ community or family imagery worked to portray this: ‘God created the world for his Son, that he might prepare a spouse or bride for him to bestow his love upon; so that the mutual joys between this bride and bridegroom are the end of creation.’ He further developed the theme in his writings on heaven. In his sermon Heaven is a World of Love he wrote: ‘They shall all be united together in a very near relation. Love seeks a near the object loved. And in heaven all shall be nearly related. They shall be nearly allied to God, the supreme object of their love; for they shall be his children. And all shall be nearly related to Christ; for he shall be always implicit in his thought. God is always actively coming into the world, and into heaven, and since the act of love causes the vision, heaven remains an eventful place.

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129 Works 8. 725.
130 McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 150; McClymond & McDermott, 420.
131 Works 8. 725.
132 Although the Trinitarian image of a family or society was held in Puritan tradition, the image can be traced to Augustine and to the eastern Cappadocians. Cf. Works 16. 415. In a letter written to Lady Mary Pepperell in 1751, Edwards wrote: ‘The eternal and immutable happiness of the Deity himself represented in Scripture as a kind of social happiness, in the society of the persons of the Trinity.’ See also McClymond & McDermott, 423; Pauw, 14, 30-37; Wilson-Kastner, 315.
133 Works 18. 289.
134 See McClymond & McDermott, 423.
the Head of the whole society, and husband of the whole church of saints. The issue of Christian conversion and spiritual transformation therefore also informed his ecclesiology.

Edwards’ soteriology became a defining aspect of his ecclesiological framework, especially in how it informed his understanding of the church’s corporate life, as can be seen in his sacramental theology. His conviction was that Christians testified to their conversion by maintaining responsibility for the manifestation of a transformed life and by engaging in spiritual disciplines. This conviction eventually led to his unwillingness to admit to communion not only those who had declined to join the church, but also attendees who did not appear to be living visibly transformed lives in the community.

What underlay Edwards’ radical conviction, which he imposed on his congregation, was his belief that the sacraments existed for the benefit of the true Christian, and that true Christianity went hand in hand with the believer’s active pursuit of holiness. He believed that the fruit of conversion showed itself visibly in the Christian’s transformation as they lived in relation to the church and to others.

9.14 Perichoresis, Emanation and Remanation

Edwards’ focus on love and its operation drew on the Trinitarian language of perichoresis. The Christian’s participation is a partaking of the three persons’ own participation in one another in the fullness of God’s divine life. In End of Creation Edwards drew on the Neoplatonic themes of emanation and remanation in his explication of Romans 11:36 which speaks of God being ‘all in all’. His analogy of God as a fountain, or as the source, portrays the purpose of God’s creative act as God expanding and enhancing his own being. Although God is self-sufficient and outside his creation, neither is God

135 Works 8, 380.
138 Ramsay, ‘Appendix III’, 734-35 n. 1. Perichoresis (Latin: circumincessio) was sometimes used as the ‘rule’ for interpreting the mutual interrelation of Christ’s two natures (human and divine), but its true home was Trinitarian theology. See also McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 150; McClymond & McDermott, 420.
complete apart from all his creation because God is love.\textsuperscript{139} God created for the glory of himself as well as for the glory of creation:

The emanation or communication of the divine fullness, consisting in the knowledge of God, love to God, and joy in God, has relation indeed both to God and creature: but it has relation to God as its fountain, as it is an emanation from God…In the creature’s knowing, esteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praising God, the glory of God is both exhibited and acknowledged; his fullness is received and returned. Here is both an emanation and remanation…The beams of glory come from God, and are something of God, and are refunded back again to their original. So that the whole is of God, and in God, and to God; and God is the beginning, middle and end in this affair.\textsuperscript{140}

Edwards’ reference to God as the ‘source’ or ‘fountain’ evokes the eastern tradition that spoke of the Father as the ground and origin of the hypostases of the Son and the Spirit.\textsuperscript{141} Edwards therefore saw continuity between God and his creation.\textsuperscript{142} God’s holiness and divine nature, his being and his love, is the eternal source or fountain. In Edwards’ ontology, God is the source and end of creation, and as such God is ‘beauty’ and ‘excellency’. He metaphysically made use of the Neoplatonic paradigm of ‘proces­sion and return’ or ‘emanation and remanation’ which enabled him to ground creation in the fullness of God’s very being. It also allowed him to accentuate creation and the creature’s dependence on God. God’s creative purpose therefore exists to communicate his divine fullness to his creatures outside

\textsuperscript{139} See McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 152; McClymond & McDermott, 422. See also Gibson, 57-58.
\textsuperscript{140} Works 8. 531.
\textsuperscript{141} Cf. Works 21. 130-31, 134-36, 142-43; cf. Works 21.186-87. Compare Augustine: trin. 4.29, 5.12-13, 6.7, 9.5 with Maximus on the question of the filioque in his letter to Marinus of Cyprus (Epistle ad Marinus [PG 91:136AB]) ‘The Westerners cited the consonant testimonies of the Latin Fathers, as well as that of Cyril of Alexandria in his commentary on the Gospel of Saint John (Καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, συμφωνόντος παρήγαγον χρήσεις τῶν Ῥωμαίων Πατέρων ἔτι γε μὴν καὶ Κύριλλου Ἀλεξανδρείας, ἐκ τῆς ποιηθείσης αὐτῷ εἶ τὸν εὐκαγγελιστὴν ἄγιον ἱωάνην ιερᾶς πραγματείας). They showed therefore that they did not view the Son as a cause of the Spirit (ἐξ ὧν, οὐκ αἰτίαν τὸν Υἱὸν ποιοῦτας τοῦ Πνεύματος, σφάς αὐτοῦς ἀπέδειξαν), for they knew that the Father alone is the cause of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (μὲνεν γὰρ ἠστιν Ὑιὸν καὶ Πνεύματος τὸν Πατέρα αἰτίαν· τοῦ μὲν κατὰ τὴν γέννησιν) but they showed that the Spirit proceeds through the Son, and therefore showed the conjunction of their nature, which is no way different (τοῦ δὲ, κατὰ τὴν ἐκπορευσθείν· ἄλλ’ ἵνα τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ προιέναι δηλώσω· καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ συνεφές τῆς οὐσίας καὶ ἀπαράλλακτος παραστήσωσι).’ The English translation has been adapted from Gibson, 57. See also Gibson, n. 76, 56-57.
\textsuperscript{142} See McClymond, ‘Salvation as Divinization’, 152; McClymond & McDermott, 422; Ramsey, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, 70.
his triune life.  This communication has affinities with Maximus, who also depicted creation as an act of God’s will, the deliberate communication of the divine idea/principle, λόγος through the emanation of God’s eternal being.

For Edwards, participation in God’s beauty and glory, the knowledge of which is communicated to the Christian, ‘is symmetrically aligned’ with God’s own being, as God’s ultimate end in the act of creation.

