



MACQUARIE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT

**Operations and Crime Reviews in the New South
Wales Police Service: An Analysis of their
Effectiveness**

**Ed Davis
Macquarie Graduate School of Management**

**MGSM Case 2002-1
February 2002**

Disclaimer

MGSM Case Studies in Management are produced as a means of stimulating discussion amongst management scholars and students. The facts reported are meant for discussion only, and are not to be interpreted as imputing any value judgments on management decisions and actions.

Copyright© Ed Davis

Research Office

Macquarie Graduate School of Management
Macquarie University
Sydney NSW 2109
Australia

Tel 612 9850 9016

Fax 612 9850 9942

Email gsm-research@mq.edu.au

URL <http://www.gsm.mq.edu.au/research>

Director of Research Professor John A. Mathews
Manager, Research Office Ms Kelly Callaghan

ISSN 1445-3126 Printed copy
1445-3142 Online copy

MGSM Case 2002-1

Professor Ed Davis
Deputy Director (Performance)
MGSM
Macquarie University
Sydney NSW 2109
Australia
Tel: 02 9850 8999
Fax: 02 9850 6155
Email: ed.davis@mq.edu.au

Abstract

The New South Wales Police Service (NSWPS) is Australia's largest police service. With more than 17,000 staff, it is a significant organisation with an important purpose: to reduce crime and pursue increased public safety. Since the mid 1990s it has implemented a range of major changes designed to improve its performance. These have included changes in leadership and management, organisational structure, training and use of technology. The Operations and Crime Reviews (OCRs) commenced in January 1998. Involving principally the Commissioner, his Executive and Local Area Commanders (LACs) their aim has been to focus the organisation on "ethical, cost effective crime reduction", underline the accountability of the LACs and provide an opportunity for top and senior level managers to share information, discuss strategy, tactics and results and learn.

In 1999 Professor Ed Davis was awarded an external collaborative research grant to study the effectiveness of the OCRs. The grant was funded equally by Macquarie University and the NSWPS. The research has involved observation of 11 OCRs; interviews with the Commissioner, his Deputies, Director of Human Resources, Region Commanders and others; a survey of LACs and two case studies of local area commands involving interviews with staff from a number of levels (see Appendix 1).

This report is in six sections. The first explores the context in which the OCRs were introduced and the stated rationale. The second looks at the issue of crime measurement and analysis. The third presents a detailed description of the OCR process and comments on its evolution. The fourth examines the apparent strengths and weaknesses of the OCRs and the fifth weaves an analysis of the effectiveness of the OCRs as a management tool and their impact on crime levels. The sixth and final section highlights some issues for further discussion as the Service continues to consider modifications to the OCR process.

Acronyms

NSWPS	New South Wales Police Service
NYPD	New York Police Department
OCRs	Operations and Crime Reviews
LACs	Local Area Commanders
COPS	Computerised Operational Policing System
PAL	Police Assistance Line
ABS	Australian Bureau of Statistics
CIDS	Computerised Incident Dispatch System

Operations and Crime Reviews in the New South Wales Police Service: An Analysis of their Effectiveness

1. Context and Rationale

It is important to place the introduction of the OCRs in context. The backdrop was provided by the Royal Commission into the NSWPS 1994-97. This found much scope for concern regarding the quality of leadership and management in the Service. The OCRs are also associated with the appointment of a new Commissioner in 1996; they represent perhaps the major reform initiative at this time. Finally, the OCRs reflect salient characteristics of the Compstat meetings, introduced to great effect by the New York Police Department in 1994. Each of these is explored in more detail.

Royal Commission

A Royal Commission, headed by the Hon. Justice James Wood, was established in 1994 to investigate corruption and other issues in the NSWPS (Royal Commission, 1997, Vol.1, p.1). In its two interim reports in 1996 and its final report in 1997 it furnished evidence of corruption. It concluded, “that a state of systemic and entrenched corruption existed within the Service” (ibid, p.84).

The Royal Commission catalogued responsible factors. Foremost among these were inadequate leadership, lack of corporate direction and lack of openness. These were reflected in a command-and-control approach to management, suspicion of new ideas, reluctance to delegate, failure to train and properly prepare supervisors, and resistance to change (Royal Commission, 1997, Vol.2, pp.207-211).

The Royal Commission noted that there was a picture of an extraordinary amount of effort to effect reform. There was a “formidable” volume of reports, surveys, plans, working parties and steering committees engaged in deliberations on reform (Royal Commission, 1996 February, p.122). There was however no clear sense of direction. The Service had failed to demonstrate that it was committed to its nominal goals. It had done too little to close the gap between its corporate goals and its operational practice (ibid, p.116).

One of the strongest and clearest messages from the Royal Commission was the need to enhance the skill of front line supervisors, the patrol commanders, and make them accountable for the performance of their staff. It stated that the Service should:

involve line commanders in the development of local crime management and anti-corruption plans so that they can assume ownership and responsibility for implementation (ibid, p.125).

The Royal Commission welcomed the major organisational restructure announced in November 1996 which disestablished the 4 regions, 25 districts and 165 patrols and replaced them with 11 regions and 82 (later 80) local area commands (Royal

Commission, Vol.2, p.237). It commended the move to a flatter structure and the increased accountability of the local area commands.

The Royal Commission also commented on the relationship of policing and crime. It considered that it is, “incontrovertible that most causes of crime are social and economic factors over which police have no control,” and warned of the vulnerability of reliance on crime statistics and clearance rates in the management of police (ibid.p.247).

Appointment of New Commissioner

Peter Ryan, a former Chief Constable and National Director of Police Training in the UK, was appointed in 1996 (Royal Commission, 1997, Vol.1, pp.8-9 and NSWPS *Annual Report*, 1995-96, p.7). He endorsed the conclusions of the Royal Commission and set the sails for, “the most ambitious reform program” in the Service’s history (NSWPS, *Annual Report*, 1996-97, p.4). Commenting on the restructure of the organisation, he said:

Local Area Commanders are the pivotal positions in the restructure. They will be the front line managers directly responsible for delivering top level service to their communities (*ibid*, p.10).

The corporate plan for 1997-2000 set four priorities: crime reduction (“our job is to prevent crime and identify and target repeat offenders”), effective and efficient work practices, motivated people and improved customer service. The overall strategy was described as community policing, with the LAC as the centre of service delivery (*ibid*, pp.26-27).

The *Annual Report* for 1997-98 discusses the introduction of the OCRs in January 1998. They were, “to focus on operational priorities and share intelligence to reduce crime” (p.2). Their discussions would be set in the context of the Commissioner’s identification of five key crime indicators, assault, robbery, break and enter, stealing and motor vehicle theft, and his goal to check and reduce crime trends to 1996 levels. [1] In his *Review* in the *Annual Report*, the Commissioner elaborated:

In January, I established the Operations and Crime Review panels that are intelligence driven forums to focus local area commanders on the business of reducing crime. These panels have encouraged the use of crime data and crime mapping to identify repeat offenders, repeat victims and repeat locations of crime. With this information, we are more effectively and efficiently targeting our valuable policing resources” (*ibid*, p.9).

