This thesis is presented for the Degree of PhD in Philosophy
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University

Thesis Title:

The Theory of Recognition
and the Ethics of Immigration

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Date of submission:

December 2009
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Thesis Summary

This thesis examines the theory of recognition and applies it in the context of Australian immigration laws, policies and procedures. Part One (Chapter One) of the thesis addresses the question “What is recognition?”, before turning to Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition and the connections between his theory and other theories. In Part Two (Chapters Two, Three and Four), I consider a number of challenges that have been raised against Honneth’s theory by Patchen Markell, Kelly Oliver and Nancy Fraser and I defend Honneth’s theory against each of these challenges. I also raise my own questions about Honneth’s account of the connection between esteem, achievement and social solidarity, and I consider whether questions of recognition of lack of recognition must be posed within the boundaries of a nation state.

In Part Three (Chapters Five and Six), I apply Honneth’s theory in the context of Australian immigration. I argue that recognition in terms of love, respect and esteem can be linked to the categories of family, humanitarian and skilled/economic migration and I contend that there is a close relationship between social frameworks of recognition and the mechanisms of social inclusion or exclusion that occur in immigration laws, policies and practice. I claim that interpreting the context of immigration in this way helps us to understand both its social function and its normative significance. In the final chapter, I revisit the challenges to Honneth’s theory and reconsider them in the context of the immigration policies. I argue that Honneth’s account of the role of struggles for recognition and its connection to social progress is particularly useful for understanding the “moral grammar” and issues of justice that are at stake.
Candidate’s Statement

This work has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university or institution. I am the sole author of this thesis and all reference to the work of others has been clearly indicated as such.

Signed:

Date:
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor Associate Professor Nicholas Smith for his advice, thoroughness, support and patience.

Special thanks to David Duloy and our children Thomas and Amy for their love and encouragement.

This thesis is dedicated to all immigrants who struggle for recognition.
Introduction

In this thesis I explore the possibility of using theories of recognition to analyse immigration. A variety of different types of “recognition” have become a familiar component of the justice claims of many socio-political movements. For example, African American civil rights activists demand recognition of the right to be treated equally to the white majority. Same-sex couples claim recognition of an equal right to marry their partner. National minorities claim recognition of the right their distinctive identity, which would allow them to be educated in their own language or to follow particular religious practices. All of these claims have been characterised as demands for recognition even though they appear to focus on different types of recognition and call for quite diverse responses. In this thesis I shall argue that the claims of immigrants, in addition to those of socially structured groups such as African Americans, gay activists and national minorities, involve demands for recognition.

The thesis is divided into three parts. Part One, “The Concept of Recognition”, consists of just one chapter. It sets the scene by introducing the concept of recognition and considering some of the central claims that are made by contemporary theorists of recognition, in particular Axel Honneth. However, Honneth’s theory has been subjected to a number of formidable criticisms. In Part Two, “Major Challenges to Honneth’s Theory” (which includes Chapters Two, Three and Four) I examine three sets of criticisms of Honneth’s theory that I take to be particularly important and I raise some criticisms of my own. I then undertake a critical analysis of these objections in order to consider the validity of Honneth’s theory and to consolidate his theory in ways that make it not so vulnerable to the criticisms. The third and final part of the thesis, “Recognition and Immigration”,
includes Chapters Five and Six. This part applies Honneth’s theory in the context of Australian immigration and, in light of that context of application, reconsiders the challenges that were the focus of Part Two.

The first section of Part One addresses the question “What is recognition?” and begins by giving an overview of some of the different types of socio-political struggles that are commonly understood as demands for recognition. I contend that these struggles involve both claims for recognition of equal rights and demands for recognition of difference and that these different types of claims/demands appear to call for quite different responses. I then investigate the theoretical concept of recognition by sketching the accounts of recognition that have been given by the contemporary theorists Charles Taylor and Nancy Fraser in order to see if they are able to shed some light on the different demands for recognition. There are problematic limitations to both Taylor’s “politics of difference” and Fraser’s theory of cultural recognition (as distinct from redistribution) because both theories focus almost exclusively on the claims for political recognition that are made by distinct social or cultural groups. This focus on claims that have already achieved political or social articulation is too narrow because it can leave out some of the injustices that are suffered by people who are unable to effectively participate in this realm. I elect to concentrate on Honneth’s theory of recognition because it has a broader theoretical focus and appears to have the capacity to offer a wider explanation of more types of recognition claims and struggles for recognition than the other theories.