And if we attend to the nature and circumstances of this eternal emanation of divine good, it will more clearly show how in making this his end, God testifies a supreme respect to himself, and makes himself his end. There are many reasons to think that what God has in view, in an increasing communication of himself throughout eternity, is an increasing knowledge of God, love to him, and joy to him. And ‘tis to be considered that the more those divine communications increase in the creature, the more it becomes one with God: for so much the more it is united to God in love, the heart drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and close: and at the same time the creature becomes more and more conformed to God. The image is more and more perfect, and so the good that is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is God...For it will forever come nearer and nearer to that strictness and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son.

God’s communication of his knowledge to believers results in the deification, not because Christians are subsumed into God’s being, but because the continuation of the Spirit’s transformative work bears witness to the true nature of the Christian’s spiritual identity as it lies in Christ.

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143 Works 8. 432-33 (cf. Works 18. 97 [(Misc. 553) End of the Creation]). ‘God’s communication or emanation of his infinite fullness ad extra is out of regard for his own perfection, excellency, beauty or fullness, which implies grace towards his creation.’ See Gibson, 59-60.

144 Amb. 7.1073C [PG 91:1073C] ‘For God is the beginning and the end (ος αρχη και τελος). From him come both our moving in whatever way from a beginning and our moving in a certain way toward him as an end (εξ αυτου γερ και το απλως κυνεσθαι ημας, ος αρχης, και το πως κυνεσθαι προς αυτον ως τελος εστιν).’ Cf. Amb 7.1077C [PG 91:1077C] Maximus’ thinking was grounded in the inner principles of the λογος that derive from God’s being and which continuously communicate God’s beauty and being throughout creation.’

145 Gibson, 62.

146 Works 8. 443. Edwards quoted from Jn. 17:21, 23, a passage that was traditionally associated with the doctrine of perichoresis. Cf. Works 8. 355-56. In Charity and Its Fruits Edwards quotes from Eph. 4:11-13 a passage that taught that God’s purpose was to perfect believers until they become ‘a perfect man’.
9.15 Heaven as a Perpetual Progress

Edwards also spoke of eternity as an endless progression into God’s divine life. According to Edwards, as Christians developed the virtuous affections they reflected God’s character of holiness, which gave them a greater spiritual appetite for spiritual things, something that would not cease in the resurrected life. He therefore creates a picture of the never-ending asymptotic progress of the believer, ever getting nearer to God’s divine holiness and being, but never being subsumed into God’s being or ineffability. This has affinities with Maximus’ teaching on deification because he also spoke of the believer’s deification in eternity as never ending.

For Edwards, ‘participation’ in the divine nature meant progressing in God’s characteristic of holiness. Not that Christians themselves became divine. Edwards’ teaching on deification, however, drew scrutiny. An unnamed correspondent raised a number of objections to Religious Affections. Edwards was accused of teaching that the Spirit communicated his very ‘nature’ to believers, which implied that the Spirit imparted his ‘essence’ to Christians, and threatened the transcendence of God and Christ. This would imply that Christians were subsumed into God’s divinity. Edwards addressed this accusation in a letter where he discussed the Greek term for ‘nature’ (φύσις) and distinguished it from ‘essence’:

As to my saying that the Spirit of God in his saving operation communicates himself to the soul in his own proper nature, implying, as you suppose, God’s communicating his essence…what I do not mean, that by his proper nature I don’t mean essence…I do mean, viz. that by the Spirit of

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148 Cf. Works 13. 478. ‘Much of their happiness has consisted in seeing the progressive wonderful doings of God with respect with his church here in this world.’ See McClymond & McDermott, 419.
149 Works 2. 376. Cf. Works 2. 202 ‘The grace which is in the hearts of the saints, is of the same nature with the divine holiness, as much as ‘tis possible for that holiness to be, which is infinitely less in degree… Therefore Christ says, John 3:6, "That which is born of the Spirit is spirit"; i.e. the grace that is begotten in the hearts of the saints, is something of the same nature with that Spirit, and so is properly called a spiritual nature; after the same manner as that which is born of the flesh is flesh, or that which is born of corrupt nature is corrupt nature.’
150 Cf. Ad Thal. 22 [CCSG 7:143]
151 See Claghorn, 631-35.
152 Cf. Works 2. 342-43. The offending passage is thought to have come from this section: ‘not only does the sun shine in the saints, but they also become little suns, partaking of the nature of the fountain of their light.’
God’s communicating himself in his proper nature, I mean communicating something of his holiness.\textsuperscript{154}

He argued that what he meant by ‘proper nature’\textsuperscript{155} was not God’s communicating something of his essence, but that God was communicating something of his holiness upon the Christian. He explained that φύσις is not just a term that is used to signify the ‘essence’ of a thing, but can refer to a characteristic.\textsuperscript{156} He believed that God created humans with the capacity for holiness, a capacity that the fall had corrupted. At conversion when the Spirit, whose proper nature is holiness, operates as the vital or operative principle in the heart and aligns the will to God’s will, something of God’s characteristic of holiness is communicated to believers.\textsuperscript{157}

His line of argument is similar to Maximus’ with regard to ‘created natures’, in that God had created the natural capacity for holiness in his creatures, which had been corrupted by the fall.\textsuperscript{158} In Maximus, the natural will no longer functioned in humans in natural alignment with God’s will. Only Christ, who was without sin, dwelled in the fullness of God’s essence. Yet the believer’s virtuous life shows that God’s fullness dwells in them by grace, because they participate in the divine energies or

\textsuperscript{154} Works 8. 638. Cf. Works 2. 203. ‘Not that the saints are made partakers of the essence of God, and so are “Godded” with God, and “Christed” with Christ, according to the abominable and blasphemous language and notions of some heretics; but, to use the Scripture phrase, they are made partakers of God’s fullness (Eph. 3:17-19; John 1:16), that is, of God’s beauty and happiness,…’; See also Works 17. 208 ‘The redeemed have all their inherent good in God. Inherent good is twofold: ‘tis either excellency or pleasure. These the redeemed not only derive from God, as caused by him, but have them in him. They have spiritual excellency and joy by a kind of participation of God. They are made excellent by a communication of God’s excellency: God puts his own beauty, i.e. his beautiful likeness, upon their souls. They are made "partakers of the divine nature," or moral image of God (2 Peter 1:4). They are holy by being made "partakers of God's holiness" (Hebrews 12:10). The saints are beautiful and blessed by a communication of God's holiness and joy as the moon and planets are bright by the sun's light. The saint hath spiritual joy and pleasure by a kind of effusion of God on the soul. In these things the redeemed have communion with God; that is, they partake with him and of him.’ See Strobel, 259-79.

\textsuperscript{155} Works 8. 638-39.

\textsuperscript{156} Works 8. 639-40. Edwards draws an analogy with the light and heat of the sun. One can say that light and heat are the sun’s proper nature, but no one would say that when the sun communicates its light on an object that it receives the sun’s essence and becomes the same being as the sun.

\textsuperscript{157} Cf. Works 2. 201-03, 392; Works 8. 640. This is in conjunction with his idea of the new spiritual sense, new principle, or habit that operates in the believer’s heart, a concept he aligned with the Spirit’s illumination of the mind.