Characteristics of the OCR process were described as: the link between the Executive and the field to ensure focus; discussion of best practice techniques to reduce crime; the accountability of LACs and measurement of performance in their commands (*ibid*. p.14).

The rationale for the introduction of the OCRs is also spelt out in a NSWPS video distributed in 1999 (NSWPS, *OCRs*, video). The video involves interviews with the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner Jeff Jarratt and Local Area Commanders. It

involves footage of an OCR. The video indicates that the focus is on “ethical, cost effective crime reduction” and this involves:

- reviewing the performance of each LAC,
- discussion of operational priorities and problem-solving,
- expanding on strategies and initiatives and removing organisational barriers,
- building leadership and encouraging teamwork, and
- combining COPS (computerised operational policing system) and mapping information with the latest technology.

The process facilitates comparison of a LACs performance over time, in comparison to other LACs and against set targets. There is the opportunity to explore strategy: what is working and what is not. Deputy Commissioner Jarratt comments on the video that the OCRs, “give life to the number one goal of the Commissioner: driving down crime. This is conveyed unerringly to the Local Area Commanders and their equivalents.” The Commissioner’s conclusion at the end of the video is that they have led to better management, better motivation, a clear focus and improved measurement of performance.

The appointment of a new Commissioner, major organisational restructure and the introduction of OCRs were not the only changes at this time designed to improve performance. Also of note were changes in the authority and powers of the Commissioner (for instance to dismiss officers in whom the Commissioner had lost confidence); changes in the appointment process to senior and command positions and changes in technology. An important example of technological change was the broadly advertised implementation of a Police Assistance Line (PAL) to facilitate the reporting of minor incidents. This quickly came to reflect a significant proportion of reported crime.

The NYPD Model

By the early 1990s New York had cemented a reputation as a dangerous and unsafe city with high crime rates. This picture changed dramatically in the mid and late 1990s with crime levels more than halved between 1993 and 1998.

Table 1
New York: Fall in Crime Categories, 1993-98, %

Murder	67%
Motor vehicle theft	61%
Robbery	55%
Burglary	53%

Source: Mayor's Management Report, New York, preliminary fiscal 1999, p.4.

Bill Bratton had taken up his appointment as New York Police Chief in 1994 and he embarked on an array of reforms designed to reduce crime. One of the most celebrated was the establishment of regular meetings involving the Police Commissioner, his top team, crime agency chiefs and New York's Precinct and Borough Commanders. These Meetings relied on computer generated statistics on crime trends area-by-area. They became known as Compstat and are held two

mornings a week (7.30-9.30am) at NYPD's headquarters. (Bratton, 1995, pp.233-9; Silverman, 1999, pp.97-124).

Outstanding features of the Compstat process include attention to high quality, up-to-date data on crime trends. The data reflect what is happening, where, the identity of victims and suspects. The Commissioner's focus is on the response of his Commanders, the effectiveness of their strategies and their actions to prevent crime. The meetings also have a specific problem-solving dimension. Obstacles to the deployment of resources are identified and, where possible, resolved within the meeting.

The strengths of the process have been elaborated on by Bratton and others. They include accessibility and demonstration of leadership at the most senior level; clear communication and organisational focus; use and analysis of up-to-date information; the accountability of commanders and enhanced problem-solving (Bratton,1999,pp.97-124; Kelling and Coles, 1997, pp.146-148; and Silverman 1998, pp.233-239). These characteristics are contrasted with the precompstat situation: a leadership vacuum, lack of organisational focus, poor and dated information, variable Precinct Commander performance and lack of Department Support (Silverman, 1999, p.98).

The NSWPS, in common with many other services around the world, took a keen interest in the NYPD model. A team visited the NYPD in early 1998, after the OCRs had begun. Their report endorsed the focus on crime reduction: "The measurement of performance is related to crime reduction. Simply stated – no crime control no success" (Evans, Ireland and Crumlin, 1998, p.3). It continued, success for Precinct Commanders depends on:

- Having the crime numbers go the right way.
- Having a detailed understanding of individual crimes committed and the relevant police operations with particular emphasis on the timeliness and persistence of police action.
- Ability to articulate a future specific plan of action to reduce crime (*ibid.*).

Their report recommended, among other things, that the OCRs should focus on organisational learning rather than punishment or humiliation and that they should seek to encourage problem-solving at both organisational and local levels (p.4). The report also highlighted the effectiveness of the NYPD's targeting of repeat offenders, on the basis that a relatively small proportion of offenders commit a large proportion of reported crime (p.6).

In sum, the OCRs were introduced into the NSWPS as a tool to improve performance. Major deficiencies in leadership and management had been identified by the Wood Royal Commission. The aim of the OCRs was to involve the Commissioner, his Executive and LACs in a regular review and analysis of performance, particularly in relation to crime, and to develop and monitor strategies to improve performance. This approach was shaped by the newly appointed Commissioner, Peter Ryan, who saw the OCRs as playing a vital role in his reform program. The NYPD's implementation of

Compstat was explored and encouraged hopes that the NSWPS might also achieve success in checking and reducing crime levels.

2. Crime and Assessment

There has been longstanding debate on the factors that determine crime levels (Kelling and Coles, 1998, p.155). Many criminologists have argued that crime and crime trends are principally shaped by economic, social, demographic, technological and other general factors (Grabosky, 1988, p.1). Policing and changes in police management are often deemed to make relatively little difference. Bill Bratton challenged this thinking in his account of tackling crime in New York:

Like most American police departments, for the last twenty-five years the NYPD had been content to focus on reacting to crime while accepting no responsibility for reducing, let alone preventing, it. Crime, the theory went, was caused by societal problems that were impervious to police intervention. That was the unchallenged conventional wisdom espoused by academics, sociologists and criminologist. I intended to prove them wrong. Crime, and as important, attitudes about crime, could be turned around. Using law enforcement expertise, leadership and management skills and an inspired workforce, I intended to create an organisation whose goal and mission was to control and prevent crime – not just respond to it... I believed that police could, in fact, be counted upon to have a significant effect on crime. With effective leadership and management we could control behaviour in the street, and by controlling behaviour we could change behaviour. If we could change behaviour we could control crime. When I interviewed with Giuliani for the police commissioner's position, I told him we could reduce crime by 40 percent in three years (Bratton, 1998, p. xi).

The astonishing fall in crime levels in New York appeared to affirm Bratton's view. Further fuel to the debate was added as doubters came up with a range of alternative explanations: crime rates were already falling before the changes introduced by Bratton were implemented; crime rates fell as much in other major cities that did not adopt the NYPD model; there was strong economic growth in the mid 1990s providing employment and diverting potential criminals from crime; drug markets stabilised and the 'crack' cocaine epidemic eased (Brereton, 1999 and Greene, 1999).

Two authors have identified a further possible factor: the legalisation of abortion from the mid 1960s (Donohue and Levitt, 1999). They correlate the introduction of abortion in different states at different times with falls in crime rates some twenty years later. Their argument is that the impact of abortion reduced the size of cohort of young people and in particular those groups more likely to engage in criminal activity.

