JAPAN’S REACTION TO

THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY:

International Society, Race Relations

and the Quest for Recognition

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Research

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2014
STATEMENT

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text, and the material has not been submitted in whole or in part for a degree at this or any other university.

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10 October 2014
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Stephanie Lawson, for her valuable advice and criticism. I would also like to thank my family for providing much needed love and support.
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy. It adopts a cross-disciplinary approach, drawing on both history and International Relations. In other words, it introduces to empirical historical evidence a systematic analytical framework based on three key concepts of state socialisation, state identity and prestige. In so doing, it analyses the motivations behind Japan’s strong objection to Australia’s racial exclusion policies.

On the basis of historical evidence, this thesis argues that Japan’s objection to the White Australia Policy was based not on material interests, but rather on Japan’s determination to preserve its identity as a civilised state and its desire to uphold its international prestige. Japan’s concern for its civilised state identity and international prestige is explained against the backdrop of its socialisation into late 19th century European international society.

The thesis interprets empirical evidence within an analytical framework, and concludes that Japan’s civilised state identity and its quest for international prestige, both of which were products of Japan’s socialisation into European international society, shaped Japan’s foreign policy as it related to the White Australia Policy. In short, the thesis highlights the profound impact which the process of Japan’s socialisation into the European international order had on Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Japan ended its policy of national seclusion in 1854, and in 1868 abolished the death penalty for citizens who sought to leave the country. Yet, the Japanese government did not encourage emigration for decades for fear that its people would be treated as coolies. It only reversed policy in the mid-1890s, after conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1894, the first equal treaty between Japan and a Western power which conferred reciprocal rights of travel and residence. In 1896, the Japanese government enacted the Emigration Protection Act (Imin Hogoho). That same year, at the Intercolonial Conference, the Australian colonies agreed to extend their anti-Chinese legislations to cover all coloured races including Japanese. In other words, Japanese migration began in earnest at the same time that Australia was closing its door against Japanese immigration.

The Japanese government vehemently condemned the White Australia Policy and objected to the fact that its people were subjected to the same legislation as Chinese or Kanakas. In negotiations with Britain and Australia, it argued that the abovementioned commercial treaty and Japan’s rising position in international society meant that Japanese immigrants deserved special consideration. Australia was, however, unwavering on its policy of excluding Japanese immigrants.

This thesis examines Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy. It focuses on the period between 1894 and 1901 – from the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation to the introduction of Australia’s Immigration Restriction Act in December 1901. During this period, the Japanese government repeatedly protested to the British
government, the colonial governments and later to the newly federated Commonwealth government, and sought exemption for its citizens from Australia’s racial exclusion policies.

It must be noted that the number of Japanese people living in Australia in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries was quite small. In 1901, for example, the number of Japanese nationals residing in Australia was 3,554 compared with 30,542 Chinese nationals (Yarwood, 1964, p. 163). This gives rise to an obvious question: Why did Japan object so strongly to the White Australia Policy even though the number of Japanese nationals residing in Australia was insignificant?

The existing literature provides only a partial answer to this question. Historians have drawn on the language of Japan’s protest notes to suggest that Japan’s objection to the White Australia Policy derived primarily from Japan’s concerns for its national pride and prestige. This in turn raises another question: If the reason behind Japan’s vehement condemnation was indeed national pride and prestige, why was Japan so concerned with immigration and its potential to harm Japan’s international reputation? Historians have failed to address this question satisfactorily. International Relations (IR) scholars, for their part, have examined how Meiji Japan’s attempt to reinvent its identity as a “civilised” Great Power during its socialization into international society influenced its foreign policy. No scholar has, however, systematically and explicitly analysed the link between Meiji Japan’s state identity and the Japanese government’s response to the White Australia Policy. It is here that an identifiable gap exists in the literature. This thesis will fill this gap.

**Existing Literature**

Both the White Australia Policy and Japanese immigration are widely and thoroughly researched subjects of historical study. The two literatures are, however, largely distinct. On
the one hand, the existing literature on the White Australia Policy generally examines the
domestic origins and development of the policy (see Yarwood, 1964; Willard, 1967; Price,
1974; Rivett, 1975; Markus, 1979; Takeda, 2000; Tavan, 2005; Hatcho, 2013). Studies of
Japanese immigration, on the other hand, focus to a large extent on Japanese immigration to
North America (see Asada, 1973; Aruga, 1984; Minohara, 2002). As a result, the number of
studies focusing on Japanese immigration to Australia is quite small. Moreover, those
historians who have studied Japanese immigration to Australia have approached the subject
mostly from social and cultural perspectives. Focusing on immigrants’ lives and
circumstances, these works highlight individual characteristics and challenge perceptions of
the Japanese in Australia as a monolithic group (see Sissons, 1977a, 1977b and 1979; Nagata,

As the foregoing attests, the volume of historical studies which examines the impact of the
White Australia Policy on Japanese-Australian diplomatic relations is small. Compounding
this situation is the disinclination of political and diplomatic historians to pay sustained
attention to immigration issues. To borrow the words of Toshihiro Minohara, immigration is
“unfamiliar territory” for most diplomatic historians with their traditional focus on “national
interests” and “power” (Minohara, 2002, p. 5). Or, as Sean Brawley has put it, “immigration
and foreign relations have rarely met in any comprehensive historical analysis” (Brawley,
1995, p. 2). Thus, the existing literature on Japanese immigration in the field of diplomatic
history is small in both the Japanese and English languages. Within this context, studies of
Meiji Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy are necessarily few.

The work by A.T. Yarwood (1964) is one exception. Although the principal focus of his book
Asian Migration to Australia is the formation of the White Australia Policy and the
mechanism of Asian exclusion, the chapters on Japanese immigration provide a detailed
description of Japanese-Australian diplomatic negotiations surrounding Japan’s objection to
Australia’s racially discriminatory legislation. Analysing Australia’s determination to prevent an anticipated influx of Japanese immigrants after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1894, Yarwood argues that both the British and the Australian governments failed to appreciate Japan’s “special claims to international recognition” and its resolve to resist “any classification that implied her inferiority to the European nations” (p. 12). Neville Bennett (1992 and 2001) has examined the Japanese migration policy and the white settler societies’ responses to Japanese immigration in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries. He argues that Australia acted against what it mistakenly believed was an imminent flood of Japanese immigrants, and thereby offended and antagonised Japan.

While many of D.C.S. Sissons’ works adopt cultural and social perspectives, some of his studies make a highly valuable contribution to the fields of Japanese-Australian relations in general and Japanese immigration’s impact on bilateral Japanese-Australian diplomacy. In *The Immigration Question in Australian Diplomatic Relations with Japan, 1875-1919* (1971), Sissons reaches the conclusion that Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy was “essentially a matter of prestige” (p.38). He elaborates on this in *Immigration in Australia-Japanese relations, 1871-1971* (1972) by arguing that although immigration issues had little to do with Japan’s tangible national interest, they “inevitably raised the question of national prestige” (p.194).

On the basis of archival materials such as Japan’s official representations and protestations, these scholars all claim that the exclusion of Japanese from Australia gravely offended the Japanese government and damaged its national pride. However, these scholars have relied almost exclusively on English language sources, including, for example, the protest notes which Japanese diplomats submitted to their Australian and British counterparts. As a result,
the motivations behind the Japanese government’s vehement condemnation of the White Australia Policy have not received adequate attention in the English-language literature.

In contrast, Isami Takeda (1981) makes full use of primary sources in both the Japanese and English languages. His extensive archival research in Britain, Australia and Japan has allowed him to gain insights into what influenced the British, the Australian and the Japanese governments’ policies and how they reacted to each other’s policies. Drawing on the Japanese government’s internal memos, as well as its official correspondence with the British and the Australian governments, Takeda affirms that Japanese policymakers’ concern with protecting their national pride and prestige played a major role in shaping their country’s response to Australia’s racially discriminatory immigration policy.

Other historical studies broadly germane to this thesis include the works by Sean Brawley and Naoko Shimazu. In his book *The White Peril: Foreign Relations and Asian Immigration to Australasia and North America 1919-1978* (1995), Brawley claims that Japanese national pride suffered as a result of its failure to introduce the “racial equality clause” in the League of Nations Covenant. Naoko Shimazu (1998), in her book on the Japanese government’s diplomatic initiative to demand racial equality at the Paris Peace Conference, argues that the Japanese Foreign Ministry gave priority to resolving the immigration issue because it was concerned about the negative implications which anti-Japanese immigration practices would have symbolically on Japan’s status as a Great Power. She claims that Japan was engaged in the “diplomacy of saving face” (pp. 68-88).

In short, the existing historical literature acknowledges the significant role which national pride and prestige played in Japan’s responses to racially discriminatory policies in white settler societies. However, these historical works have not explicitly and systematically analysed why Japan was so concerned and almost obsessed with national pride and prestige. As Tomoko Okagaki (2013, p. 6) has put it, historians’ approach to the subject is
characterised by their emphasis on questioning “how” instead of “why” certain events unfolded. Historians have, in other words, failed to explain why Meiji Japan cared so much for its national pride and why its obsession with reputation and prestige came to play such a significant part in its decision-making processes as they related to the White Australia Policy. This thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature. It attempts to answer “why” in addition to “how” by incorporating a conceptual framework which contemporary IR scholarship has applied to Meiji Japan’s foreign policy.

**Conceptualising Japan’s Modernisation and Meiji Japan’s Foreign Policy**

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Japan’s responses to white settler societies’ racial exclusion policies have been studied mostly as a historical subject, while IR scholars have largely ignored the subject. Some IR scholars have, however, examined Meiji Japan. One of the earliest and probably the most important work in this field is Hidemi Suganami’s contribution in *The Expansion of International Society* by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (1984). In his chapter “Japan’s Entry into International Society,” Suganami uses the theoretical framework of the English School and examines the advancement of Japan in international society in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries in terms of the adoption of European diplomatic practices and international law and Japan’s participation in international conferences.

More recently, Tomoko Okagaki (2013) has attempted to introduce a political science perspective to the study of Japan’s modernisation, which has also heretofore been studied as a historical subject. In her book *The Logic of Conformity*, Okagaki emphasises the significance of contextual factors in accounting for the extraordinary degree of conformity that Japan demonstrated in accommodating itself to Western norms of international relations. She examines the interaction between the structural constraints of the international system and the
actors’ choices as represented in Japan’s socialisation into international society, and provides a perspective on understanding how and why decisions were made. At the same time, Okagaki acknowledges the value of historical work and her argument is empirically grounded. In short, Okagaki aims to explain Japan’s modernisation and socialisation into international society “while bridging political science, international law, and history” (p. 17).