\textsuperscript{158} Cf. Maximus Amb. 7. 1076C [PG 91:1076C]; Amb.41.1308B [PG. 91: 1308B] ‘The person unites the created nature with the uncreated through love (καὶ τέλος ἐπὶ πᾶς τοῦτος, καὶ κυστήρ φώς τῆς ἀκτίστω δι’ ἀγάπης ἐνυώδεις,…showing them to be one and the same through the possession of grace (ἐν καὶ ταύτων δεξίεις κατὰ τὴν ἐξή τῆς χάριτος), the whole [creation] wholly interpenetrated by God (ὁλὸς ὁ λόγος περιχωρήσας ὀλικὼς τῷ Θεῷ) and become completely whatever God is (καὶ γενόμενος πᾶν εἰ τί πέρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς…), save at the level of essence/being (χωρὶς τῆς κατ’ οὐσίαν ταυτότητος).’
Christians do not share in God’s being or essence, but they share in and participate in God’s characteristic or trait of holiness.

According to Maximus, God’s ‘likeness’, his properties (energies or activities) are restored in Christians, so that the divine activity becomes the driving force for the Christian life. Edwards similarly says that Christians see God’s image upon their soul, and that Christ’s likeness resides in them. This is outwardly evidenced for Christians in the moral life. Yet, Christian good works are ‘good’ or ‘holy’ because their value originates and comes forth from God, the fountain or source of all goodness, beauty and holiness. Eschatology therefore informs Christian moral theory because Christians participate in God’s divine nature, something impossible for non-Christians. For Edwards, this made his moral theory a theocentric concern, not an anthropocentric one, which demarcated Christian moral theory from Enlightenment libertarian theory.

9.16 Conclusion

Although Edwards did not use the term ‘deification’ or theosis in his writing, his soteriology and eschatology was characterised by the notion. His engagement with the patristic doctrine of deification shows the biblical foundations of the doctrine. It was informed by the soteriological themes given meaning by the incarnation and the Trinity that worked to give a robust meaning to the shape of Christian salvation. Edwards’ adaptation of the doctrine brought together the transcendent and immanent qualities of the work of grace in the Christian life in a way that is not antithetical to, or incompatible with, the activities.

159 CK 2.21 [PG 90:1133D] ‘In Christ who is God and the Word of the Father (Ἐν μὲν τῷ Χριστῷ, Ἐβρ. Ἰσραήλ καὶ Λόγῳ τοῦ Πατρὸς) there dwells in bodily form the complete fullness of the deity by essence (ὅλον κατ’ οὐσίαν οἰκεῖ τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς); in us the fullness of the deity dwells by grace (ἐν ἡμῖν δὲ κατὰ χάριν οἰκεῖ τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος) whenever we have formed in ourselves every virtue and wisdom (ἡνίκα πᾶσαν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀθροίσωμεν ἁρετὴν καὶ σοφίαν), lacking in no way which is possible to man in the faithful reproduction of the archetype (μηδενὶ τρόπῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπων λειτουργίαν τῆς πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἀληθοὺς ἐκμίμησις). For it is not unnatural thereby that the fullness of deity dwell also in us by adoption (Ὅδε γὰρ ἀπεικόνισα κατὰ τὸν Θεόν λόγον, καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν οἰκήσαι τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος), expressed in the various spiritual ideas (τὸ ἐκ διαφόρων συνεστηκός πνευματικῶν θεωρημάτων).

160 God’s love is one of his common properties or energies, which is restored to Christians and operates within their hearts (cf. Amb.41.1308B [PG. 91: 1308B]). Edwards point is that God’s love has gone forth to Christians, not his essence or his being. See Claghorn, 632; McClymond, 148.

161 Works 14. 108 ‘But the believer may rejoice, and does rejoice, to see the image of God upon their souls, to see the likeness of his dear Jesus. The saints in heaven, who have all remainders of pride taken away, do yet rejoice to see themselves made excellent by God and appearing beautiful with holiness. And if it be a great pleasure to see excellent things, it must be a sweet consideration to think that God of his grace has made me excellent and lovely. If they delight to see the loveliness of Jesus Christ, it must needs be matter of delight to see that Christ has communicated of his loveliness to their souls.’

162 Works 2. 204.
Reformed doctrine of justification by faith. Moreover, his deification theology served to capture the full implications for the Christian life of the righteous effects of Christ’s transaction for sin. It does not compete with the Reformed doctrine of justification, but completes and informs it. Consideration of the Christian’s eschatological end was a summons to effort, not quiescence. Eschatology informed Christian moral theory in the present and placed it on a doctrinal basis, which did not dichotomise or negate either of the spiritual or earthly realities of the Christian life. For Edwards, as for Augustine and Maximus, moral theory was a theocentric concern, not an anthropocentric one.
Chapter 10: Conclusion: The Importance of the Patristic Doctrine of Deification for Western Theology

10.1 Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the nature and significance of the similarities among Augustine, Maximus and Edwards on the doctrine of deification. Despite its biblical foundations it has remained elusive and often misunderstood especially by the western theological mindset. The core argument of the thesis is that all three theologians share the same or similar understanding of deification. The result is that they give a theocentric, rather than anthropocentric understanding of the human predicament (sin and guilt) and human nature (will and affections). The similar understanding of the role of deification in these three theologians can be seen to be the mechanism which frames their soteriologies and allows each to extrapolate not only on the human predicament but it also results in a theocentric understanding of holiness. This aspiration, central to Christianity, is not achieved through human effort, but through the divine activity (grace) of God in the cross of Christ. Only through that is the Christian saved and only through the application of this saving work to the human spirit is sanctification attainable. Christian practice is never separable from the Christian’s salvation.

This sheds light not only on how the doctrine should be understood but why it holds relevance to western theological discourse today. Despite the difficulty in ascertaining a technical definition for the patristic doctrine of deification (θεώσις [theosis]), it is informed by a robust spectrum of biblical themes which is the principal reason it holds relevance to western theology today. Although interest has grown in the doctrine from the western sphere of the church, Reformed Protestants have tended to resist interacting with the doctrine, due in part to its abstract nature. One reason the doctrine has remained on the periphery of soteriological and Christological study in the west is due partly to the two modern technical definitions that have originated from the eastern Orthodox realm. The two definitions focus on and employ the distinct Greek metaphysical and philosophical terminology that often accompanied the communication of the doctrine in the patristic setting. The first definition defines the doctrine in terms of the distinction made between God’s uncreated energies (ἐνεργεία) and God’s essence (οὐσία). The second definition defines the doctrine in terms of the believer’s
participation in Christ’s hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) rather than specifically in the divine energies. Although both definitions aid insight into understanding the metaphysics behind the doctrine’s development in the early church (once the epistemological context of the vocabulary has been explained), the problem with both definitions is that each focuses on the Greek language alone. This works to promote a purely ontological view of the believer’s union with Christ, which has been found objectionable in western theology.