The counter case to those doubting the influence of changes in police management and tactics is forcefully put by Eli Silverman. New York did not experience a reduction in the 15-19 year old population in the mid 1990s; while the numbers of employed rose in this period, so did the proportion of unemployed (from 3.2% in 1995 to 9.4% in 1997); and there was little evidence of major changes in drug habits (Silverman, 1999, pp.8-13). He concluded,

The plummeting of New York's crime rates since 1993 provides a dramatic demonstration that more is at work than can be explained by comparatively glacial changes in the social fabric (*ibid.* p.13).

His assertions are supported in New York Mayor Guiliani's *Management Report*. It refers to an FBI index of crime per 100,000 population. In 1993 New York ranked 87th out of 181 cities with 100,000 or more population . In 1997, New York, ranked 163rd indicating the strength of its improved relative performance (*Mayor's Management Report*), preliminary fiscal 1999, p.4).

Australian criminologist David Brereton has explored the NYPD model, its impact on crime levels and its relevance for Australian police services. He describes the model as comprising the dissemination of clear crime reduction objectives; the use of much improved and up-to-date information on criminal activity; the accountability of precinct commanders; Compstat; strict enforcement in the case of minor offences (zero tolerance) and the allocation of detectives to local commands rather than central agencies (Brereton, 1999, p.2). He argues that while the NYPD model played a role in the reduction of crime levels in New York so too did a number of more general factors (see above). He is also critical of the model for its perceived failure to exploit opportunities to work with the community and engage government and non-government organisations in checking and preventing crime. He saw damage to community relations as citizens were dismayed and at times offended by police street sweeps and searches. Examples of police brutality and shootings are presented as the unacceptable edge of the model (*Time*, 6 March 2000).

Brereton's conclusion is that Australian police services might do well to adopt some features of the model, such as increased use of information, focus on proactive policing and commander accountability but step cautiously in regard to the elevation of crime reduction as the organisation's over-riding purpose and the application of zero tolerance.

The debate on the impact of the NYPD model has demonstrated that there are indeed a whole range of factors that influence movements in crime levels and that it is hazardous to single out the impact of any one factor and unequivocally assert causality. Nonetheless, Bratton and his supporters have mounted a plausible case that the major changes in leadership, management and strategy associated with Bratton's appointment played a significant role in the sustained reduction in crime reported in New York,

Reporting, Non-Reporting and Their Implications

A further complication in crime analysis is presented in the fact that significant proportions of crimes are not reported to the police. This emerges from crime surveys conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Crime rates recorded by the ABS survey are then contrasted to crime rates reported to police. An ABS survey in 1994 found that 21.5% of break-and-enters, 48% of robberies and 78% of assaults were *not* reported to the Police (Carcach, 1997, p.2). A variety of factors were at play, such as the seriousness of the experience. One factor identified was attitudes towards the police.

The under-reporting of assaults, for instance, is well-known and police have been instructed in NSW to take countervailing action. Officers attending calls in relation to domestic violence will now more regularly record the incident as an assault and the service has worked with various agencies, including women's groups and refuges, to encourage victims to report to police. The business of interpreting trends in assaults is therefore complicated. Are increases in reported assaults the result of (a) increased actual assaults, (b) increased police willingness to record assaults or (c) increased victim willingness to report assaults.

3. OCRs: Process and Evolution

The OCRs were introduced in January 1998. The framework for the OCRs has remained largely consistent but there have been some significant changes in their style. The OCRs are held in a large room at the Police Centre in Sydney. Tables are placed in a U shape, with the Commissioner and his Executive seated at the left hand side. In the early rounds of the OCRs the two other struts of the U were occupied by up to ten LACs. Behind them and elsewhere in the room might sit other police from the local area commands, such as duty officers and intelligence officers and personnel from other LACs keen to see what happens and gather clues for their turn on another occasion. At the very back of the room, behind a glass panel, sit members of the Corporate Information Unit (previously called the Reform Coordination Unit) who project crime trends and other information on three large screens at the front of the room.

The OCRs held in 2001 have involved a smaller number of LACs, usually five or six, their crime managers, duty officers, local area managers and selected others. Seated at the right hand strut of the U have been representatives from Education Services, Traffic, Forensic Services, Crime Agencies and the Information and Intelligence Centre.

The meetings have generally begun at 8am and finished around 1pm. The Commissioner, or Deputy in his absence, opens the meeting with comments on the latest trends in crime across the state and reflections on other developments of note, such as the development of strategy to add DNA testing to assist in crime detection.

In the early rounds, the Commissioner would then attend to the LACs in turn. Crime data and trends for assaults, robbery, break and enter, steal and motor vehicle theft for each respective local area command would be displayed on the screens.

The Commissioner would comment on the trends and then ask the LAC for their view and analysis. The Deputy Commissioners follow on, drilling further down and exploring what strategies are being deployed, evidence of their effectiveness and further response from the LAC.

Some of the early rounds pursued particular themes, so that each LAC could expect scrutiny of, for instance, the number of outstanding arrest warrants in their command (there are approximately 60,000 outstanding warrants across NSW in 2001); trends in break and enter and evidence of use of the *Crimes Legislation Amendment (Police and Public Safety) Act 1998* equipping police with the power to stop, question, search and request that individuals move on (*Annual Report, 1998-99, p.2*). Other themes

have included use of fingerprinting services and evidence regarding the work of detectives.

Up to the middle of 2000 much use was made of data which showed current monthly averages for the five key crime areas against their situation in 1996. For instance, see Table 2.

Table 2

1996 Target Figures and Current Monthly Average for May 2000: The Hills


	1996	2000	Variation
Assault	20	25	+5
Break and Enter	74	85	+11
Robbery	3	6	+3
Stealing	83	160	+77
Stolen Vehicle	34	34	-

OCR 14 June 2000, Reform Coordination Unit Folder.


Charts are also displayed indicating the movement of monthly trends and four month average trends against the 1996 target figures. Further detail is supplied for display in the form of a breakdown for, say, stealing. A table will indicate the proportions of stealing from motor vehicles, retail stores, persons, dwellings and other. Maps will display the exact location of criminal offences, and indicate whether the offence occurred on a weekday or weekend, and whether it began during the day or night. See map below depicting all recorded crimes for Bankstown.

All Crimes: Bankstown

Hot Spot - All Crime



Bankstown All Crime Hot-Spot



Source: OCR, Reform Coordination Unit folder, 11 April 2001.

The Directors of Human Resources (HR) and Management Services have also asked questions in relation to their respective areas. The HR Director has sought feedback on issues such as use of the performance management system, trends in sick leave and the state of morale in the command. The Management Services Director has looked at expenditure per head on allowances, shifts, penalties and overtime and other categories such as motor vehicle, travel and mobile phone expenses. Each command is ranked against all other commands resulting in a table indicating highest to lowest expense for each category.

Each LAC can expect between 15 and 45 minutes devoted to the trends and issues in their command. The Commissioner and his Deputies seek to discover whether the LAC has analysed the trends; the nature and quality of their strategic response and indications of their effectiveness. LACs will be pressed on their attention to the top ten suspect offenders in their command and high risk offenders generally. In this fashion, the Service is acting on the belief that a high proportion of crime is committed by a small proportion of very active criminals.

