Purpose: Continuous Disclosure Regime (CDR) has been one of the three pillars of corporate disclosure environment in Australia. It aims to improve investor confidence and market integrity by requiring managers to disclose any material price-sensitive information publicly once they become aware of the information. To improve the compliance of this regime, regulators have been expanding the penalty variety. With levelling the playing field of market participants being one of the stated objectives of the legislated CDR, additional penalties are expected to improve corporate compliance and thus provide a more levelled competitive field for sell-side analysts. This paper examines whether additional penalties on disclosure regulations do incrementally deteriorate (advance) the performance of 'superior' ('inferior') analysts. Originality: This paper focuses on the distinctive development of CDR, on which regulators have been gradually expanding the penalty variety to improve compliance: criminal penalties were introduced in 1994, civil penalties in 2002 and administrative penalties in 2004. Key literature/theoretical perspective: n/a. Design/Methodology/Approach: Following the literature, the levelling of information access can be inferred from a narrowing accuracy gap between 'superior' and 'inferior' analysts as penalties are added. This paper identifies 'superior' and 'inferior' using various methods. Findings: n/a. Research limitations/implications: The findings of this paper will contribute to the disclosure literature by providing empirical evidence of how various penalty types of a disclosure law have incrementally impacted on the levelling of information access among market participants. Practical and social implications: These findings will have practical implications for Australian regulators and legislators in evaluating the existing CDR, and obtaining the optimal level of enforcement.