Focusing on the terminology alone, as it is superimposed on the western epistemological context, appears to negate the essential divine-human distinction even when the notion of deification is qualified. Greek theological terminology is not generally understood in the west. It serves only to alienate rather than aid appreciation of the scriptural foundations of the doctrine and of the theological reasons for its remaining a relevant and important doctrine today. This thesis found that the ways in which Augustine, Maximus and Edwards engaged with the doctrine are informed by a broad spectrum of soteriological themes framed by the incarnation and the Trinity. Each theologian’s adaptation of deification ultimately worked to locate the believer’s sanctification at the spiritual level of the divine.

This is because the doctrine insists on the inseparability of the consequences of Christ’s atoning work and Christ’s divine origins, both of which belong to believers because of their spiritual adoption. Moreover, the doctrine works to communicate a rich view of Christian salvation. Enhanced meaning is given to the nature of Christian salvation. It is drawn from the perspective both of Christ’s redemption of the believer and of his resurrection. Both, through the Spirit’s dispensation and inauguration of a spiritual new age, give meaning to the believer’s current life, placing Christian moral theory on a theocentric platform. The incarnation’s salvific work has spiritually refashioned human nature. In consequence, the believer’s identity lies in Christ as the model of ‘true humanity’, and, as the Spirit-filled image of God and instrument in the world.

10.2 The Eastern Orthodox Definition of the Distinction Between God’s Energies and Essence

Although the patristic doctrine of deification has predominately not been part of western theological discussion, there is growing interest from both Catholics and Protestants in recovering the doctrine for the west.\(^2\) By contrast, the doctrine has consistently informed the soteriology of the Eastern Orthodox

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1 See ‘Introduction’, pages 16-17.
2 See n.5 in Introduction of this thesis.
Church to the extent that it is now held as a key component or focus of its soteriology. Despite growing interest in the doctrine by western scholars, Protestant Reformed scholarship has remained uneasy with the notion because it has been unable to reconcile the early church’s soteriological doctrine of deification with its recognised central soteriological doctrine of justification.

One reason the doctrine has been ill received by Protestants can be attributed to the two definitions that were developed for the doctrine of deification by Eastern Orthodox scholars. Following the trend in modern times to establish quantifiable and measured definitions of doctrines (for the purpose of understanding as well as to establish credibility) the first technical definition that was developed was based on the Palamite\(^5\) distinction of God’s essence and God’s uncreated energies.\(^6\) The definition’s intent, in part, is to ensure that the patristic practice of qualifying the doctrine is maintained so that Christians can never be said to be equal to God or subsumed into his being or essence.\(^7\) Christians are deified because of the work of grace understood in light of the Greek terms ‘activity/energy’. The believer’s virtue and good works (the outward evidence of the restoration of God’s likeness in them) renders them capable of participating in God’s divine nature because humanity was created in God’s image. God’s likeness, lost in humans because of the fall, is restored in believers because of grace.\(^8\)

The first definition seeks to maintain the metaphysical and ontological quality or value of the Greek words energy/activity (\(\epsilon\nu\rho\gamma\epsilon\iota\alpha\)) and nature/essence (\(\phi\omicron\upsilon\omicron\varsigma\omega\omicron\sigma\iota\alpha\)). This is the same

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5 See n.8 in this chapter.

6 The major proponent of this definition is Vladimir Lossky. See V. Lossky, *Orthodox Theology: An Introduction* (tr. I. & I. Kesarcodi-Watson; Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1989), 72; V. Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co. Ltd., 1944), 102. Lossky’s definition has been promoted by G. I. Mantzarides, *The Deification of Man: St Gregory Palamas and the Orthodox Tradition* (tr. L. Sherrard; Crestwood: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984), 111-13. For a discussion on this definition see Olson, 189-92.

7 See Mantzarides, 112. See also Lossky, *Mystical Theology*, 72-73, 86.

8 Lossky, *Mystical Theology*, 88. See also Olson, 190.
terminology the Fathers drew on in their development of the Chalcedonian Christological and Trinitarian definitions during the Trinitarian debates. In the linguistic context of the Trinitarian debates it was the metaphysical and ontological quality of the vocabulary used that enabled the Fathers to maintain the distinction between God and his creation. The definitions sought to maintain God’s sovereignty, transcendence, omnipotence and omniscience over his creation, without compromising his engaged, sustaining relationship with the corporeal world.

The Greek terms worked to convey a sense of the ongoing dynamic relationship between God and his creation, yet did so in a way that preserved God’s otherness. The medieval Byzantine theologian Gregory Palamas (1296-1359) drew on the same vocabulary (ἐνέργεια and φύσις/οὐσία) in his dispute with the Neoplatonic theology of Barlaam of Calabria. It is Palamas’ use of this vocabulary that inspired this technical definition of deification that has focused on the Greek vocabulary (ἐνέργεια and φύσις/οὐσία) alone. Thus, eastern scholars who promote this technical definition, wish to maintain the ontological distinction between God and the believer. And they seek to do this in a way which communicates the believer’s dependence on God because of grace. To say that Christians ‘participate in God’s energies’ is to convey that their participation remains inclusive not exclusive of their integral involvement in God’s economy of salvation plan (οἰκονομία). In other words, Christians are essential to God’s salvation plans not merely in name, but in the very real sense of being God’s Spirit-empowered instruments.

Clearly, the proponents of this first definition wish to convey a robust view of Christian salvation, but the problem with the definition lies in its focus and reliance on the metaphysical and ontological quality of the Greek terminology in which it is expressed. As Danielou, Hallonsten, and

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Russell\textsuperscript{12} have noted, it is the anachronism that belies the approach of this definition (having been inspired by the vocabulary as it was used by the medieval Gregory Palamas) that poses the problem. It attempts to define deification as a Byzantine theologian would. The need is not for a more modern definition, but to get closer to the source of the doctrine. This necessitates learning how much earlier theologians engaged with the doctrine and developed their language in earlier contexts.

A problem is created, then, by the definitions’ neglect of the Christological scriptural context that shaped and gave meaning to the patristic doctrine of deification in the early church. Augustine and Maximus help us to address that problem. Both equated their notions of deification with Christian adoption, the result of Christ’s salvific mediatory work due to his fully divine and human natures. Each held notions of Christian adoption associated with the idea of the believer’s imitation of Christ. This they understood in a Trinitarian framework: Christ was held to be the perfect image of the Father, and humanity had been created in God’s image. Christ reflected the Father to the world, and the Spirit transfigured and transformed Christians into the perfect image of Christ, so that they too reflected Christ, and hence the Father, to the world.\textsuperscript{13} Both theologians could therefore speak of Christ’s deification of the believer in correlation with Christ’s justification of the believer. The nexus between the doctrines of deification and justification lay in Christ’s fully human and divine natures. Christ’s justification of believers began their deification because Christ had restored his own righteousness to them, and believers claimed Christ’s own spiritual home as their own.

Given the Christology that informs the soteriological themes of the doctrine, the first definition inadvertently neglects the doctrine’s Christological foundations, so that it can fall into promoting a purely ontological view of the believer’s union with Christ. It is this ontological emphasis, even when the notion of deification is qualified, that has been found objectionable because it appears to negate the essential divine-human distinction that has marked classical or orthodox theological reasoning in the west.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} See N. Russell, \textit{The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 4-7; Russell, \textit{Fellow Workers}, 47-54.