The Commissioner has regularly asked questions which explore the management style of the LAC. For instance:

If I was a young cop in your command, would I feel that my opinion on crime and community needs was being sought? ... As a young cop, is my view, my opinion valued? (OCR, 5 April 000, author's minutes, p.3).

Deputy Commissioner Jarratt has regularly asked LACs to outline their strategies to reduce crime: the process, the deployment of staff, the use of fingerprinting and the involvement of highway patrols. He posed the following to a Crime Manager:

What is your plan? Describe the process. I am on your task team. What happens? (OCR, 31 May 2000, author's minutes, p.3).

For the most part, LACs will be commended on their work. There have also been a relatively small number of occasions when an LAC will be told by the Commissioner or a Deputy that they will need to improve their results.

An innovation in the third round of OCRs was the request to LACs that they bring with them an outstanding performer from their command for commendation to the Commissioner. At the end of the LACs report, they will recount the good work done by the officer, who is then congratulated by the Commissioner.

After all the LACs have had their turn, the Commissioner pulls together the themes pursued and the main points. He has also often finished the session by reminding the LACs of the importance of how they lead, mentor and motivate their people. They have received a direct and strong message to move away from 'command-and-control' and empower their officers.

Evolution

The OCRs have gone through a number of phases. The Service has experimented by bringing together different groupings of LACs for review, pursuing different themes

and requesting the attendance of different positions. Where the first rounds focused on the Commander, the most recent round involves teams from each LAC, made up of the LAC, Duty Officers, Crime Managers, Intelligence Officers, Local Area Managers and selected others. The teams generally comprise between four and six people.

There has also been a change in style. Where early rounds featured interrogation in turn of the LACs more recent OCRs have seen a shift to broadening discussion to involve all LACs and their team members. Deputy Commissioner Ken Maroney chaired the OCR on 23 May 2001. He opened the meeting with the observation that:

The OCRs now have a different form. They are just as inquisitorial but the focus is on discussion and problem-solving and will involve everyone in the room There are no trick questions and no right answers! (Author's minutes, p.1 and p.3).

Making some comments on state wide issues, Ken Maroney invited the first of five LACs to explore crime trends on his patch. The Crime Manager was then invited to comment on the factors which had aided their recent success in crime reduction. In further discussion involving the Deputy Commissioner Field Operations, Jeff Jarratt, the role and use of crime analysts was explored. Comment was also sought from the representatives from Crime Agencies, from the Information and Intelligence Centre and from the other four LACs. The approach and interchange provided evidence of the aim to increase use of the OCRs as opportunities for information-sharing and discussion.

The increased focus on problem-solving was also apparent in the request to each LAC to prepare a problem-solving case study for attention at the OCR. Guidelines indicated that the case study should outline and provide evidence of the problem, the approach and measures adopted by the LAC, assessment of their impact and a final evaluation. At the OCR each LAC would be asked to give a brief presentation on their study and discussion would follow of the lessons to be learned. [2]

Therefore, while the OCRs continue to focus on LACs' understanding of key issues, their development of strategy and results achieved the balance between inquisition and problem-solving has shifted in favour of problem-solving.

4. OCRs: Strengths and Weaknesses

The perceived strengths and weaknesses of the OCRs have been approached from several angles. First, observation of eleven OCRs has furnished a range of impressions. Second, key participants have been interviewed and their view explored. Third, a survey of the 80 LACs was conducted which sought their opinions. Finally, the views of selected officers in two stations were sought.

OCRs Observed

The following strengths and weaknesses were apparent to the observers. These are displayed in the Table 3.

Table 3
OCRs: Strengths and Weaknesses (Observers' Views)

<u>Strengths</u>	<u>Weaknesses</u>
Leadership Communication Accountability Learning Problem-Solving Team Building	LAC discomfort Poor interaction Meetings too long Meetings too infrequent

Leadership is on display and active at OCRs. If, in past police eras, top leadership was often remote, this is reversed in this forum. Prominent roles are played by the Commissioner and his Deputies. Major roles are also played by the LACs and their Region Commanders.

Following on from this, OCRs are an exercise in **communication**. Top leadership take the opportunity to dwell on the focus, “ethical cost-effective crime reduction”, of the organisation and their expectations of the LACs. The component parts of the message are disentangled: the LACs know that the Service is committed to checking crime. They can anticipate discussion on major crime categories, pursuit of outstanding warrants, drug detection and internal management processes such as those involved in the monitoring of high-risk offenders.

A significant strength, then, of the OCR process is that the LACs receive a very clear message about the organisation’s goals, directly from the Commissioner and his Deputies. Further, the communication process is two-way, with the leadership seeking information and feedback from the LACs. This may be in the form of exploring an LACs analysis of crime trends or experience in using techniques such as crime mapping. It may involve responses to questions such as:

‘How useful is the police intranet?’ ‘What information would you like displayed on it?’

‘How are the Crime Management Units working?’

‘How useful do you find the OCRs?’

‘What are the major barriers to performance in your command? How can we help?’

The third strength is **accountability**; the LACs are held accountable for the performance of their staff. It is not simply a matter of high crime levels being equated with poor performance because it is accepted that crime levels differ markedly across the LACs. The major benchmark is performance within an LAC over time and against 1996 levels. The process is facilitated by the high quality of data which displays trends in the five Key Crime Areas, clear-up rates, drug detection, use of fingerprinting, use of the ‘move-on’ powers and other HR and financial data. There is

therefore constant pressure on LACs to demonstrate improvements in performance. In the event that trends are unfavourable, LACs know that they will be expected to have an explanation which can withstand scrutiny.

The fourth strength is **learning**. All parties to the OCR have the opportunity to learn about the nature of the challenges facing the organisation, the strategies that appear to be delivering good results and the obstacles that thwart progress. For the Executive it is an opportunity to hear directly from the LACs and their teams; for LACs it is an opportunity to hear from the Executive and other commands and the occasion is also important for the various agencies in attendance.

Some examples of interchanges involved the Executive pushing LACs to explain disappointing trends: “what use have you made of crime mapping? What steps have you taken to task your officers? What work have your detectives been doing?...” These appear examples of ‘tough’ learning. The more general learning is seen in the broad discussion of issues and accounts of problem-solving that have characterised the late-rounds of the OCRs.

The next strength is **problem-solving**. Through out the OCRs the Executive have encouraged the LACs to identify barriers to performance. Where commands have identified, say, failure to fill vacant positions, significant numbers on sick leave or failure to access fingerprinting resources, the Executive and relevant agencies have sought to suggest ways of speedily sorting out the problem.

The final strength is **team building**. This operates in two ways. The OCR itself pulls together the Executive, Region Commanders, LACs and their teams and Agency representatives. There is a sense in which the OCR brings all of these sections together to focus on the Service’s goals. It has the potential to act as a unifying force, promoting and demonstrating teamwork. Some OCRs have reflected a rich vein of humour which has helped in this regard. Other OCRs, where humour has been less evident, may not have contributed as much to this outcome.