Shogo Suzuki (2005 and 2009), similarly, introduces a new approach to the study of Japan’s entry into the 19th century international system. In his works on Japan’s socialisation into the normative framework of “Janus-Faced” European international society, Suzuki points out the shortcomings of the theoretical assumptions of the English School, especially the insufficient attention paid to non-European perspectives, and argues for a more flexible analytical framework which recognises the significance of the historical context, empirical inquiry and constructivist insights, particularly agent’s interests deriving from identity-construction (2009, pp. 5-8 and 32-33). He argues that the Japanese elite in the late 19th century internalised the normative structure of European international society and tried to reinvent Japan’s identity as a “civilised” Great Power. He also argues that this new identity greatly influenced Japan’s foreign policy behaviour towards its Asian neighbours (2009, pp. 140-148). Jeffrey Legro (2009), on the other hand, employs the concept of national identity, or more specifically “the plasticity of identity,” to examine the “opening” of Japan in the 19th century.

Pertinent to the issue of state identity is the question of prestige and politics. Steve Wood (2013) argues that “prestige is an enduring and protean feature of human behaviour” (p. 384). Analysing the role of prestige in the political and international relations sphere, he suggests that prestige derives from and contributes to the shaping of identities. He argues, moreover, that gaining prestige and avoiding its loss is a universal and persistent motivation in international affairs.
This thesis incorporates the various approaches used by these scholars in its overall analytical framework. It aims to contribute to the existing scholarship on the Japanese government’s response to the White Australia Policy by introducing a sophisticated analytical framework, which has thus far been absent in historical interpretations of Japan’s reactions to white settler societies’ racially discriminatory immigration policies. At the same time, it recognises and draws on the valuable contributions made by historians in this field. In short, this thesis adopts a cross-disciplinary approach, incorporating insights from both IR and history.

**Beyond the Conventional Approach to Japan’s Reaction to the White Australia Policy:**

**A Cross-disciplinary Approach**

The importance of cross-disciplinary study between international relations and history has often been noted, especially when IR scholars have based their studies on varying intellectual and disciplinary strands within social science (see Buzan and Richard, 1994 and 2000; Elman and Elman, 2001 and 2008; Reus-Smit, 2001 and 2008; Keene, 2008; Suganami, 2008; Yetiv, 2011). Christian Reus-Smit (2001 and 2008), for example, argues that the rise of constructivism since the end of the Cold War has sparked a renewed interest in history. British scholars Barry Buzan and Richard Little (2001) go further. In their book *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*, they argue that the linkage between IR and history is “an essential act” for IR scholarship (2000, p. 385).

Although IR scholars are increasingly recognising the significance of history in IR scholarship, the reverse trend has barely occurred. In other words, except for a very small number of international or diplomatic historians, few historians have crossed the disciplinary line to draw insights from IR theories and perspectives (see Schroeder, 1997; Elman and Elman, 2001). This is certainly the case with scholars who have studied Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy.
This thesis therefore departs from the conventional approach to Japan’s response to the White Australia Policy. While it will adopt a historical methodology and examine both the English and Japanese language primary sources, it will, at the same time, employ a theoretically informed IR approach. In so doing, it seeks to explore the link between the Japanese government’s response to the White Australia Policy and Meiji Japan’s state identity and socialisation into international society. In other words, by combining the strengths of theories of IR and empirical evidence of history, this thesis aims to offer a more comprehensive and systematic analysis of Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy.

**Research Plan and Methodology**

Methodologically, this thesis attempts to fill a significant gap in the literature and advance knowledge in the field both empirically and conceptually by providing a systematic analytical framework as well as empirical historical evidence.

The second chapter sets out an overall analytical framework based on three key concepts so as to construct a theoretically informed explanation of Meiji Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy. The first key concept is state socialisation. In this regard, Chapter Two draws on the English School’s theoretical framework concerning the expansion of international society and socialisation of non-European states into European international society. The second key concept under investigation is state identity. This requires insights from constructivist IR scholars, who argue that state identity functions as a source of state foreign policy, because identity forms an actor’s interests, which in turn shapes an actor’s behaviour (Wendt, 1992, 1994 and 1999; Katzenstein, 1996; Reus-Smit, 2001; Ashizawa, 2008). The third key concept is prestige. While prestige has not attracted much attention as an influence in politics, it is an enduring feature of political behaviour and gaining prestige and avoiding its loss is a universal and persistent motivation in international affairs (Etzioni, 1962;
Dore, 1975; O’Neill, 1999; Sharman, 2007; Lebow, 2008; Wood, 2013). These three concepts are not exhaustive as possible explanations for Meiji Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy. They provide, however, satisfactory coverage of the possible factors which are needed to analyse Japan’s motivations.

The next two chapters provide the broad historical context appropriate to the investigation of the subject matter of this thesis. Chapter Three examines Japan’s socialisation into international society in the late 19th century, highlighting Japan’s struggle to establish its state identity as the only non-white “civilised” Great Power by conforming to Western norms and distancing itself from its Asian neighbours. Chapter Four then analyses Japan’s migration policy and the development of the White Australia Policy, paying particular attention to how anti-Chinese legislation was extended to cover all “coloured” races including Japanese.

Chapter Five examines Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy based on interpretations of empirical historical evidence within the analytical framework. It introduces historical materials, including primary sources on Japanese policy which go beyond what appears in the existing historical literature. It examines not only the official correspondence concerning the White Australia Policy, but also the internal memoranda which reveal debates between and among Japanese officials concerning the proper response to the White Australia Policy. It also makes use of Australian documentary records, including Japanese-Australian correspondence contained in the National Archives of Australia. This chapter will draw upon the abovementioned sources, as well as secondary sources, to construct narrative-based historical explanations. At the same time, it also constructs theory-based explanations using the analytical framework discussed in Chapter Two. In so doing, it seeks to explicitly and systematically analyse the motivations behind Japan’s strong objection to the White Australia Policy.
CHAPTER TWO

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:

State Socialisation, State Identity and Prestige

This Chapter clarifies three key concepts which together make up the analytical framework of this study. Although these concepts are not exhaustive as possible explanations for Meiji Japan’s foreign policy, they provide satisfactory coverage of the possible factors which are needed in analysing Japan’s motivations. Moreover, the analysis of these concepts will show that no single concept, but rather a combination of the concepts is needed to understand the policies and actions taken by Meiji Japan’s political leaders. For example, during the period of Japan’s modernisation and westernisation which this thesis focuses on, Japanese leaders internalised the normative structure of European international society and attempted to reinvent Japan’s state identity as a “civilised” state in order to be accorded full membership status in the European-dominated international society. At the same time, they tried to gain and defend the country’s prestige as a “civilised” state.

State Socialisation

Socialisation is generally defined as “a process of learning in which norms, values, attitudes and behaviours accepted and practised by an ongoing system are transmitted from one party to another” (Sigel, 1965, p. 1; Freeman and Freedman, 1981, p. 258; Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990, p. 289; Parsons, 1991, p. 28). Any discussion of socialisation involves newcomers and a certain learning process where the newcomers come to adopt social skills appropriate to their social positions.
Socialisation has attracted the attention of IR Scholars as a concept to explain how compliant behaviours of states are achieved and maintained. G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan have examined state socialisation in a hegemonic international environment and defined socialisation as “the process through which national leaders internalise the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and, as a consequence, become socialised into the community formed by the hegemon and other nations accepting its leadership position” (1990, pp. 289-290).

Since how states interact with one another and how they adjust themselves to the external environment constitutes one of the core themes of international relations, state socialisation has been discussed in all major IR theories in one way or another (see Waltz, 1979; Bull and Watson, 1984; Keohane, 1986 and 1989; Wendt, 1999; Thies, 2010). Among them, the English School approach, with its emphasis on the societal aspects of international relations, has systematically analysed the expansion of international society and socialisation of non-European states into European international society.

Conventional studies by English School scholars have claimed that the expansion of European international society took place primarily between the late 15th and 19th century through the imperialist expansion by European powers (Watson, 1984). Supported by overwhelming military strength, the European powers were able to impose their codes of diplomatic conduct on non-European states. This normative code of conduct was known as the “standard of civilisation” (Gong, 1984a and 1984b). By the beginning of the 19th century, the “standard of civilisation” emerged as a prevalent norm and was forced on newcomer states. According to Gerrit W. Gong (1984b), a “civilised” state was expected “to guarantee the life, liberty, and property of foreign nationals; to demonstrate a suitable governmental organisation; to adhere to the accepted diplomatic practices; and to abide by the principles of international law” (p. 179). Standard studies of the expansion of European international society have described the
socialisation of non-European states primarily in terms of these states adopting international law and European-style diplomacy, reconfiguring their domestic political structures along modern western lines, thus fulfilling the “standard of civilisation” to be eventually accorded full membership status in the society (see Bull and Watson, 1984; Gong, 1984a).

However, the English School’s excessive Eurocentric perspective has tended to gloss over the darker side of international society, and has downplayed the coercive role that European imperialism and its firm belief in the superiority of European civilisation played in ensuring the compliance of non-European states (Keene, 2002; Suzuki, 2005 and 2009). Shogo Suzuki (2009) argues that the English School’s conventional conceptualisation of European international society as a progressive society which promotes tolerance and coexistence among its members ignores the fact that such norms were generally limited to govern relations only between European states (pp. 17-25). He claims that non-European states, including Japan and China, were socialised into a Janus-faced European International Society, where there existed a dualistic mode of interaction - the modes of interactions which governed relations among “civilised” states and the one between “civilised” and “uncivilised” states (Suzuki, 2005 and 2009). He argues that the dualism inherent in European international society and its coercive mode of interaction forced non-European states into socialising. Such assumptions were also visible in Gong’s work on the “standard of civilisation.”

As is clear from the preceding discussion, socialisation is a system-maintainer concept that privileges continuity over change. It is a mechanism through which control by senior or authoritative members over other members is established and maintained. Socialisation is an effective instrument for the consolidation of an ongoing social system, and the ultimate goal of socialisation is to reproduce members who will function to maintain the social structure already in place (Suzuki, 2005, p.12; Okagaki, 2013, p. 22). This notion is also reflected in the definition by Ikenberry and Kupchan presented earlier.
The theoretical assumptions of the English School regarding socialisation in the international arena are shared by the constructivist approach, which this thesis also draws on. Constructivist scholars have taken the English School’s sociological framework for understanding international relations further and explored how ideational factors play a crucial role in shaping international political behaviour. They argue that a state’s interests and behaviour are shaped by identity, which is formed in the course of social interaction. This particular constructivist assumption regarding identity will be examined next.