10.3 The Eastern Orthodox Definition of the Christian’s Participation in Christ’s Hypostasis

Other eastern scholars who have criticised this definition as too limiting have noted the neglect of the doctrine’s Christological foundations. They define the doctrine in terms of the believer’s participation in Christ’s hypostasis (ὑπόστασις), rather than specifically in the divine energies. Christ is understood as the model of ‘true humanity’, so that Christians become ‘truly human’ in relation to God through Christ. Apart from its Christocentric focus, the strength of this second definition lies in how it works to inform ecclesiology. Just as the church is Christ’s identity, so Christ is the identity of the universal church at the historical level. A real ontological unity exists not only between the individual believer and Christ, but also between the church’s corporate body and Christ. The strength of this definition lies in how it seeks to convey the believer’s union with Christ, as a union that is also inclusive of the corporate body of the church.

Yet, problems emerge with this definition because of the limitations of the Greek term by which it is defined. This definition focuses on the metaphysical and ontological meaning of another Greek term, hypostasis (ὑπόστασις). In isolation from the cosmic or ‘big picture’ context of God’s salvation plans, this word falls short of conveying how the eschatological future of believers informs their current life. Christ in his personhood is not just a model to be emulated by Christians, but he is also the agent of a new creation. Spirit-filled Christians enter a new modality of life by which they also become instruments in the progression of God’s plans. Although this second definition, due to its Christological focus and ecclesiological utility, has found favour with Catholics and Protestants, its abandonment of the essence/energies distinction has caused its opponents to argue that it risks promoting a pantheistic identity of the Christian. Here, the doctrine of deification is treated more as a metaphor that fails adequately to address the realism of the believer’s union with Christ.

16 Russell, Fellow Workers, 52. See also Olson, 191-92.
17 See Olson, 191-92.
18 See Ibid., 192.
Weighted on the metaphysical and ontological quality of the Greek terms alone, the definitions fail to articulate the full spectrum of soteriological themes that gave life to the doctrine in the early church. Adapting the Greek philosophical and theological vocabulary and transposing it into the present day has led to confusion, accusations of heterodoxy, and misunderstanding. In the end, neither definition frees itself from a purely ontological view of deification or the believer’s union with Christ, because both definitions overlook the teleological value of the doctrine.

With regard to all three theologians, their adaptations of deification were determined by a teleology that implied that God in creating humans in his image had endowed humans with an affinity with, and likeness to, himself. Humans so endowed had the capacity to be drawn towards God. The scriptural tradition held that this natural capacity or ‘likeness’ was destroyed in humans by sin, but restored in the believer by the totality of the incarnation’s work and the illumination of the Spirit. Each theologian, therefore, reflected on the nature of Christian salvation in terms of the totality of Christ’s redemptive work for the Christian life and the world.

10.4 The Christian’s New Disposition and the New Age

Christ’s resurrection had established a new age, an age that awaited a final consummation, but which was spiritually experienced by the Christian in the current life. Despite their different provenances, all three theologians’ adaptation of deification works to locate the believer’s sanctification at the spiritual level of the divine because of the Christian’s spiritual adoption in Christ. Their explication of the doctrine always insists on the inseparability of Christ’s work on the cross and his divine spiritual origins or home, which belong to Christians because of their spiritual adoption. The spiritually renewed nature of the believer’s mind differentiated it from the mind of the non-believer so that in some ‘realistic’ sense Christians can be said to share Christ’s spiritual home because they take on Christ’s mind. Christians united in Christ could therefore be said to share in Christ’s spiritual home, not only in name but also in a more ‘realistic’ sense because of the believer’s spiritually renewed human nature. Each established his picture of the believer’s ‘true humanity’ in terms of the Spirit’s illumination of the ‘whole person’ (the head/mind and the heart). The Spirit’s illumination of the mind to its knowledge of God engages the believer’s heart in a united action of

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19 See Hallonsten, 285.
volition and mind, so that the believer’s choice to obey God is portrayed as a free, intentionally autonomous choice. Christian moral theory is placed on a theocentric platform, which distinguished Christian moral theory from the anthropocentric foundations of philosophical and secular moral theory. As long ago as 1938, Jules Gross in his study of the patristic doctrine of deification, stressed the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit in the Christian life which marked Christians as God’s adoptive children. By thus implying that a ‘real’ change had occurred in their moral nature, Gross had already begun to discern the biblical veracity of deification as understood in the early church context.

The commonality between all three theologians can therefore be traced to how their orthodoxy, as it was informed by their inherited scriptural tradition, caused them to deal with issues of human self-determinism arising within their respective historical contexts. Each controversy, despite their different manifestations, struck at the heart of what each theologian understood to be critical. This was the soteriological view that, because sin had compromised human nature, humans were incapable of achieving perfection and determining their own salvation without Christ’s mediation and the work of grace. All three theologians can be seen to have developed a theology on the will and the affections that communicated intentionality (Christians through grace were capable of reforming and transforming their life), and was framed by, and climaxed in, their notions of deification. The doctrine made plain the nature of the Christian person, contrasting with the Greco-Roman philosophical conception of the human person as soul/mind and body, which conceived materiality/corporeality as a negative. In early Christian thought, however, the person was understood as a triadic unity of body, soul/mind, and Spirit. As such they embraced a new modality of life, the nature and meaning of which brought to light the earthly and spiritual composition of the ‘born-again’ Christian which the patristic doctrine of deification was concerned to address.

Augustine expressed his image of the spiritually-renewed human via his Trinitarian concept of the mens. For Augustine the mens was a conception inclusive of the intellectual, emotional and volitional aspects of the interior person, whereby memory/knowledge/will operated as three simultaneous functions in the believer as the mind and heart operated in unity. Through this process

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Christians are made aware of their knowledge of God and acquire an intention to obey God.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, the voluntary action of the Christian will is the result of the Spirit’s work of illumination. When believers regained their knowledge of God which was lost in the ‘memory’ (\textit{memoria}) of all humans at the fall, their will aligned itself naturally to God’s will in obedience.\textsuperscript{23}