More recent OCRs have required the attendance of LACs and up to six of their staff; crime managers, duty officers, intelligence officers, local area managers and selected others. For these groups, the OCRs will have often been a team building experience as together they engaged in preparation for the OCR, travelled to and from the OCR and experienced the OCR.

Weaknesses

Several weaknesses of the process were apparent. More especially in the early rounds, some LACs seem tense and uncomfortable. They did not relish scrutiny of their performance in front of their peers and others in the room. The process tended to be perceived as inquisitorial with the Executive seen as probing the LACs. A question-and-answer format prevailed rather than discussion. This, in effect, limited the opportunities for learning and problem-solving. Another concern has been that at five hours, the process may be too long. It is hard for all parties to sustain concentration and to mine the opportunity available. From another angle, many LACs will attend an OCR on an annual basis. More frequent attendance may assist in sustaining the focus and exploiting the benefits of learning and problem solving.

Less attention has been paid here to the weaknesses than the strengths. The strengths were seen to be considerable. The weaknesses of lesser consequence and, for the most part, attended to over the successive phases of the OCRs. The most recent phases, for instance, have seen action to limit the potential for undue LAC anxiety. The timetable for OCRs is published months in advance; LACs receive detailed folders some weeks before their OCR containing crime trend data, crime maps, other information and a summary of the discussion from the last OCR. The style of the OCR has shifted, as discussed above, to reflect discussion and attention to problem-solving rather than inquisition.

Executive and Region Commander Views

Discussion in the interviews corroborated the picture drawn from observation. The OCRs bring top leadership out of head quarters. It has the opportunity to focus attention on the service's core business and on 'best practice' strategies. The OCRs provide opportunities for learning and, in the view of a Deputy Commissioner, act as a crash course in gathering and using data. There had been a major improvement in the analytic skills of the LACs, reflected in the level of discussion at the OCRs.

What we have seen over this two-year period is a complete change in the language of policing. (The Commanders) are speaking in a way which reflects knowledge of good practice, of how to deploy people, combat crime, relate to the community and how to deal with complex and difficult issues (interview with Commissioner Peter Ryan, 9 June 2000, transcript, p.3).

A point made in several interviews was that there had been a lack of central focus, lack of commander accountability and poor and dated information before the OCRs commenced in 1998. The OCRs were a powerful tool transforming practice in the Service. And they were seen to make a major contribution to checking and reducing crime levels.

The interviews also explored weaknesses of the OCRs. Several recognised the anxiety of the LACs in the early phases and linked this to the major organisational restructure in 1997. Many of the LACs were new to the role. Both more and less experienced Commanders were unused to a process where their performance was tested in front of their peers. The LACs were aware that the OCRs had drawn on the NYPD's Compstat meetings. The message on the grapevine was that failure to perform well at the OCR might lead, New York style, to loss of command. No commander has been removed as a result of poor performance at an OCR.

Other concerns included a tendency for the OCR process to become too routine. The LACs develop knowledge of 'right' answers to predictable questions. Some saw the OCRs as having too broad a focus, with questions spanning crime, corruption, financial and HR issues. Others saw the OCRs as too narrow. Too little time is spent on the two thirds of police time that is committed to non-crime and community issues. There is a perceived management failure to provide the LACs with the appropriate training to equip them for their role. Finally, there was a concern that the LACs and members of their staff devoted excessive time in preparation for the OCRs. They became distracted from their core business.

Survey of LACs

A survey was distributed to the 80 LACs in mid 2000 and 40 were returned. The survey form is reproduced in Appendix 2. There was only one female respondent. The average age of the respondents was 49, with the youngest being 37 and the oldest, 57. Most had held their position since the establishment of the local area commander role in 1997. The surveys asked LACs to indicate their agreement or disagreement with a number of statements and then to list the top four perceived strengths and weaknesses of the OCRs. Their responses are set out in Table 4.

Table 4
Local Area Commanders' Views on the OCRs: % (n=40)*

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
The OCR is an effective management tool.	-	7	5	55	33
The OCR has contributed to improved police performance in my command.	-	3	10	74	13
The OCRs have helped to reduce crime.	2	15	20	43	20
OCRs improve communication between the Commissioner and the LAC.	-	26	29	29	16
OCRs improve communication between LACs.	2	30	26	40	2
OCRs are a good way to learn from other police officers.	-	15	23	45	17
OCRs have made me accountable for crime trends in my area.	-	13	5	45	37
OCRs have increased the authority of LACs.	27	38	25	8	2
OCRs have helped my officers focus more on crime reduction.	-	13	20	50	17

- percentages are rounded.

The most obvious impression from the Table is that significant majorities see the OCRs as an effective management tool which helps to improve police performance and reduce crime. They provide opportunities to learn from other officers, hold LACs accountable for crime trends and, in turn, focus the attention

of police officers in the command on crime reduction. To only one question did a majority indicate disagreement: that the OCRs had increased the authority of the LACs.

The LACs were also asked to identify the top four strengths and weaknesses of the OCRs. Table 5 indicates those strengths and weaknesses mentioned by more than ten LACs.

Table 5
Strengths and Weaknesses of the OCRs: Opinions of Local Area Commanders

<u>Strengths</u>	<u>Weaknesses</u>
Learning	Process confrontational
Awareness of Service priorities	Requires excessive preparation
Focus	Focus too narrow and too quantitative
Communication	
Accountability	

The impression is further reinforced that the LACs saw the OCRs as having significant strengths but they were also uncomfortable with the process; a number describing it as humiliating. Several mentioned that the most recent phase was much less confrontational; that there was more room for them to raise and discuss issues rather than merely respond to Executive questions. Perceptions that the OCRs have focused on negative aspects of LACs' performance and have involved an interview process have contributed to the opinion that they have done little to increase the authority of the LACs and have not maximised the opportunity to improve communication between the Commissioner and LACs. The shift of emphasis at the OCRs towards more joint problem-solving is doubtless welcomed by these officers.

Case Studies

Time was spent in two local area commands. Interviews were conducted with the two LACs, duty officers, crime managers, intelligence officers and constables. The aim was to take a slice of the organisation and explore knowledge of, and attitudes towards, the OCRs.

The LACs differed in their leanings towards the OCRs. One stressed the beneficial effects of focus, learning and accountability and the fillip to motivation. The other saw the OCRs as too narrowly focused on the data supplied with too little Executive understanding of the impact of lack of resources and other problems at command level. He commented that the OCRs sought evidence of medium and long term strategies but dwelt on short term results.

Attitudes to the OCRs ranged among the other staff with some pointing to the pressure and preparation involved and others noting their usefulness as an audit of the command's operation and framework for tasking. One Intelligence Officer remarked that there were "no surprises" and not much additional preparation required. Neither of the Constables interviewed knew much about the OCRs. The material from the case studies tended to corroborate the impressions drawn from other sources. It did highlight that more could be done to explain the process and its relevance to staff at all levels.

This section has explored the role and impact of the OCRs from several different angles. The next section poses two questions: how effective are OCRs as a management tool and to what extent have they made an impact on crime levels?