The second section of Part One concentrates on what I take to be the key components of Honneth’s theory. For Honneth, recognition is a broad explanatory concept with normative force. His central claim is that our capacity to function as self-directing
individuals depends on the recognition relationships that we have with other people throughout our lives. This means that adequate recognition is a necessity for everyone and not only for people who participate in the socio-political movements that make public demands for various forms of recognition. In order to explicate Honneth’s theory I reconstruct his account of three distinct forms of recognition that occur through love, respect and esteem and of the importance of struggles for recognition. Honneth contends that his theory provides not only a description of how contemporary societies function but also an explanation of how the different forms of recognition can change over time and of the mechanisms that drive these changes. I argue that Honneth’s theory can help to illuminate the normative dimensions that underpin many social struggles and that his theory is particularly useful as an explanatory and diagnostic framework for understanding social change.

In the third section of Part One I compare the normative aspects of Honneth’s theory with the normative claims that are made by some other social and political theories. I argue that there are some similarities between Honneth’s theory and the ethics of care, liberalism and communitarianism and I investigate a number of theoretical resonances and antagonisms. This involves an exploration of the connections between the ethics of care and the recognition through love relationships that Honneth describes, an analysis of Honneth’s account of respect and its relationship to liberal accounts of autonomy and respect, and a comparison of communitarian accounts of social solidarity and the recognition that happens through frameworks of social esteem.

In particular, I contend that Honneth’s account of recognition in the form of love and the account of care that is given in the ethics of care are very similar, although they are not
motivated in exactly the same way. The sphere of love in Honneth’s theory and the ethics of care have also been subjected to similar criticisms of their inappropriateness for the political arena on the grounds of partiality and of allowing psychological or emotional responses to carry some weight. I argue that Honneth’s model is not as vulnerable to these criticisms as the ethics of care because he also emphasises the importance of recognition in terms of respect and esteem. Although Honneth argues for the importance of autonomy and rights (which are also emphasised in liberal theories of justice), I contend that his account explains the importance of the social context that makes autonomy and rights a possibility. Honneth’s account of the importance of social solidarity (which is also emphasised in communitarian theories) is also able to explain the importance of social progress and the role of social conflict. I conclude that Honneth’s theory may be able to provide a different, broader (and perhaps better) framework than the ethics of care, liberalism or communitarianism.

Although I find Honneth’s theory of recognition to be plausible (at least on face value), many other theorists have raised challenges to his theory and subjected it to a number of specific criticisms. If these criticisms of Honneth’s theory were valid that would potentially undermine the legitimacy of applying his framework. In the fourth and final section of Part One I begin by briefly introducing three sets of criticisms that have been raised by Patchen Markell, Kelly Oliver and Nancy Fraser. Markell raises concerns about the empirical accuracy of Honneth’s theory and whether individuals currently do (or could have) the capacities that mutual recognition seems to require. Oliver suggests that even if mutual recognition is possible, it may not be a desirable goal because it might cause more suffering and she argues that conflictual struggles are not the right instrument to generate
mutual recognition. Fraser contends that Honneth’s theory is not able to give an adequate account of the issues of redistribution and economic injustice.

I then introduce two criticisms of my own. Firstly, I argue that there are problems with Honneth’s account of the connection between esteem, achievements and social solidarity. Even if achievements do generate self-esteem as Honneth contends, there are other sources of esteem that he has under emphasised. Honneth’s focus on paid work-based achievements appears to problematically overlook other types of achievements that are closely connected to social solidarity. Competitive paid work-based achievements also appear to be an unlikely mechanism for fostering social cohesion. Secondly, I point out that Honneth’s theory is problematically focused on the recognition that occurs (or does not occur) within the borders of a nation state and I argue that the actual boundaries of some and perhaps all of the forms of recognition do not necessarily coincide with national borders. I will explore this criticism in more depth in Part Three when I apply Honneth’s theory in the context of immigration.