In Maximus’ conception, the Spirit’s illumination of the believer’s mind also operates to unite mind and heart in a unity of action. The Christian’s spiritually-renewed mind operates at the natural level/mode of the \textit{λόγος} (Christ’s actions remained sinless, which indicated that his will was identical to his Father’s will and that his mind was identical to God’s own mind). Although he portrayed the current Christian life as living in the sin-affected level of the \textit{τρόπος} (the created material/corporeal sin-affected realm of human experience or the current human predicament) through the Spirit’s illumination the believer’s mind is made aware of its knowledge of God, as heart and mind engage in a unity of action. Grace enables the sin-affected gnomic will in the believer to operate at the natural level/mode of the \textit{λόγος}. Maximus expressed the work of grace in the spiritual renewal of the believer’s mind by way of the processes of ‘activity/energy’ (\textit{ἐνέργεια, ἐνεργητικόν}) and ‘will’ (\textit{θέλημα}). As Christians participate in God’s ‘activity/energy’ their will moves to freely incline itself towards God, thus restoring God’s ‘likeness’ in the Christian person through grace.\textsuperscript{24} Maximus’ language of God’s ‘activity/energy’ and ‘will’ therefore functions to depict the transcendent and immanent qualities of grace assumed to be at work in the Christian person, leading to the reformation of the sin-affected gnomic will which now deliberately chooses to obey God.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22} Cf. \textit{trin. }14.2.4 [CCL 50a: 426]
\textsuperscript{24} Early Church theologians did not separate the transcendent and immanent qualities of grace at work in the believer. God’s grace referred to his energy/activity, power and action. Although God was understood to be eternal and uncreated his activity of grace as it referred to the Christian life meant something, which was different from God’s own divine essence. Grace was created and temporal (expressing God’s involvement in the created order), but also something that was transcendent and immanently at work in the Christian life. See Pelikan, 269-70. See also A. Louth, ‘The Cosmic Vision of Saint Maximos the Confessor’, \textit{In whom we Live and Move and Have our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World} (ed. P. Clayton & A. Peacocke; Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company: 2004), 184-203.
\textsuperscript{25} In \textit{Ad Thalassium} 6 [CCSG 7:69-71] with regard to the question on how it is possible for a believer to be ‘born-again’ when they had been born into sin Maximus responded with a two-fold answer: Christians are spiritually adopted by grace (\textit{χάρις}), which is ‘entirely present potentially’ (\textit{παθάσαν δικυμίου παρούσαν}) in them. Yet, God’s bestowal of grace is activated or exhibited in activity (\textit{κατ’ ἐνέργειαν}) when the believer chooses to intentionally (\textit{προκαίρεσις}), wilfully or deliberately obey God.
Edwards conveyed a similar portrait of the spiritual renewal of the Christian mind, via his idea of ‘sense of the heart’ that was inclusive of his conception of ‘consent to being’. According to Edwards the true nature of Christian conversion consisted in the comprehensive and well-ordered moral and spiritual character of the Christian mind, free from disproportion and deformity. He correlated this spiritual renewal along with his conceptions of ‘true beauty, excellency and virtue’. When the Spirit illuminated the Christian’s mind to its knowledge of God, the heart and mind engaged in a unity of action, resulting in the Christian’s naturally consenting to God’s being. The Christian’s free choice to obey God resulted in the harmonising of the will with God’s will and purposes. The distinction Edwards made between the ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ image of God can be traced to the scholastic division of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ categories. Yet his application of ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ resonates with the Greek patristic distinction between image (ἐικόνα) and likeness (ὁμοίωσις). Edwards’ conception is unique in Reformed theology.

Although each theologian’s conception remains unique in expression, their conceptions result in similar portrayals of the spiritually-renewed mind because each theologian developed their conceptions out of a Trinitarian and incarnational framework. The metaphysical and ontological structure of all three conceptions functions to preserve the traditional or classical Christian teaching about God and his relationship with his creation. This teaching was that everything God had created, whether immaterial or material/earthly, owed its origin, existence and preservation to the activity of his Word (Λόγος). God had no need in his Trinitarian existence of anything outside of himself. That he had ‘created from nothing’ implied that he was not only transcendent and self-sustaining in his being, but that he continuously sustained and preserved his creation so that creation remained dependent on him. For early theologians, the Genesis story defined God’s creative acts to his good or holy being, as a work of grace. This conception of grace encapsulated for them the entirety of God’s work with regard to the created order, and to his historical dealings with humanity.

For early Christian thinkers, God’s Trinitarian existence and his perfect autonomy had its analogy in the self-sufficient activity of the human intellect, because the Genesis story taught that God had created humanity in his image. Although Christ’s redemption began the work of the believer’s


26 Cf. Gen. 1; Jn.1: 1-5; Heb. 11:3.
restoration, it was the Spirit’s work that continued the process of reformation and transformation. Yet, to say that the believer’s transformation was a result of grace did not negate the believer’s own responsibility in the moral and ethical choices that he or she made, so the patristic doctrine of deification also addresses the restoration of the sin-affected human nature always within the soteriological context.

10.5 Deification as a Rhetorical Tool

One reason why early theologians engaged with the doctrine of deification in the pastoral context was that it addressed Christian moral and ethical issues. Concerning itself with all matters of spirituality, the doctrine drew on a broad spectrum of other doctrines (such as the Trinity, incarnation, Christian anthropology, pneumatology, soteriology, and eschatology) that functioned to give meaning to Christian salvation because they all drew meaning from the incarnation’s work. The doctrine was not treated by early theologians as an independent matter in the modern systematic sense. Instead, it was used as a rhetorical tool with a great range of applications that were applied to a vast variety of aspects of Christian spirituality. Yet this was not to diminish its theological significance. Rather, rhetoric enhanced the notion of deification and the broad spectrum of doctrine that informed it, so that its rhetorical application worked to make the doctrine applicable with regards to all kinds of spiritual matters to a broad audience of Christians.

The doctrine of deification is difficult to define precisely because it is informed by this broad spectrum of theology. In addition, the eschatology, which informs the doctrine, adds to the difficulty of ascertaining a technical definition for it, because the believer’s eschatological future awaits fulfilment. With its focusing on the Christian life, the eschatology that informs the doctrine of deification also works to distinguish it from its correlate doctrine of justification in its focus on the sinner. Although Augustine, Maximus and Edwards can all be seen to correlate their notions of deification with justification, neither theologian ever equates deification with justification. Whereas the doctrine of justification can be quantified or described in ‘concrete terms’ as drawing attention to

27 See Louth ‘The Place of theosis’, 43.
29 Ibid., 116.
30 Ibid., 116.
finite or complete action (Christ died for the sinner, Christ atoned for the sinner, the sinner is declared righteous), the doctrine of deification cannot be quantified. It concerns itself with what lies at the other side of the sinner’s justification as it shifts the focus to the meaning and shape of Christian salvation itself. The doctrine extrapolates on the implications of Christ’s resurrection, his ascension, the dispensation of the Spirit, the promise of the New Creation, and all that these imply for Christian salvation in the current life as well as in the life to come. The doctrine is abstract and unquantifiable, informed by spiritual and eschatological concerns which make it ‘unknowable’ and even ‘unreasonable’ to the human mind and present experience.

10.6 How Apophatic Theology gave Absolute Meaning to an ‘Abstract’ Doctrine

Ascertaining a definition of the doctrine of deification by focusing on the metaphysical and ontological value of Greek vocabulary (essences, energies, and hypostasis) alone will ultimately fall short of an adequate comprehension of the biblical foundations of the doctrine. It fails to convey the wider meaning and application that the doctrine had for the early theologians who engaged with it, especially in the didactic and pastoral context. The Fathers were not so much concerned with vocabulary and metaphysics as much as they were concerned to use the vocabulary to communicate sound doctrine which would preserve orthodoxy and be understood by a broad range of audiences. For the present day, the way to understand the orthodoxy of the doctrine lies not in whether a modern technical definition can ever be ascertained for it which would not compromise its scriptural foundations. Rather, the doctrine is to be understood in the light of its concomitant doctrines of the incarnation and Trinity.