5. Analysis

The Wood Royal Commission painted a picture of an organisation that was adrift. The Service lacked leadership and a sense of direction. Its front line commanders lacked accountability and were out of touch with their staff (Royal Commission, 1997, Vol.2, pp.207-211). Corruption was systemic and endemic. The Commission urged that significant steps be taken to address this situation and warned that it would not be amenable to a quick fix (Royal Commission, 1997, Vol.1, p.11).

The OCRs were established as one of a number of tools to lift performance. Their significance lies in their engagement of top and senior management. The Commissioner and his Executive are involved in regular, lengthy and structured discussions on the range of issues confronting the organisation. There is a particular focus on the core business of 'ethical, cost-effective crime reduction'. The discussions are underpinned by attention to high quality and timely information. The performance of LACs and indeed of the Service as a whole is under review.

Three further features enhance the value of the OCRs as a management tool. First, they provide a forum for learning at all levels. Both in preparation for the OCRs and in the event itself, there are opportunities to broaden understanding of the issues facing the Service. Second, they facilitate problem-solving. This may occur at the OCR as a response to a situation discussed or through the determination of meetings and arrangements to follow. Third, the process itself will often tend to strengthen ties, both within and across local area commanders and between the Executive and other parties to the OCR. Such outcomes are more likely with the shift in OCR approach towards joint discussion and problem-solving.

There is evidence that the early phases of the OCRs were experienced as confronting and even humiliating by some LACs. This is not surprising in the context of unfamiliarity with a searching process of this sort and lack of training of the LACs for this aspect of their role. It might be noted that observation of eleven OCRs revealed very few examples of interchanges that appeared humiliating. An LAC, responding to comment and questions from the Executive, of course may have received this differently. Nonetheless, significant majorities of this group believed the OCRs to be an effective management tool, contributing to improved performance.

On the basis of observation, interviews and surveys, the OCRs appeared to present a very powerful tool to improve management within the Service. Key

features are the significant role played by the Service's Commissioner and Executive, the strength and consistency of focus, the clarity of communication, the accountability of the LACs and associated monitoring of performance, attention to problem-solving and opportunities for learning.

OCRs: Impact on Crime Levels

What has been happening to crime trends in NSW? How reliable are the data? What factors appear to have influenced the trends? To what extent have the OCRs exercised an influence?

The NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research released data on crime trends for 1996-2000 in April 2001. Table 6 reproduces information on the major crime categories identified by the Commissioner.

Table 6

NSW Recorded Crime Statistics 1996-2000: Incidents and percent change on previous year

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Assault	48869	54303 +11%	58672 +8.1%	58497 -0.3%	61338 +4.9%
Robbery without weapon	4952	6487 +31.0%	6503 +0.3%	6455 -0.7%	6972 +8.0%
Robbery with firearm	824	1139 +38.2%	919 -19.3%	697 -24%	655 -6%
Robbery with weapon not firearm	1894	3381 +78.5%	4382 +29.6%	3527 -19.5%	3660 +3.8%
Break and enter dwelling	74546	79838 +7.1%	85768 +7.4%	77612 -9.5%	80843 +4.2%
Break and enter non dwellings	43551	45467 +4.4%	48772 +7.3%	45855 -6.0%	49569 +8.1%
Motor vehicle theft	49206	55556 +12.9%	53866 -3.0%	48328 -10.3%	52279 +8.2%
Steal from motor vehicle	63771	71079 +11.5%	75497 +6.2%	77784 +3.0%	89576 +15.2%
Steal from retail store	22619	21492 -5.0%	21112 -1.8%	21049 -0.3%	21066 +0.1%
Steal from dwelling	28420	28586 +0.5%	30984 +8.4%	30323 -2.0%	31673 +4.5%
Steal from person	9939	10864 +9.3%	11631 +7.1%	11585 -0.4%	12761 +10.2%

Source: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, *Media Release: 2000 Recorded Crime Statistics*, 19 April 2001.

The table presents an indication both of the size of the various criminal categories and annual proportional changes. 1997 represents significant increases in crime in most categories, with very large increases in robberies. 1998 saw evidence of improvement with a reduction in robberies with firearms, checking of robberies without weapons

and a much smaller increase in robberies with weapons not firearms. Motor vehicle theft fell, and most other categories saw relatively small increases. 1999 demonstrated that crime levels had been checked and reversed in all categories with the exception of stealing from motor vehicles. 2000 however witnessed small increases in most categories with the exception of relatively strong growth in stealing from motor vehicles and a moderate fall in robberies with firearms.

Before further examining the data it is relevant to explore the reliability of the data. The NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research sought to verify the unexpected improvement in crime levels in 1999 by comparing the crime data recorded by the NSW Police on their Computerised Operational Policing System (COPS) which provide the basis for the figures in Table 6, with monthly calls for service to the NSWPS recorded in the Computerised Incident Dispatch System (CIDS), insurance claims and crime victimisation rates, captured annually by the ABS, *NSW Crime and Safety Survey* (Chilvers, 2000). The validation exercise found that each data source confirmed the trends illustrated in Table 6 (*ibid.*, p.5). No evidence was found to suggest that the improvements in 1999 were due to changes in the recording of crime by the NSWPS.

Explaining the Trends

It has been the practice of the Director of the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, Dr Don Weatherburn, to make brief comment following the annual publication of NSW Crime data. Commenting on the rising trends revealed in the 1996 data he noted that there appeared to be significant increases in criminal activity. He cautioned however that the apparent increases might also have been influenced by the introduction of a new police reporting system (the Computerised Operational Policing System) which diminished the paperwork associated with recording crime and therefore increased the likelihood of police reporting. He also pointed to the possibility of increased public willingness to report crime (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research *Media Release*, 1 May 1997, p.1). Commenting in 1998 on the significant increases in robbery in the previous year, he suggested that evidence of increased heroin addiction may have played a part as heroin users turned to robbery to fund their addiction (NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, *Media Release*, 30 April 1998, p.1).

Commenting in 1999, Dr Weatherburn observed a substantial slowing in the rate of growth of recorded crime in 1998:

While it is impossible to be sure of the precise reason for the improvement, changes in policing policy may have played a part. Police have been targeting crime hotspots, increasing the arrest rate of repeat offenders and confiscating dangerous weapons such as knives. Each of these strategies has been shown in rigorous overseas research to be effective in reducing crime (NSW Bureau of Crime Research and Statistics, *Media Release*, 3 March 1999, p.1).

A year later, looking at crime levels from 1998-1999, he noted that there was no upward trend in crime and significant downward trends in most categories (NSW Bureau of Crime Research and Statistics, *Media Release*, 19 April 2000, p.1). The year 2000 saw some reversals in this picture, particularly in relation to property


crimes, such as break and enter, and stealing from motor vehicles and persons. Dr Weatherburn said:

There is little doubt that the introduction of the Operation and Crime Review (OCR) panels and the police strategy of targeting repeat offenders resulted in a substantial fall in recorded crime over the 1998-99 period. For some reason that fall in crime has not been sustained... (Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, *Media Release*, 19 April 2001, p.2).