Having briefly introduced these criticisms and potential problems at the end of Part One, I move on in Part Two to defend Honneth’s theory against the challenges that have been raised. Each of the Chapters (Two, Three and Four) in Part Two addresses a particular set of challenges. In Chapter Two, I address what I have termed the problems of non-reciprocal recognition that have been raised by Markell and Oliver. I consider Markell’s claim that mutual recognition is an unrealisable goal that misconstrues the cause of injustice and that recognition theorists mistakenly assume that individuals have a pre-given identity that needs to be recognised. I also outline Oliver’s contentions that recognition theorists mistakenly assume that intersubjective relationships are necessarily conflictual
and that the need for recognition condemns oppressed people to seek recognition from their oppressors. Honneth’s theory of recognition is then reconstructed in order to demonstrate that the theory is not actually subject to most of the problems that are identified by Markell and Oliver and to argue that Honneth’s account can address these challenges. A key part of this argument is a detailed consideration of the different meanings of the term “recognition” and the confusions that can arise when Honneth’s use of the term “recognition” is not understood as he intends it to be. I then consider the alternatives to recognition theory that are proposed by Markell (“acknowledgment”) and Oliver (“witnessing”) to see if they might enhance Honneth’s theoretical framework or identify some areas that are under explored by Honneth. I argue that both “acknowledgment” and “witnessing” can be understood as a partial analysis of relationships of recognition because “acknowledgement” focuses almost exclusively on the responsibilities of dominant people and groups and “witnessing” focuses on the role and experiences of people who are oppressed. I contend that both “acknowledgment” and “witnessing” are ultimately dependent on the broader multidimensional mechanisms of mutual recognition that Honneth’s theory describes.

After concluding that Honneth’s theory can be defended against Markell’s and Oliver’s challenges, I move on in Chapter Three to address Fraser’s contention that Honneth’s theory of recognition cannot adequately address the issue of redistribution. In order to do this, I give a more detailed account of Fraser’s theoretical framework and I rehearse and analyse the debate between Honneth and Fraser. My analysis returns to the question of the meaning of the term “recognition” and explores the different interpretations of “recognition” that are given by Fraser and Honneth. Fraser claims that Honneth’s theory of recognition cannot adequately identify all of the causes of market forces. I argue that
having the ability to fully explain all the numerous mechanisms that distribute and redistribute resources is different from having the ability to evaluate the effects of maldistribution. I contend that Honneth does not claim (and does not need to claim) that his theory can explain all of the workings of the free market. One does not need to provide such causal explanations in order to provide a useful diagnosis of the normative dimensions of the effects of particular patterns of distribution and redistribution. I illustrate my argument by scrutinizing Honneth’s own use of his theoretical framework to address various issues of injustice in the context of paid work that he argues have arisen as part of the evolution of modern societies. Honneth’s account of the importance of recognition can be used to provide a substantial critique of the effects of these circumstances of paid work. Having concluded that Honneth’s theory has the capacity to diagnose the effects of maldistribution, I move on to consider my own criticisms that I raised at the end of Part One in more depth.

In Chapter Four, I expound my own concerns about Honneth’s account of the connection between esteem, achievement and social solidarity in modern societies. The first section of this chapter focuses on Honneth’s description of the mechanisms that generate esteem in contemporary society. I contend that there are two distinct mechanisms of esteem. The first type of esteem relates to characteristics that are “innate” and the second type of esteem relates to attributes and traits that would count as achievements according to Honneth. I question the possibility of separating the esteem that relates to what are commonly understood as “innate” characteristics from the esteem that is connected to particular attributes, traits and achievements, but I argue that Honneth’s theory can show how these two different types of esteem can have the potential to be either mutually supportive or conflicting.
In the second section of Chapter Four, I raise some concerns (that are also articulated by Honneth) about the emphasis on and prominence of particular types of work-based achievements in contemporary societies. As Honneth argues, the focus on particular types of work-based achievements can mean that there is a lack of esteem given to other achievements such as those that happen through voluntary work or care work. This means that some achievements may not be adequately recognised in terms of their contribution to society. I begin my exploration of these issues of achievement and contribution by considering the approach that Jonathan Seglow has used to address similar concerns. I analyse Seglow’s account of the problematic relationship between achievements and contributions and identify some difficulties with the way that he has addressed this problem. Seglow categorises particular activities as competitive achievements and other activities as uncompetitive contributions. I disagree with Seglow’s categorisation and argue that there are moments of competition and contribution in all of the activities that he identifies. However, I concur with Seglow’s conclusion that it is hard to see how competitive achievements could be expected to foster an increase in social inclusion and social solidarity in the way that Honneth’s account suggests.