State Identity

Constructivist approaches emphasise the impact of ideas. Unlike realism and liberalism which focus on material factors such as power and trade, constructivism highlights the importance of ideational and normative factors shaping the beliefs, interests and behaviour of social and political actors.

Constructivist approaches are by no means monolithic and since the end of the Cold War, they have produced a diverse field of scholarship. Among them, state identity approaches represented by Alexander Wendt (1992, 1994 and 1999) and Peter Katzenstein (1996) have presented one of the most serious challenges to the dominance of rationalist approaches in international relations. While acknowledging that power is not irrelevant, these constructivist scholars claim that a theoretical framework based on the concept of state identity can offer a viable alternative to rationalist theory- namely realism and liberalism (Katzenstein, 1996, p. ix).

State identity is only one of the many ideational factors such as culture, norms and values studied by constructivist scholars. Yet they pay particular attention to the concept of state identity because identity functions as source of a state’s foreign policy (Ashizawa 2008, p.
Constructivists argue that identities are the basis of interests, which in turn shape actors’ behaviour (Wendt, 1992, p. 392 and 1999, p. 231) and that understanding how states develop their interests based on their identities is “crucial to explaining a wide range of international political phenomena that rationalists ignore or misunderstand” (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 217).

Just as constructivist theories are quite diverse, so too is the concept of state identity. For example, while Wendt defines state identity mainly in terms of its external aspect - systemic constructivism (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 219), others focus on internal aspects of state identity - unit-level constructivism (Reus-Smit, 2001, p. 220). Wendt sees the state as a unitary actor and defines state identity as an actor’s intersubjective self-understanding formed in the course of interactions with other actors and constructed by the normative and ideational structures of international society (1994, p. 385 and 1999, p. 224). In contrast, Katzenstein (1996) argues that the state has different sets of political relations and should not be assumed as a unitary actor (p. 4). While not entirely disregarding the role of international norms in conditioning the identities of states, unit-level constructivists emphasise state’s domestic norms, values, interests, culture and other social factors as a source of state identity. However, despite their differences, all constructivist scholars share the notion that identity is a source of an actor’s behaviour, and therefore fundamental (Ashizawa, 2008, p. 573). Moreover, they generally view state identity not as fixed but as highly fluid, sometimes undergoing dramatic transformation (see Katzenstein, 1996; Legro, 2009).

While acknowledging the view that a state is not a unitary actor, this thesis is also alert to the fact that given the significant power and legitimacy wielded by state actors, especially government, it is the construction of meaning by authoritative state actors, not domestic popular attitudes, that tends to dominate (Lawson and Tanaka, 2012, p. 6). In other words, as a common practice, state identity is conceived by those involved in policy making and may not be necessarily shared by people outside policymaking process. It is, therefore, justifiable
to treat a state as a unitary actor in examining the attempt by Meiji Japan’s political elite to formulate a drastically new identity during the country’s socialisation into European international society.

**Prestige**

Pertinent to the issue of state identity is the influence of prestige over state behaviour, as “prestige emerges from and contributes to the shaping of identities” (Wood, 2013, p. 405). Prestige is related to concepts such as honour, status, reputation and respect, and as such it is an enduring and universal feature of human and political behaviour (see O’Neill, 1999; Sharman, 2007; Lebow, 2008; Wylie, 2009; Wood, 2013). Prestige is a socially constructed relational concept. It is a shared belief, opinion and judgement about the relative standing of one party made by other parties (Etzioni, 1962, p. 24; Sharman, 2007, p. 26). Unlike reputation, which can be positive or negative, prestige always grows out of a positive reputation. Moreover, prestige is generally hard to attain and it is valued even more highly than good reputation (Wylie, 2009, p. 113). In the international sphere, states with prestige are recognised by other states as having a high standing and command respect from them (Wylie, 2009, p. 113; Wood, 2013, p. 388). As Richard Lebow (2008) has noted “acquiring prestige is essential for becoming a great power, just as becoming a great power confers prestige” (pp. 487-488). Thus, an aspiring great power seeks prestige and acknowledgement by others (Wood, 2013, p. 388).

Nation states go to great lengths to defend their prestige. Prestige becomes a major political factor when loss of prestige and an accompanying sense of humiliation incite resentment and occasionally intensive and widespread feelings of aggression (Etzioni 1962, pp. 21-22). Amitai Etzioni (1962) has observed that the “prestige deprivation” inflicted on Germany by
the Versailles treaty is commonly seen as a contributing factor in the emergence of Nazism, a movement obsessed with national status (p. 23).

Prestige has not attracted much attention as an influence in international politics, as IR scholarly tradition has conventionally understood state behaviour as governed by material interests. For realists, prestige is merely instrumental, never an end in its own right. Hans Morgenthau writes: “While in national societies prestige is frequently sought for its own sake, it is rarely the primary objective of foreign policy. Prestige is at most the pleasant by-product of foreign policies whose ultimate objectives are not the reputation for power but the substance of power” (1985, p. 94).

However, states often engage in international behaviour that cannot be explained by a focus on national interests as defined by realist theory or by rationalist descriptions used by neoliberalism. Both these perspectives on international relations assume that as rational actors, states will make decisions based on material-interest-based calculations. Yet history is rife with examples where states made decisions that appeared to gain them little material reward because of their desire for international prestige (see Lebow, 2008).

Indeed, various scholars have acknowledged that prestige is an important variable in explaining a state’s behaviour in the international sphere. For example, R.P. Dore (1975) argues that status aspirations, pride and prestige are motivating factors in human and international affairs and that “it is possible to interpret the trends of Japan’s foreign policy from 1870 to the 1940s as motivated by a dominant concern with Japan’s international status” (p. 203). Barry O’Neill (1999) underscores this argument by suggesting that contrary to much conventional wisdom, states exhibit a great concern with their national prestige in their interactions with one another. Richard Lebow (2008), similarly, conceives of standing and honour as an expression of the universal human drive for self-esteem and treats prestige as both an end and means of foreign policy.
This thesis argues that prestige is not simply a by-product of foreign policy but can also be an end of state behaviour. Contrary to the logic of mainstream IR theories, a state may engage in policies for the express purpose of generating, increasing or defending that state’s prestige, and it may even do so at the expense of material interests. In other words, gaining and defending prestige is a universal and enduring motivation in politics and international relations.
CHAPTER THREE

REDEFINING JAPAN’S STATE IDENTITY

Japan’s modern era started with the shock encounter with the West, when US Commodore Matthew Perry arrived at Edo Bay on 8th July 1853 and pressed the Japanese to give American ships access to their ports. Prior to this historic event, for more than two centuries from 1638 to 1853, Japan maintained a highly restricted form of diplomatic and commercial relations with a few foreign nations. Only the Dutch, Koreans and Chinese were allowed to conduct a strictly supervised trade. During this period of self-imposed seclusion, no warfare, either domestic or foreign, disturbed the peace under the bakufu (shogunate) regime, and Japan increasingly developed its identity as a “hermit” state (Legro, 2009, p. 49), remaining largely outside and apart from the European international system.

However, the peaceful hermit state identity was suddenly interrupted by Perry’s coercive naval diplomacy. When Perry came back the following year, in February 1854, he forced Japan to sign the Treaty of Peace and Amity and open two ports. In 1858, Townsend Harris, the American Consul permitted to reside in Japan under the 1854 treaty, managed to force Japan to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, which would open five ports between 1859 and 1963 to American residence and trade. This treaty contained two major inequalities; tariff restrictions and extraterritoriality. Soon the principal European powers followed suit with similar treaties. Through these treaties and subsequent agreements, the full unequal treaty system developed between European powers and China was applied to Japan, and Japan was stripped of its sovereign prerogatives.

The agreements which the United States and European states gained from reluctant bakufu negotiators made it necessary for Japan to abandon the policy of seclusion. However, Japan
did not abandon its closed-country thinking immediately. Without any ready replacement idea, 1853 was merely the beginning of 15 year struggle over what Japan would do (Legro, 2009, p. 52). The turning point came in 1868 with the onset of the Meiji Restoration, when Japan finally adopted open-country thinking and entered the international system on terms defined by the West.

*Bunmei Kaika (Civilisation and Enlightenment)*

The Meiji Restoration put an end to the reign of Tokugawa bakufu in 1868 and established a new government under Emperor Meiji. The overthrow of the old regime gave a momentum for an enormous transformation. Under the entirely new political system, Japan opened up and started to absorb Western norms of international society.

However, it should be noted that opening up the country was a compromise that Japan had to make based on the assessment of the country’s inability to compete with the powerful West. Meiji leaders acknowledged that they had to learn from the West if they were to match the European powers’ military might and escape the threat of colonisation. They had also learnt that unless they complied with Western rules and practices, it would suffer like China (Suzuki, 2005, p. 153). The first challenge for Japan as a newcomer to the European international society was, therefore, to figure out how to survive as an independent state in the system.

As discussed in the previous chapter, when Japan entered into European international society the “standard of civilisation” existed as a prevalent norm of that society and was imposed on newcomers. In order to convince the “civilised” members of the society that it had undergone a successful process of socialisation, and in turn, qualify for the protection of the norms and institutions of the society, a newcomer state was required meet the “standard of civilisation” criteria set by the member states (Suzuki, 2005, p. 141 and 2009, p. 90)
One of the criteria for meeting the “standard of civilisation” was “to demonstrate a suitable governmental organisation” (Gong, 1984b, p. 179). Here again, the social logic and demands of the late 19th century European international society called for the adoption of European-style domestic institutions by a newcomer state. The Japanese elites’ desire to enter European international society and their willingness to be judged by the society’s standards in order to be accepted as a “civilised” nation meant that Japan’s reforms took place explicitly on European models. Under the slogan of *Bunmei Kaika* (civilisation and enlightenment), Meiji leadership embarked on the task of building a modern nation state and started to vigorously learn from the West.

Indeed, Meiji Japanese leaders were keen students of the West. For 22 months from 1871 to 1873, a large number of the Meiji leadership toured America and Europe as part of the *Iwakura* mission to study the essence of Western society and civilization. The importance placed on the mission can be easily understood by the size of its delegation. A total of 107 government officials, scholars and students participated in it, virtually emptying the Japanese government for two years (Jansen, 2000, p. 355). On the mission’s return, Japan embarked on a revolutionary program to establish a modern centralised state based on Western models. Under the slogans of *Fukoku Kyohei* (a rich country and a strong military) and *Shokusan Kogyo* (increase production and promote industry), the Japanese government implemented a series of policies to modernise and Westernise Japan by emulating Western technologies, institutions and thoughts. At the same time, thousands of foreign advisers, instructors and educators (*oyatoi gaikokujin*) were hired to assist Japan in its quest for modernisation and civilisation in the 1870s and 1880s.