The potential of the OCRs to reduce crime levels was the subject of a paper by Dr Weatherburn and Marilyn Chilvers, presented in 2000. The researchers noted that the coincidence of the introduction of OCRs and falling crime levels could not be taken as, "unequivocal evidence of their success" (Chilvers and Weatherburn, 2000, p.3). The paper therefore sought to test the influence of a range of social and economic factors to ascertain their part. The focus of the research was on break and enters for the 48 months before the introduction of the OCRs and the 18 months after. The researchers' conclusion is that the OCRs, with their focus on pursuing and arresting targeted offenders, played a role in checking and reducing crime levels in the late 1990s (*ibid.*, p.12).

The preceding analysis has demonstrated that a significant number of factors may be expected to influence trends in reported crime and that police management is certainly one. Figure 1 lists critical police and other variables.

Figure 1: OCRs and Other Factors with an Influence on Reported Crime Levels



The NSWPS underwent major change in the mid 1990s, including the appointment of a new Commissioner (for the first time from outside the Service) and a significant organisational restructure. Several new technologies have been introduced, such as COPS and the Police Assistance Line (PAL). The first has facilitated police recording of criminal incidents (see above) and the second has made it very much easier for the public to report crime. PAL was trialled during 1999 and became fully operational in January 2000 (NSWPS *Annual Report*, 1999-2000, p.14). Up to 50% of recorded crimes in some local area commands are entered through PAL. No research has yet been done on the impact of the implementation of PAL on crime reporting but it is certainly plausible that it has led to a significant increase in the reporting of crime.

Other technological changes, too, have the potential to influence crime trends. Two examples are improvements in, and increased use of, fingerprinting and the introduction of DNA testing and matching to crime scenes (*Police Service Weekly*, Vol.12, No.28, p.8 and Vol.12, No.48, p.2). Both may be expected to increase arrest rates.

There can be no doubt that changes to legislation, sought by the NSWPS, such as the *Police and Public Safety Act 1998*, equipping police with the powers to search and request people to move along, have made an impact. This has been seen in the confiscation of weapons and deterrence of assaults and stealing in crime hotspots. Also to be considered are the array of external factors such as trends in employment and poverty, increasing urbanisation, growth of cyber crime and the ebb-and-flow of drug related factors. For instance, the early months of 2001 have seen a significant reduction in the supply of heroin and a major increase in its price. Substantially more stealing and more robbery is therefore required to satisfy heroin habits (*OCR*, 11 April 2001, author's minutes, p.2).

The year 2000 saw the staging of the Olympic Games in Sydney. While the Games were regarded as a great success and passed seemingly without incident as far as

policing was concerned, they may well have contributed to crime trends. There was a significant increase in the numbers of people in NSW. Approximately 5,000 of the Service's 14,000 sworn officers were redeployed in preparation for and during the Games (*Police Service Weekly*, Vol.12, No.47, p.30). Normal policing was disrupted for three months: the ability to undertake pro-active police work was severely stretched. In recognition of the extraordinary demands on police time during the winter and spring of 2000, no OCRs were held from July-October.

Finally, it is important to remember that other factors such as police practice and public willingness to record crime will have affected reported outcomes. In the past, police may have attended domestic disturbances and chosen not to record incidents of assault. Police have received a strong message in recent years that they must report such incidents. This might then be expected to influence reported levels of assaults.

In sum, the OCRs have demonstrated that they are a powerful tool for improved leadership and management within the Service. They have resulted in a sharp focus on crime reduction, with LACs in no doubt that they will be held accountable for crime trends in their area. While no rigorous scientific experiment can be conducted to single out and test the role played by the OCRs it is probable that they have contributed to a reduction in crime levels below where they might otherwise have been. In other words, it is likely that they contributed to a lowering of reported crime trends in the late 1990s and limited the rise in levels reported for 2000.

6. Matters for Discussion

Seven issues are identified as worthy of more consideration by the Police Commissioner and his Executive. These issues are related to the function and process of the OCRs.

1. Focus

The early intent of the OCRs was to focus on crime trends and the strategic response of LACs. There was also some time spent on HR and financial matters. Later phases of the OCRs have seen more time spent on broader issues. Options for consideration include tightening the focus on crime; continuing to discuss a range of issues and returning to themes. The next phase, for instance, might focus on crime, or even a particular measure such as assaults or break and enter, and the following phase may focus on management and leadership styles at the local area commands.

2. Time

The OCRs, since their inception, have run for approximately five hours. On the basis of observation, this stretches the ability of the participants to sustain concentration. An option for consideration is shorter meetings, say, either 7-10am or 8-11am.

3. Frequency

This paper has argued that the OCRs are a powerful tool to lift the quality of management and assist in improving the Service's performance. Most LACs attend an OCR approximately every 9-12 months. Options for consideration include much more frequent attendance, especially for high crime local area commands. The NYPD model finds Precinct Commanders attending every 4-6 weeks! The NSWPS is not similarly placed. Its commands cover a vast area rather than a single city. The logistics are therefore less favourable. Nonetheless, high crime, city commands (Sydney, Newcastle and Wollongong) might usefully attend, say, every three months. All commands might be rostered at least annually.

4. Complementary Learning and Problem Solving Opportunities

Past experience of the OCRs and the folklore that has been created ensure that LACs continue to see them as occasions where their performance will be put under searching scrutiny. Their preparation and focus is on acquitting themselves well. In this environment it is not always easy to engage in joint discussion and problem solving. These goals may be more easily achieved in differently-styled and structured meetings. For instance, all or significant numbers of LACs might be invited to an off-site and out-of-uniform meeting where the focus is problem solving and learning. The opportunity is therefore presented to explore case studies in depth and their relevance to different commands. The learning will come both within the formal sessions and through interaction over the tea, lunch and dinner breaks.

5. Training for OCRs

The initial phase of the OCRs proved a shock for a proportion of the LACs. They had had little explicit training to prepare them for this new aspect of their role. With the rich benefit of hindsight, more training might have been of considerable assistance and alleviated some of their anxiety. Consideration might still be given to the design of suitable training for LACs, Crime Managers, Duty Officers and others who will be participating in the OCRs. The training might be approached in several different ways, from sessions at the Academy to on-line. It might cover the role and structure of the OCRs and how participants can most effectively make their contribution.

6. Disseminating Learning from the OCRs

An ambition of the OCRs is to promote learning not only among the immediate participants but also to a broader audience. This occurs currently through the distribution of the *minutes* of the OCR on the police intranet and articles in *Police Service Weekly*. If the OCRs regularly generate useful discussion, then it is important to consider how the learning from particular OCRs can be maximised. For instance, are the OCR *minutes* presented in a form which makes learning accessible? Is there evidence that LACs and their relevant staff are reading the minutes? What is the impact of stories in the *Police Service Weekly*?

7. Attendance and Audience at OCRs

The OCRs have involved the Commissioner, his Executive, representatives from police agencies, the LACs and selected members of their staffs. A concern expressed by some LACs was that they were unsure of who was in the room; who were witnessing the scrutiny of their performance. Their preference was for as small an audience as possible. This level of anxiety may well have been diminished with the shift in emphasis towards discussion and problem solving. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to explore both which staff members might most usefully accompany their Commander and who else should be in attendance.