I argue that Honneth’s theoretical framework has the capacity to illuminate the relationship between achievements and contributions to society and to reveal the particular sort of skills that are currently considered to be socially useful. If we focus on Honneth’s account of the importance of struggles for recognition we might expect that the definition of socially useful skills will be determined not only though market forces but also through struggles for recognition that question the prevailing norms of esteem by condoning or rejecting the
current ideas of which activities are worthy of esteem and how achievements ought to be evaluated.

This question of how contribution to society is assessed is closely linked to Honneth’s conception of the mechanisms that support social solidarity. In the third section of Chapter Four, I explore Honneth’s account of social solidarity and his assertion that solidarity is dependant on the existence of shared intersubjective value-horizons. I return to the question of the assumptions that are commonly made (not necessarily by Honneth) about the value-horizons that relate to recognition through love, respect and esteem. For example, it is assumed that love relationships occur within the bounds of a family, group of friends or other localised small social group. Respect, on the other hand, is expected to apply equally to everyone regardless of local ties, although there are disagreements about how broad the boundaries of respect should be and whether they are national or international. Social esteem is presumed to occur within the bounds of a particular community (or on some accounts a particular nation) that has a specific shared value-horizon.

I argue that the boundaries of each form of recognition appear to be different from those that are usually assumed to apply and I consider the possibility that the processes of immigration in fact generate and support wider or in some cases more circumscribed boundaries. Although love relationships are assumed to occur in situations of relatively close proximity they can in fact stretch across national borders and result in a very wide shared value-horizon that is not confined within a local community or a particular nation. The relationships of work-based social esteem that Honneth describes also have the capacity to go far beyond a local workplace, business or industry perhaps generating a type
of international shared-value horizon for those who have the abilities and traits that are valued according to the current standards of meritocratic achievement. In contrast, the relationships of recognition that are based on mutual respect do not necessarily have a universal value-horizon that applies equally to everyone. In fact, many institutionalised forms of respect such as legal rights are primarily enacted within the boundaries of a nation state despite the existence of some frameworks of international conventions and agreements. This raises questions about the extent of the boundaries (or shared value-horizons) of social solidarity that Honneth describes. These questions are closely related to my own concern that Honneth’s own account of his theory may be problematically limited to the questions of recognition or lack of recognition that occur within the borders of a nation state.

I finish off this central part of the thesis by summarising the conclusions that I have drawn in response to the theoretical challenges that have been discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four. I conclude that mutual recognition is a possible and desirable goal. Although conflictual struggles are not the only way of generating mutual recognition, they may be the inevitable outcome of a lack of recognition (if the social and political circumstances allow such struggles to occur). Consequently, social struggles can be an invaluable indicator of lack of recognition or misrecognition. Honneth’s theory has the capacity to provide some valuable insights into the injustice that relates to inadequate distribution and redistribution of material resources and to raise questions about the mechanisms that evaluate achievements and contributions to society. I contend that if my conclusions are correct we might expect Honneth’s theoretical framework to be able to describe and elucidate the normative dimensions of the policies of social inclusion and exclusion that
control immigration and to highlight the moral relevance of the social struggles that occur in these circumstances.

In Part Three of this thesis (Chapter Five and Six), I test the conclusions that I have made by applying my own interpretation of Honneth’s theory as a descriptive, diagnostic and normative theoretical framework. In particular, I apply the theory to Australian immigration law and policy. The applicability of Honneth’s model suggests itself on several grounds. The circumstances of immigration relate very directly to the issues of social usefulness, social solidarity and shared value-horizons. There are substantial social struggles that are associated with immigration and we might expect that Honneth’s theory would be able to give an explanatory and normative account of them. The processes of social inclusion and exclusion are controlled (at least to some extent) in this context and the criteria for admitting or excluding particular individuals are clearly articulated which makes them easier to describe. Australia has three main types of immigration that prima facie map on interestingly to Honneth’s three types of recognition. In addition, Honneth’s theory has not been applied in this way and in this context before by Honneth himself or by any other theorist (to my knowledge).

Chapter Five applies Honneth’s theoretical framework to current (and some historical) Australian immigration laws, policies and procedures. The first section describes the three major categories of immigration, which are skilled migration, family migration and the humanitarian program. I argue that skilled migration can be understood as a form of recognition in terms of esteem for particular achievements, family migration as a way of fostering the recognition that occurs through love relationships and the humanitarian program as an attempt to restore recognition in terms of respect to some of those who lack
a form of respect. These arguments support my contention that there is a close relationship between the established social norms of recognition and the related mechanisms of social inclusion or exclusion that are enshrined in the immigration laws, policies and practice. I contend that the degree of priority that is given to each form of immigration reflects a hierarchical recognition order where some forms of recognition are deemed to be more important than others.