While Meiji Japan’s ultimate ambition was to join the ranks of the Great Powers of “civilised” international society, its initial priority was to secure treaty reforms with the West and regain its sovereignty in order to remove the humiliation of foreign extraterritorial rights in Japanese
ports (Gong, 1984a, p. 181; Jansen, 2000, p. 427). As the Europeans demanded that the life, liberty, and property of their nationals be guaranteed if the extraterritorial systems were to be lifted, Japan examined the civil and criminal codes of numerous European states in order to reform its legal systems. These efforts bore fruit with the promulgation of a constitution in 1889 and the enactment of criminal and civil codes in the 1890s. These legal reforms were accompanied by the introduction and adoption of institutions and frameworks which the Japanese believed to have empowered the West. During the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s, Japan introduced a new school system, a new system of local government, a new army and navy, a new banking system, a new commercial code and criminal code, and political constitution – all devised after exhaustive study of Western models.

Adherence to International Law

Besides reconfiguring domestic institutions, another criterion for meeting the “standard of civilisation” was “to adhere to the accepted diplomatic practices and to abide by the principles of international law” (Gong, 1984b, p. 179). In this regard, perhaps no country was more faithful and eager to meet the “standard” of international society than Japan. Meiji leaders strongly believed that behaving according to the norms of international society and observing international law were critical components of the “civilisation” required for membership in international society (Gong, 1984a, pp.180-187). Afraid of being looked down on as “uncivilized” and desiring early revision of the unequal treaties, Japan displayed an unusual degree of willingness to adopt European diplomatic practices and international law to govern its foreign relations (Okagaki, 2013, pp. 59-75).

Meiji leaders’ eagerness to learn and abide by international law and to demonstrate their capacity to faithfully adhere to it was most clearly manifested during the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). During these two wars, Japan tried to
impress the Western powers by its meticulous observance of international law. Two eminent Japanese jurists were attached to the Army and the Navy respectively during the Sino-Japanese War as a legal advisor of each headquarters, and in the Russo-Japanese War many more advisors were involved. Japanese soldiers and sailors were instructed to observe international law faithfully and to avoid any conduct that might invite accusations of violating these codes (Suganami, 1984, p. 195).

Japan’s faithful observance of international law during the Sino-Japanese war contrasted with China’s “unlawful” behaviour. One of the jurists accompanying the military during the war, Ariga Nagao, claimed that the Sino-Japanese War was a war between a “civilised” and a “uncivilised” nation, because one party (Japan) strictly followed international law, while another (China) never observed any legal practice of war (Okagaki, 2013, p. 87).

The Sino-Japanese War became a great opportunity for Japan to impress the West with its level of civilisation, especially in view of the fact that the war proceeded in parallel with the treaty revisions. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was signed in London on 16th July 1894, a fortnight before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. The treaty provisionally renounced extraterritoriality in Japan, with its actual abrogation to take effect five years after the signing. Of great significance was that the treaty served as the basis for extracting similar treaties from other European countries. Japan’s faithful adherence to international law during the Sino-Japanese War was highly praised by the European powers, contributing greatly to the reputation of Japan as a legitimate “civilised” country, and convinced European powers of the justice of revising unequal treaties (Gong, 1984a, pp. 184-186). In 1899 the European treaty powers formally renounced their extraterritorial privileges in Japan as agreed, and this marked Japan’s formal acquisition of an international status as a “civilised” nation.
Adopting and Demonstrating a “Civilised” Identity- Datsu-a Nyu-o (Abandoning Asia and Joining the West)

While Japan undertook a complete overhaul of its domestic institutions and made an effort to adhere to the norms of European international society to show its progress towards attaining a “civilised” status, Japan also sought to reconfigure its own identity. Meiji Japanese leaders believed that in order to be accepted as a full member of “civilised” European international society, they would have to take on the identity of a powerful “civilised” state (Suzuki, 2005, p. 154; Suganami, 1984, pp. 191-192).

As discussed earlier, in the process of being socialised into European international society, Japan accepted the European “standard of civilisation” and the dominant belief in the superiority of Western civilisation. A consequence of this was Japan’s reluctant admission that it was “backward” and “uncivilised” (Gong, 1984a, pp. 172-173). In order to embrace the ideas, institutions, and material symbols of European civilization, Japan had to move away from its traditions and dismiss its inherited ideas and institutions as “old fashioned” or “out of date” (Gong, 1984a, p. 187). With Japan’s pre-modern identity being subject to fundamental rethinking, Japan was engaged in a serious endeavour to adjust its identity.

Subsequently, under the slogan of Datsu-a Nyu-o (abandoning Asia and joining the West) Japan began to reject traditional Asian values and ideas and started to separate itself from the rest of Asia so that the newly civilising and rapidly modernising Japan could not be lumped together with the “uncivilised” neighbours by the West. The prominent Meiji thinker and educator Fukuzawa Yukichi expressed this idea in 1885 with the publication of his widely noted article called “Datsu-a-ron (Escape-Asia).” He insisted that “it was important for Japan that it should not be associated in Western minds with a decrepit and backward Asia” and “that Japan should part with Asia and go its own, Western-style way,” (Jansen, 2000, p. 427).
Coincidentally, Darwin’s theory of evolution was introduced at this time and was also applied to interpret the nature of international relations (Cashmore and Troyna, 1990, pp. 36-7). In the contest of the “survival of the fittest,” Japan started to identify itself with the stronger side. In an attempt to redefine its identity within the Eurocentric international order, Japan accepted the dominant belief in the superiority of Western civilisation and rejected traditional Asian values and ideas which were identified with a past that Japan wished to leave behind. By labelling their neighbours as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘backward’ and distancing itself from them, Japan tried to reaffirm its “civilised” identity.

While Japan was engaged in a serious endeavour to reinvent its identity as a “civilised” state, it also tried to demonstrate its “civilised” identity on the international scene by behaving like the European Great Powers. Japan’s attempt to demonstrate its new identity most clearly manifested itself in its style of diplomacy in handling international issues involving its neighbours. In its diplomatic relations with its now “uncivilised” Asian neighbours, Japan “began to apply what she had learnt from the West in her external affairs” (Suginami, 1989, p. 192). Meiji Japanese leaders emulated the modes of interaction used by the European powers and started treating their Asian neighbours as ‘uncivilised’ states. They believed that one important component of “civilised” identity was that of “civiliser” and began to engage in coercive diplomacy towards their Asian neighbours (Suzuki, 2009, p. 142). In 1874, Japan sent a military expedition to Taiwan, leading to China’s acknowledgement of Japanese sovereignty over Ryukyu Islands. Moreover, just as Japan was at the receiving end of unequal treaties with the West, in 1876 Japan imposed an unequal treaty upon Korea, thereby ending the seclusion of that country, and in 1895 after the victory in the Sino-Japanese war, Japan gained most favoured-nation status in relation to China.

Japan’s Asian neighbours naturally reacted negatively to these coercive diplomatic actions and viewed Japan with the utmost suspicion. However, how Asian nations viewed Japan was
not of primary importance for Japan, as the audience for Japan’s demonstration of its new identity was the European powers. Japan’s ultimate goal at the time was to be recognised by European states as “civilised” and become a legitimate member of European international society. Therefore, Japan was demonstrating its identity as a “civilised” state in order to be collectively judged as such by the European powers and Asian states were often used by Japan to reaffirm and demonstrate its newly acquired identity (Suzuki, 2009, p. 140-141).

**Conclusion - Insecure Identity**

When Japan emerged from self-imposed seclusion and opened itself to the rest of the world, the international order that Japan encountered was characterised by European imperialism and the assumed cultural and racial superiority of the West. Japan accepted the prevailing norms of European international society and endeavoured to adopt the behaviour appropriate to the European-dominated international society in order to be accepted as one of its full members.

While conventional studies have depicted Japan as a prize pupil of modernization and Westernisation, emphasizing the peculiarity and uniqueness of the country, it is important to acknowledge that Japan’s socialisation was also the product of the normative and systemic constraints of the 19th century international system. In other words, it is essential to recognise the effects of European imperialism, the “standard of civilisation” and the Janus-faced nature of European international society had on Japan’s socialisation process and on Japan’s subsequent international behaviour. In the course of its socialisation into European international society, Japan identified itself with the European Great Powers and tried to establish its identity as a “civilised” state. At the same time, Japan internalised the norms of the society and started to regard its Asian neighbours as “uncivilised.” Japan also engaged in coercive diplomacy towards its Asian neighbours, thereby reaffirming and demonstrating its newly acquired “civilised” identity.
The Quest for equality and recognition as a “civilised” state was a predominant theme in Japan’s foreign policy in the late 19th century. Japan’s effort to become a “civilised” power eventually bore fruit in 1899, when it succeeded in abolishing extraterritoriality and was accorded equal status with the European powers. However, as the only non-white power of the time, Japan never felt secure about its newly-acquired international status vis-à-vis the other powers, which were all Western (Shimazu, 1998, p. 89; Sam-Sang, 2011, p. 10). Meiji Japanese leaders saw their international environment as an insecure one and continued to look upon the Great Powers with suspicion (Suzuki, 2005, p. 150). The Triple Intervention by Russia, Germany and France, which publically humiliated Japan after its victory over China in 1895, contributed to Japan’s suspicion. The experience also had the effect of undermining Japan’s sense of confidence and security regarding its status and identity.

In spite of the fact that the Western powers generally acknowledged Japan as a “civilised” member of international society, Japan felt that it was not treated equally by the other powers because of the dominant belief in the racial and cultural superiority of the West. Japan also felt that despite having joined the “civilised” West by distancing itself from Asia, it continued to face discrimination and was hypocritically excluded from the Western community on the basis of its identification with Asian race and culture (Sam-Sang, 2011, p. 10). In light of this, Japan was especially sensitive about its status and identity, not only in terms of how it perceived itself but also of how others perceived it.

By the end of the 19th century, Japan had won recognition from the European powers as “civilised” and was developing its state identity as the only “civilised” power in the Orient. As an aspiring Great Power, Japan was also seeking prestige to accompany its status and acknowledgement by others. It was precisely at this time that the White Australia Policy was at the final stage of its development and Australia was excluding Japanese as “undesirable” immigrants along with other Asian peoples, from whom Japanese leaders were so eager to
dissociate themselves. This was the context of international society in which Japan came to object strongly to the White Australia Policy.
CHAPTER FOUR

JAPANESE MIGRATION AND WHITE AUSTRALIA

Japanese Migration and White Reaction

From 1635 to 1868, during the rule of Tokugawa shoguns, Japanese nationals were forbidden, on pain of death, to travel abroad or return home from overseas (Prohibition of Foreign Voyages). In 1868, with the Meiji Restoration, the death penalty was abolished for those Japanese who sought to leave the country. However, as mentioned previously, the Japanese government did not encourage emigration until the mid-1890s for fear that its people would be treated with the indignity of Chinese coolies (Bennett, 1992, p. 24).