The doctrines of the incarnation and Trinity were formulated out of the context of apophatic or negative theology, which is what makes them difficult to define in the modern context. For example, modern attempts to define or create a metaphysical image of the doctrine of the Trinity inevitably result in its compromise and even to accusations of heterodoxy. The Fathers developed their Trinitarian and Christological definitions by making use of Neoplatonic metaphysics and Greek philosophical vocabulary which served them as tools for communication. As such, the terminology they used should not be superimposed on the modern context as the technical definition of the doctrine. In the early church, the context which gave the doctrines of the incarnation and Trinity meaning, was apophatic theology. The doctrine of deification also gained its validity and meaning out
of the context of apophatic theology, which is the reason the doctrine is unable to be conceptualised concretely by the human mind.

Having arisen out of apophatic theology, the locus for understanding the doctrine of deification lies not only in the imparted ‘silence’ of the doctrines of the incarnation and the Trinity. It must also be understood in the broad spectrum of soteriological doctrines and themes that inform it and which provide the pathway to cataphatic or positive knowledge and revelation about God and the Christian life.\(^{31}\) Moreover, knowledge affirmed by the scriptures was inclusive, not exclusive of the church’s sacramental theology (Baptism, the Lord’s Supper/Eucharist), so that the doctrine also remained connected to ecclesiology.\(^ {32}\) Thus, in its application the doctrine had an added function in elucidating matters of ecclesiological practice that were inclusive of sacramental theology.\(^ {33}\) Although this thesis did not attempt to examine in depth how the doctrine of deification informs ecclesiological practice, it found that there was ample ground for further investigation into the topic.

The Fathers understood that God’s holy being was unknowable, but they believed that God had made himself known through his incarnate Son. It was in the ‘silence’ of God’s holy being, the mysteries of the incarnation, resurrection, and God’s salvific plans for creation, where the pathway to human knowledge of God lay. For early Christian thinkers apophatic theology was not opposed to positive knowledge that they discerned in their reading of scripture because they believed that what was said apophatically about God was true.\(^ {34}\) Given the apophatic context, the doctrine of deification drew absolute meaning from what scripture affirmed about Christian salvation and taught about the nature of Christian living. In the early church setting, the doctrine informed Christian practice because

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\(^ {31}\) See Pelikan, 264-65. See also Louth, ‘Cosmic Vision’, 192-93.

\(^ {32}\) See Chapter 7 section 7.7, Chapter 8 section 8.3, Chapter 9 section 9.13 in this thesis.


\(^ {34}\) Cf. CC2.27 [PG 90:992] ‘When you intend to know God do not seek the reasons about his being, (Θεολογεῖν μέλλων, μὴ τοὺς κατ’ αὐτὸν ζητήσῃς λόγους) for the human mind and that of any other being after God cannot discover this (οὐ μὴ γὰρ εὑρῇ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, ἀλλ’ οἶδε ἄλλοι τινὸς τῶν μετὰ θεοῦ). Rather, consider as you can the things about him (ἀλλὰ τοὺς περὶ αὐτοῦ), for example his eternity, immensity, infinity, his goodness, wisdom, and power which creates, governs, and judges creatures (ὡς οἶδον τε, διασκόπει. Οίον τοὺς περὶ ἀειδότητας, ἀπειρίας τε καὶ ἀοριστίας, ἀναθάντος τε καὶ σοφίας καὶ δυνάμεως, δημιουργικῆς τε καὶ προοφητικῆς, καὶ κριτικῆς τῶν δυνατῶν). For that person among others is a great theologian (Οὕτω γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις μέγας θεολόγος) if he searches out the principles of these things, however much or little (ὁ τούτων τοὺς λόγους καὶ ποιός ἔξευγκτικός).’ See Pelikan, 265; I. A. McFarland, ‘Developing an Apophatic Christocentrism: Lessons from Maximus the Confessor’, *Theology Today* 60 (2003), 200-14.
it drew from the two constructs of ἡθολογία and the οἰκονομία. In its application, the doctrine did not function as a specific soteriological definition for Christian salvation. Its purpose was to function to give meaning and spiritual shape to the Christian life.

**10.7 Meaning Gained from Silence**

The patristic doctrine of deification sought to explicate what lay at the heart of the Christian faith and the reason for the incarnation, namely, the conviction that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself (2 Cor. 5:19). What lay at the heart of the Christian faith found its summation in the Irenaean-Athanasian exchange axiom: ‘God became human (without ceasing to be God) that humanity might become God (without ceasing to be human)’. The doctrine therefore sought to express the soteriological consequence of the incarnation’s work for humanity and the world as it was articulated in the second part of the formula. It concerned itself with addressing, describing and giving meaning to the process of Christian transformation from the old self / old creation or old way of life to the new self/ new creation or new way of life. As Newey writes: ‘Its implication is not the subsumption of humanity into the ineffability of God, but rather the full realisation of humanity in relationship with the Creator.’

As the doctrine sought to express a robust view of the nature of Christian salvation, all of which had been achieved by Christ’s mediatory work, its concomitants were naturally the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation. In the modern context, the way to understanding the doctrine lies not in the formation of specific terminology associated with a systematic process, but in discerning its contextual origins and the doctrines and soteriological themes which came to inform it in the early church. The doctrine is not solely concerned with the final goal of Christian salvation, but conceives the final goal as a comprehensive doctrine of soteriological themes that encompassed the whole economy of salvation, which function together to bring meaning to Christian practice and to ecclesiological practice as well. The doctrine operates to bring together Christian knowledge/reason and experience/practice without negation of the other and can be seen to be the reason why Edwards

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35 See Chapter 2 section 2.7 in this thesis.
37 Chia, 129.
38 Newey, 2.
39 Ibid., 2.
40 See Newey, 2; Kharmalov, 115.
engaged with the doctrine. The Enlightenment had imposed a severe separation between knowledge and reason, and experience and practice that had begun to impact Protestant thought and he believed this dichotomy to be false.

For contemporary western theology, the validity of the patristic doctrine of deification lies not in gauging a technical definition for the word ‘deification’ (*theosis*) by which the doctrine is known, but in understanding how the doctrine drew together Christian knowledge and practice. The doctrine functioned to give meaning to both the spiritual and earthly concerns, in a way that did not dichotomise or negate either of the spiritual and earthly realms of the Christian life, but treated both realms as an established whole. Unlike its correlate soteriological doctrine of justification, the importance of the doctrine of deification does not lie in the name or ‘label’ by which it is known. It lies in the broad spectrum of soteriological themes which inform it, themes given meaning by the incarnation and the Trinity, which is the reason why Edwards was able to engage with the doctrine without needing to refer to it by name.

Whilst all three theologians engaged with the doctrine of deification, they did so whilst also engaging with Neoplatonic metaphysics. Even so, that they engaged with Neoplatonic metaphysics does not nullify the theological validity of the doctrine for contemporary theology. In the early church Neoplatonic metaphysics had long been associated with the development of established Christian doctrines that came to be preserved in the dogmatic tradition. To acknowledge that Neoplatonism played an epistemological role in the development of Christian doctrine does not detract from a doctrine’s orthodoxy, but helps to explain why the doctrine prevailed in Church Tradition.