- My thanks to Christie Coleman who worked with great enthusiasm as the research assistant on this project during 2000 and to all the police and others who have contributed their time and support.

Footnotes

1. These five crime categories are taken to represent 90-95% of reported crime in NSW, according to Deputy Commissioner Ken Maroney in the *Sydney Morning Herald (SMH)*, 21 June 2000. Police approaches to crime reporting have been criticised in the media and the stuff of editorials. See *SMH*, 22 June 2000, p.16.
2. The website of the NYPD contains a description of Compstat, see www.ci.nyc.ny.us/ntml/nypd and look for chief of Department's report.
3. The problem-solving case studies at this OCR (23 May 2001) explored lessons learned from a major search and rescue operation in 1999 and the trialling of a new approach to domestic violence. The Shoalhaven local area command has categorised offenders as high risk, medium and low risk and provided for tailored police responses for both offenders and victims. The third story dealt with a strategy to combat the poaching of abalone.

References

- Bratton, W. 1997, *Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society*, London, 1Ea Health and Welfare Unit.
- Bratton, W. 1998, *Turnaround*, New York, Random House.
- Brereton, D. 1999, "Zero Tolerance and the NYPD", paper to Australian Institute of Criminology Conference, Canberra, March 1999.
- Carcach, C. 1997, "Reporting Crime to the Police", in Australian Institute of Criminology, Trends and Issues, No.68.
- Chilvers, M. 2000, "Validation of NSW Police Crime Statistics", NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, *Bureau Brief*, No.6.

- Chilvers, M. and D. Weatherburn, 2001, "Do Targeted Arrests Reduce Crime?", NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research.
- Donohue, J.J. and S.D. Levitt, 1999, "Legalised Abortion and Crime", paper, Stanford Law School.
- Evans, C., S. Ireland and S. Crumlin, 1998, Key Decisions and Recommendations arising from an Examination of the New York Crime Reduction Strategy, NSWPS unpublished paper.
- Grabosky, P.N. 1988, "Efficiency and Effectiveness in Australian Policing", in Australian Institute of Criminology, *Trends and Issues*, No.16.
- Greene, J.A. 1999, "Zero Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practice in New York City", *Crime and Delinquency*, Vol.45, No.2, pp.171-187.
- Kelling, G.L. and C.M. Coles, 1998, *Fixing Broken Windows*, New York, Simon and Schuster.
- Kelling, G.L. and others, 1998, "Declining Crime Rates: Insiders' Views of the New York City Story", *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol.88, pp.1217-1231.
- Mayor's Management Report, 1999, City of New York, Preliminary Fiscal, Volume 1.
- New South Wales Police Service, *Annual Report*, 1995-96 to 1999-2000.
- New South Wales Police Service, *Police Service Weekly*.
- Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service, 1996, Interim Report, February, NSW government.
- Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service, 1996, Interim Report, November, NSW government.
- Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service, 1997, Final Report, Vols.1-3, NSW government.
- Silverman, E.B. 1999, *NYPD Battles Crime*, Boston, Northeastern University Press.
- Wilson, J.Q. and G.L. Kelling, 1982, "Broken Windows", *Atlantic Monthly*, March, pp.29-38.

Appendix 1

1. Observation

Operations and Crime Reviews were attended on the following dates:

9 December 1998,
24 March 1999,
9 February 2000,
8 March 2000,
24 March 2000,
5 April 2000,
3 May 2000,
31 May 2000,
14 June 2000,
11 April 2001 and
23 May 2001.

2. Interviews

Interviews were conducted with:

NSW Police Commissioner Peter Ryan
Deputy Commissioner Jeff Jarratt
Deputy Commissioner Ken Moroney
Dr Ed Chadbourne, Director Human Resources
Sean Hannen, Reform Coordination Unit

Region Commander Terry Collins, Hunter Region
Region Commander Dick Adams, City East Region
Region Commander Peter Walsh, Northern Region
Region Commander Chris Evans, Greater Hume Region
Region Commander Christine Nixon, South Eastern Region
Region Commander Graeme Morgan, North Metropolitan Region
Region Commander Bruce Johnston, Macquarie Region

NSW Bureau Crime Statistics and Research

Dr Don Weatherburn, Director
Marilyn Chilvers

NSW Police Association

Ian Ball
Mark Burgess
Greg Chilvers
Peter Remfrey

3. Survey of Local Area Commanders

A survey of 80 LACs was conducted in mid 2000. The survey was distributed through police internal mail, with a letter from the Reform Coordination Unit requesting LACs to complete and return the surveys. The surveys could be returned either by letter directly to Professor Ed Davis at Macquarie University or by email to Christie Coleman. 40 of the 80 LACs returned surveys; there was therefore a 50% response rate.

4. Case Studies

Christie Coleman spent two days in October 2000 at both the Maroubra and Marrickville local area commands. At Maroubra she interviewed the Commander, the Duty Officer, the Crime Manager, Investigations Manager, two members of the Intelligence team and a constable. At Marrickville, she interviewed the Commander, Intelligence Officer, the Local Area Manager, Community Safety Officer, and two Senior Constables.

LAC Survey

Professor Ed Davis and Christie Coleman from the Macquarie Graduate School of Management are engaged in research looking at the effectiveness of the OCRs. Their research is jointly funded by the Service and the University. Please fill out the survey and return in the envelope by July 7th. Completed surveys can be returned by email to christieco@hotmail.com or by post to Professor Ed Davis, Labour-Management Studies Foundation, Macquarie University NSW 2109.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Please provide answers to the following questions.

1. Name:
2. Local Area Command:
3. Age:
4. Sex:
5. Length of time as Local Area Commander:
6. How many OCRs have you attended?:

For the following statements please tick the box that best represents your level of agreement.

7. The OCR is an effective management tool.

Strongly disagree disagree neither agree nor disagree agree strongly agree

8. The OCR has contributed to improved police performance in my command

Strongly disagree disagree neither agree nor disagree agree strongly agree

9. The OCRs have helped to reduce crime

Strongly disagree disagree neither agree nor disagree agree strongly agree

10. OCRs improve communication between the Commissioner and the LAC.

Strongly disagree disagree neither agree nor disagree agree strongly agree

11. OCRs improve communication between Local Area Commanders.

Strongly disagree disagree neither agree nor disagree agree strongly agree

12. OCRs are a good way to learn from other police officers.

Strongly disagree disagree neither agree nor disagree agree strongly agree

13. OCRs have made me accountable for crime trends in my area.

Strongly disagree disagree neither agree nor disagree agree strongly agree

14. OCRs have increased the authority of Local Area Commanders.

Strongly disagree disagree neither agree nor disagree agree strongly agree

15. OCRs have helped my officers to focus more on crime reduction.

Strongly disagree disagree neither agree nor disagree agree strongly agree

16. List the top four strengths of the OCRs:

- 1.....
.....
- 2.....
.....
- 3.....
.....
- 4.....
.....

17. List the top four weaknesses of the OCR:

- 1.....
.....
- 2.....
.....
- 3.....
.....

4.....

.....

18. List suggestions for improving the OCRs:

.....

.....

Thank you. Your time and cooperation is appreciated.