The Japanese government only reversed policy in the mid-1890s after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1894, the first equal treaty between Japan and a Western power which conferred reciprocal rights of residence, trade and acquisition of land on the subjects of the signatory nations. Other European powers soon followed suit and concluded similar treaties with Japan. Once the unequal treaties were revised, the Japanese government entertained high hopes of fostering economic growth by the free movement of labour, capital and trade, and migration was to play a full part in this strategy of growth (Bennett, 1992, p. 24 and 2001, p.92). By the mid-1890s, controls on migration were relaxed and many private emigration companies were formed with links to Japanese shipping and foreign companies. These companies hired the bulk of the Japanese indentured labourers sent to Hawaii, America, Canada and Australia in 1890s. However, the Japanese government retained ultimate control and remained vigilant in protecting both migrants and the national interests. In 1896, the Japanese government enacted the Emigration
Protection Act (*Imin Hogoho*) to regulate the activities of emigration companies and protect the interests of emigrants.

The Japanese government initially designated the United States, Canada, Hawaii and Australia as “favourable areas” (Bennett, 1992, p. 27). As a result, in spite of its proximity to the Asian mainland, modern Japan’s emigrants went primarily to the Western Hemisphere. As of 1900, more than half of Japanese living abroad lived either in mainland America or Hawaii. Even within its own Pacific region, more than three-quarters of Japanese emigrants lived in Australia (Sowell, 1996, p. 106). In other words, before the creation of a Japanese overseas empire, most Japanese migrated to the higher-income European off-shoot nations. However, immigration restrictions by these recipient countries and territories changed this trend.

When Japanese migration began in earnest at the end of the 19th century, white settler societies such as the United States and the British Dominions including Canada, Australia and New Zealand were closing their doors against Japanese. By the mid-1890s, white settler societies had openly asserted racial superiority, particularly backed by the emergence of the theory of “Social Darwinism.” Social Darwinism asserted that humans, like animals and plants, competed in a struggle for existence in which a small number of races best suited to the prevailing environment would survive and the weaker races would be subjugated or eliminated – the survival of the fittest races (Cashmore and Troyna, 1990, p. 35). According to this proposition, the white Caucasians were placed at the top of a “tree” of man above other races such as Mongoloid, Negroid and Australoid, because of their superior strength, technology, culture, wisdom and, in many eyes, Christianity (Jupp, 2002, p. 7). Social Darwinism was used as a rationalisation for imperialist, colonialist and racist policies, sustaining belief in Anglo-Saxon biological, moral and cultural superiority (Cashmore and Troyna, 1990, pp. 36-7; Tavan, 2005, p. 12). Having swept aside indigenous peoples such as Indians, Maori and Aborigines, these white settlers sought to create societies with few
 coloured people. Coloured migrants were regarded as undesirable in white settler societies because they would either intermarry and lower the quality of the higher race, or remain aloof and create ghettos and undercut wages and prices (Bennett, 1992, p. 28 and 2001, p. 93).

By the end of the 19th century, the United States and the British Dominions had already imposed legislative and other restrictions upon Chinese immigration. In 1882, the United States introduced the Chinese Exclusion Act. Canada enacted the Chinese Immigration Act in 1885 and levied a “Head Tax” of $50 on any Chinese coming to Canada. Similarly, New Zealand and Australia imposed a poll tax on Chinese migrants in the late 19th century (Sowell, 1996, pp. 213-227; Jupp, 1998, pp. 70-74).

When Japanese began migrating to these white settler societies, they quickly encountered attitudes and obstacles already in place against Chinese migrants. For example, when Great Britain requested its Dominions’ adherence to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894, the members of New Zealand Upper House rejected the request by claiming that “the Chinese damaged trade sanitation, race-purity, carried vile diseases, gambled and smoked opium,” and that “the Japanese were the same as the Chinese, yet more dangerous” (Bennett, 1992, p. 29). It was precisely the racist connotation of statements and sentiments such as this which humiliated the Japanese government. As we have seen, by the end of the 19th century Japan had asserted its identity as the only non-white “civilised” state by distancing itself from “uncivilised” backward Asian nations. However, its self-image and identity as a “civilised” non-Asiatic state was not widely shared in a world which, due to the influence of Social Darwinism, was becoming increasingly racist.
Japanese Presence in Australia

In 1883, the Japanese government signed an indentured labour contract with Captain J. A. Miller of the Australian Pearl Company, which permitted him to employ 37 Japanese to engage in pearling operations in Thursday Island for a period of two years. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese government’s attitude towards emigration until the mid-1890s was generally unfavourable. The government particularly regarded the contracting of indentured labourers as tantamount to slavery (Nihon Gaikō Monjo (NGM): Vol. 16/442). The Japanese government, therefore, only grudgingly approved labour contracts in occupations that it considered consistent with Japanese prestige and whose terms it considered satisfactory. In negotiations with Captain Miller, the Japanese government looked very carefully at the contract and required several amendments (Sisson, 1992, p. 195).

These pearl divers at Thursday Island prospered due to their industry and reliability and more such contracts ensued. Consequently, the number of Japanese in Thursday Island rose from about 100 in 1891 to 720 in 1894, causing unemployment and public agitation on the island. This problem was swiftly resolved by the Japanese government which agreed to place restrictions on the Japanese immigrant population in the region, leading many Japanese labourers to move to the sugar cane fields of northern Queensland.

Japanese immigration in Australia showed an upward trend in the 1890s, increasing from less than 500 in 1891 to 3,593 in 1901. There were two major contributing factors to the rapid increase in 1890s beside the Japanese government’s change of attitude towards emigration after 1894. The first factor was the emergence of the large Japanese companies established to act as brokers in the emigration of labourers. The second reason behind the increase was the establishment of a monthly Australia service by the NYK (Nihon Yusen Kaisha) – Japan’s largest shipping company in October 1896. In fact, the first emigration company, the Yoshisa Emigration Co. was founded by the vice-president of NYK. These newly emerging
emigration and shipping companies worked closely in actively recruiting emigrants and transporting them overseas. However, despite the significant rise in Japanese emigration to Australia, Japanese comprised less than 0.1% of the total Australian population in 1901.

The Japanese population in Australia at the end of the 19th century had two main characteristics. First, they generally worked as skilled labourers either in the pearling or the sugar cane industry. In other words, they were engaged in occupations which were considered unsuitable for white labourers. Second, the vast majority of them worked in remote tropical locations such as Thursday Island in far-north Queensland and Broome in northern Western Australia. Their presence in cities was limited and, therefore, the existence of the Japanese community was not widely known in the white Australian community (Takeda, 2000, p. 64). As a result, apart from occasional and isolated incidents, such as the abovementioned case in Thursday Island, Japanese did not generate any major friction with the white Australian population (Takeda, 2000, p. 66). In this sense they were quite different from Chinese, whose population was almost ten times larger than that of Japanese and whose presence was noticeable in many parts of Australia. During the mid- to late-1800s, Chinese were the main target of anti-immigration sentiment among the white Australian population. In contrast, there was no major anti-Japanese sentiment until the mid-1890s, when Japanese too became a target of the anti-immigration movement in Australia.

**Development of the White Australia Policy**

The Immigration Restriction Act (IRA) was introduced in December 1901. Now known as the infamous White Australia Policy, the act made it virtually impossible for non-Europeans to migrate to Australia. Although the introduction of the IRA symbolised the formal establishment of the White Australia Policy, White Australia was, in fact, already a well-accepted and widely-practiced policy by federation. The origins of the White Australia Policy
can be traced to the 1850s and early 1860s, when the arrival of many thousands of Chinese on the Victorian, South Australian and New South Wales goldfields ignited fear and resentment toward industrious Chinese diggers among white miners, and led these colonies to restrict Chinese immigration. A series of colonial laws were already in place before the introduction of the IRA in 1901. Most of the legislation either excluded Chinese from immigrating to Australia, or barred them from specified occupations or made it virtually impossible for them to become citizens.

According to Myra Willard (1923), the development of the White Australia Policy can be divided into four stages – (1) isolated and temporary action with the object of checking Chinese immigration in the time of the gold rush; (2) attempted concerted action among the Australian colonies towards Chinese immigrants in the early 1880s; (3) the adoption of fairly uniform restrictive measures against Chinese by the colonies in 1888; (4) the extension of anti-Chinese legislation to cover all coloured races, leading to the introduction of the IRA by the Commonwealth government. The first stage began in the 1850s, when the colonies imposed temporary measures against the large influx of Chinese during the gold rush. This period was characterised by the separate actions taken by the individual colonies to temporarily restrict the entry of Chinese.

An idea for a united and concerted action among the colonies to solve the problem of Chinese immigration developed during the second stage. This was largely prompted by a new influx of Chinese in the late 1870s to the newly-discovered goldfields of Queensland and some experience by white labourers of competition with cheap Chinese labour in eastern colonies. The Intercolonial Conference of 1881, which Henry Parkes played a major role in hosting, was symbolic of this stage. At the conference the colonial governments agreed to Parkes’s proposal and resolved that the problem of Chinese immigration called for a concerted action of all the colonies to pass uniform laws.
The third stage was the last phase in the movement against Chinese immigration into the Australian colonies, and was characterised by the unified decision among the colonies to impose a full-scale Chinese exclusion. The arrival of several thousand Chinese at Port Darwin to work on railway construction and the discovery of smallpox cases on six successive vessels during 1887 and 1888 led to a widespread anti-Chinese agitation. At the Intercolonial Conference of 1888, the colonies strengthened the previous call for uniform legislation to restrict Chinese immigration and moved towards total prohibition of Chinese as a goal. This led immediately to restrictive legislation against Chinese in all the colonies except for Tasmania.