In the second section of Chapter Five, I explore the diagnostic and normative dimensions of Honneth’s theory by analysing the justice or injustice of the Australian immigration policies. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate whether interpreting immigration laws, policies and procedures in this way helps us to understand both their social function and their normative significance. I undertake this exploration by using the principle of justice that Honneth argues applies to each of the types of recognition. According to Honneth’s theory, skilled migration (esteem) would be evaluated in terms of merit, family migration (love) in terms of need and humanitarian immigration (respect) in terms of equality. In many cases the categories of immigration are not, in fact, evaluated in the way that Honneth suggests and I argue that this is problematic. I also contend that all of the types of recognition are in fact relevant to questions of justice and injustice in each of the categories of immigration and I highlight how some applicants for immigration are problematically denied adequate levels of recognition in many forms.

Although the selection criteria that control the skilled migration program no longer evaluate applicants on the basis of “innate” characteristics such as skin colour or ethnic origin (a change which would constitute social progress in Honneth’s terms), they are based on a “recognition order” that reflects current (and contestable) assumptions of what
constitutes socially useful skills. I point out that successful applicants in the skilled migration category are well placed to have adequate levels of all three types of recognition. Skilled migrants are afforded a form of universal respect because they are admitted regardless of “innate” characteristics. These applicants are also able to sustain relationships of mutual recognition with loved ones because it is relatively easy for them to sponsor family members to accompany them or to join them in Australia.

The selection criteria for family migration also appear to reflect a “recognition order” of current norms that relate to love relationships by giving priority to heterosexual partnerships (even though there is some recognition of same-sex relationships with lower priority for processing of applications). I contend that need is not the only criteria that is used to assess applications for parent visas because wealthier applicants are admitted more quickly. This means that the principle of merit (in terms of potential for contribution to society) is able to take precedence over the principle of need in these circumstances, which could be problematic according to Honneth’s framework for evaluating justice and injustice.

Although the selection criteria for the humanitarian program (primarily asylum seeker or refugee status) might be construed as an attempt to restore a type of universal respect to those who lack a particular form of respect, I argue that the Australian policies problematically restrict access to recognition in terms of respect, love and esteem for these applicants in a number of ways. Respect is not applied equally, the need for love is not adequately considered and the possibility of acquiring esteem for socially useful labour is curtailed. Respect in the humanitarian category is defined in accordance with international agreements that do not encompass all of the factors that may be necessary to support
adequate recognition in terms of respect. Even if applicants do qualify for admission under the restricted selection criteria, there are a number of policies that are designed to deter applicants and to avoid having to provide this type of recognition in terms of respect.

For example, there is mandatory detention of “unauthorised” asylum seekers. Parts of Australian territory have been “excised” from the migration zone to restrict the possibility of claiming asylum. Until recently, successful asylum seekers were required to pay a “detention debt” which covered the cost of their detention. There is also a policy of offshore processing of asylum claims in other countries or on a remote Australian island, which restricts access to legal support. There have been policies in the past that provided only temporary and revokable protection for refugees and it is possible that these policies may be reintroduced. I address each of these policies and analyse all of them in terms of Honneth’s principles of justice. Although liberal theories of justice and the ethics of care could raise similar objections to some of the policies, I argue that Honneth’s theory of recognition offers a broader diagnostic framework that reveals problems of injustice that may be overlooked by other theories.

Having put Honneth’s theory to use for the sake of understanding the phenomena of immigration, in Chapter Six I reconsider my conclusions with regards to the challenges to his theory to see if they remain valid. I begin by revisiting the challenges that have been made by Markell, Oliver and Fraser and reconsidering each of them in the context of the Australian immigration policies. I make an assessment of how each of these theorists might address the questions of justice and injustice in immigration policies that I have identified. I argue that my use of Honneth’s theoretical framework in these circumstances of immigration can be defended against the challenges that have been made by these other
theorists, but some aspects of Markell’s, Oliver’s and Fraser’s theories might serve to emphasise or call attention to issues of injustice in immigration that are under emphasised by Honneth.