Although neither theologian can be definitively connected to the other, their engagement with the patristic doctrine of deification can be attributed to the scriptural tradition that each had inherited. Although there is no proof that Maximus or Edwards had direct access to Augustine’s writings, nor that Edwards knew Maximus’ works, it is the shared Christian inheritance, which presents the important link between all three. Even so, the similarities that form the context of their theological

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41 Hallonsten, 287.

42 Although Maximus was exiled for twenty years in Carthage, North Africa, so that his geography is shared with Augustine, he makes no mention of him in his works. It is significant, however, that in a letter (dated 645-46) to Marinus of Cyprus, Maximus examined the orthodoxy of two typically western theological developments that had troubled the east: the Trinitarian idea of the *filioque* (the
ideas can to some extent also be attributed to the influence of Neoplatonism on their specific epistemological, educational and cultural contexts. As a philosophical system it did not present theologians with a severe dualistic system. As a tool its metaphysics was adapted by each theologian to resolve, communicate and bridge the gap between the spiritual and material or corporeal realm of human existence. Yet, it was the dogmatic tradition each had inherited that paved the way to their originality of thought in each of their portrayals of the Spirit-filled Christian.

Given that today’s western intellectual context stemmed from the Enlightenment, Edwards’ engagement with the doctrine of deification has much to offer western theology. His adaptation of the doctrine allowed him to re-establish both the immanent and transcendent qualities of the Spirit’s work of grace, which had been lost inadvertently by the Protestant reformers. In the reformers’ counteractions of the Catholic emphasis on imparted/infused or ‘intrinsic’ grace in the Christian person, they had emphasised the ‘extrinsic’ nature of grace at work in the Christian life. Edwards’ procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son as well as the Father) and the freedom of Christ from original sin. As Augustine is held to be the chief Latin writer on both these doctrines and that Maximus commented on them positively in the letter adds to speculation that he knew of Augustine’s writings. See G. C. Berthold, ‘Did Maximus the Confessor Know Augustine?’, Studia Patristica 17 (1982), 14-17. See also B. Neil, Seventh-Century Popes and Martyrs: The Political Hagiography of Anastasius Bibliothecarius (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 73, 78-79; I. A. McFarland, In Adam’s Fall: A Meditation on the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 88. See also J. Borjesson, ‘Maximus the Confessor’s Knowledge of Augustine: An Exploration of Evidence Derived from the Acta of the Lateran Council of 649’, Studia Patristica 68 (2013), 325-36 (I have not had the opportunity to examine this article since its release). On Augustine and the Greek Fathers see J. Lossl, ‘Augustine in Byzantium’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 51 (2000), 267-71. Aside from the Cambridge Platonists, the influence of patristic theology upon Edwards’ thought would have also come through via his reading of the non-conformist Puritan writers (e.g., Richard Sibbes, John Cotton, John Owen and Thomas Goodwin, William Ames, Richard Baxter and Cotton Mather) and by way of his reading of the reformed scholastic continental theologians, like Peter van Mastricht and Francis Turretin, as well as some others (see Catalogue and Accounts see Works 26. 4,5,11,28,47,121). In addition, the theology of both Augustine and Maximus were influential to Thomas Aquinas*, a medieval theologian whose writing Edwards more than likely knew but does not cite. From the turn of the eleventh century, the writings of both the Latin and Greek editions of the works of Maximus the Confessor, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and other eastern theologians circulated in western Europe. On the reception of the Church Fathers in the west see I. Backus (ed), The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997) [see chapter 9 n. 88 in this thesis]. See also M. D. Gibson, ‘The Beauty of the Redemption of the World: The Theological Aesthetics of Maximus the Confessor and Jonathan Edwards’, Harvard Theological Review 101 (2008), 46-47 n. 5, 6; A. P. Pauw, The Supreme Harmony of All: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), 46-47, 58-69; B. G. Withrow, Becoming Divine: Jonathan Edwards’s Incarnational Spirituality Within the Christian Tradition (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2011), 107, 121-35; *Thomas Aquinas is not cited by Edwards in his Catalogues and Accounts but Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae as well as several other Thomastic books was owned by his grandfather Solomon Stoddard. The Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae also appears in the Yale library catalogue in 1742 (See Works 26.52).

43 Newey, 3.
adaptation of deification therefore brought together the transcendent and immanent qualities of the Spirit’s work of grace in the Christian life. This had always been assumed in the writings of the Fathers and was assumed by Augustine and Maximus. Edwards achieved this because of his incarnational and Trinitarian framework, in a way that was not antithetical or incompatible to the Reformed doctrine of justification by faith, and which did not treat grace in isolation from the life and disposition of God and his relationship with his creation. That Edwards’ theology engaged with the doctrine of deification in his Enlightenment context shows that the doctrine was established in the scriptural tradition as concomitant to the doctrines of the Trinity and incarnation from its inception.

10.8 Conclusion

These three seminal thinkers, while responding to the thought forms of their age, arrive at remarkably congruent soteriologies because each used the patristic doctrine of theosis to frame their theologies of sin and grace and of the will and affections. All three theologians make use of deification to give a theocentric, rather than anthropocentric, understanding of the human predicament and human nature.

The doctrine insists on the inseparability of Christ’s work on the cross and Christ’s divine spiritual origins, which also belong to Christians because of their spiritual adoption. From its inception, the Greek word θέωσις (theosis) has been difficult to define technically, but the doctrine takes on its meaning from a fuller view of the incarnation’s salvific work not only for the Christian life but also for the world. The ways, in which all three theologians engaged with the doctrine show that it is informed by a broad spectrum of soteriological themes, given meaning by both the incarnation and the Trinity. The incarnation’s salvific work has spiritually refashioned human nature, so that the believer’s identity does not merely lie in Christ as the model of ‘true humanity’, but in a far more realistic sense. This realistic sense is presented by all three theologians in their portraits of the Spirit-filled Christian as God’s image and instrument in the world. Informed by eschatology, the doctrine functioned to allow eschatology to simultaneously bear on the believer’s current life, so that eschatology informed Christian ethical issues in the present. A key feature of the doctrine lies in how it worked to demarcate Christian moral theory from secular and philosophical moral theory which

made moral theory an entirely theocentric concern, rather than an anthropocentric one. The doctrine also worked to account for all matters spiritual that pertain to the Christian life that did not separate issues of Christian spirituality from ecclesiological or sacramental practice. Moreover, the importance of the doctrine to theology today lies in how it works to account for both the spiritual and earthly concerns of the Christian life without negation of the other, and without enforcing a dichotomy between either realm. With regard to Edwards, whose intellectual context has been inherited by western epistemology today, the reason the doctrine appealed to him was because of his Enlightenment context. He perceived the ever growing rationalism in Reformed Protestant thinking which had imposed a dichotomy between knowledge and reason, experience and practice, to be a false one - a tension which remains and continues to impact modern theological thinking in the western mindset today.
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