The development of the White Australia Policy became complete during the last decade of the 19th century. Hitherto, the policy had been concerned only with the preservation of Australian society from a fairly large Chinese element in the community. However by the mid-1890s, popular hostility towards the Chinese had evolved into a broad doctrine of preservation of Australian society from undesirable immigrants whose cultures, traditions, races and standards of life differed fundamentally from those of the white population. At the Intercolonial Conference of 1896, the colonies endorsed a proposal to extend their anti-Chinese legislation to apply them to all coloured races. Until then, non-European exclusion was synonymous with Chinese exclusion. Almost all measures were intended to exclude Chinese from the colonies of Australia. Precisely for this reason, there was no major problem associated with Japanese immigration in Australia during the first three stages of the development of the White Australia Policy. However, it all changed with the decisions reached at the 1896 Intercolonial Conference.
1896 Intercolonial Conference

Intercolonial Conferences, which had first met in 1856, contributed greatly to the establishment of Australia’s national identity (Takeda, 1981, p. 25). Through the 1860s and 1870s, these conferences discussed such inter-colonial issues as post, telegraph, tariffs, customs duties and trade. In the 1880s, the exclusion of Chinese immigrants became a major concern of conferees (Livingston, Jordan and Sweely, 2001, p. xi). From 1890, with the rise of Australian nationalism, these conferences became instrumental in the movement towards federation (Takeda, 1981, p. 25). At the same time, during the 1890s, the presence of non-Chinese Asians including Indians, Syrians and Japanese began attracting attention among the Australian public. Against this social background, on 4th and 5th March 1896, the premiers of the Australian colonies gathered in Sydney for a conference. There they unanimously agreed to extend the prohibition of Chinese to all non-European coloured races. The resolution of the 1896 Intercolonial Conference was made up three items (1) the colonial parliaments should amend their anti-Chinese laws so as to apply them to all coloured races (2) the exemptions in favour of coloured British subjects (e.g. Indians) should be withdrawn (3) the Australian colonies should not adhere to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1894 (Yarwood, 1964, p. 5; Takeda, 1981, p. 25).

Two of the three decisions reached at the conference, items (1) and (3), directly concerned Japan. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation could offer tariff preferences to the Australian colonies. This was a very attractive option for the colonies, which had been suffering from the impact of the international financial crisis since 1890 and had already explored the Japanese market for their primary products (Hatcho, 2012, p. 88). However, the treaty also conferred reciprocal rights of travel and residence in Article One. If Australia were to enter into the treaty, it also guaranteed the right of Japanese people to enter and reside in Australia. The delegates at the Sydney Conference unanimously decided not to adhere to the
treaty, rejecting the prospect of the bilateral trade promotion and instead giving the White Australia Policy their highest priority (Yarwood, 1964, p. 5; Willard, 1967, p. 109-110; Takeda, 1981, p. 23)

As a result of the agreement to extend anti-Chinese laws to all coloured races –item (1), in 1986 New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania introduced the Coloured Race Restriction and Regulation Bills. However, Britain reserved royal assent to these Bills because of the diplomatic sensitivities involved, and urged the colonies to adopt a less offensive and more indirect method of exclusion in the form of a dictation test. In 1897, Western Australia copied Natal in British South Africa in introducing a dictation test for immigrants. Western Australia was followed by New South Wales in 1898 and Tasmania in 1899. These colonial laws formed the basis for Commonwealth legislation and marked a departure from previous colonial restrictions since the 1850s, which had been directed specifically against Chinese (Jupp, 1998, p. 75). Under these laws, the Japanese were regarded as a coloured race together with Chinese, Indians and Kanakas.

During the 1890s, Australian colonial parliaments passed legislation which for the first time restricted immigration of Asian races other than Chinese. These decisions obviously reflected the colonial leaders’ desire to preserve the racial purity of the Australian population. However, at the same time, they were also motivated by the fear of Japan (Yarwood, 1964, pp. 5-9; Takeda, 1981, p. 27; Meaney, 1999, p. 58). This fear of Japan was not intrinsic in its origin (e.g. a rapid increase in the number of Japanese immigrants in Australia), but rather extrinsic. In other words, Japan and Japanese immigration began to attract attention in Australia in the 1890s due to external factors including the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1984 and Japan’s victory over China in the following year. These events made Australia realise that Japan would, in the future, probably be a force to be reckoned with politically (Willard, 1923, p. 109). Alerted by the possibility of diplomatic
intervention by a powerful nation on behalf of its overseas nationals, the Australian colonies hastened to stem an anticipated influx of Japanese immigrants (Yarwood, 1964, pp. 6-8).

Anti-Japanese immigration movement in the late 1890s, therefore, did not come from popular demands, as in the case of Chinese immigrants in the earlier decades, but rather from politicians who sought to prevent the diplomatic repercussions that could result from the formation of Japanese minorities. The stimulus came from outside Australia with the dramatic rise of Japan’s international status. By the end of the 19th century, Japan had attained a “civilised” status and had demanded international recognition and treatment befitting a non-Asiatic nation. However, ironically, because of Japan’s rising position in the international sphere, Japanese became the target of Australia’s racially discriminatory immigration restriction policies.

In the eyes of the Japanese government, a string of events in the late 1890s, including the decision taken by Australian colonies at the 1896 Intercolonial Conference not to adhere to the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894 and the subsequent introduction of the Coloured Races Restriction and Regulation Bills by three Australian colonies, was at odds with Japan’s status as a “civilised” power. As the Japanese Minister in London, Takaaki Kato, expressed in his letter to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigenobu Okuma, on 2nd September 1897, these events were grave issues involving “Japan’s national prestige” (NGM: Vol. 30/415). This illustrates the importance of the concept of prestige in analysing Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy.
CHAPTER FIVE

JAPAN’S REACTION TO THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY

1894-1900

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which was signed in London on 16th July 1894, horrified the Australian colonies. The treaty, while offering tariff preference to the Australian colonies, gave full liberty to the subjects of either Empire to enter, travel and live in any part of the other signatory’s territory. However, Article 19 stipulated that the treaty was not to apply to Britain’s self-governing colonies unless they expressed their wish to adhere to the treaty within two years from the date of its ratification. On 31st December 1894, the British government transmitted copies of the treaty to Australia and informed the colonies that if they wished to adhere, notice should be given before 25th August 1896.

The Australian colonies were thus suddenly faced with the need to determine the nature of their future relations with Japan. The Premier of New South Wales, George Reid, agreed to hold an Intercolonial Conference in Sydney on 4th and 5th March 1896 to debate the issue. At the conference, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the delegates from all the colonies adopted unanimous resolutions to reject the treaty and to amend their anti-Chinese acts so as to apply them to all coloured races. In accordance with the resolutions reached at the conference, New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania subsequently introduced the Coloured Races Restriction and Regulation Bills, which excluded native inhabitants of Asia, Africa and the Pacific Islands.

Following an instruction from the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigenobu Okuma, the Japanese Minister in London, Takaaki Kato, arranged an interview with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, to protest against the legislation from these three Australian
colonies and a similar bill from New Zealand. In their conversation on 25th November 1986, Kato condemned the bills as being “wholly gratuitous” given the extremely small number of Japanese residents in those colonies, and requested that the Japanese would be exempted from the operation of these bills (NGM: Vol. 29/541).

In a confidential memorandum to Okuma of 6th May 1897, Kato expressed his opinion that these immigration restriction bills were devised merely for political reasons. “The governments of New Zealand, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia were always trying to appease Labor Party members,” and these bills were “nothing but a tactic to maintain their current cabinets.” Kato, moreover, criticised “the illegitimate actions taken by these colonies which bear no direct responsibility in diplomatic relations,” and warned that if these bills were to be applied to the Japanese, they would “affect the friendly relations which now exist between Japan and those colonies” (NGM: Vol. 30/410).

Having voiced its displeasure and issued a warning, the Japanese government from the outset argued that it was unreasonable for the Australian colonies to impose restriction on Japanese immigration in view of the fact that only a small number of Japanese were residing in those colonies (NGM: Vol. 29/541, Vol. 30/410, 412 and 414). However, gradually, Japan’s objection came to focus upon being treated as if they were Chinese and other Asian people. “The Japanese government fully understands and sympathises with the desire of the people of the colonies to defend their land from being swamped by the enormous surplus population of Asia,” wrote Kato to Okuma on 2nd September 1897. “However, we cannot allow any legislation which regards our people as being on the same level as other Asian people and treats our people in the same way as the Chinese.” Kato insisted the Japanese government should request amendments to any legislation which “confuses the distinction between the Japanese and other Asian people” and “damages our national pride” because “we are deeply aware that the Japanese are far superior to other Asian people” (NGM: Vol. 30/415). This
claim that the Japanese were superior to Chinese and other Asian people was repeatedly made by Japanese diplomats, who were conscious of their country’s international status as a “civilised” state.

The correspondences between Kato and Okuma show that the Japanese government was determined to seek exemptions for its citizens from the operation of the bills and to block Royal Assent to these bills in their original forms (NGM: Vol. 30/409, 411, 414 and 415). Kato’s confidential memorandum to Okuma of 5th October 1897 reported his interview with Salisbury on 1st September 1897, where Kato again demanded that the Japanese be exempted from the operation of these bills because “lumping us together with other Asian people and excluding us along with other Asian immigrants is truly unjustified.” He further requested that immigration restriction should be based not on a man’s colour or nationality but on his character, because in this way, “the Japanese and Europeans are treated equally” and the legislation would be “less likely to hurt our pride and prestige, and be more acceptable” to the Japanese government (NGM: Vol. 30/ 421).

Salisbury either misinterpreted Japan’s position or saw no need for compromise on this issue. He wrote to Kato telling him that New South Wales and South Australian bills exempted tourists, merchants, students, etc., and if the same exemptions were adopted by New Zealand and Tasmania, “the Japanese Government will doubtless recognise that all reasonable cause for complaint has been removed” (NGM: Vol. 30/415). Kato responded in a letter, which has been quoted by various scholars:

From a material point of view there was no very great grievance of which Japan could complain. The actual immigration was very small, and the class of Japanese who chiefly desired to enter the Australian colonies were exempted by special provisions from the prohibitions of the Colonial Bills. But the point which had caused a painful feeling in Japan was not that the operation of the prohibition would be such as to exclude a certain number of Japanese from immigrating to Australasia, but that Japan should be spoken of in formal documents, such as the Colonial Acts, as if the Japanese were on the same level of morality and civilisation as Chinese and other less advanced populations of Asia…. (Yarwood, 1964, p. 14; Sissons, 1972, p. 199; Shimazu, 1998, p. 80).

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These bills were all refused Royal Assent, mainly because the British government feared the negative effect the bills would have on its relations with India and Japan. As the leader of a multiracial empire, Britain readily adopted Japan’s suggestion that exclusion should not be based on colour or race (Bennett, 1992, p. 29). At the Imperial Conference held in London, Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, explained that Britain objected to the colonies’ exclusive legislation because it was contrary to the Empire’s guiding principle of equality of all races and because it was offensive to the Japanese with whom Britain was anxious to remain on friendly terms (Willard, 1923, pp. 111-115). He requested that rather than use a man’s colour or race as a basis for exclusion, the colonies might follow the Natal Immigration Restriction Act of 1897, which required a modest standard of literacy in a European language.