Markell’s concern that mutual recognition is an impossible goal appears to be valid for many “unauthorised” asylum seekers who have inadequate respect, curtailed access to loved ones and limited opportunities for acquiring social esteem for their work-based achievements. But adequate levels of recognition appear to be much more probable for skilled migrants and many family migrants. There has been an expansion of the selection criteria for immigration so that immigrants are no longer admitted solely on the basis of “innate” criteria such as skin colour and some of the other policies (such as temporary protection visas) that resulted in inadequate recognition have been revoked. This suggests that progress towards better levels of mutual recognition is at least possible. However, Markell’s concern with regards to unrealisable sovereign agency is very pertinent to the interpretation of Australian sovereignty as a “right to exclude” (although Markell’s argument relates to the sovereign agency of individuals and not to state sovereignty). The struggles of asylum seekers do appear to challenge the sovereign agency of the state. Some of these struggles appear to result in a type of “acknowledgement” of the sort that Markell describes, although this occurs through the mechanisms of reciprocity that Honneth describes.

Oliver makes the objection that recognition perpetuates oppression, since oppressed peoples are compelled to seek recognition from their oppressors. Recognition does not necessarily appear to perpetuate oppression for asylum seekers if they are able to escape the circumstances of their original persecution and to enter a state where they can be
afforded an adequate level of respect. It could be argued that those who are placed into mandatory detention or subjected to detention debt and temporary protection are obliged to seek recognition of refugee status from their oppressors in these contexts (if these policies are interpreted as oppressive), although this would constitute an injustice in Honneth’s theoretical terms.

Some aspects of Oliver’s account of the importance of “witnessing” have the capacity to usefully highlight the multiple dimensions of mutual recognition that are at stake in the context of immigration (if her theory were to be interpreted in a particular way). The role of non-government agencies and advocacy groups in facilitating adequate levels of recognition highlights that relationships of recognition are multi-faceted and not necessarily achieved unilaterally or bilaterally. Despite Oliver’s concerns that recognition theorists over emphasise conflict, the struggles of asylum seekers do appear to highlight underlying perceptions of injustice and to raise normative questions in the way that Honneth suggests.

Fraser’s concerns about the importance of redistribution appear to be very relevant to the “economic” factors in legal and illegal immigration. However, I argue that a specifically “economic” analytical perspective is not required to allow us to comprehend the socio-economic injustices that can occur as a result of particular immigration policies. Immigration policies could be interpreted as an attempt to control market forces in accordance with the established norms of recognition, because the policies control the movement of skilled workers and of unskilled “illegal” immigrants. The struggles of “illegal” immigrants could be interpreted as a mode of challenging the norms of recognition and changing or circumventing the recognition order. Honneth’s account of
the role of struggles for recognition can explain the phenomena of “illegal” immigration without recourse to a specifically “economic” analytical perspective.

In the second section of Chapter Six, I review the problems that I raised with regards to Honneth’s account of the connection between esteem, achievements and social solidarity and reconsider them in the context of Australian immigration. Honneth’s theoretical framework is able to reveal and analyse the different mechanisms of esteem that are expressed in the immigration policies and to show how the esteem that relates to “innate” qualities such as ethnic origin has come to be replaced by the esteem that relates to work-based achievements over time. I argue that there are some problems with the way that the achievement principle is applied because the competitive environment is not based on a fair opportunity to compete for everyone. I consider the issue of the recognition or lack of recognition of the achievements of potential immigrants and argue that Honneth’s theory is able to highlight some of the forms of injustice that occur in the application of the norms of achievement and social contribution. In order to do this, I review the questions of justice and injustice in a wider context that involves not only potential immigrants but also the members of the receiving and home societies. This wider context raises broader questions about the competitive nature of the meritocratic assessment of achievements, which reflect Seglow’s concern about the difficulty of fostering social solidarity in a competitive environment. I argue that the work-based achievements of “illegal” “unskilled” immigrants are discounted and disconnected from social solidarity and contend that Honneth’s theory can explain the type of social problems that would arise in these circumstances.
In the final section of Chapter Six, I conclude this re-evaluation of the challenges to Honneth’s theory by reconsidering his account of the connection between struggles for recognition and social progress in relation to the many struggles that arise in the circumstances of immigration. While liberal cosmopolitans and communitarians can throw light on aspects of these circumstances, I claim that Honneth’s theory is better placed to account for the full range of normative issues that are at stake in immigration.