In compliance with Chamberlain’s request, New South Wales, Western Australia and Tasmania amended their bills and enacted legislation on the Natal model, whereby immigrants would be subject to a dictation test in either in the English or a European language. In a confidential note to Okuma on 12th July 1898, Kato praised the British government for inducing the Australian colonies to withdraw the old bills. The new bills “are not able to bring ignominy to our people” and “I am sure that the Imperial government is quite satisfied,” wrote Kato (NGM: Vol. 31/652). However, Victoria and South Australia did not comply with Britain’s wish.

Queensland followed a different path altogether. Its government revised the opinion expressed by its delegates at the 1896 Intercolonial Conference regarding the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. On 16th March 1897, Queensland alone among the Australian colonies joined the treaty by means of a special protocol which granted either party the right to regulate the immigration of labourers and artisans.
In fact, a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” formula reached between Japan and Queensland was Japan’s favoured solution for problems concerning restriction of Japanese immigration, because Japan could at least maintain an appearance of being accorded equal treatment with European nations (Sissons, 1972, p. 195; Bennett, 1992, p. 30). Under this formula, a treaty right to most favoured nation treatment regarding right of entry was guaranteed to Japanese, while the Japanese government indicated that it would voluntarily prevent the emigration of labourers and artisans. This was the nature of the agreement reached with the United States and Canada in the early 1900s.

In the late 1890s, the Japanese government repeatedly suggested that the other Australian colonies adopt the same formula. On 24th November 1897, Tsunejiro Nakagawa, recently appointed as the first Japanese Consul in Sydney, offered an arrangement such as that between Japan and Queensland to the Premier of New South Wales, George Reid. Nakagawa told Reid that by such an arrangement, the colony’s aim could be “practically secured” without damage to “the most friendly commercial relations” because Japanese “are under no necessity to emigrate, as may be judged from the fact that wages have nearly doubled within the last three years” (NGM: Vol. 31/643). Nakagawa’s successor, Hisakichi Eitaki, repeatedly approached Reid with the same offer. “My Government, I am sure, will be quite ready at any moment to give any assurance or to enter into suitable arrangements for controlling immigration to New South Wales, and they do not wish it to be believed for a moment that they have any thought or wish to promote Japanese Immigration to your shores or elsewhere,” wrote Eitaki to Reid on 16th May 1899 (NGM: Vol. 32.1/495). Eitaki repeated the same paragraph in his letter to Reid a few weeks later on 7th June 1899 in order to stress his point (NGM: Vol. 32.1/496). Clearly, Japan did not wish to increase the number of Japanese immigrants in Australia. It just wanted an appearance of equality with European countries. However, these offers were all rejected by Reid.
During the late 1890s, the Australian colonies passed legislation to restrict Japanese immigration. Japan finally accepted that some restrictions were inevitable and consented to the exclusion of its people on a de facto basis provided this was done in a manner acceptable to its national pride and prestige. However, Japan remained vigilant about the means of exclusion and objected to its citizens being nominated in legislation as if they were in the same category as Chinese or other Asian people.

Japan’s determination to defend its prestige and to resist any classification which implied her inferiority to European nations was highlighted in the following examples involving three sets of Queensland legislation. In the late 19th century, the Queensland Parliament passed the Pearl Shell and Beche-de-Mer Fishery Act (1898) which restricted the issue of new pearling licences to British subjects in order to prevent Japanese financial domination of the industry; the Aborigines’ Protection Act Amendment Act (1899) which denied Asians and Africans the right to employ Aborigines; and the Sugar Works Guarantee Act Amendment Act (1900) which prohibited the employment of Asians, Africans and Pacific Islanders in the Central Sugar Works Mills or on permanent tramway.

The first act directly and substantially affected the financial interests of Japanese. The President of the Japanese Society of Thursday Island, Torajiro Sato, described the act as “intended to drive the Japanese out of the pearling industry” and petitioned the Japanese Prime Minister, Aritomo Yamagata, and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shuzo Aoki, to intervene. However, Aoki instructed the Japanese Minister in London, Kaoru Hayashi, to “make only a friendly representation to the British Government” as “all foreigners were equally affected” (NGM: Vol. 32.1/503). In other words, the Japanese government saw no need for strong protest because nowhere was Japan’s inferiority to European nations implied.

In contrast, both the second and the third acts were vigorously opposed by the Japanese government because they applied only to Asians and non-Europeans, even though the
Japanese Consul in Townsville, Kametaro Iijima, admitted that they were insignificant to Japanese from a material point of view (NGM: Vol. 32.2/512 and 33/401). As for the third act, Iijima told the Japanese Foreign Minister, Takaaki Kato, in a telegram of 20th November 1900 that “the bill does not affect the interests of our men as they are employed in private sugar-mills with which the bill is not concerned” (NGM: Vol. 33/401). However, on 29th November 1900, Iijima wrote to the Chief Secretary of Queensland, James Dickson:

The bill establishes race discrimination and it imposes a certain disability upon Japanese subjects which is not imposed upon other European or North American aliens. The Imperial Japanese Government take a strong exception to the bill and object to it being enforced against the Japanese subjects as it now stands. Accordingly my Government are desirous that the wording of the bill be so altered as to except the Japanese subjects from the words “the aboriginal native of Asia” used in the bill (NGM: Vol. 33/401).

In the end, the second act was amended to apply only to the Chinese and the third act was refused Royal Assent (NGM: Vol. 34/618 and 626).

Japan’s responses to these three acts demonstrate that Japan’s objection to Australia’s racial exclusion policies was not based on material interests. Instead, Japan objected to the implication that the Japanese were no better than other Asian people and inferior to the Europeans. Evidently, the Japanese considered themselves superior to other Asian people to whom, in Japan’s opinion, immigration restriction acts should be applied. Japan regarded itself as being on the same plane as European nations, and duly expected its nationals to be accorded the same treatment as the Europeans. Consequently, the Japanese government insisted that, as citizens of a “civilised” state, the Japanese should be exempted from immigration restriction legislation which was aimed at undesirable “uncivilised” people. This attitude was consistently displayed by the Japanese government leading up to the introduction of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901.
The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901

The Immigration Restriction Bill was the first piece of legislation introduced by the newly formed Commonwealth Parliament in May 1901. The establishment of the Immigration Restriction Act (IRA) after receiving Royal Assent on 23 December 1901 marked the culmination of the popular movement in Australia to create a white British society founded upon the principle of racial and cultural homogeneity.

The IRA was intended “to place certain restrictions on immigration and to provide for the removal from the Commonwealth of prohibited immigrants” (Ball, 1969, p. 5). However, the IRA nowhere mentions race or the White Australia Policy. The reason for this was diplomatic pressure applied by Britain and Japan in the lead-up to the introduction of the IRA. As the majority of British subjects by 1900 were Indians or Africans, and as Britain had important trade and strategic interests with Japan, Britain objected to any legislation of an overtly discriminatory character (Jupp, 2002, p. 8; Tavan, 2005, p. 10). Instead, the restrictions were enforced through the application of a dictation test. According to Section 3(a) of the IRA, “any person who when asked to do so by an officer fails to write out at dictation and sign in the presence of the officer a passage of fifty words in length in an European language directed by the officer” would fall into the prohibited category (Ball, 1969, p. 5).

The Japanese government, again as in the late 1890s, insisted that the wording of the legislation should not appear to classify its people with Chinese or other Asian people. In a letter to the Prime Minister of Australia, Edmund Barton, on 3rd May 1901, Eitaki wrote:

The Japanese belong to an Empire whose standard of civilization is so much higher than that of Kanakas, Negroes, Pacific Islanders, Indians, or other Eastern peoples, that to refer to them in the same terms cannot but be regarded in the light of a reproach, which is hardly warranted by the fact of the shade of the national complexion (National Archives of Australia (NAA): CA8, 1901/203/1).

In the same letter, Eitaki accepted Australia’s right to control immigration but made clear Japan’s outright objection to legislation that excluded its immigrants on the grounds of colour.
“My government recognise distinctly the right of the Government of Australia to limit in any way it thinks fit the number of those persons who may be allowed to land and settle in Australia, and also to draw distinction between persons who may or who may not be admitted,” wrote Eitaki. However, he insisted that “as Japan is under no necessity to find outlet for her population, my Government would readily consent to any arrangement by which all that Australia seeks, so far as the Japanese are concerned, would be at once conceded.”

“Might I suggest therefore,” he continued, “your Government formulate some proposal, which being accepted by my Government, would allow of the people of Japan being excluded from the operation of an Act….“ Eitaki, moreover, reminded Barton of the growing trade between their countries (NAA: CA8, 1901/203/1).

Although the Australian government made no effort to meet Japan’s request for exempting Japanese citizens from the operation of the IRA, Barton replicated the Natal Pattern as employed in the Immigration Restriction Acts of Western Australia, Tasmania and New South Wales and adopted an education test for the speedy adoption of the Act. Barton feared that a direct bill that named coloured races to be excluded would incur the delay and perhaps the refusal of Royal Assent (Yarwood, 1964, p. 26).

Barton initially proposed a test in the English language rather than a European language. Eitaki praised this as “being formulated after consideration of our government’s protest” (NGM: Vol. 34/623). In Eitaki’s opinion, as expressed to the Japanese Foreign Minister, Arasuke Sone, in his letter of 30th July 1901, a test in the English language “would place Japanese people on the equal footing with European people except for British and American citizens” and “the Imperial Government does not take exception to such a test” (NGM: Vol. 34/622), while a test in a European language implied “a racial discrimination” (NGM: Vol. 34/635). However, Barton’s proposal was vigorously opposed in the parliament on the ground that the test in English would deter non-English speaking European immigrants (Yarwood,
1964, p. 27; Takeda, 2000, p. 47; Tavan, 2005, p. 10). In the end, Barton gave into the opposition and announced his acceptance of a test in “any European language” on 12th September 1901.

The Attorney-General Alfred Deakin confirmed that the European language test specifically targeted Japanese citizens. Speaking before Commonwealth Parliament on 12th September 1901, he noted that “the Japanese require to be absolutely excluded.” The Japanese were, in Deakin’s words, “incapable of assimilated,” yet “they most nearly approach us, and would therefore, be our most formidable competitors.” It was not “the bad qualities” but “their high abilities” which made the Japanese “most dangerous to us” (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates: 1901/37/4812). In making his case, Deakin turned the Japanese government’s protestations on their head and reaffirmed the Australian government’s intentions to exclude Japanese immigrants.

Eitaki expressed the Japanese government’s subsequent discontent in a letter to Barton on 16th September 1901. “The English test was regarded by my Government as courteous to Japan, inasmuch as it placed her upon an equal footing with other nations,” but “the amendment now proposed must be regarded as discourteous.” Eitaki suggested that the Japanese might be examined in the Japanese language “by adding the words ‘or Japanese’ after ‘European’ in the proposed amendment.” The reason he gave was:

In Japanese schools and other educational establishments the most approved European methods are adopted, and the most important works on science, literature, art, politics, law, etc., which are published in Europe from time to time, are translated into Japanese for the use of students. Thus a Japanese, without being acquainted with any other language than his own, is frequently up to a very high educational standard in the most advanced branches of study, by means of a liberal use of these translations. I cannot imagine any sufficient reason why the Japanese language should not be regarded as upon the same footing with, say, the Turkish, the Russian, the Greek, the Polish, the Norwegian, the Austrian, or the Portuguese, or why, if an immigrant of any of the nationalities I have mentioned may be examined in his own language, the same courtesy should not be extended to a Japanese (NGM: Vol. 34/628).

Four days later, on 20th September 1901, Eitaki again wrote to Barton with much stronger words, “my requests that the Japanese might be treated in the same manner as the European
nations have not been of any avail, and the Bill is unmistakeably and professedly aimed at the Japanese upon grounds which must form the subject of the strongest possible protests should it be passed” (NAA: A8, 1901/203/1).

In September, communications were repeatedly sent to Barton from Eitaki, urging that an arrangement with Japan be made for restricting Japanese immigration in return for the exemption of its citizens from the operation of the IRA (NAA: A8, 1901/203/1). In October, the tone of Eitaki’s letter changed from request to protestation. “It is a pity that racial prejudice should be so strong as to seek expression even in a clause dealing with the imposition of penalties for the infringement of an Act,” wrote Eitaki to Barton on 10th October 1901 (NAA: A8, 1901/203/1). However, the repeated approaches by Eitaki were almost completely ignored by Barton.

Having pressed Barton to the limit, the Japanese government then changed tactics. In October, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Jutaro Komura, instructed Eitaki and the Japanese Minister in London, Kaoru Hayashi, to renew their appeals for intervention by the British government (NGM: Vol. 34/633). On 5th October 1901, Eitaki wrote to the Governor General, Lord Hopetoun, and expressed “high dissatisfaction” with the proposed bill. Eitaki told Hopetoun that he had communicated with the Prime Minister Barton “expressing the hope that the Commonwealth Parliament might see its way clear to avoid legislating in such a manner as to make distinctions affecting the Japanese on the ground of race and colour.” “My communications, however,” he continued, “were not fortunate enough to produce the desired effect” and the Japanese government considered that the proposed bill “clearly make a racial discrimination” (NAA: A8, 1901/203/1). In London, Hayashi requested the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, “to induce the Government of Australia to modify the educational test contained in this Bill in such a manner as to place Japanese on an equal footing with European immigrants” in order to “remove the obstacles which may work to the
detriment of friendly and commercial relations between Japan and that important part of the British Empire” (NGM: Vol. 34/639).

At the time, Japan was in a secret negotiation with Britain over the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and theoretically, Japan was in the perfect position to exert diplomatic pressure over Britain. However, the alliance meant more for Japan than Britain. To become Britain’s ally was a substantial gain for Japan’s international prestige, and the White Australia Policy was nothing more than “a minor irritant” in the alliance negotiations (Nish, 1963, p. 204). Thus, in his communications with the British government over the issue of Japanese exclusion in Australia, Hayashi made “petitions” but could not afford to make “threats” (Takeda, 1981, p. 35).

At the same time, the British government was unwilling to act on Japan’s request. For one thing, the British government did not want to hold itself responsible for the actions of its self-governing dominions on immigration (Nish, 1963, p. 202). For another, Britain thought that Japan had been content with the formula of a dictation test along the line of the Natal Bill. Partly at Japan’s request in 1897, Britain had induced the Australian colonies to abandon their Coloured Races Restriction Bills and to effect the exclusion of coloured people by means of a test in a European language. In Britain’s opinion, the form of Acts which thus emerged had the explicit recommendation of the Japanese Minister in London, and the British government was unprepared to follow Japan’s policy reversal (Yarwood, 1964, p. 38; Willard, 1968, p. 125).

In spite of Japan’s persistent efforts, the Immigration Restriction Bill finally passed on 3rd December 1901 and received Royal Assent on 23rd December 1901, thereby completely closing Australia to further settlement by Japanese. Thereafter, for over half a century, the only Japanese to enter Australia were a handful of merchants, students and tourists on temporary visas, and contract labourers for the pearling industry, none of whom was permitted to remain in Australia for more than a few years.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The net emigration of Japanese has been surprisingly small in view of the extent of the popular agitation against it and the number of diplomatic crises it has precipitated (Schumpeter, 1940, p. 70).

One clear theme emerges from this investigation into Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy: Japan objected to the White Australia Policy and sought exemptions for its citizens from Australia’s racial exclusion policies in order to defend its international prestige as a “civilised” state. As the only non-European “civilised” power, Japan objected to any legislation which implied its inferiority to European nations, whose civilisation Japan had set out to emulate. Japan also objected to any legislation which put its citizens in the same category with “uncivilised” Chinese and other Asian people, from whom the Japanese were trying to distance themselves. The White Australia Policy undercut Japan’s claim that its standard of civilisation was much higher than that of other Asian nations, and lumped Japanese people together with other Asian people. It also labelled Japanese as undesirable immigrants and placed Japanese beneath, not on the same footing with, European people. As such, the White Australia Policy was a great insult to Japan’s national pride and prestige and Japan’s state identity as a “civilised” power.

As shown previously, Japan’s state identity as a “civilised” power was formed during its socialisation into the late 19th century European international society. Constructivist assumptions hold that state identity is a state’s self-understanding which is formed by the normative structure of international society in interaction with other states. In the course of its socialisation into European international society, Japan accepted and internalised the prevailing norms of that society, and attempted to reinvent its identity as a “civilised” state by
faithfully adhering to the “standard of civilisation.” At the same time, in its interaction with the European Great Powers in the “Janus-faced” international society, Japan identified itself with powerful European states and tried to reaffirm its “civilised” identity by treating other Asian nations as “uncivilised.”

Japan’s newly acquired state identity formed Japan’s interests, which in turn, shaped Japan’s behaviour. As Japan developed its identity as a “civilised” state, acquiring, increasing and defending prestige came to occupy a prominent place in Japan’s national interests. Not only did Japan attempt to defend its prestige as a “civilised” state, but, as an aspiring Great Power, Japan also tried to increase prestige. At the same time, as the only non-European power, Japan was insecure about its status and constantly sought affirmation from others of its “civilised” identity. Consequently, Japan’s desire and determination to defend and gain prestige shaped its international behaviour.

As Japan’s position rose in the international sphere, it became evident that there was an inherent contradiction in the recognition of Japan as a “civilised” state and of the treatment of Japanese as second-class citizens in the Anglo-Saxon territories. In other words, Japan’s international status did not tally with the reality whereby Japanese immigrants were a target of discrimination. In this sense, the Japanese government was particularly concerned about the potential damage the White Australia Policy would have on Japan’s international prestige. The Japanese government feared that being nominated in a formal document as an undesirable immigrant nation would symbolise Japan’s inferiority to European nations, and denigrate Japan’s status as a “civilised” power. Hence, the value the Japanese government attached to solving the immigration problem was not based on material interests. It did not, in other words, want to increase the number of Japanese immigrants in Australia. The concern was instead almost entirely symbolic: the Japanese government was most concerned with the
negative implications that the White Australia Policy and the exclusion of Japanese would have on Japan’s international prestige and its status as a “civilised” state.

Rationalists have argued that a state, as a rational actor, makes decisions based on material-interest-based calculations. However, this study has demonstrated that Japan often made decisions that cannot be explained by a focus on national interests as defined by rationalist theory. In other words, Japan often made foreign policy decisions that gained little material reward. Those decisions were instead based on Japan’s “civilised” state identity and its desire to defend its international prestige. Prestige, in short, was an important motivating factor behind Japan’s international behaviour. For Japan, prestige was not simply a by-product of foreign policy but the primary objective of foreign policy. Japan’s concern with prestige, in turn, emerged from its hard-earned identity as a “civilised” state, which was formed during its socialisation into European international society. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the process of Japan’s socialisation into the European international order had a profound impact on Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy.

This thesis has examined Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy by drawing insights from both history and IR. More specifically, it has analysed how Japan’s state identity and its quest for prestige, both of which were products of Japan’s socialisation into European international society, shaped Japan’s foreign policy as it related to the White Australia Policy. This investigation of Japan’s reaction to the White Australia Policy has revealed the plight of Japan in the late 19th century – the only non-white member of “civilised” European international society, which nonetheless found itself the subject of arrogant treatment by Anglo-Saxon countries and felt keenly its hypocritical exclusion from the Western community on racial and even cultural grounds.

It might be noted, from a slightly longer term view, that the Australian government tended to treat Japanese immigrants better than other non-white immigrants largely due to Japan’s
international status and continuous diplomatic efforts expended by the Japanese government (Yarwood, 1964, p. 100; Shimazu, 1998, p. 71). In this way, the Japanese government’s efforts in its diplomatic negotiations with Australia bore fruit after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. In 1904, Eitaki’s successor, Mitsuo Iwasaki, concluded the Passport Agreement with Australia, which permitted the temporary settlement of merchants, students and tourists and their wives. In the following year, in 1905, the dictation test of the IRA was changed so that it was no longer based specifically on a “European language” but instead on “any prescribed language,” thereby granting Japanese immigrants nominal equality with their European counterparts (Willard, p. 125; Yarwood, 1964, p. 84; Takeda, p. 36; Tavan, 2005, p. 22).

These changes were, however, cosmetic. While gaining some minor concessions from Australia, Japan was unable to change Australia’s basic policy regarding the exclusion of Japanese, and Australia remained closed to Japanese immigrants. Thereafter for over half a century, the discriminatory treatment of the Japanese on account of race remained a thorny issue in Australia-Japanese relations. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the Japanese-Australian clash over racial equality at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Japan’s delegation arrived in Paris determined to insert into the League of Nations Covenant a racial equality clause. The Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes claimed that Japan was using the racial equality proposal to challenge the White Australia Policy, and played a prominent role in its ultimate defeat. The effect on Japan was so considerable that Japan’s Showa Emperor later cited Australia’s racially discriminatory policies as a distant cause of World War II.
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